One prominent hypothesis used to explain the cause of illnesses of Gulf War veterans is that some of the reported symptoms are the result of exposure to chemical warfare agents.

During and after the Gulf War, people reported that they had been exposed to chemical warfare agents. To investigate these incidents, and to assess the likelihood of presence of chemical warfare agents, the DOD developed a methodology for investigation and validation based on work done by the United Nations and the international community where the criteria include:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site
• Physical evidence from the site such as weapons fragments, soil, water, vegetation or human/animal tissue samples
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence
• Testimony of eyewitnesses
• Multiple analyses
• Review of the evidence by experts.

While the DOD methodology (TAB F) for investigating suspected chemical warfare agent incidents is based on these protocols, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence was often not collected at the time of an event. Therefore, we cannot apply a rigid template to all incidents, and each investigation must be tailored to its unique circumstances. Accordingly, we designed our methodology to provide a thorough, investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and determine what happened. Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical agent presence, nor may a single individual’s observation be sufficient to validate a chemical agent presence.

By following our methodology and accumulating anecdotal, documentary, and physical evidence, and by interviewing eyewitnesses and key personnel, and analyzing the results, the investigator assesses the validity of the presence of chemical warfare agents on the battlefield. Because information from various sources may be contradictory, we have developed an assessment scale (Figure 1) ranging from "Definitely" to "Definitely Not" with intermediate assessments of "Likely," "Unlikely," and "Indeterminate." This assessment is tentative, based on facts available as of the date of the report publication; each case is reassessed over time based on new information and feedback.

Figure 1. Assessment of Chemical Warfare Agent Presence

The standard for making the assessment is based on common sense: do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that chemical warfare agents were or were not present? When insufficient information is available, the assessment is "Indeterminate" until more evidence can be found.

The 11th Marines was a reinforced artillery regiment, tailored for the ground campaign ("task organized") by adding elements of other artillery units. It fought with five battalions, each having three or (in one case) four batteries. Most batteries had eight guns, mainly towed 155 mm howitzers. The 11th Marines supported the entire 1st Marine Division that entered Kuwait from the south and moved to the vicinity of Kuwait City during the 100-hour ground campaign (February 24-28, 1991). The battalions and batteries of the 11th Marines deployed throughout the 1st Marine Division sector. Most directly supported a reinforced infantry regiment (for example, Task Force Ripper, Task Force Papa Bear, Task Force Grizzly, etc.). Figure 2 summarizes the Operation Desert Storm scheme of maneuver and the relative role of the 1st Marine Division.

Figure 2. 1st Marine Division and the Scheme of Maneuver

In the unit chronologies and operational logs for the Gulf War, the 11th Marines reported many alerts for chemical warfare agent. Elements of the 11th Marines initiated some of these alerts. Others alerts began elsewhere and were passed by radio to 11th Marines units.

This investigation addressed two questions: was chemical warfare agent (CWA) present during any nuclear/biological/chemical (NBC) incidents; and why did the 11th Marines record so many chemical alerts

After studying the written documentation and interviewing witnesses, this investigation cataloged 18 potential NBC incidents associated with the 11th Marines. Of the 81 individuals/positions selected as primary witnesses, 69 were contacted in person or by telephone. For various reasons, the remainder could not be identified, located, or contacted.

Most of the 18 NBC incidents caused at least some of the 11th Marines to put on additional chemical protective garments and masks. In many cases, the units’ logs, chronologies, and messages contained scant detail. In our interviews, witnesses could recall little about some alerts. These we characterized as "Unlikely" because no evidence could be found of casualties or delivery means. Seven incidents fell in this category. For 11 incidents, substantial information was collected. In each case, investigators judged the chance of agent presence as "Unlikely." Five other potential incidents originally identified for investigation did not involve the 11th Marines, and one other concerned precautionary increase in protective posture as the regiment approached enemy lines. These were set aside as beyond the scope of this case. The first five could be candidates for investigation in a future case. For all incidents, no chemical casualties were reported.

Positive chemical agent tests, using various detection devices, triggered some of the alerts. All of the devices available to Marine units could produce false positive readings in the presence of substances other than CWA. For much of the ground campaign in Kuwait, sabotaged oil wells exposed Marines of the 1st Division to high concentrations of smoke and raw petroleum. In retrospect, it is clear that such pollution could affect detection equipment and could have caused many of the chemical alerts recorded by the 11th Marines.

The units initiating alerts frequently failed to identify themselves and their locations. Units passing along alerts from elsewhere often did not note who alerted them. This probably caused more 1st Marine Division units than necessary to mask as a precaution. As the ground campaign progressed, some commanding officers (COs), including COs of 11th Marine units, responded by limiting their response to alerts which originated with other units. Theoretically, this could have increased the risk of exposure to chemical warfare agents (CWA) in these units. Conversely, stopping to don protective gear in response to alerts from afar would have increased the risk of conventional engagement by the enemy (moving targets being more difficult to find and bring under effective fire).

Table 1 summarizes the 18 incidents and the investigators’ assessments. Each incident has been assigned a letter. The numbers and letters that follow in parentheses were earlier designations that appear in interview lead sheets and can aid in following lead sheet references. These numbered designations no longer run sequentially because over time new incidents were inserted in the sequence and investigation of a few incidents led to adjustments in timing.

Table 1. Incident Assessment Summary

To explain why the 11th Marines recorded and participated in so many alerts, one must consider the following factors:

• The 11th Marines elements had extensive communications and liaison with each other and with supported infantry units. They became aware of, and passed on, many alerts. Operational logs and journals throughout the 1st Marine Division recorded these warnings, often citing 11th Marines units as the source.
• Artillery units moved in leapfrog fashion. While infantry units advanced more continuously, artillery units spent more time in stationary locations. Therefore, artillery units had more time to observe their surroundings and conduct NBC tests. Because they often were stationary and could not always maneuver to avoid chemical threats, they were more motivated than infantry elements to mask in response to alerts. They also could do so more easily.
• Three of the 16 batteries that fought under the 11th Marines arrived shortly before the ground campaign. They did not have the benefit of the same in-theater training and familiarization as the units that had been on the ground for several months. Also, training did not stress discipline and completeness in passing alerts by radio.
• Some in the regiment assumed that the unit was a priority target with above average chance of exposure if Iraqi forces used chemical weapons. Consequently, they were unusually sensitive to any indication of CWA presence.
• For much of the ground campaign, elements of the 11th Marines and the units they supported were immersed in the extraordinarily heavy contamination from the sabotaged oil wells that were burning and spewing raw petroleum. The smoke turned day into night. To some degree, this contamination affected all available NBC test equipment, potentially producing false positive readings for a chemical agent when none was actually present. The detection equipment was not designed to work in this environment and was often ineffective. Many detector operators did not fully understand the capabilities and limitations of their equipment in heavy pollution.
• At times, the 11th Marines relied on detection equipment (particularly the Fox NBC reconnaissance vehicle) that was not sensitive enough and was not designed to detect low concentrations of agent in ambient air. Not understanding this, some Marines stopped using other detection devices that were sensitive enough and appropriately designed to alert for small concentrations of CWA in the air.
• In propagating NBC alerts, the Marines of the 11th Regiment worked to preserve the safety and operational capability of the 1st Marine Division. They faced what they had every reason to perceive was a serious chemical warfare threat. They believed in their detection and alerting capability and generally did as they were trained under the stress of combat in a unique environment. Post-war assessment of the chemical threat, training, detection equipment shortcomings, and lessons learned should not be construed as critical of the consummate professionalism of these Marines.

The 11th Marines case remains open. As relevant facts come forward, this narrative will be updated.

During Operation Desert Storm, the 11th Marines was a reinforced artillery regiment supporting the 1st Marine Division. The regiment had a relatively high number of NBC alerts recorded in its units’ command chronologies, field message traffic, and operational logs. This observation derives from impressions by several investigators, but was not verified with any statistical precision. This narrative presents a preliminary analysis of NBC incidents involving the 11th Marines. Ultimately, it seeks to address the likelihood that the Marines and sailors of this regiment may have operated in areas where chemical warfare agent was present.

Unlike other narratives, this paper does not focus on a single location or small number of incidents. Instead, it covers the experience of a specific unit involving 18 separate incidents. These incidents extended over more than 160 miles, during a 42 day period, immediately before and during the coalition ground campaign.

Six incidents initially investigated were found not to involve the 11th Marines or involved a precautionary increase in protective posture not triggered by a perceived threat. For completeness, and because these incidents were included in 1997 testimony and summaries provided to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses, these incidents and the reasons they were set aside are briefly covered in Tab D.

The 11th Marines, based in California during peacetime, was tailored or "task organized" for the Gulf War. This involved adding elements of other regiments, particularly the 12th Marines, which was based in the Pacific (Hawaii and Okinawa). As they entered the ground campaign, the 11th Marines had five artillery battalions:

• The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines (1/11 or "one-eleven" in Marine parlance)
• The 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines (3/11)
• The 5th Battalion, 11th Marines (5/11)
• The 1st Battalion, 12th Marines (1/12); and
• The 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines (3/12).

Not all of the batteries fought with the battalion to which they were assigned in peacetime. Figure 3 diagrams the regiment as it went into the ground campaign.

Figure 3. Gulf War Organization of the 11th Marines[1]

All of these battalions, except the 5/11, had three firing batteries, each with eight towed 155mm guns (Figure 4). The 5/11 included four batteries tasked with general support for the 1st Marine Division. As such, it engaged targets wherever the Division Commander determined the need was greatest. In addition to two batteries of six towed 155 mm guns each, the 5/11 had two batteries of six self-propelled guns each -- one 155 mm (Figure 5) and one 8 inch caliber (Figure 6).[2,3] A more detailed presentation of the regiment’s components appears in Tab B.

Figure 4. Most 11th Marines Battalions had Model M198 155 mmTowed Howitzers.

Figure 5. One 11th Marines Battery had Six Model M109 155 mmSelf-propelled Howitzers.

Figure 6. One 11th Marines Battery had Six Model M110 8-inchSelf-propelled Howitzers.

The 11th Marines also had a variety of heavy trucks to carry ammunition and tow the artillery pieces, as well as numerous command and control and utility vehicles. A typical battalion had about 600 men. The regiment had over 3,600 as they entered the ground campaign.

Except for the 5/11, the 11th Marines battalions supported particular infantry task forces built around infantry regiments and various reinforcing elements. As the ground campaign unfolded, commanders adjusted these artillery support missions, based on the tactical situation. Unlike the 2nd Marine Division, the 1st Marine Division used arbitrary code names for the infantry task forces rather than the unit designation of the core regiment. These task force names (Ripper, Papa Bear, Grizzly, etc.) appear in chronologies and logs of the time as the principal maneuver elements. Tab B lists the 1st Marine Division units and their compositions pertinent to this narrative.

To coordinate requirements, maneuver, and fire missions, the 11th Marines maintained close contact with the primary maneuver elements of the 1st Marine Division. This contact was maintained through tactical radio nets and by placing 11th Marines forward observer and liaison teams with other units’ command posts. With this dense and far-flung network, the artillery regiment had up-to-the-minute awareness of the situation across the division. The regiment was also in a position to rapidly communicate (and log) NBC alerts well beyond the unit that initiated them.[4] The commanding officer of the 11th Marines said that senior commanders always liked to visit the artillery command post. Unlike other tactical units, artillery had the "big picture" because the artillery monitored everyone’s nets and actions.[5]

The geographic and temporal flow of the 1st Marine Division and the 11th Marines during Operation Desert Storm provides a backdrop for the analysis of incidents to follow.

In the weeks prior to the February 24th start of the ground campaign, several NBC alerts occurred among the elements of the 11th Marines. These generally occurred in association with reports of Iraqi SCUD long-range missile attacks on Saudi Arabia and incoming Iraqi artillery fire near the border with Kuwait. As a precaution, some units donned protective gear in case chemical warfare agents had been employed.

Figure 7 shows the general location of the 11th Marines leading up to the ground campaign.[6]

Figure 7. 1st Marine Division Pre-offensive Deployment

Beginning on the night of January 20-21, elements of the 11th Marines began conducting occasional artillery "raids" against Iraqi targets near the border.[7] On a typical raid, a battery of artillery and supporting trucks and command elements would move with stealth to the Saudi Arabia/Kuwait border area. Under cover of darkness, they would wait to receive the location of a priority Iraqi target (like a multiple rocket launcher about to fire). Often this intelligence came from unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicles (UAVs). The artillery unit would fire on the target and rapidly depart the area to avoid any return fire.[8]

As the coalition ground offensive began on February 24th, 11th Marines battalions entered Kuwait, moved north, and began crossing the two obstacle belts in southern Kuwait. The 3/11, supporting Task Force Ripper, was the first artillery unit through the first obstacle belt.[9] Figure 8 depicts the situation.

Figure 8. 11th Marines in the Ground Campaign, Day 1

On the second day of the ground campaign, most 11th Marine elements moved through the second obstacle belt and were heading north to positions between Al Jaber Airfield and the Al Burqan oilfield. Key unit locations are shown in Figure 9. These units spent most of the day in intense pollution from burning oil wells (see Figure 10). Some elements of the regiment remained farther south between the obstacle belts.

Figure 9. 11th Marines in the Ground Campaign, Day 2

Figure 10. Burning Oil Well Head

On the third day of the offensive, all but the A Battery, 1/12, moved north and east to establish positions to the south and west of Kuwait International Airport on the outskirts of Kuwait City. On the fourth day (February 27), the 11th Marines assisted the 1st Marine Division in consolidating their positions and establishing security. General locations appear in Figure 11. Over the following days, the 11th Marines returned to port areas in Saudi Arabia and eventually to their respective home stations.

Figure 11. 11th Marines in the Ground Campaign, Day 3-4

a. Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP)

Like the rest of US forces in the Gulf War, the 11th Marines responded to NBC alerts by following the procedures of the Mission Oriented Protection Posture (MOPP) system. As the level of the perceived chemical agent threat increased, Marines first donned two-piece chemical protective garments (MOPP Level 1), then vinyl overboots (MOPP Level 2), followed by protective hood and mask (MOPP Level 3), and finally butyl rubber gloves (MOPP Level 4).[10] Additional information on MOPP appears in the Glossary at Tab A. (See also at this site the separate Information Paper on Mission Oriented Protection Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection.) From the initial breach of the Iraqi protective belts to the end of the ground campaign, most elements of the 11th Marines maintained at least MOPP Level 2 as a precaution. In response to a specific alert, affected elements of the regiment generally went to MOPP Level 4 (full protection). The log records of these alerts and the directions to increase or decrease MOPP Level represent a significant part of the contemporaneous written record of the incidents covered in this narrative.

b. Chemical Detection Equipment

Brief descriptions of the various types of chemical detection equipment mentioned in this narrative appear in the Glossary at Tab A. They include the M256A1 chemical agent detection kit, the Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM), the Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL), the Fox NBC reconnaissance system (vehicle) and the M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm. The CAM, the XM21, and the Fox vehicle were all fielded with the 1st Marine Division just days or weeks before the beginning of the ground campaign.[11] Consequently, operators of this equipment were not as familiar with using these items as they were with older detectors. It should be noted that all the chemical warfare agent detection devices available to the Marines could, at times, produce false positive readings in the presence of interferents such as oil well smoke.[12] The commanding officer of the 11th Marines noted that this was not clearly understood by most of the 11th Marines as they entered the ground campaign.

At the time of the Gulf War, it was widely believed that Iraq had chemical warfare agent munitions in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations. The US Intelligence Community found that Iraq had chemical weapons capability, and had used chemical weapons against its own citizens, as well as against Iran.[14]

Following the war, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), via its chemical inspections program, identified Iraqi chemical weapons and their delivery means. Table 2 summarizes Iraqi CWA delivery capability during the Gulf War. Discussion of CWA and their toxic and other effects appears in Tab A. When assessing the 11th Marines’ NBC incidents, investigators considered the post-war data on Iraq’s ability to deliver particular types of agents.

UNSCOM and CIA experts have testified recently[15] that they believed Iraq did not deploy chemical weapons or agents out of Iraq and into Kuwait before or during the war. Along with the neutralization of the Iraqi Air Force, this would have greatly limited Iraqi CWA delivery capability. However, investigators did not assume Iraq lacked forward-deployed chemical capability in investigating and analyzing the 11th Marines case.

Table 2. Iraqi Chemical Weapon Capabilities at the time of the Gulf War

Investigators took several factors into consideration in applying the previously described methodology. In selecting key witnesses to interview, investigators:

• Tried to choose individuals who might have first hand knowledge of NBC incidents;
• Examined all 11th Marines battalions (but not necessarily all the batteries in each battalion) and other relevant units;
• Put the most weight on witnesses from those 11th Marines elements that had the most alerts, positive detection tests, and other corroborating information;
• Focused on command, operations, and NBC personnel; and
• Relied on witnesses to help identify others who could help.

Tab C contains an organizational diagram annotated with the witnesses’ positions. In a few cases, despite repeated efforts, investigators could not locate or contact individuals key to particular incidents.

This investigation identified 18 separate NBC incidents possibly involving the 11th Marines.[17]

Figure 12 shows the distribution of the 11th Marines incidents over time, beginning shortly after the air campaign started, and continuing through the end of the 100-hour ground campaign.

Figure 12. Time Distribution of the 11th Marines NBC Incidents

Note that the first two lines represent, by day, January and February 1991. The remaining lines show an account of the four days of the ground campaign by hour. Each alarm bell icon represents one possible NBC incident. The incidents were clustered at the beginning of the Coalition air campaign in the second half of January 1991, and during the ground campaign in late February 1991.

The amount and quality of available information about these incidents varies greatly. Some events are based on a single log entry. Witnesses often had difficulty recalling or discriminating among single incidents once the ground war began. For a few incidents, the data uncovered was not always consistent.

As the following graph shows (Figure 13), the battalions of the 11th Marines did not respond uniformly to the NBC events investigated. To illustrate this point, 13 alerts have been graphed. Some incidents did not result in alerts, while others put the whole regiment (and many other Marine units) into full chemical protective suits and masks. As the graph indicates, the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines (1/11) initiated the most alerts and responded to many alerts initiated by other units.

Figure 13. How NBC Alerts Were Distributed Among 11th Marines Battalions

Initial Reports

At 10:15 p.m., on the day the Coalition began offensive air operations (January 17th), positions occupied by the 3rd Marines (the core of Task Force Taro) received incoming artillery rocket fire. At this time, the components of the 11th Marines were located generally back from the coast and between Al Mishab and Manifah.[19] Commanders declared "Condition Red,"[20] and the 3rd Marines and at least the nearby 1/12 masked as a precaution. The 1st Marine Division, the 11th Marines, and probably the 3rd Marine Regiment's Headquarters sent out monitor/survey teams. These teams reported no indications of chemical warfare agent. One or more Marines performed selective unmasking at the battery level in the 1/12 and were observed for symptoms. For the 1/12, the "all clear" came from the 11th Marines level. All involved then unmasked (returned to "Condition Yellow").[21] Figure 14 shows the 1/12 location at the time.

Figure 14. Location of Incident A

Additional Evidence

One of the NBC non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in the 1/12 recalled this as a SCUD missile attack, but the unit’s CO, referring to personal notes from the time, recorded it as an artillery attack. The commanding officer recalled no positive CWA detections, unusual detonation characteristics, or peculiar smells.[22,23]

Assessment

Chemical warfare agent presence was "Unlikely." The masking was only done as a precaution at a time of heightened alert and Iraqi artillery attack. There were no SCUD attacks against Saudi Arabia until the next day. The incoming rounds were reportedly unremarkable. The monitor/survey teams recorded no positive reads. There were no casualties.

Initial Reports

The 11th Marines Command Chronology reported that, at 5:25 a.m. on the second day of the air campaign (January 18), two of their battalions (the 1/12 and the 3/11) noted incoming rounds. The 1/12 went to MOPP Level 4, but there was no indication that the 3/11 did so. At the same time, there were unconfirmed reports of a SCUD launch in the direction of Al Mishab. The operations officer, 3rd Marines, instructed the 1/3 and the 3/3 to send out monitor/survey teams in their areas. There are no available 1/12 logs for this period. The 3rd Marines log reflects negative survey results from the 1/3, the 1/12, and the "NBC Det" (Detachment). The Detachment is not identified further. Apparently, these teams had no positive detections because unidentified units then carried out selective unmasking. The logs report an "all clear" at 7:02 a.m..[24,25] Unit locations are shown in Figure 15.

Figure 15. Location of Incident B

Additional Evidence

In a recent interview, the commanding officer of the 1/12 recalled that the unit’s NBC officer sent out survey teams. The CO did not believe that the incident resulted from a SCUD launch.[26]

Assessment

It is "Unlikely" that CWA was present in the vicinity of either 11th Marines battalion. From the limited information available, it has been concluded that incoming fire triggered the alert. No evidence indicates that this fire had unusual munition characteristics. Monitor/survey teams did not get positive detections. One of the two battalions apparently did not mask and reported no chemical casualties (note, however, on the map that they were a substantial distance apart). Other units performed selective unmasking without report of symptoms. An "all clear" followed the selective unmasking.

Initial Reports

At 9:10 p.m. on January 19, a 3rd Marines operations log entry notes that the 1/12 conducted a chemical monitor/survey and that COs subsequently called an "all clear." The 3rd Marines passed on these results, noting that the "all clear" was based on M256 kits. An almost unreadable hand entry prior to 7:09 p.m. suggests that they received an NBC-1 message (see Tab A) to initiate the alert, but they did not note the sender.[27] No NBC-1 report was found in the Gulf War documentation. Investigators could not find this activity reported in any other contemporaneous documents. See Figure 16 for the 1/12 location.

Figure 16. Location of Incident C

Additional Evidence

None of the 11th Marines witnesses interviewed recalled the incident.

Assessment

The presence of a chemical warfare agent is "Unlikely." There were no casualties, no reports of incoming artillery or other means of delivery, and no positive detections by M256 kits. No other evidence of an NBC-1 report could be located.

Initial Reports

This incident occurred[28]during an artillery raid, the first ground action of Operation Desert Storm on the night of Jan. 20-21, 1991. A field radio operator on the artillery raid initiated the investigation of this incident with a call in 1995 to the DOD Persian Gulf illnesses1-800 hotline set up at that time. Investigators also conducted a follow-up interview with this individual. He reported that M8 alarms went off beginning at 2:00-3:00 a.m.. Troops went to MOPP Level 4. He stated that M256 tests were positive for nerve agent two or three times. The unit decided that the alarms and M256 kits must have been malfunctioning due to High-Mobility, Multi-purpose, Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) exhaust or something from the "chicken farm" (a nearby abandoned Bedouin camp). After performing selective unmasking procedures, the unit unmasked.[29] Another source document—an attachment to the 1/12 Command Chronology—reported incoming artillery fire at 11:44 p.m., "Gas attack, burning fuel fumes" at 1:33 a.m., and "All clear; [M]256 [kit] negative" at 2:00 a.m..[30] A third source, the Command Chronology for the 11th Marines, briefly noted the raid, but said nothing about incoming artillery or a "gas" attack. It stated, "Battery F, 2/12, from 1/12, conducted an artillery raid at 0315C [3:15 a.m. local]. ... They fired 84 rounds ... on suspected targets. No battle damage assessment available…"[31] Because of the disparity in reporting, the investigation of this incident centered on clarifying the sequence, as well as the nature, of events. See Figure 17.

Figure 17. Location of Incident D

Additional Evidence

Various witnesses recalled the details of this incident differently. The raid involved the F Battery, 2/12, a 1/12 forward command post (CP), intelligence and security elements, and a mobile unmanned aerial vehicle downlink receiving station.[32] The firing battery and some of the security elements were positioned well forward of the CP area. An Egyptian tank platoon and some Marine infantry provided security for the battery.[33] An operations officer estimated the CP location at five miles south of the Kuwait border. The 1/12 CP was behind and to the side of the gun line, which he estimated was 500-800 meters (up to half a mile) away. Subsequently, he deferred to the F Battery, 2/12, CO on this distance (almost four miles).[34] Logs and personal journals agreed that incoming artillery fire struck the general area of the 1/12 elements at 11:44 p.m.,[35,36] although a witness located near the CP recalled the time as 2:00-3:00 a.m. and estimated the impacts at 1,500 m to the front.[37] One of the operations officers in the CP estimated the number of incoming rounds at six. He thought impacts were about 2,000 to 2,500 meters to the front. This range also appeared in an incoming fire report filed at 11:44 p.m..[38] A field radio operator was not sure the raid party was the target,[39] a view shared by the CO of the 1/12, who commanded the raid. The CO referred to contemporaneous notes when interviewed. He said that the raid party did not operate a counter-battery ("fire finder") radar that could have tipped off the Iraqi forces. He recalled that the Saudi Arabian King Abdul Azziz Brigade maneuvered tanks, headlights on, to the left flank of the CP (he sent an officer to request they stop this during the raid). He thought the noise and lights of the Saudi unit might have drawn the Iraqi fire. The CO remembered that the sound of the incoming fire was like artillery shells, not artillery rockets.[40] The raid’s intelligence officer was sitting in his vehicle near the CP and recalls the incoming fire as perhaps half a kilometer away. He saw the flash but could not remember how many rounds detonated. He recalled he could not open the vehicle door and jumped through the window to take cover.[41]

Figure 18 diagrams the approximate positions of various raid elements based on testimony of the F Battery CO and a 1/12 operations officer in the forward CP.[42,43] Both officers reviewed drafts of this diagram and concurred that it portrayed what they remember (except that the operations officer did not recall Egyptian tanks on the raid).

Figure 18. Positioning of the 1/12 for First Artillery Raid

The CO of the firing (F) battery recalled that when the incoming fire hit "around midnight," it impacted about 1,500 meters behind his rear security element and 3,000 meters behind the center of the gun line. He recalled four or fewer rounds (shells) of tube artillery fire, which were probably 122 mm rounds rather than 155 mm rounds. This identification was based on the distinctive sound when passing overhead. Artillerymen often serve as forward observers or spotters and have experience with this phenomenon.[44]

According to intelligence and subsequent UN investigations after the war, there was no evidence that Iraqi 122 mm tube artillery had chemical rounds. Iraqi ground forces were only capable of delivering nerve and blister agents via 155 mm artillery and 122 mm rockets. Iraq could deliver CS riot control agent with 120 mm mortar rounds, but these would not sound like artillery or rockets. Both nerve and mustard agents could be delivered in aerial bombs,[45] but close aerial surveillance and Coalition air supremacy prevented aerial delivery during the Gulf War.

Most witnesses recalled the wind during the raid as out of the north, from the direction of the border.[46] One witness believed the winds were calm and mentioned dense fog,[47] and another thought there may have been a "slight breeze."[48] The Air Force weather database for the war indicates the winds in the general area at the time were from the northeast at 5-10 knots (6-12 miles per hour).[49] Assuming a northerly wind of six miles per hour--and assuming the rounds landed about 2,500 meters northwest of the CP-- any smoke or chemical agent from the rounds would have passed abreast of the CP and to the west about nine minutes later.

A journal and a witness recorded a chemical alert by the CP at 1:33 a.m., an hour and 49 minutes after the incoming fire.[50] The 1/12 Command Chronology has an entry for 1:33 a.m. that reads, "Gas attack, burning fuel fumes." Another entry for 2:00 a.m. states, "All clear, [M]256 kit negative."[51] However, the same source that recalled the detonations at 2:00-3:00 a.m. also believed the time separating the explosions and the alert was about 15-20 minutes.[52]

An intelligence officer along on the raid said he initiated the alert after smelling what he described in an initial interview as "sulfur." In a follow-on interview, he recalled sensing CS, a riot control agent used in NBC training; he said it both smelled and felt (irritated) like CS. He recalled no incoming artillery fire near the time of the smell. A communications officer present with him smelled the strong odor of sulfur. They masked and passed the alarm in the area of the CP.[53]

The senior operations officer recalls standing near the back of a HMMWV when all of the sudden he could not breathe. He recalled a choking sensation (a "bitter bite") that did not taste like CS or smell like rotten eggs. He called CS "kids play" compared to the sensation he experienced. He said he gagged and coughed, but the symptoms slowly subsided after he masked. He recalled that, "we could not get anything to pop positive on the M256 kits. The results were negative." When the unit unmasked, the irritant was gone. On return to base, a corpsman checked his pupils and throat and treated him for sore throat. His throat remained sore for up to a week.[54]

The 1/12 CO, who also commanded the raid, emphatically stated that he smelled sulfur (rotten eggs) but definitely not CS, expressing confidence he could tell the difference.[55] The operations officer manning the radios in the CP recalled that at the time he got the alert, the intelligence officer said he had smelled CS and experienced CS-like symptoms.[56] The NBC officer of the 11th Marines, who did not accompany the raid, remembers that the incident definitely involved CS and was reported as such up the chain of command.[57] The communications officer directed a driver and a communications technician to conduct M256 tests. He remembered that the first test was positive for nerve agent. He was almost certain that a second test about 80 feet away was negative. He recalled they performed selective unmasking "by the book" and the "all clear" was sounded. The smell had disappeared by the time they unmasked.[58] The operations officer who experienced a choking sensation also detected nothing after unmasking (although throat irritation from the exposure lasted several days).

Several witnesses believed no M8 Chemical Agent Alarms accompanied the raid forces.[59] However, one Marine witness believed he recalled several instances when M8 chemical monitors alarmed during the raid. This same Marine was one of those who conducted M256 kit tests. He recalls two or three positive M256 tests during a time when M8 alarms were repeatedly going off and being reset. He noted that someone decided the positive was due to vehicle exhaust or something from the "chicken farm" (deserted Bedouin camp).[60] Based on disparate recollections of outcomes and the opinion of the communications officer, it is possible that more than one survey team ran M256 tests in the vicinity of the CP.

According to an authoritative source, the M256 detection kits would not produce a positive indication for chemical warfare agents in the presence of CS.[61] The kits could, however, produce false positive readings for CWA in the presence of smoke, petroleum products, and other battlefield contaminants. (See the Glossary entry on M256).

The battery commander on the raid, located forward and west of the CP, recalled that the CP notified him by radio that somebody had smelled something back at the CP. He did not order the battery to mask, and he was not aware of anyone with symptoms. He did not find out that the CP had gone to MOPP Level 4 until after the raid the next day.[62]

The CO of the 1/12 indicated that days after the raid, he recalled hearing that coalition aircraft had bombed an enemy site, and the sulfur smell resulted from this attack.[63] A check of a classified database covering coalition air strikes placed the closest attack (time and distance) some tens of miles from the raid positions and more than six hours before the unusual smell incident. This air attack used large bombs against an area target.[64] Considering the wind data cited above and the geometry of the locations, the center of any airborne residue from this attack would have passed more than 10 miles west of the CP position. This would have happened between about 10:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m.. The later time (assuming six mile per hour winds) is half an hour before the smell was noted at 1:33 a.m.. The exact nature of the air targets in the target area is unknown, but raids against area targets do not focus on fixed facilities. (If hit, fixed facilities would be more likely to emit smells and gases than bombed areas.)

Finally, investigators found that the raid participants were given a target in Kuwait, fired 84 rounds at 3:15 a.m., and rapidly departed the area.[65] Figure 19 summarizes the timing of the incident.

Figure 19. Timeline for Incident D

Assessment

The investigation could not definitively determine the cause of reported positive M256 detections, the nature of the substance(s) smelled, or the source. However, on balance, the likelihood that chemical warfare or riot control agent was present in the CP area is "Unlikely."

To come to this conclusion, two key questions had to be answered:

1. Did Iraqi troops fire any chemical warfare agent or riot control shells at the 1/12 elements on the raid; and
2. If they did, what are the chances the 1/12 elements were in the contaminated area?

If the CO of the raid battery correctly estimated the caliber of the incoming rounds as 122 mm artillery, the rounds did not contain chemical agents because the only tube artillery Iraq used to deliver agent (blister) was 155 mm. Several witnesses recalled positive M256 readings for nerve agent. Available information indicates Iraq did not have nerve agent shells for tube artillery. The possibility that Iraqi troops fired CS rounds into the area of the raid party is also unlikely since Iraq used 120 mm mortar rounds—not artillery—to deliver CS. Finally, the time separation between the incoming artillery fire and the first notice of an unusual smell suggests that the two events were unrelated.

Several witnesses that were near the CP clearly experienced something strong. The lack of agreement on the nature of the smell prevents an unequivocal conclusion about what it was. Hydrogen sulfide (H2S) smells like rotten eggs—the smell identified by the 1/12 CO who discounted the possibility of CS. No known lethal or riot control agent smells like rotten eggs.[66] The intelligence officer believed strongly that he smelled and "felt" CS, which has a pungent, peppery smell. The communications officer in the same area at the time recalls smelling sulfur. The operations officer behind the HMMWV reported choking sensation that caused a sore throat, but he was sure the cause was not CS. Despite getting a "whiff" of something strong, none of the witnesses reported experiencing the enduring and serious symptoms one could expect from this kind of exposure to lethal chemical warfare agents.

The 11th Marines report indicated that CS was involved in the incident, but those on the scene thought vehicle exhaust or something from the abandoned camp was the cause. The commanding officer of the 1/12 "heard" the source of the smell was a Coalition air strike, but the nearest attack was over six hours earlier and a considerable distance away. This seems too long and too far to sustain the concentration that the "strong" smell suggests, even if the CP had been directly downwind.

Witnesses' recollections about M256 test results also varied, perhaps because more than one survey team conducted tests. One of the testers recalled multiple positive detections. The Marine who directed him to do the test remembered only one positive detection. Others recalled no positives at all. If the strong-smelling substance was CS, M256 kits would not have produced positive readings.

The majority of evidence from witnesses suggests the raid elements did not have M8 chemical agent alarms available, despite testimony from one Marine to the contrary.

The weather and the location of the raid forces make it unlikely that any agent Iraq might have fired in the 11:44 PM artillery salvo would have been detected by members of the raid. However, winds vary somewhat in speed and direction, and none of the witnesses claimed absolute certainty about speed and direction. Consequently—although it is unlikely—the presence of some kind of agent at the CP could not be entirely ruled out.

In short, the assessment of "Unlikely" rests on there being no evidence of a delivery means, the absence of serious casualties from CWA, reports of key witnesses of an H2S smell that is not associated with any known CWA or riot control agent, and the belief of some present that the cause was an environmental contaminant.

Initial Reports

An NBC NCO assigned to the 1/12 Jump Command Post (CP - mobile command post sent ahead of main CP to take control while the main CP moves forward) reported that on or about the night of Feb. 25, his unit was conducting an illumination mission (firing shells that release flares with parachutes to light the battlefield) towards an airfield. During the mission, the unit’s XM21 Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL) alerted. (A description of the XM21 may be found in TAB A.) He tested with an M256 kit and a CAM after the first detection; both tests were negative. He reset the XM21, and a few minutes later it went off again. He conducted another M256 test; again, the results were negative. The XM21 continued to sound over the next hour, but he never produced a positive M256 or CAM test. He finally shut off the XM21, believing it was alerting to exhaust, dust, tanks, artillery smoke, etc. In his first interview for this investigation, he stated that the unit did not increase its protective posture in response to the XM21 detections. He said he alerted the chain of command about the situation, but nothing came of the detections. In a subsequent interview, he contradicted his initial interview by remembering that the unit did increase its protective posture.[67]In retrospect, he thinks it was a false alarm. The CP stayed in that position for 6-7 hours, and then headed back to join the rest of the Battalion.

Additional Evidence

A 1/12 operations officer reviewed the information on this incident and indicated that he believed this illumination mission occurred in the vicinity of Kuwait International Airport. He recalled that the unit fired an illumination mission in support of forces at Kuwait International. In a follow-on interview, the 1/12 NBC NCO believed the location was near Al Jaber airfield. Records indicate that his unit was near that airfield at the approximate time he ascribed to the incident.[68]

No logs or chronologies have been found reporting these RSCAAL detections or any change in the unit’s protective posture during the reported timeframe of this incident.

In an interview, the 11th Marines NBC officer stated that his regiment had only one XM21 and that it was deployed with 5/11 throughout the ground campaign into Kuwait. Therefore, the 1/12 could not have had a RSCAAL detection during that period. However, he did recall that he sent his only RSCAAL with artillery raid forces twice after the reported detection of CS (riot control agent) during the artillery raid described in Incident D above. Eventually he decided that the set-up and teardown times for the RSCAAL kept participating artillery units exposed for too long and also exposed this unique piece of equipment to loss from counter-battery fire. Thereafter, he ceased sending the equipment on artillery raids. He did not recall hearing about any positive RSCAAL detections on either of these two raids.[69]

After the first artillery raid (conducted by the 1/12), the 1/12 participated in one additional artillery raid on Jan. 23-24, 1991, in the vicinity of Khafji (fire missions were executed shortly before midnight).[70] Based on the testimony of the NBC officer of the 11th Marines, this would have been the first of the two raids on which a RSCAAL would have accompanied the raid party.

In an effort to clarify the timing and location of his reported RSCAAL detection, investigators again contacted the NBC NCO assigned to the 1/12. He was apprised of the additional information provided by the 11th Marines NBC officer and the record of 1/12 artillery raid involvement. The NBC NCO indicated he might have confused an incident on an artillery raid with activity during the ground campaign, although he had the "feeling" that his initial testimony about the timing was correct. He did recall participation in the Jan. 23-24 artillery raid. He was sure the incident occurred at night and that it was too dark to determine what the XM21 might have been "looking" at. He could not recall what type of CWA the device detected. He initially attached the XM21 to an external alarm used with the M8 device. After this alarm went off, he disconnected it and used the device only with the built-in alarm, which continued to go off. He was unable to recall when, and from whom, he received the XM21 initially, or when, and to whom, he may subsequently have relinquished it.

The NBC officer of the 11th Marines noted that the XM21 had power supply problems. They were hooked up to vehicle power supplies. If the vehicle was not running, the detector would draw down the vehicle battery rapidly and then alarm for low power. In the incident described here, the NBC NCO remembered that the XM21 was hooked up to a vehicle (HMMWV) for power.[71] Because it was a new piece of equipment, Marines may not have been trained on such problems.[72]

Figure 20 shows the approximate location of this incident, assuming it occurred late on January 23, 1991, during an artillery raid launched near Khafji.

Figure 20. Location of Incident E

Assessment

Investigators conclude that the incident, recalled in some detail by the 1/12 NBC NCO, occurred during an artillery raid near Khafji. On balance, it is believed that the presence of chemical warfare agent in the raid area was "Unlikely." Because the XM21 could detect agent at a distance of several kilometers, CAM and M256 tests would not necessarily sample the same air as the XM21. There were no reports of chemical casualties. The RSCAAL may have detected contaminants or generated false alarms because of power supply problems. A valid long-range detection, however, cannot be entirely ruled out.

Initial Reports

Intelligence reported Iraqi preparation for, and possible use of, chemical weapons on the evening of Jan. 30.[73]

Shortly thereafter, NBC alert warnings were transmitted to maneuver units including the 11th Marines. The I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) initiated "Condition Yellow" (attack probable, do not don protective gear yet).[74] At 8:35 p.m., Task Forces Shepherd and Taro received orders to go to MOPP Level 2 (overgarments and overboots but no masks or gloves).[75] Logs indicate that shortly after 9:00 p.m., I MEF had gone to MOPP Level 3 (mask on but not gloves) for all forces north of 28 degrees, 5 minutes north.[76] Location data from the time indicates that the only 11th Marines unit north of this line was the 5/11.[77] See Figure 21.

Figure 21. Location of Incident F

Additional Evidence

During the previous day (Jan. 29), Iraqi tanks had penetrated the border into Saudi Arabia not far from the 5/11 location, the 5/11 elements went to 100 percent alert. However, early on the morning of Jan. 30, the enemy tanks retreated back into Kuwait, and the 5/11 reduced alert to 25 percent. Neither during the incursion on Jan. 29, nor at the time of this incident on Jan. 30,[78] did 5/11 report any incoming fire. None of the witnesses contacted shed further light on this alert. There were no associated reports or recollections of CWA tests being run.

Assessment

The possibility that Iraq delivered chemical agents into 11th Marines locations in connection with this alert was "Unlikely." No reports indicated that any coalition unit in northeastern Saudi Arabia came under chemical weapons attack on this date.

Initial Reports

By 3:00 p.m. on Feb. 24, elements of the 11th Marines were positioned between the two obstacle belts, providing artillery support to Task Forces Ripper and Papa Bear.[79] At 3:07 p.m., an XM21 Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL) used within the 5/11 alerted for nerve agent. (A description of the XM21 may be found in Tab A.) The 3/11 sounded "GAS GAS GAS" over the radio network. The 11th Marines went to MOPP Level 4.[80]

This incident was reported to the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses via the incident reporting hot line. The caller stated that within the first day or two of the ground war, (Feb. 24 or 25) "about 400 meters ahead of us two white smoke rounds detonated at about 400 meters altitude, bright white rather than grayish white of regular smoke rounds, did not dissipate like normal smoke rounds. Reported possible chemical attack, we went to MOPP-4, word passed, and all units went to MOPP-4 lasting several hours. Immediately after my verbal report, CWO [redacted] [the 5/11 NBC officer] at headquarters with high speed detection equipment, detected nerve agent. Higher authority ordered quit sounding alarm and stand down from chemical alert, and declared there was no NBC threat."[81] Numerous Marine unit logs documented the incident.[82] At the time, the 5/11 had the mission of general support (reinforcing) of the 3/11, which had the mission of direct support of Task Force Ripper (see Figure 22).[83]

Figure 22. Location of Incident G

An entry in the 11th Marines Command Chronology for Jan. 1 to Feb. 28, 1991 read:1507: "Rascal [RSCAAL/ XM21] in 5/11 position detected nerve agent; 11th Marines went to MOPP Level 4. Further detection efforts were negative; all clear sounded at 1541."[84] Additional Evidence: Although the 1-800 caller stated initially that the 5/11 NBC officer detected the agent, that caller denied this in a subsequent interview. The 5/11 NBC officer suggested that the XM21 was fielded with the S Battery, 5/11. Although numerous personnel from that unit have been interviewed, attempts to identify and interview the Marine who actually operated the XM21 have proven unsuccessful.[85] The alert to go to MOPP Level 4 was passed over the battalion command net (radio network), and up to the 11th Marines Regiment Headquarters over the regimental radio net.[86] According to the executive officer (XO) of the S Battery, there were two airbursts that he estimated were 150-200 meters high. The XM21 alerted for nerve, so everyone masked. A sergeant from the battery performed an M256 test and obtained a negative result. A Marine was chosen to perform selective unmasking procedures. This Marine showed no signs of chemical exposure, so the rest of the unit unmasked. He recalled that the unit was at MOPP Level 4 for a little over an hour.[87] The Battery XO, as well as the CO, noted that birds were flying around during the incident. The XO decided that, although he did not know what kind of artillery rounds had been fired, they were not chemical, and that the XM21 had alerted falsely. He added that he eventually shut it down due to smoke and dust sensitivity, and at some point, probably on the third day of the ground campaign (Feb. 26), stored it for the remainder of the war.[88,89]

While the S Battery was conducting M256 chemical agent tests, other personnel in the area were also performing chemical detection tests. The 5/11 NBC officer stated that his personnel conducted M256 tests by the book, and then proceeded with unmasking procedures. As he recalled, the M256 tests were negative for chemical warfare agents.[90] He did not remember an XM21 alert that day, but he did vaguely remember that one individual said that the airbursts set off an M8 alarm.[91] The 5/11 NBC NCO said that he conducted an M256 test following the incident and got negative results. At the time, he was positioned in a moving convoy to the flank of the S Battery position. The 5/11 operations officer, also in the convoy, could not recall if anyone ran M256 tests.[92] Another 11th Marines unit, the T Battery, was positioned approximately one-half mile from the S Battery. The T Battery commanding officer believed that his unit conducted M256 tests, with negative results.[93]

Other witnesses stated that anywhere from one to four airbursts occurred, at an approximate altitude of 400 meters.[94] The commanding officer of the 5/11 recalled four artillery rounds exploding at a significant altitude that he remembered as 400 meters. The rounds were not white phosphorous (WP) or high explosive (HE).[95] He recalled thinking that they could be chemical, but were simply too high up to cause concern. In addition, the winds were in his favor, blowing towards the enemy.[96] For the afternoon of Feb. 24, 1991, an Air Force weather summary indicates that the winds for the general area were southwesterly to westerly (out of the southwest/west).[97] Among the witnesses interviewed, there was a consensus that the resultant smoke, or "cloud," was unlike anything they had seen before. The odd characteristics of the smoke concerned them. The 5/11 operations officer recalled that he saw "an ugly looking cloud that didn’t look right." He recalled that the visibility at the time of this incident was good. (He compared it to times when he could literally not see his hand in front of his face due to oil well smoke.) At this time, the prevailing winds were beneficial, and there was no oil smoke blowing into their faces.[98] The 1/11 NBC NCO described a low-lying cloud that was "hovering," rather than dissipating.[99] On the other hand, the 1st Marine Division NBC officer remembered seeing the white smoke, but described three small puffs that dissipated quickly and were small, more the size of a signal flare. They were not what he, as an NBC officer, would expect of a chemical munition.[100]

Another witness distinctly remembered the airbursts. A corporal assigned to Task Force Ripper, also traveling in the convoy, recalled being outside his vehicle when a "popping" sound overhead caught his attention. He looked up to see a whitish cloud, followed by two more airbursts. He remembered that the wind picked up the smoke and moved it over his head, in a southerly direction. To his surprise, commanders called no increase in MOPP Level, so he proceeded to direct Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs) to the rear. Shortly thereafter, he turned and saw other troops donning their gas masks. His gas mask was back in his vehicle, so with eyes shut, he ran back to his vehicle and donned his mask. In his interview, he stated that he experienced no physical symptoms from this incident. When asked if any of the unprotected EPWs were affected, he replied that, to the best of his knowledge, no EPW showed any symptoms. He also recalled checking the chemical detection tape (M9 tape) attached to his vehicle. It showed no signs of having come into contact with chemical warfare agent.[101]

In the follow-on interview of the witness who originally reported the incident via the hot line, he suggested that a Fox vehicle, operated by the Task Force Ripper NBC officer, detected Sarin.[102] The Ripper NBC officer could not recall specifically sending his Fox vehicle back through the minefield, against the flow of advancing Marines, to check out the 5/11’s position. (At the time of this RSCAAL detection, Task Force Ripper had already passed through the second minefield.) Although he could not remember sending his Fox vehicle, the Ripper NBC officer was nevertheless of the opinion that another Fox vehicle attached to the 1st Marine Division would likely have been used to check out this incident.[103]

In fact, the 1st Marine Division Fox vehicle did respond to this incident. With a 1st Marine Division NBC officer on board, the Fox drove around the general area sampling the air in the "air-hi" mode, and got no positive detections from the MM1 mass spectrometer. According to this NBC officer, there were no NBC-1 reports, CWA effects, or casualties from this incident.[104]

After the war, the 11th Marines NBC officer learned from the S Battery 1st Sergeant that several Marines looking up at the unusual cloud had experienced burning faces and watering eyes. According to this second-hand information, the Marines immediately masked and then reached under the mask to wipe their faces with the agent neutralizing wipes carried by each Marine. Following this episode, they were immediately returned to duty. The regiment’s NBC officer assumed the burning substance was not blister agent because he received no reports of anyone being medically evacuated or treated for chemical exposure at battalion aid stations. According to this NBC officer, a blister agent would have caused much longer-lasting and severe symptoms, even if immediately treated. In his opinion, these Marines may have been exposed to something like rocket propellant. He does not believe any chemical warfare agent was involved.[105] Investigators could not identify or interview any of the Marines that reportedly experienced burning faces and watering eyes.

Investigators have identified the S Battery 1st Sergeant, but have been unsuccessful in contacting him. Both the commanding officer and executive officer of the S Battery, 5/11, were re-contacted in an effort to learn more concerning this second-hand report of burning faces and watering eyes. The unit CO stated that he was not informed that anyone had performed decontamination procedures as a result of this incident. He added that had this occurred, the XO (who acted as logistics officer) would have known about it because those Marines would have had to replace their decontaminating wipes. He concurred with other witnesses’ comments that the cloud was odd in appearance, but noted that certain Marines conducted M256 tests, got no positive results, and the unit unmasked without incident.[106] The XO stated that he was not aware of any injuries as a result of the incident. Because the battery corpsmen were located near the XO, he remembers no one called for a corpsman. He added that he felt skeptical about any injuries from this incident; it was over within a few minutes and the unit moved on.[107] A memorandum dated March 11, 1991, from the 11th Marines regimental surgeon to the regimental commanding officer, summarized the organization and implementation of medical treatment for the command. Included was the statement, "No serious injuries or mortalities were received and no medical evacuations called" (during Operation Desert Storm).[108] Investigators contacted the former 11th Marines regimental surgeon who indicated he was unaware of any chemical casualties in the Regiment from this or any other incident. The leading chief petty officer of the Regimental Medical Team, a US Navy Hospital Corpsman, stated that to his knowledge, no personnel assigned to the 11th Marines were treated for chemical warfare agent exposure.[109] Figure 23 summarizes the timing of this incident.

Figure 23. Timeline for XM21 Incident

Assessment

Chemical warfare agent presence during this event is assessed as "Unlikely." There is some agreement among the witnesses that the airburst(s) and resultant "cloud" had an odd appearance--unlike anything any of them had seen before--and that the source and type of rounds involved was suspicious. However, no witness to the airburst(s) was able to definitively identify the source and type of rounds involved. Numerous M256 tests were conducted. None showed signs of chemical warfare agent. A Fox NBC Reconnaissance vehicle tested the general area and detected no traces of CWA. There is no evidence of casualties from this incident--even among the unmasked EPWs moving south through the area. Two witnesses recall seeing birds flying around during the incident. This fact could be significant, since birds are very sensitive to the effects of toxic airborne chemicals.[110]

The XM21 was designed to detect chemical agent clouds at a distance of up to five kilometers, and in this instance, the XM21 reportedly alerted for nerve agent. Although no positive M256 tests resulted, it is possible that the M256 tests were performed too far from the airburst(s).

If, as one witness stated, the wind carried the suspect cloud in a southerly direction, and that "cloud" contained chemical warfare agent, it is possible that some of that agent may have dropped on Marine columns and yet been undetected by the M256 tests. If, as two witnesses stated (the Air Force Weather database concurs), the wind carried the suspect cloud in a northerly or northeasterly direction, back towards the Iraqi lines, it is also possible that chemical warfare agent may have dropped on Marines forward of the position of the XM21 detection. Both possibilities are unlikely since medical personnel and other witnesses were unaware of any associated casualties. In addition, chemical munitions are seldom designed for airburst because of reduced effectiveness.

Although the XM21 reportedly alerted for nerve agent, it must be noted that the detector was a prototype (hence the designation "X"M21--for experimental), and not in the regular inventory. Witnesses have stated that the XM21 typically alarmed erroneously, and at one point, the battalion leadership ordered the detector stored because they lost faith in its capabilities. Investigators have been unable to identify the individual who actually operated the XM21 for this incident, so the specifics of the XM21 detection are unknown. Nevertheless, it remains "Unlikely" that Marines were exposed to chemical warfare agent during this incident.

Initial Reports

A log from the 5/11 forward Command Post includes the following outgoing message entry at 6:18 p.m. on Feb. 24:

"GAS NBC 1 REPORT FALSE ALARM"[111]

Additional Evidence

At about this time, the NBC officer of Task Force Ripper recalls receiving an NBC-1 report. When he received no confirmation from 11th Marines or 1st Marine Division, he discarded the report and did not retransmit or take action on the alert. No one interviewed from the 5/11 recalled the log entry, why it was initiated, or why it was declared a false alarm. The NBC officer of the 11th Marines believed that if there had been an NBC incident associated with this log entry, word of it would have gotten out via the artillery nets (and presumably be recorded elsewhere) even if the 5/11 had canceled the NBC-1 report before transmission.[112] No other documentation related to this incident could be located. Figure 24 shows the unit’s location at the time of the incident.

Figure 24. Location of Incident H

Assessment

Chemical warfare agent presence is assessed as "Unlikely." Whoever made the original entry considered the incident a false alarm. No other documentary evidence or testimony supports a real NBC incident (no test results, no casualties, no witness recollection of the event). If something had happened in the 5/11 location, it would have been reported by other channels, even if the 5/11 decided not to forward the NBC-1 report.

Initial Reports

In an interview, the operations officer of the 11th Marines recalled that an incident occurred on the evening of Feb. 25. The H Battery, 3/14 (a reserve unit attached to the 1/11), fired its cannons directly at a multiple rocket launcher vehicle as it was raising its missiles into firing position and destroyed the enemy vehicle. According to the operations officer, someone from the unit reportedly went back to the site and determined that two or three "gas rounds" were among the conventional rounds in the launcher.[113] A review of the 1st Marine Division monograph confirmed that the H Battery destroyed the launcher.[114] Relevant locations are shown in Figure 25.

Figure 25. Location of Incident I

Additional Evidence

The CO of the H Battery did not recall being told that there were chemical rounds in the destroyed multiple rocket launcher vehicle. He did report hearing that the 1st Marine Division Commanding General visited the site. After the war, the Assistant Division Commander presented the battery CO with a souvenir from the launcher. No available logs or chronologies noted chemical rocket rounds in connection with this engagement or any subsequent visit to the site.[115] According to intelligence reporting, Iraqi 122mm rockets with CW warheads had no identifying markings to distinguish them from conventional high explosive warheads.[116]

The rocket launcher in question is shown in Figure 26. It was a Soviet manufactured BM-21 122 mm launcher. This caliber of rocket launcher has been identified in UN investigations as an Iraqi ground system capable of firing nerve agent rounds.[117]

Figure 26. Iraqi Rocket Launcher Put Out of Action

The 11th Marines NBC officer did not recall hearing about chemical rounds in the launchers, although he remembered the incident. He did a quick reconnoiter of the scene, within less than half an hour of the engagement, taking along a couple of Marines. They were in a hurry to return to their unit so they would not be left behind or mistaken for the enemy. He paid particular attention to the rocket launchers, which were deployed with tanks. He used his CAM and got no positive CWA indications. The Marines with him performed an M256 test and got a positive result, but the NBC officer determined they had taken shortcuts in the test. When they repeated the test properly, they got negative results. The NBC officer noted that there was no special chemical protective equipment at the site—as one would expect if the enemy unit possessed an offensive chemical capability. He took a few samples, which he turned over to the regimental S-2 (intelligence officer). The NBC officer did not believe there was chemical agent present at this site.

Determined efforts to find and interview those who reportedly identified chemical rounds on the destroyed launcher have so far been unsuccessful. The samples also have not been found.

Assessment

The possibility that the multiple rocket launcher contained chemical rounds is considered "Unlikely." If chemical rockets had no special markings, how could someone casually determine their nature? None of those who inspected the vehicle up close reported chemical agent symptoms. Inspection and tests at the site by the 11th Marines NBC officer did not indicate chemical agent presence or Iraqi offensive chemical capability. If, indeed, some of the rockets were chemical munitions, it is possible there were no leakers (although this is difficult to imagine since the vehicle was hit by Marine fire). The report of finding chemical rockets was second hand. Investigators could not identify the individual who allegedly noted chemical rockets at the site. [119]

Initial Reports

On the second day of the ground war, shortly after 5:30 p.m., several units reported incoming artillery fire assumed to be chemical weapons. These units included:

• The 3/12 (which responded to an alert over the battalion command net from an unknown sender, tested with a CAM, got a reading for nerve agent, and performed subsequent tests which proved negative. The "all clear" came 20 minutes later).[120]
• The E Battery, 2/12 attached to the 1/11 (which reported incoming fire .6 miles north of their position, 3 miles southeast of Al Jaber Airfield, and assumed these rounds to be gas).[121]
• The 1st Marine Division main command post (which masked, believing itself to be under gas attack).[122]
• The 5/11 (which reported Task Force Grizzly to be under "gas" attack: "Reason - took artillery on friendly side of PL [Phase Line] Red and assumed a gas attack.")[123]
• Task Force Ripper (presumably because Task Force Grizzly received a report of gas attack, "apparently from Task Force Ripper").[124]

Based on these reports, the 11th Marines and other 1st Marine Division units went to MOPP Level 4. According to the sources cited above, most of the units unmasked within half an hour after negative detector tests. See Figure 27 for locations.

Figure 27. Location of Incident J

Additional Evidence

The operations officer of the 11th Marines recalled listening to the events unfold over the radio. He remembered hearing that incoming fire hit between the locations of the 3/11 and the 5/11 and that canisters (sub-munitions) were dispensed by the incoming rounds.[125]

The CO of the 3/12, the unit that got the positive CAM reading for G (nerve) agent, recalled that he sent his NBC officer to check. The tests (of unknown type) were negative. The CO unmasked himself rather than find someone else to perform selective unmasking procedures. From then on, the NBC officer advised the CO of any positive CAM readings, but the CO delayed masking the unit pending confirming tests, which never came.[126]

After the 11th Marines operations officer (S-3) reported in a recent interview that he heard about canisters over the radio, investigators asked a variety of witnesses if they knew first hand or indirectly about canisters or sub-munitions from incoming artillery fire. The 11th Marines NBC officer recalled that there were several instances of airbursts and low order detonations. He said he discounted the possibility they were chemical rounds because no one reported any casualties. He recalled intelligence that the Iraqis had canister CW dispensing rounds and claimed he knew which Iraqi units had them. He said that Coalition air forces struck one such unit near Al Jaber Airfield before the ground campaign began, and that the enemy unit was subsequently observed from the air performing what he described as decontamination operations.[127]

Assessment

The presence of chemical warfare agent in this cluster of activity is assessed as "Unlikely." Some of the logs and chronologies clearly indicate that commanders "assumed" a chemical attack (presumably as a precaution) with no repeatable CWA detections in addition to incoming artillery fire. Logs did not record any unusual characteristics for the incoming fire, and there were no first hand reports of canisters or submunitions associated with this flurry of activity. After a single positive CAM test in the 3/12, tests for chemical agents in that and other units were negative, resulting in expeditious unmasking. No one reported any casualties. On the other hand, the recollections of the Regiment’s S-3 and NBC officer about "canister" or cluster munitions and the initial positive CAM test suggest the possibility of CWA presence. Most G agents are non-persistent, which could explain early positive detections and negative or weak detections thereafter. However, the weight of the evidence favors the "Unlikely" assessment.

Initial Reports

Less than half an hour after the previous incident (shortly after 6:00 p.m. on the 25th), the A Battery, 1/12, reported they were "under gas attack" about 6 miles southeast of Al Jaber Airfield.[128] At the same time, the 3rd Tank Battalion log train also reported that they were gassed (location not identified).[129] Various elements of the 1st Marine Division, including Task Force Ripper, went to MOPP Level 4. No one recorded the results of the subsequent M256 tests, but the "all clear" was sounded beginning at 6:30 p.m..[130] The A Battery, 1/12, stood down from MOPP Level 4 at 6:48 p.m.[131] Figure 28 shows the location of the A Battery, 1/12 at the time.

Figure 28. Location of Incident K

Additional Evidence

Interviews conducted with 13 witnesses from the 1/12 revealed no further information on this incident. Others who could recall nothing about this incident when specifically asked included the commanding officers of the 11th Marines and the 1/12, as well as the NBC officer of Task Force Ripper.[132] The commanding officer of the F Battery, 2/12, (attached to the 1/12) indicated that "we never could pick up anything on a detector. Though we had detectors go off, none of our kits [M256] ever indicated anything. We had done them quite frequently."[133] The commanding officer of the A Battery, 1/12, did not remember ever identifying a chemical attack.[134]

Assessment

Chemical warfare agent presence for this incident which occurred during the 1st Marine Division’s most intense combat of the war--is assessed as "Unlikely." It also happened during a flurry of NBC reporting. Consequently, witnesses had difficulty recalling individual alerts. Available evidence suggests that incoming fire probably triggered the alerts, which in turn initiated NBC alert calls and precautionary masking. No reports of positive detections by any means have been located in connection with this incident.

Initial Reports

The Al Jaber Air Base Case Narrative reveals that the Fox NBC reconnaissance vehicle assigned to Task Force Ripper had a preliminary mustard detection at 7:08 p.m. on Feb. 25. The Fox vehicle passed this detection by radio to the Task Force Ripper NBC officer, who relayed it to 11th Marines units and possibly others (apparently misquoted as a lewisite detection). The 3/11, which provided direct support to Task Force Ripper, echoed this report. During confirmation attempts, Task Force Ripper went to MOPP Level 4.

Contemporaneous logs suggest multiple detections and confirmation by a Fox reconnaissance vehicle. In the separate Al Jaber investigation conducted by the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses/aljaber/, investigators determined that the only detection was made by a Fox reconnaissance vehicle in the "air-hi" mode. After subsequent battery-level tests using M256 kits failed to produce any confirmation of chemical warfare agent presence, the units selectively unmasked and returned to MOPP Level 2.[135] See Figure 29 for unit locations.

Figure 29. Location of Incident L

Additional Evidence

Both the CO and the NBC officer of Task Force Ripper believe that this was the only incident where chemical warfare agent was actually present in Ripper’s area of operations.[136]

Assessment

Despite the convictions of Task Force Ripper’s CO and NBC officer, the separate Al Jaber Airbase case assessment determined that the presence of chemical warfare agent in the area of the affected units was "Unlikely." Readers are invited to consult that report regarding this incident and the detailed rationale for the assessment.

Initial Reports

NOTE: This section covers three sequential alert incidents over a few hours. Since most research material addressed them together, so will this narrative.

The incidents, reported together, include:[137]

• Incident M: At 2:13 a.m. on February 26th, the third day of the ground campaign, the A Battery, 1/11, received a chemical warning message (possibly from the 3/11). The A Battery ran tests with two M256 kits, which registered positive indications for blister agent. The unit reported the detections, and went to MOPP Level 4. An "all clear" was sounded at 2:45 a.m.
• Incident N: Again at 3:27 a.m., the A Battery reported a positive reading for blister agent. A chemical warning was passed to 11th Marines and Task Force Papa Bear.
• Incident O: Subsequent tests by the A Battery at 4:10 a.m. were also positive.

Figure 30 plots relevant locations.

Figure 30. Location of Incidents M, N, O

The 1/11 requested a Fox NBC reconnaissance vehicle from Task Force Papa Bear at 3:33 AM and again at 4:10 a.m.; six minutes later, Papa Bear reported that the Fox was en route. Operational logs indicated that when the Fox vehicle arrived some time after 4:18 AM, it recorded positive readings for blister agent in what was described as the "passive mode," but the mass spectrometer registered negative when "programmed to look specifically for lewisite" (a blister agent). Investigators interpret this description to mean that the mass spectrometer in the general sampling ("air-hi") mode alerted for blister agent, but follow-up tests involving a full spectrum analysis did not confirm this alert. (See the Fox Vehicle Information Paper for operational details.) One report also noted that CAM tests by the Fox crew gave a four-bar (substantial concentration) reading for blister agent, but M256 tests (reported at 4:21) were negative. The unit did not begin selective unmasking, however, until 6:34 a.m.. Action summaries attributed the positive readings to oil in the air.[138]

Additional Evidence

The S-3 (operations officer) of the 11th Marines recalled that he directed the Regiment’s NBC officer to send a Fox vehicle to survey the location of the A Battery, 1/11.[139] The Regiment’s NBC officer recalls that the NBC officer of Task Force Papa Bear accompanied the Fox when it was finally dispatched and that he reported by radio that the Fox had gotten no positive readings.[140]

The Task Force Papa Bear NBC officer believed that the 3/11 originated the first alert and, because of a potential downwind hazard that might carry chemical agent toward Coalition units, higher headquarters passed it to the A Battery, 1/11, and the 3/9. Consequently, the 1/11 and the 3/9 went to MOPP Level 4. The Task Force Papa Bear NBC officer further recalled that the 3/9 had a CAM available, allowing that unit to test and quickly unmask. However, the 1/11 did not have a CAM and required a Fox vehicle to check. The Papa Bear NBC officer could not get permission to go forward with the Fox vehicle until after 4:00 a.m. In the meantime, A Battery’s M256 kits kept testing positive for blister agent. The Task Force Papa Bear NBC officer suspected that burning oil well smoke caused the positives; false positives from burning petroleum products were not uncommon. (The M256 kit, including the M256A1 kits used during the Gulf War, could present false readings in the presence of some smokes and petroleum products, according to an authoritative equipment description[141] and the NBC officer of the 11th Marines.[142]

The CO of Task Force Papa Bear echoed this belief.)[143] The Papa Bear NBC officer suggested that the battery perform selective unmasking, but the continued M256 positives kept the battery in MOPP Level 4. When he finally got to the A Battery, his Fox tested in the "air-hi" mode. The crew then stepped out of the vehicle and unmasked to convince the unit that it was safe.[144,145] The operations officer for the 3/11 did not recall his battalion initiating this alert.[146] The CO of the A Battery, 1/11, recalled the multiple positives from the M256 kits. He noted that Marines in the battery were testing on their own volition, and testing substances on the outside of their vehicles. When they got a positive, they called it in to the 1/11. At the time, the battery was about half a mile from an oil well head that was spewing raw petroleum.[147] The CO of the 1/11 also noted that the battery’s NBC team was "were out aggressively checking."[148] The CO of the A Battery’s guns platoon remembered that the section chief for Gun 2 ran two positive M256 tests while in a fighting hole between Guns 1 and 2. (Investigators have identified this individual, now separated from the Marine Corps. Attempts to contact him have been unsuccessful.) The Fox crew gave the "all clear" and told battery personnel that oil smoke caused the positives.[149]

]A Battery’s executive officer remembered that the battery’s M9 detection paper produced positives and that their M8 alarm sounded. He did not know about the M256 tests. He stated that the battery had three NBC monitor/survey teams with three or four Marines on each team. One was upwind of the battery, one was with the battery, and the third was downwind. He believed that all three teams kept registering positive readings.[150] Calculating time and distance, the NBC officer of the 11th Marines figured that the command post he was with was about 20 minutes downwind of the the A Battery. This individual also recalled that the wind at the time as out of the northeast. Responding to each of the three positive detections, he dispatched Marines to run M256 tests every 15 minutes around the command post. They never got positive readings.[151]

The 1/11 operations officer said he called for selective unmasking across the battalion. Battery leaders selected two individuals from each of three batteries (including the A Battery, 1/11) to perform the procedure—which resulted in an "all clear."[152] The 11th Marines NBC officer noted that the A Battery, 1/11, was downwind from the lead division echelons at the time of the alerts. Artillery had engaged and destroyed an Iraqi multiple rocket launcher (see Incident I above which occurred over 14 hours earlier and for which the assessment of agent presence was "Unlikely"). Since the location of the rocket launcher was about a mile from the A Battery’s location at the time of the alerts,[153] he suggested that this might have been the cause of the positive detections.[154] According to an Air Force summary, the reported winds in the general area of Kuwait at the time of the alerts were blowing from the northwest at 6-17 miles per hour.[155] If local winds in the A Battery’s area were similar, the battery was not downwind from the destroyed rocket launcher. But if local winds were from the northeast—as the 11th Marines NBC officer recalls--it is possible that the unit might have been downwind of the rocket launcher. Figure 31 summarizes the chronology of events.

Figure 31. Timeline for Incidents M, N, and O

Assessment

Considering the following evidence, blister agent presence during this series of incidents is assessed as "Unlikely." The evidence suggests that the A Battery, 1/11, began testing in response to an alert that they were in a downwind hazard area. If winds were from the northwest, they were, in fact, downwind of the 3/11, which may have initiated the alert. Two witnesses implied that the A Battery, 1/11, had very diligent monitor/survey personnel who tested often. If the testers used the kits by making direct contact with vehicle surfaces (as suggested by the CO of the A Battery), they used an inappropriate procedure.

The kits were designed to test for airborne agents only. One witness recalled that M9 detection tape and M8 alarms also gave positive readings[156] (M8 alarms do not test for blister agent, and both test devices can give false readings in the presence of petroleum products—see M8 and M9 entries in Glossary, Tab A.) The battery was positioned on the right flank of the battalion (immediately adjacent to the Al Burqan oil field) and close to a well head spraying raw petroleum. This could explain the persistent positives. The Fox reconnaissance vehicle got negative results. The Task Force Papa Bear NBC officer, who traveled with their Fox reconnaissance vehicle, indicated that his system never had a positive detection during the Gulf War. There were no reports of incoming fire or other potential agent delivery means around the time of the alerts. If, as one source claimed, a nearby destroyed multiple rocket launcher contained some chemical rounds—and if the A Battery was indeed downwind from that launcher—one can not entirely rule out a leaking rocket from this launcher as a non-persistent agent source. (See Incident I where we assessed CWA presence as "Unlikely.") Air Force weather data suggests, however, that the A Battery was not downwind of the multiple rocket launcher—despite a witness on the scene who thought the battery was downwind. More than half a day (but only about a mile) separated the incidents. Once deposited on surfaces, persistent CWA, like mustard, would not be a serious downwind hazard. Post-war UN inspection data indicated that Iraqi Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL) ammunition with chemical warheads could carry nerve agent but not blister agent.[157] Despite the presence of other units nearby that were not in MOPP Level 4 (masked), no one reported chemical casualties in connection with this incident. Rigorous testing at the 11th Marines command post, computed by NBC personnel to be downwind of the alerting battery, failed to detect agent. Investigators have therefore concluded that it is much more likely that oil well contamination—rather than blister agent—caused the multiple positive detections by the A Battery early on the morning of Feb. 26.

Initial Reports

The 1/11 reported "gas" at about 11:30 a.m. on Feb. 26. Brief entries in two logs indicate Task Force Ripper and Task Force Papa Bear went to MOPP Level 4. The written evidence does not indicate whether the 1/11 initiated or only passed the alert which prompted the MOPP Level 4 posture, or if other units also masked. Commanders called an "all clear" beginning at 12:34 p.m.[158] See unit locations in Figure 32.

Figure 32. Location of Incident P

Additional Evidence

The CO of the 1/11 recalled the alert, agreed that the 1/11 was in MOPP Level 4 for about 40 minutes, but could not remember further details.[159] Most of the interviewed witnesses could not recall this incident.

Assessment

The likelihood of chemical warfare agent presence is "Unlikely." The 11th Marines made no positive detections, no one reported casualties or remembered details, and the originating unit and location are unclear.

Initial Reports

On Feb. 26, at 3:00 p.m., the 1/11 initiated a chemical alert after sighting yellow smoke thought to be from incoming rounds or signaling Iraqi use of CWA. At least Task Force Ripper and Task Force Papa Bear went to MOPP Level 4. The Task Force Papa Bear Fox vehicle checked the alert using the MM1 mass spectrometer, and initiated an "all clear" 10 minutes later. Numerous Marine Corps chronologies and logs recorded this event.[160] The following entry comes from a Marine Corps Summary of Action Report:

At approximately 1500 [3:00 p.m.], the 1/11 reported taking incoming chemical rounds. Apparently, someone observed yellow smoke and mistook it for chemical agents. The Task Force was place[d] in MOPP 4 until the CAMS and Fox vehicle could verify the absence of chemicals. No chemical agents were detected and the "all clear" was given approximately 10 minutes later.[161]

See Figure 33 for relevant locations.

Figure 33. Location of Incident Q

Additional Evidence

The Task Force Papa Bear NBC officer was a particularly useful witness for this incident. A Marine collecting after-action reports on NBC incidents interviewed him on March 7, 1991, shortly after the cessation of the ground offensive.[162] In an October 1997 interview, the Papa Bear NBC officer explained that he and other Marines were gathered on the 26th preparing for a Commander’s briefing. The gathering included the CO of the 1/11, the CO of the 1st Tanks, the CO of the 3/8, and the CO of the 1/1. Someone from the 1/11, presumably a radio operator, sounded the alert over the regimental tactical radio network.[163] In his 1991 interview, the Papa Bear NBC officer stated:

On the afternoon of G-plus-2 [Feb. 26], somebody observed a yellow pop-up, and that pop-up caused a lot of alarm. Based on intelligence units,[164] Iraqi tank units would use yellow markers if they expected a chemical attack or if they had been involved in a chemical attack. And somebody from the 11th Marines saw a yellow pop-up that was being used by friendly forces to indicate the completion of a specific task, and he started sending this alert that he’d seen the yellow pop-up and suspected a chemical attack.[165]

The 1/11 operations officer initiated the first chemical attack report. Task Force Papa Bear was moving towards Kuwait International Airport. He heard a popping sound, looked to his left, and observed three to five yellow smoke streamers heading towards the ground, approximately 800 meters to the left of the 1/11 Command Post. He took them to be the streamers from grenades (smoke grenades), although he did not see the grenades. The streamers resembled 155mm white phosphorous rounds, only much smaller. He had no prior intelligence indicating yellow smoke as a sign of Iraqi chemical attack. He thought, however, that this was an unusual event; so, to be on the safe side, he ordered that it be reported as a gas attack.[166]

Other witnesses provided descriptions of the yellow smoke. One described it, "like when you toss a canister out and the wind picks it [the smoke] up."[167] Another had the impression that the smoke was to the unit’s flank rather than ahead or behind it. He said that it looked like a smoke grenade that started very dense at the ground and dispersed as the smoke column rose.[168] Another witness recalled that a forward observer may have noted that it was a smoke grenade.[169]

Units immediately responded to the alert. Those gathered for the commanders briefing went to MOPP Level 4 and returned to their units. The Papa Bear NBC officer immediately returned to his Fox vehicle. His job was to gather information about the alert—who sounded it, what was the unit’s location, was there a means of delivery for the alleged chemical agent, etc.? He stated that he and the Task Force operations officer were manning the radios, attempting to gather that data. He soon discovered that the yellow marker was a signal used by the combat engineers to warn others that they were about to blow up some enemy ammunition that had been discovered in a trench or storage bunker in the vicinity of Task Force Papa Bear. He noted that there were many trenches just beyond the second breach, and that enemy ammunition had been left behind. He reiterated that someone informed him over the radio that friendly forces fired the yellow smoke.[170]

A Papa Bear operations officer conducted his investigation from the Command vehicle. He recalled a "frantic" radio operator yelling "Gas, Gas, Gas" over the radio net. He questioned the radio operator in an attempt to ascertain a means of delivery for the suspected chemical agent. He asked if any incoming artillery, aircraft, or helicopters were over the operator’s position at the time? The radio operator said he saw nothing that could deliver a chemical agent.[171]

While the NBC officer and the operations officer were conducting their inquiries into the source of the alert, the Papa Bear Fox crew performed their tests, but detected nothing:

We had the FOX vehicle operating, and the MM-1 [mass spectrometer] was operating, so we immediately got in and just started doing a survey and were able to, probably within ten or fifteen minutes, get the task force back out of MOP[P]-4, and at the same time the FOX vehicle was running. Three-nine [3/9], 1st Tanks, and 1-1 [1/1] were already running their CAMS and proving that we weren’t under any type of chemical attack.[172]

A personal journal provided by one of the 1/11 operations officers contains a passage that describes going to MOPP Level 4, and then going to MOPP 4 again. It also notes that they conducted chemical tests with negative results:

Went to MOPP 4 for gas from 3/11. 5/11 used 2 yellow smokes for gas signal that we thought was a gas round. Then went again [to MOPP-4] because of P[apa] Bear. W[arrant] O[fficer] [redacted]went out and got negative results from monitor survey [chemical monitor/survey team conducted tests]. All clear, then moved up 5 km.[173]

Once the Fox crew had determined that no chemical agent was present, they passed the word to the other units over the radio. They also notified the Papa Bear executive officer, who was standing outside in full MOPP gear (MOPP Level 4).[174]Just as the commanding officers were being assured that no chemical attack had occurred, the Task Force received incoming artillery. According to the NBC officer’s March 1991 testimony, he and another operations officer:

...were on two different radio nets trying to assure people that this was a friendly pop-up...where right on cue we got hit with enemy artillery, which immediately sent everybody into Mop[P]-4 again...1-11, their poor radio operator was in a big-time panic. We could not, for the life of us, get him to quit screaming on the radio. We couldn’t get any information on a means of delivery, a point of attack. We just knew it was artillery, and we knew it was close.[175]

The Papa Bear NBC officer witnessed the explosions caused by the incoming fire. He recalled that the unit took three to six rounds, which landed in the middle of the Task Force. Everyone was still in MOPP 4 when the artillery hit and, to his knowledge, no one was hurt. He stated that the entire incident probably lasted no more than 10-15 minutes. They gathered commanders, initiated selective unmasking, and he, the battalion CO, and the executive officer (XO) were the first to unmask. He believed that someone misinterpreted the friendly yellow marker (smoke).[176] According to a Papa Bear operations officer, the incoming was high explosive (HE), and was uneventful.[177] The Papa Bear XO recalled that, after the event, someone briefed him on, or there was a discussion of, a "yellow round" being fired that was mistaken for the start of a chemical attack. He was certain that this was not a chemical attack since he recalls no enemy artillery attacks before or after the incident. The Iraqis were on the run and putting up no organized resistance.[178] The 1/11 NBC NCO stated that nothing came of it, and that he believes that the source of the smoke was friendly. He seemed to recall getting confirmation that it was indeed friendly.[179]

It appears that for many Marines, prior intelligence reports contributed to a heightened awareness of potential Iraqi CW attacks and likely played a role in this incident. According to a Task Force Papa Bear operations officer, US forces had intelligence that the Iraqis would use yellow smoke to alert their own troops of an impending chemical attack against the enemy.[180] Another intelligence report stated that Iraqi artillery units would warn their own troops of impending CW fire by firing two or three red star cluster rounds.[181] Investigators were subsequently unable to locate any intelligence about the use of yellow smoke by Iraq to warn their own troops of a chemical attack. However, a declassified intelligence information report did state:

The Iraqi army uses a red and green (combined) star cluster flare as a signal that chemical weapons are in use and that protective masks should be worn [emphasis in original]. A red flare fired vertically indicates an Iraqi unit is under attack or needs help. A red flare fired obliquely indicates the direction of enemy movement or advance.[182]

The Task Force Ripper NBC officer indicated that he never saw such cluster rounds during the ground campaign.[183]

No witness was able to identify authoritatively the source or purpose of the yellow smoke. The 1/11 NBC NCO stated that he did not recall anyone blowing up any ammunition.[184] Others thought that the yellow smoke was actually a signal fired by explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialists working in this area.[185] To date, investigators have been unable to tie this alert to an EOD event or signal.[186] At least one witness thought an armored vehicle had fired smoke grenades, but these vehicles carry only white smoke grenades.[187] Another witness believed that the 5/11 was the source of the yellow smoke. In retrospect, none of the Marines interviewed believed that this incident was an actual chemical attack.

Assessment

Based on the following considerations, chemical warfare agent presence during this event is "Unlikely." The 1/11 operations officer saw yellow smoke, thought it unusual, and initiated a gas attack alert to be on the safe side. Incoming artillery did not precipitate this alert. When the Task Force Papa Bear Fox vehicle conducted tests, it found no sign of chemical warfare agents. Additionally, other units used CAMs to test the area, and got negative results. The 1/11 NBC NCO did not recall conducting M256 tests, but monitor/survey teams got negative tests of some kind. Both the Papa Bear operations officer and NBC officer investigated the cause of the alert, and both believe that a chemical attack did not take place. Many witnesses to the event believe that the yellow smoke was mistaken for an Iraqi chemical attack warning. Contemporaneous Marine Corps logs also documented that, at that time, the yellow smoke was mistaken for chemical agents. Lastly, this incident caused no known injuries.

Initial Reports

Shortly after midnight on January 27th, the 11th Marines and Task Force Papa Bear sent positive CW reports to the 1/11. The 1/11 log did not indicate any change in protective posture.[188] Figure 34 shows unit locations at the time.

Figure 34. Location of Incident R

Additional Evidence

Investigators found no witnesses or other journal/log entries addressing this incident.

Assessment

A chemical warfare agent presence in this instance is "Unlikely." Investigators could not find any cause for this alert. No one reported any casualties or changes in MOPP status.

One or more chemical detection devices initiated many of the alerts recorded by the 11th Marines. If interferents caused these devices to give false positive indications, they were responsible for false alarms and unnecessary masking. On the other hand, if these devices were used in ways for which they were not designed, they may have been trusted to warn of chemical agent when their designs made them too insensitive to detect low concentrations—thereby putting Marines at risk. A brief review of the key Marine chemical detection equipment follows. Descriptions of this equipment may be found in the Glossary at Tab A.

The Fox NBC reconnaissance vehicle with onboard mass spectrometer got high marks from many Marines.[189] The design features of the Fox system made it particularly effective for detecting and identifying persistent agent residues at close range on the ground, on vehicles, etc. During the Gulf War, Marines used the system primarily to "sniff" the air for potentially low concentrations of agents and thereby verify or refute positive detections by other devices. In this "air-hi" mode, the Fox was 500 times less sensitive than the M8 alarm and at least 10 times less sensitive than other devices such as the M256 kit and the CAM. Table 3 shows the relative sensitivities for various detection devices and agents.

A knowledgeable source has indicated that the Fox system might not have always alerted in the "air-hi" mode during the Gulf War until agent concentrations were well above the threshold where one would expect prompt symptoms.[190] Nevertheless, Marines appreciated the Fox for its relatively low false alarm rate in a petroleum-polluted environment and used it to "confirm" that other types of detections were false alarms. These confirmations allowed units to unmask—perhaps prematurely. It is at least probable that those trusting the "no threat" indications by the Fox did not fully understand the equipment’s limitations and lack of sensitivity in the ambient air sampling mode.

Table 3. Vapor Chemical Agent Detector Characteristics

In the presence of some petroleum and combustion products, the M256 kit could generate false positives, particularly for blister agents.[194] As noted in the incident summaries, the 11th Marines used M256 kits extensively to test for chemical warfare agents. Commanding officers and operations personnel frequently bemoaned the false alarm rate from interfering chemicals.[195] However, the majority of the trained NBC personnel expressed overall confidence in this "wet chemistry" kit, if used properly.[196] An 11th Marines Battery (the A Battery, 1/11) reportedly ceased using the M256 after a Fox crew told them that only the Fox was reliable in the oil smoke.[197] As noted above, this was not true for the Fox in the air sampling mode. Consequently, that unit and any others that followed similar advice, might have missed any instances when there were low levels of chemical warfare agents present.

According to the regiment’s NBC officer, as the ground campaign approached, some of the 11th Marines’ M256 kits approached or exceeded their shelf life expiration dates. He could not recall what portion of their inventory was affected but had the impression that it was "low." He noted that for each lot number involved, he requested and received an extension of the shelf life. He was not as concerned about shelf life as he was about having sufficient kits available going into the ground campaign. He believed that even expired kits were better than nothing, and he would have taken additional expired kits if he could have gotten them.[198]

A U.S. Army technical report notes that an M256 kit with inactive, dead, or too little enzyme due to excessive age produces a false positive for nerve agent. The kit relies on viable enzymes to provide a negative or "no nerve agent" indication by turning a paper patch from white to blue. In the presence of chemical agent (or because of age), the enzymes become inactive and the color change does not occur, thus giving a positive reading.[199] Kits that exceeded their original expiration dates may have been responsible for some positive M256 nerve agent test in the Gulf War. (False positives, however, are generally better than the reverse—false negatives. Except in critical battle situations, false positives err on the side of safety, while false negatives open the way for possible exposure to chemical warfare agents

The 11th Marines also extensively used the Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) in their operational area. Most witnesses commented positively about it, although some noted it could give false alarms in a "polluted" environment (gave a fairly high concentration reading for nerve agent when sniffing a Cup-o-Noodles ).[200] Marines frequently used this device to monitor ambient air. The CAM, however, was designed as a point source detector for contamination at close range on equipment and personnel.[201] Despite this, there is no evidence that inappropriate use of this device contributed to potential exposure. From available information, it appears the CAM complemented other continuous and periodic monitoring. The use of the CAM in the Gulf War did not sideline other detection devices and did not cause Marines to ignore other types of detections.

The XM21 was an experimental device capable of detecting chemical warfare agents by passively sampling infrared spectra of clouds up to several kilometers away.

Prior to the ground campaign into Kuwait, the 11th Marines sent the XM21 along on two artillery raids. During one of these, the device repeatedly alarmed. In the middle of the night, it was too dark to tell what the detector might have sensed. The XM21 operator for this raid did not recall what type of agent the device detected.[202]

During the ground war, the 1st Marine Division’s XM21 was deployed with the S Battery, 5/11. S Battery stopped using the device before the end of the ground campaign because the XM21 detections were not confirmed by short-range detectors like the CAM and M256 kits.[203] Reportedly, chemical interferents or a low power supply could cause the device to false alarm.[204] Although the Marine training on the device was marginal,[205] there is no known evidence that the XM21 was used inappropriately or contributed to a false sense of security. It did, however, initiate two of the 11th Marines’ recorded alerts that were subsequently considered false alarms.

An expert at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command involved in testing and fielding Marine Corps NBC equipment was asked to comment on how the XM21 was viewed at the time of the Gulf War. He indicated he was the one responsible for fielding the RSCAAL for the war and had a very favorable view of the equipment. He noted that the US Army and Marine Corps jointly tested the equipment in a laboratory environment before the war and confirmed that it could detect chemical warfare agents. They also tested the equipment using some interferents and determined that the XM21 could discriminate these test interferents from real chemical agents. The expert was unaware and surprised that the prototype device deployed with the 1st Marine Division was sidelined before the end of the ground campaign because of alleged false alarms. The feedback he received on the device after Desert Storm was "very positive."[206] (The two XM21s with the 2nd Marine Division received better marks than the 1st Marine Division’s XM21.)

As noted in Table 2 above, the M8 alarm is highly sensitive to chemical agent vapor. It is also sensitive to a wide variety of interferents including smoke, engine exhaust, burning fuel, and even aftershave.[207] Before the ground campaign began, M8s generated false alarms at a rate that caused many Marine units (for which the M8 was not a normal equipment item) to leave them behind or turned off for the attack into Kuwait.[208] The M8, therefore, contributed little to the Marines’ chemical warning capability—particularly the capability to detect nerve agent in the air. (The 11th Marines, however, reported no symptoms of nerve agent exposure.)

As the CO of the 11th Marines pointed out in an interview, when the ground campaign began, they did not understand the limitations of the issued chemical agent detectors. In particular, they did not know that the oil well fires could at times produce false positives on all of the detectors. Therefore, until proven otherwise, they were inclined to treat all positive readings as valid.[209] As previously noted, the Fox chemical reconnaissance vehicles, CAMs, and XM21 RSCAALs were introduced very late in the ground war preparations. Marine operators had only a limited opportunity to receive training and become familiar with these systems.

The sensitivity to battlefield interferents (particularly pollution from burning oil wells) by the 11th Marines’ various detection devices probably resulted in a significant number of false alarms and unnecessary transitions to MOPP Level 4. Operators were unfamiliar with some of the limitations and responses to interferents in a highly polluted environment. Detections by more sensitive equipment, considered false alarms, led to increasing reliance on equipment like the Fox and CAM—which were not optimized to detect relatively low airborne agent concentrations. Because the Fox, the CAM, and the XM21 were fielded late, Marines using these devices did not get sufficient training to fully grasp the respective capabilities and limitations.

The only first-hand medical document discovered was a memorandum dated March 11, 1991, from the 11th Marines regimental surgeon to the regimental commanding officer. It summarized the organization and implementation of medical treatment for the command—and included this statement; "No serious injuries or mortalities were received and no medical evacuations called" [during Operation Desert Storm].[210] If the 11th Marines operated in the presence of substantial chemical warfare agent, at least a few serious casualties would have shown up in these medical records.

In a recent interview, the regimental surgeon indicated that he and a small team were located with the logistics base. This is where any chemical casualties requiring decontamination were to be taken as the medical teams with the forward battalions could not stop and treat these casualties. The surgeon was not aware of any chemical casualties or any one in the 11th Marines claiming to have been exposed to chemical warfare agents. He believed he would have been notified if any of the forward teams (a doctor and about 12 corpsmen) had treated chemical casualties.[211]

Investigators also interviewed the chief Navy corpsman and one other medical corpsmen assigned to the 11th Marines. They recalled a few instances where Marines reported shortness of breath, dizziness, or eye irritation. These Marines were observed and chemical exposure was ruled out.[212]

Investigators requested that the office of the current 11th Marines regimental surgeon review any existing records from the Gulf War period for reports of chemical casualties. That office replied by telephone that they no longer retain these records.

If expert opinion is correct and Iraq neither deployed forward nor employed chemical warfare agents during the Gulf War, why did the 11th Marines initiate and record as many alerts as it did? Were there other explanations for the numerous alerts, even if chemical warfare agent was not present? A summary of the evidence follows.

A number of witnesses pointed out that the manner in which artillery units operated and maneuvered is different from infantry units in ways that probably affected NBC alerts and reactions. Basically, artillery elements "leapfrogged" each other during movement to provide continuous fire support cover. Consequently, they were in a fixed position for longer periods than infantry units and had the opportunity to observe more.[213]

The CO of the 11th Marines noted that having to remain stationary meant that their batteries could not "walk away from the stuff if there was a chemical attack." In addition, he believed that, in temporary fixed positions, artillery units could upgrade protective posture more easily and could afford to mask more than infantry units in response to alarms. Therefore, they were inclined to upgrade the MOPP level rather than take a chance.[214]

The 11th Marines’ CO was not surprised that the unit recorded a lot of incidents. He noted that the regiment monitored all of the division radio networks. Whenever anybody said "gas, gas, gas," they responded. He recalled that senior commanders liked to come to the artillery regiment because there they could find out what the whole division was doing rather than just one unit.[215] Other Marines agreed. It was the nature of artillery units. They had communications nets and liaison people over a wide area. They would pick up on a suspected NBC attack and report it on the artillery nets. Alerts "tended to spread like wildfire across unit boundaries and throughout artillery formations."[216] Some of the recipients of these alerts may not have been close enough to the source for masking to be rational, even if the distant threat had been real.

Several witnesses believed that those troops passing chemical alerts did not demonstrate proper discipline. This did not reflect just on the 11th Marines, but presumably on other units as well. An NBC officer noted that, while he had instructed his artillery battalion on proper NBC reporting procedures, the multitude of reports sometimes involved people panicking and reporting "gas, gas, gas." He thought that if the units had properly followed the reporting procedures, they could have avoided many instances of troops remaining in MOPP Level 4 for long periods.[217] One CO recalled that if anybody suspected CW, they got on the net and the alert spread like an "uncontrollable fire."[218] Another officer said their battalion NBC NCO became livid about the alerts, believing the detections were false. On one occasion, he went outside without his mask during an alert to underscore his point.[219] Noting that alerts often did not contain information on the initiating unit or location, another witness offered the opinion that proper procedure was not used in at least one instance he remembered.[220] An NBC NCO outside the 11th Marines thought that the regiment was most undisciplined in using the radios. Because of their Fire Support Coordination Center, their messages went all over the place. They reported other units’ alarms, as well as their own. He recalled that, at one point, an element of the regiment thought they were under gas attack, when in fact they were reacting to outgoing fire. The witness stated that there was so little discipline that he often could not tell who had originated an NBC-1 report.[221] In the words of a fire direction control man with the 11th Marines, alerts were "kind of like a chain reaction, word spread, people ran around."[222]

The NBC officer of the 11th Marines noted that alerts were to be sent up the chain of command, down, and laterally. He believed there was no practical alternative to radioing alerts. The problem was that one unit would initiate an alert and it would circle the network. Consequently, it often appeared there had been more than one incident when there had not been. He recognized there were spurious alerts causing units to go to MOPP Level 4, but could not figure an alternative solution. He noted that most of those initiating alerts did not file a formal NBC-1 report even though they theoretically should have. (The format contains entries for time, location, unit, nature of the threat, etc. See discussion of the NBC reporting system in the Glossary at TAB A.) He attributed this partly to the press of battle and fatigue.[223] Another observer noted that the 11th Marines had five battalions for the ground campaign but only one NBC officer at the regiment. Members of the 11th Marines assumed that, as artillery, the enemy would try to take them out first. They took the NBC threat seriously. This witness thought the 11th Marines NBC officer did a "hell of a job."[224]

Investigators analyzed whether the 11th Marines trained or indoctrinated personnel differently than other units in the 1st Marine Division. Such differences might help to explain the number of alerts. In pursuing this line of questioning, there was no intention of making value judgments about what was correct--only what might have been "different."

Several witnesses suggested that elements of the 11th Marines might have been more cautious about chemical threats than other units. An NBC officer with the 1st Marine Division pointed to the influence of the 11th Marines NBC officer. He described this Marine as careful and inclined to play it safe by reporting possible chemical weapons.[225]

The 11th Marines personnel received the following training during Operation Desert Shield: testing and reporting of chemical incidents, handling of casualties, unmasking procedures, and decontamination of equipment.[226]

As the CO of the 11th Marines pointed out, the 11th Marines had only three subordinate battalions for most of Operation Desert Shield. Shortly before the beginning of the ground campaign, the 3/12 from Okinawa arrived and was integrated. He recalled that A Battery, 1/11, and two reserve batteries (the H and I Batteries, 14th Marines) also joined the regiment. To optimize experience level across the regiment, the CO reassigned some batteries between battalions. He noted that the late arriving units did not have the full benefit of in-theater training. This could have affected the way they reacted to alert situations.[227]

One battalion in particular, the 1/11, reported a significant number of NBC alerts after the beginning of the ground campaign. One NBC officer indicated that the 1/11 was quite diligent in their NBC procedures and was "quick to go to MOPP-4."[228] The 1/11 CO noted that the A Battery of his battalion had a very active NBC monitoring team. Their people were very "up on what they were doing." However, he did not have a sense at the time that the 1/11 was getting more readings than anybody else. "So, I didn’t have a sense, gee whiz, we were at the epicenter of all these incidents. It seemed to me that there were other units reporting things that we were responding to."[229] Asked if he thought the NBC teams in the 1/11 were more aggressive than others, an NBC officer with the 1/11 said he did not know, but basically thought everybody was aggressive.[230]

Without an extensive cross-unit survey, it is difficult to judge objectively whether the 11th Marines NBC training differed from other units. Nevertheless, investigators asked some witnesses to reflect on this issue. One NBC NCO with the 1/12 noted that for five months they did nothing but train in NBC. He said, "We did so much training, preparing to fight in an NBC environment that, yeah, maybe we were a little anxious."[231] The CO of the 3/12 suggested that, as a result of their training, the Marines may have been "over prepared" for an NBC environment. He said that any lance corporal who smelled something or saw unusual smoke could get on the radio and cause the Marines to go to MOPP Level 4.[232] The NBC officer of the 11th Marines attributed the number of his unit’s alerts to "thorough training" and emphasized that he personally instructed every battery on NBC procedures. He put the number of alerts in a positive context.[233]

It appears clear from the available evidence that there were systemic factors contributing to the level of 11th Marines alerts. In some cases, these factors appeared to affect certain subordinate elements of the regiment more than others.

The distinctive maneuver pattern of artillery units probably provided them with more opportunity to observe their surroundings, run chemical detection equipment, and report suspicious activity. They alternately leapfrogged ahead, with some batteries always in place and ready to fire to protect division forces. Therefore, they remained stationary more than infantry units, which moved more steadily. Sitting in fixed positions and not being able to immediately move away from suspected chemical fires meant that artillery batteries were more motivated to respond to chemical alerts and could do so more easily than infantry units.

From these observations emerges a consensus that the extensive artillery coordination networks contributed to the spread of alerts far and wide--even to some units that were too far away to be at risk and units not down wind. This communications capability—combined with questionable discipline in providing key information about potential threats-- probably sowed some confusion and generated over reaction.

During Operation Desert Shield, 13 firing batteries of the 11th Marines (out of the eventual 16) trained extensively in NBC defense. Three of the regiment’s batteries arrived shortly before the ground campaign. The reduced in-theater NBC training may have contributed on the margin to incident levels.

Based on collected data, it appears that the NBC officer of the 11th Marines was comparatively conservative in approach and that this approach was probably passed on to the subordinate units during training. (The 11th Marines NBC officer noted that he trained every battery). Between safety and the negative impact of going to MOPP Level 4, safety was generally favored within the 11th Marines—partly perhaps because of its pattern of deployment. Some battalions—particularly the 5/11 and the 3/12—seemed less safety-minded than others and instituted restraining procedures (like requiring a CO decision before masking in response to outside alerts). The perception of spurious alerts can have its own impact on safety. One battalion NBC NCO referred to a "yelling wolf type syndrome."[234]

Investigators recognize that their observations have the advantage of hindsight. The 11th Marines and other elements of the 1st Marine Division penetrated the part of Kuwait where the enemy probably most expected an attack. Iraq had chemical weapons and had used them in the past. Artillery units probably would have been priority targets. During part of the fighting, Marine units operated with restricted visibility from oil well fires and had to feel their way forward against an enemy they might not be able to see. There was incoming fire. Stress was a natural reaction. As the CO of the 11th Marines noted, "It was not an academic exercise."[235] It was, however, a successful one.

As a final observation, investigators conclude that their extensive research on 11th Marines NBC incidents produced no clear evidence to refute the belief of United Nations inspectors and others that Iraq chose not to move chemical warfare munitions into Kuwait before or during the war.

This narrative concludes that the elements of the 11th Marines used the NBC indications and information they received to try to protect their forces from CWA exposure while focusing on their critical mission of supporting infantry units. They tried to do the right thing. With benefit of hindsight, lessons learned can be extracted from their experience that hopefully will help prepare Marine forces for future operations in the face of NBC threats.

Many witnesses interviewed noted that some units sometimes failed to apply proper procedures and discipline in handling chemical alerts. In particular, they:

• Broadcast "gas, gas, gas" and similar alerts over tactical radio networks without clear evidence of a chemical attack (for example, when observing incoming fire at a distance); and
• Failed to note "who, what, where, and when" in initiating or passing NBC alerts.

Consequently, some units had no choice but to increase their protective postures to MOPP Level 4 as a precaution. They often did not know if the triggering "threat" was upwind, nearby or actually chemical. Had the Gulf War happened in warmer weather, inappropriate protective posture increases might have had a much greater impact on operations and could have contributed to heat stress casualties.

U.S. forces in Operation Desert Storm had established procedures for reporting and disseminating alerts based on confirmed chemical attacks. (See NBC Reports described in Tab A.) They had no procedures, however, for reporting precautionary increases in protective posture based on sighting incoming fire, unusual clouds, etc. Consequently, some Marines used the "gas, gas, gas" warning to their unit comrades. This warning was passed to other units by radio operators, sometimes without direction from senior unit command or operations officers. For example, one witness observed that any lance corporal that smelled something or saw unusual smoke could get on the radio and cause the Marines to go to MOPP Level 4.

Conversely, to reduce the impact of chemical warnings that they could not evaluate, some commanding officers eventually required their personal approval for their unit to respond to NBC alerts from anyone but higher headquarters or their own Marines. This could have reduced their units’ NBC readiness in the face of real chemical threats.

Investigators offer the following suggestions to address these problems:

• Develop separate procedures for situations in which someone perceives a chemical threat from ambiguous indications. This would permit the affected unit to increases its local protective posture as a precaution, advise other units and echelons of this action, but not trigger inappropriate responses until NBC personnel could evaluate the threat. These procedures should clearly distinguish precautionary action from warnings based on confirmed chemical threats.
• Whether the result of precautionary alerts or detection of real chemical warfare agent, all personnel in a position to radio NBC alerts to other units should use a common format for alert dissemination. This format should include the initiating unit, the action taken, the cause of the alert, the location, and the time. Posting a simple format on or near appropriate tactical radios might help assure compliance under the pressure of combat. This system would compliment the existing NBC Reports initiated primarily by NBC personnel and help assure things do not get out of hand before such NBC experts can bring their judgment to bear.

As previously noted, personnel sometimes used NBC detection equipment in ways for which it was not designed or optimized. In particular, both the CAM and the Fox reconnaissance vehicle were mainly used to "sniff" ambient air some distance from the ground. Both of these equipment models were optimized to detect CWA at close range (and consequently higher concentrations). The CAM was designed to sort contaminated from uncontaminated personnel and vehicles. The Fox was developed to map out and mark terrain contaminated with persistent agent. Neither piece of equipment was optimized to provide initial chemical attack warning.

Because of trust in "new" technology equipment, Marines sometimes relied on devices considerably less sensitive than chemical agent detectors built specifically to sample ambient air. In the case of the Fox vehicle, the threshold for detection in the "air-hi" mode was higher than the agent concentration that would cause casualties. In the face of an actual chemical attack, relying on the Fox as a substitute for other devices could result in missed early warnings and increased chemical casualties. Marines had inadequate understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the various chemical warfare agent detectors, partly because the Marine Corps fielded some of these devices shortly before the ground campaign and partly because of operations in levels of pollution unanticipated by equipment designers.

Investigators suggest this action:

• Since the Gulf War, most chemical agent detectors have improved, with additional improvements expected in the future. Hardware upgrades should be accompanied by a better understanding by combat personnel of device capabilities relative to alternative detectors. NBC personnel should be most knowledgeable of the details, but rank-and-file Marines also must know better what they can expect from the NBC detection equipment they might use.
• DOD should expedite work on a chemical agent monitor to replace the M8 that can detect nerve and mustard agents at low concentrations in ambient air but rejects registering false positives for common battlefield interferents.

During the ground campaign, as presumed "false alarms" for chemical agents accumulated, the commanding officers of the 5/11 and the 3/12 put in place procedural "fire breaks" to control reaction to NBC alerts. Increases in protective posture required CO authorization if an alert came from outside the unit or its higher headquarters. The other battalions generally continued to respond to external alerts by automatic increases in protective posture.

Both approaches have potential drawbacks. In the heat of battle, commanding officers may not always be available to make timely protective posture decisions. Any delay in precautionary measures could risk chemical warfare agent exposure and casualties. Conversely, indiscriminate response to alerts of unknown origin may cause units to suffer degraded performance—a problem that gets worse with each increase in MOPP level. The time it takes to upgrade protective posture also can rob tactical momentum and consequently increase threats from enemy engagement.

Investigators suggest:

• The Marine Corps should put in place additional limits on the authority to initiate protective posture increases—at least until enemy employment of chemical weapons has been confirmed. Authority for directing protective posture increases based on NBC alerts radioed from outside a unit’s chain of command should be restricted to the commanding officer, executive officer, on-duty operations officer, and, in the absence of these individuals, the NBC officer. Trained NBC personnel, of course, would continue to bear special responsibility for evaluating threats and advising command and operations personnel. This arrangement would avoid relying solely on the commanding officer to make decisions.
• Radio operators should not pass on NBC alert messages without explicit direction from command, operations, or duty watch officers.

This and other investigations have brought into sharp focus the strengths and weaknesses of NBC documentation practices in the Gulf War. Investigators often faced inadequate or conflicting information on NBC incidents and other issues of significance for veterans’ health. The Marine Corps practice of requiring regular unit chronologies—with detailed documentation as attachments—helped greatly and served as a solid foundation for recreating a sequence of chemical incidents for the 11th Marines. Often, however, detail was scant, and witnesses had difficulty recalling additional information.

Post-war interviews by Captain T. F. Manley, USMC, covered chemical defense issues days after the end of the Gulf War while Marine 1st Division participants’ memories were still fresh. Captain Manley’s report (see Bibliography, Tab E), and transcripts of interviews on which that report was based, gave investigators valuable analytical input.

Perhaps only with hindsight can we now understand the importance of contemporary documentation of NBC (and other operational) activity. Current and future combat deployments may raise similar questions about long-term health impacts. Investigators understand that documenting action in the fury and fog of war is a challenge, and record keeping must not be allowed to jeopardize operational objectives. Still, the need and difficulty of reconstructing important details of combat events suggest the need for a reasonable enhancement of documentation procedures. With this in mind, investigators propose:

• The Marine Corps and Army should assess continuous audio recording of conversation and tactical radio traffic in fixed or mobile command posts during combat operations. Operations personnel should use these recordings to register comments and observations and help put ongoing activity in context. These tapes should be preserved and controlled as official documentation and archived.
• The Services should provide operations personnel with enhanced procedures emphasizing the need for basic detail in recording NBC alerts and incidents. Logs of incoming radio traffic should identify the sender.
• Whenever possible, Fox crews should take detailed MM1 spectra when a chemical warning registers on the equipment. The spectra should always be printed out on paper tape or saved in digital form. This data must be treated as essential historical evidence. Where possible, the originating unit should make and retain copies and forward the original through channels to a single collection point. The data should be controlled with chain of custody maintained.
• In the future, objective outside experts should debrief all who are associated with a suspected or confirmed NBC incident—much as Captain Manley did after the Gulf War. Debriefers should have detailed guidance on the information to collect and how to corroborate testimony. Interviewers should solicit personal journals and make copies of relevant information.
• In cases where personnel claim NBC exposure, but an NBC attack has not been confirmed, medical personnel should take extra care to assure timely evaluation and thorough documentation of symptoms. Medical interviews should be recorded (video preferred) and the recordings archived. Interviewers should solicit and document the names of others who might provide additional information on an incident. Documentation of NBC incidents should be kept indefinitely by respective medical units.
• The other Services should evaluate adopting the Marine Corps approach to maintaining detailed unit chronologies, particularly during preparation for and engagement in combat operations. This may require adjustment to current Service historical procedures.

Implementation of the suggestions above would require changes to NBC-related training. Specifically:

• Reporting, retransmitting, and logging NBC incident alerts (communications and operations personnel).
• Authorizing initiation or retransmission of alerts (command, operations, and NBC officers).
• Capabilities, limitations, and appropriate use of the various NBC detectors (all deployable personnel).
• Special documentation, routing, and archiving requirements for NBC incident-related information (command, operations, NBC, Fox crew, medical, and historian personnel).
• Post-operation interviewing regarding suspected NBC incidents (selected personnel at time of requirement).

This case is still being investigated. As additional information becomes available, it will be incorporated. If you have records, photographs, recollections, or find errors in the details reported, please contact the DOD Persian Gulf Task Force Hot Line at 1-800-472-6719.

AC Hydrocyanic Acid

AOR Area of Responsibility

ASP Ammunition Supply Point

BN Battalion

BTRY Battery

CAM Chemical Agent Monitor

CBT Combat

CE Combat Engineer

CG Commanding General

CMAT Case Management Action

CO Commanding Officer

COC Combat Operations Center

CP Command Post

CS Riot control agent ("tear gas")

CW Chemical Warfare

CW3 Chief Warrant Officer 3 (Army)

CWA Chemical Warfare Agent

CWO3 Chief Warrant Officer 3 (Marine Corps)

DET Detachment

DIA  Defense Intelligence Agency

DIV Division

DOD Department of Defense

DPICM Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition

DS Desert Shield (also) Desert Storm (also) Direct Support

DS2 A chemical decontamination fluid

DTG Date Time Group

EOD Explosive Ordnance

EPW Enemy Prisoner of War

FDC Fire Direction Center

FM Field Manual

FSC Fire Support Coordinator

FSCC Fire Support Coordination Center

FWD Forward

GA Tabun

GB Sarin

GD Soman

GF Cyclosarin

GS  General Support

GSR General Support Reinforcing

GWAPS Gulf War Air Power Survey

GySgt Gunnery Sergeant

H Mustard

HD Distilled Mustard

HE High Explosive

HQ Headquarters

HMMWV High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle

IAD Investigation and Analysis Directorate

ID Identification

IIR Intelligence Information Report

K Kilometer

KM Kilometer

L Lewisite

Loc Location

LtCol Lieutenant Colonel

MAG Marine Air Group

MAR Marine

MARDIV Marine Division

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force

MG Machine Gun

mm Millimeter

MOPP Mission Oriented Protective Posture

MRL Multiple Rocket Launcher

N/A Not Applicable

NBC Nuclear, Biological, Chemical

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer

NM Nautical Mile

OPER Operation

OPS Operations

OSAGWI Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses

RAP Rocket Assisted Projectile

PB (Task Force) Papa Bear

RCT Regimental Combat Team

RSCAAL Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm

S-2 Intelligence Officer

S-3 Operations Officer

S-3A Assistant Operations Officer

S-3Z Officer Working in Operations Section

SHELREP Shelling Report

SMCR Selective Marine Corps

SOCENT Special Operations Command Central

TACNET Tactical Radio Network

TF Task Force

TRAFCON Traffic Control

TSgt Technical Sergeant

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UN United Nations

UKN Unknown

US United States

USAF United States Air Force

USMC United States Marine Corps

UTM Universal Transverse Mercator (map projection)

Vic Vicinity

WASHDC Washington D.C.

WO Warrant Officer

WP White Phosphorous

XO Executive Officer

Z Zulu Time (Universal Mean Time)

Berm

An earthen mound.

Blister Agents

Mustard (H) gas was used during the later parts of World War I. In its pure state, mustard is colorless and almost odorless. The name mustard comes from earlier methods of production that yielded an impure, mustard or rotten-onion smelling product.

Distilled mustard (HD) was originally produced from H by a purification process of washing and vacuum distillation. HD is a colorless to amber colored liquid with a garlic-like odor. It has less odor and a slightly greater blistering power than H and is more stable in storage. It is used as a delayed action casualty agent, the duration of which depends upon the munitions used and the weather. HD is heavier than water, but small droplets will float on the water surface and present a hazard.

Heavily splashed liquid mustard persists one to two days or more in concentrations that produce casualties of military significance under average weather conditions and a week to months under very cold conditions. HD on soil remains vesicant for about two weeks. The persistency in running water is only a few days, while the persistency in stagnant water can be several months. HD is about twice as persistent in seawater.

Mustard acts first as a cell irritant and finally as a cell poison on all tissue surfaces contacted. Early symptoms include inflammation of the eyes; inflammation of the nose, throat, trachea, bronchi and lung tissue; and redness of the skin. Blistering or ulceration is also likely to occur. Other effects may include vomiting and fever that begin around the same time as the skin starts to redden.

Eyes are very sensitive to mustard in low concentrations: Skin damage requires a much larger concentration. HD causes casualties at lower concentrations in hot, humid weather, because the body is moist with perspiration. Wet skin absorbs more mustard than dry skin absorbs. HD has a very low detoxification rate. Repeated exposures, therefore, are cumulative in the body.

Individuals can protect themselves from small mustard droplets or vapor by wearing protective masks and permeable protective clothing. The use of impermeable clothing and masks can protect against large droplets, splashes and smears.

Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM)

The CAM was a hand-held, soldier-operated post-attack device for monitoring chemical agent contamination on personnel and equipment. It detected vapors of chemical agents by sensing molecular ions of specific mobilities (time to pass through a series of baffles). The monitor detects and discriminates between vapors of nerve and mustard agents. It was employed in both monitoring and survey missions and was designed primarily to sort contaminated from clean vehicles, equipment, and personnel. It has been replaced with the Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM).

False Responses/Interferents: The CAM may give false readings when used in enclosed spaces or when sampling near strong vapor sources (i.e., in dense smoke). Some vapors known to give false readings are: aromatic vapors (perfumes, food flavorings, some aftershaves, peppermints, cough lozenges, and menthol cigarettes when vapors are exhaled directly into the nozzle), cleaning compounds (disinfectants, methyl salicylate, menthol, etc.), smokes and fumes (exhaust from some rocket motors, fumes from some munitions) and some wood preservative treatments (polychlorinated biphenyls or PCBs) when in an enclosed space. The operator should "experiment" in his environment to determine what common items will cause his CAM to respond.

Fox NBC Reconnaissance System

During the Gulf War, the Fox vehicle was provided by Germany and modified for use by US forces. It was designed as a high-speed, high-mobility, armored carrier capable of performing NBC reconnaissance on primary, secondary or cross-country routes. It could detect chemical contamination in its immediate environment through point detection.

During Operation Desert Storm, the Fox vehicle’s MM-1 detector continually monitored against a target list of approximately 10 selected chemical agents most likely to be present, based on intelligence reports and the suspected chemical threat--such as Tabun (GA), Sarin (GB), Soman (GD), VX (VX), S-Mustard (HD), Lewisite (L), Phosgene (CG), Hydrocyanic Acid (AC), Cyclosarin (GF), and (as interferents) Fat, Oil, Wax. To speed the initial search, the MM-1 looks for only four ion peaks for each chemical and attempts to match the pattern and ratio of these peaks against the target list of chemicals. If an initial match is made with these four ion peaks, the MM-1 sounds an alarm. However, this first alarm does not confirm the presence of a chemical agent since there are many chemical "interferents" that have similar ion peaks and many combinations of chemicals that may yield ion patterns similar to those in the target list. Consequently the MM-1 can falsely indicate the presence of dangerous chemicals.

A "false positive" is an initial alert for a dangerous chemical that is not present. To positively determine what chemical is present, the MM-1 operator must run a spectrum to analyze all the ions present, not just the four (peaks) used in the initial alert. The spectrum of the suspected chemical is compared to all the detection algorithms stored in the MM-1 chemical library. If a match is found, the MM-1 confirms the initial alert. If a match is not found, the MM-1 displays "unknown." For later analysis and a permanent record of the alarm, the complete ion spectrum by atomic weight can be printed on the Fox tape; however, this is a manual function that the operator must perform and is not an automatic feature of the system. See also the Information Paper on the Fox Reconnaissance Vehicle at this site.

M256A1 Chemical Agent Detection Kit

The M256A1 kit is a portable, expendable item capable of detecting and identifying hazardous concentrations of chemical agent. It is designed to detect Blister, Blood, and Nerve agents. In the field, this kit was called simply the M256.

The M256 kit is used after a chemical alert to determine if it is safe to unmask. The M256A1 kit has replaced the M256 kit. The only difference between the two kits is that the M256A1 kit will detect lower levels of nerve agent. This improvement was accomplished by using an eel enzyme for the nerve test in the M256A1 kit in place of the horse enzyme used in the M256 kit.

False Responses/Interferents: Some smokes, high temperatures, DS2 (a chemical decontamination fluid), and petroleum products may cause false readings. Results may be inaccurate where sampling is done in smoke from burning debris.

M8 Chemical Agent Detector Paper

M8 Paper detects and identifies liquid chemical agents (Blister and Nerve).

M8 Paper is widely distributed on the battlefield. Each soldier has a booklet in his protective mask carrier. It is also found in the carrying case for the M256AI Kit and in the M18A2 Chemical Agent Detection Kit. M8 Paper is used any time the soldier suspects liquid contamination is present. The paper must touch the liquid agent. It does not detect vapors. It is best suited for use on non-porous materials. Since M8 paper will also change color from many interferents, it is unreliable to check for completeness of decontamination. M8 paper is never used as a sole basis for agent identification. It must always be verified with more reliable means of identification (e.g., M256AI Kit). Also, soldiers have some difficulty identifying the color change at night and differentiating it from wet paper.

False Responses/Interferents: M8 Paper responds to some common battlefield interferents. Among them are certain cleaning solvents (ammonia), DS2, "Break Free" (a weapons cleaner and lubricant), high temperatures, and some petroleum products.

M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm System

The M8A1 is an automatic chemical agent detection and warning system designed to detect the presence of nerve agent vapors or inhalable aerosols. The M8A1 will automatically signal the presence of the nerve agent in the air by providing troops with both an audible and visible warning. The M8A1 was fielded to replace the wet chemical M8 detector with a dry system; this eliminated the M229 refill kit, the logistic burden, and the associated cost. The M8A1 operates in a fixed, portable, or vehicle-mounted configuration. In the field, it was just called the M8.

False Responses/Interferents: The M43A1 (detector component) will false alarm to heavy concentrations of rocket propellant smoke, screening smoke, signaling smoke, engine exhausts, burning fuel, insecticides, paint fumes, cigarette smoke, aftershave, and whenever a nuclear blast occurs.

See also the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses Information Paper, M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm, Oct. 30, 1997.

M9 Chemical Agent Detector Paper

M9 Paper is a portable, expendable single roll of paper that comes with mylar-adhesive backed and coated tape. It is used by ground forces and is placed on personnel and equipment to identify the presence of liquid chemical agent aerosols. The paper contains a suspension of an agent-sensitive dye in a paper matrix. It is colored a pale green with insoluble pigments. It will turn pink, red, reddish-brown, or red-purple when exposed to liquid agent and can detect but does not identify the specific agent.

M9 Paper is the most widely used method of detecting liquid chemical agents. It is more sensitive and reacts more rapidly than M8 Paper. The self-adhesive paper attaches to most surfaces. The paper is wrapped around the lower left sleeve, upper right sleeve, and on one lower leg of the overgarment. It is also normally attached to larger equipment that the soldier will be "handling" (crew served weapons, vehicle controls, etc.). As soon as M9 Paper indicates the presence of chemical agents, soldiers must take protective action.

False Responses/Interferents: M9 Paper responds to some common battlefield interferents. Among them are petroleum products, brake fluid, aircraft cleaning compound, DS2, insect repellent, sand color camouflage stick, smoke, defoliant, ethylene glycol (antifreeze), and scuffs of dirt or mud. The M9 Paper will not respond to chemical agents when wet and will give false positive indications when abraded against a rough surface. Heat may cause M9 Paper to turn red and cause false positive readings.

Problems exist during night operations and because of interferents. When under "red light" conditions, it is not possible to identify a color change ("Red light" conditions are those in which soldiers normally use red lenses on their flashlights and other lights at night in order to decrease their observability). Commanders must periodically rotate soldiers into a white light area to check M9 Paper for a color change.

Mark 19

The Mark 19 is a 40mm machine gun that can fire a variety of grenades including rounds that are lethal to personnel within about 16 feet and can pierce armor up to two inches thick. It is link-belt fed and is sometimes mounted on vehicles like the HMMWV.

Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP)

The wearing of MOPP gear provides soldiers protection against all known chemical agents, live biological agents, and toxins. MOPP gear consists of the following items:

• Overgarment (two-piece chemical suit)
• Overboots
• Mask ("gas mask") with hood
• Gloves

When a person is wearing MOPP gear, they can not work for very long nor can they work very fast. They may also suffer mental distress as a result of feeling closed in and will suffer from heat stress and heat exhaustion when working in warm temperatures and at high work rates. The MOPP concept arose from the need to balance individual protection with the threat, temperature, and urgency of the mission.

Commanders can raise or lower the amount of protection through five levels of MOPP. In addition, commanders can exercise a mask-only option.

• MOPP Level Zero: Individuals must carry their protective mask with them at all times. Their remaining MOPP Gear must be readily available (i.e., within the work area, fighting position, living space, etc.).
• MOPP Level One: Individuals wear their overgarment. They must carry the rest of their MOPP gear.
• MOPP Level Two: Individuals wear their overgarment and overboots and carry the mask with hood and gloves.
• MOPP Level Three: Individuals wear their overgarment, overboots, and mask with hood. They carry the gloves.
• MOPP Level Four: Individuals wear all their MOPP gear.

See also the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses Information Paper, Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) And Chemical Protection, Oct. 30, 1997.

NBC Reports

NBC Reports are formatted messages designed to rapidly disseminate key information on NBC threats:

• NBC 1 Report. The observing unit uses this report to give basic initial and follow-up data about an NBC attack. Battalion and higher elements consolidate reports and decide which to forward.
• NBC 2 Report. The NBC 2 report is based on two or more NBC 1 reports. It is used to pass evaluated data to units, usually by Division and higher elements.
• NBC 3 Report. This report disseminates information on predicted downwind hazard areas based on analysis of NBC 1 reports. Each unit evaluates the NBC 3 report, determines which of its subordinate units may be affected, and further disseminates the report as required.
• NBC 4 Report. When a unit detects NBC hazards through monitoring, survey, or reconnaissance, this information is forwarded as an NBC 4 report (normally from company level).
• NBC 5 Report. Once NBC 4 reports are posted on a situation map, an NBC 5 report is prepared showing contaminated areas. This report normally is disseminated as map overlays by division level.
• NBC 6 Report. This report, summarizing information concerning a chemical or biological attack, is prepared at battalion and submitted to higher headquarters only when requested.

Nerve Agents

Nerve agents are organophosphate ester derivatives of phosphoric acid. They are generally divided into the G-agents, which in the unmodified state are volatile (easily vaporized), and the V-agents, which tend to be more persistent. Even G-agents are capable of being thickened with various substances to increase the persistence and penetration of exposed skin. The principal nerve agents are Tabun (GA), Sarin (GB), Soman (GD), and VX. The G-agents are organophosphates containing either fluorine or cyanide. In pure form they are colorless liquids. Their solubility in water ranges from complete solubility for GB to almost total insolubility for GD. They have a weakly fruity odor but in field concentrations are odorless. Clothing gives off G-agents for about 30 minutes after contact with vapor. The V-agents are organophosphorous compounds containing sulfur. They are oily liquids with high boiling points; they do not vaporize easily and are consequently highly persistent. They are therefore primarily contact hazards and are exceptionally toxic. Nevertheless, the limited amount of vapor they do produce is enough to be a hazard if inhaled. They do not mix with or spread through water, and any chemical reaction with water is minimal. V-agents affect the body in essentially the same manner as G-agents.

The nerve agents are not really "gasses;" technically, they are all viscous liquids and are spread in the form of liquid drops. Since G-agents vaporize easily, they become rapidly lethal in an airborne state. GB, for instance, vaporizes so easily that small droplets sprayed from a plane or released from a shell exploding in the air may never reach the ground. Consequently, GB is largely a vapor hazard. At the other extreme, agent VX hardly vaporizes at all—making it mainly a liquid contact hazard. Physical harm can occur from the spray falling on one’s skin or clothes and from touching surfaces on which the spray has fallen. GD is also mainly a vapor hazard, while GA contaminates surfaces for a sufficiently long time to be a contact hazard. Thickeners added to GD increase persistence in the field. The thickened agents form large droplets—thereby concentrating the agent reaching the ground and making the contact hazard greater. The ability of GB and GA to mix with water means that water can wash these agents off surfaces, that these agents can easily contaminate water sources, and that they will not penetrate skin as readily as the more fat-soluble agents VX and GD. G-agents spread rapidly on surfaces (like skin); VX spreads less rapidly, and the thickened agents very slowly. The moist surfaces in the lungs absorb all the agents very well.

Both G-agents and V-agents have the same physiological action on humans. They are potent inhibitors of the enzyme acetylcholinesterase (AChE), which is required for the proper function of many nerves and muscles in nearly every multicellular animal. Normally, AChE prevents the accumulation of acetylcholine after its release in the nervous system. Acetylcholine plays a vital role in stimulating voluntary muscles and nerve endings of the autonomic nervous system and many structures within the central nervous system. Thus, nerve agents that are cholinesterase inhibitors permit acetylcholine to accumulate at those sites, mimicking the effects of a massive acetylcholine release, and striking particularly skeletal muscles, parasympathetic end organs, and the central nervous system. Individuals poisoned by nerve agents may display the following symptoms:

• Difficulty in breathing.
• Drooling and excessive sweating.>
• Nausea.
• Vomiting, cramps, and loss of bladder/bowel control.
• Twitching, jerking, and staggering.
• Headache, confusion, drowsiness, coma, and convulsion.

The number and severity of symptoms depend on the quantity and path of entry into the body. When the agent is inhaled, the pupils of the eyes often pinpoint, reducing the amount of incoming light and dimming visions. If exposure is through the skin or by ingestion, however, the pupils may be normal or only slightly to moderately reduced in size. In this event, correct diagnosis depends on recognizing the other symptoms of nerve agent poisoning. Exposure through the eyes produces a very rapid onset of symptoms (usually in less than 2 to 3 minutes). Respiratory exposure usually brings on symptoms in 2 to 5 minutes. Lethal doses kill in less than 15 minutes. Liquid in the eye kills nearly as rapidly as respiratory exposure. Symptoms appear much more slowly from skin absorption. Skin absorption great enough to cause death may take one to two hours to become fatal. Respiratory lethal dosages kill in one to ten minutes, and liquid in the eye kills nearly as rapidly. Very small skin dosages sometimes cause local sweating and tremors but little other effects. Nerve agents are cumulative poisons. Repeated exposure to low concentrations, if not too far apart, will produce symptoms. The treatment of nerve agent poisoning includes the use of the nerve agent antidote (atropine and 2-PAM chloride). Atropine blocks acetylcholine, and 2-PAM Cl reactivates the enzyme AChE. As time passes without treatment, the binding of nerve agents to AChE "ages" and the 2-PAM Cl can no longer remove the agent. Certain rapidly "aging" agents, like GD, may resist treatment if it is not prompt. Therefore, an antidote enhancer, pyridostigmine bromide (PB), is available to US forces in active theaters of operation. PB pretreatment increases the victim’s survivability when the antidote is used after exposure to nerve agents.

Sabkha

An Arabic term for a broad, salt-encrusted flat that only floods occasionally. There are three types, coastal, river-lake, and continental. Coastal sabkhas in arid regions become salt flats. Salt water is drawn into the pores of the sediment and evaporation from the surface causes concentration of seawater. Continental sabkhas (referred to in this narrative) are further inland and occur in low-lying basins in the desert. Surface crusts are formed by evaporation. The water table is near the surface, usually within one meter.

SCUD

Originally, the NATO nickname for a Soviet designed and built liquid propelled short-range ballistic missile. Iraq also produced an improved domestic version that it called the Al Hussein. Both versions could carry high explosive and chemical warheads. Coalition forces often referred to these missiles collectively as SCUDs.

Selective Unmasking

The Selective Unmasking procedure is designed to determine if, following an actual or suspected NBC attack, general unit-wide unmasking is safe. Two distinct procedures for unmasking existed during the Gulf War. The first involved the use of an M256/M256A1 Chemical Detection Kit. This procedure took approximately 15 minutes. The procedure is as follows: After all tests with the kit are negative, the senior soldier selects one or two soldiers for selective unmasking. Those selected unmask for 5 minutes, and then reseal and clear their masks. They are observed for 10 minutes. If no symptoms appear, it is safe to give the "all-clear" and unmask. The selected soldiers are further observed for possible delayed symptoms.

If an M256/M256A1 kit is not available, the second procedure is used. This unmasking procedure takes about 35 minutes. After a reasonable amount of time passes following an attack, the senior soldier selects one or two soldiers. Those selected take a deep breath, break the mask seals, and keep their eyes wide open for 15 seconds. After clearing and resealing their masks they are observed for 10 minutes. If no symptoms are observed, they again break the mask seals, take two or three breaths, and then clear and reseal their masks. Again, they are observed for 10 minutes, and if no symptoms appear, they completely unmask for 5 minutes and then remask. If no symptoms are observed in the 10 minutes following the last unmasking, everyone else in the unit can then unmask. The selected soldiers are further observed for any delayed symptoms.

Task Force

As used in this narrative, a task force is a tailored ("task organized") collection of forces drawn from various units and built around a core regimental combat team (an infantry regiment).

UAV

UAV stands for "Unmanned Aerial Vehicle." Also known as Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs), UAVs are powered vehicles that can fly autonomously, be piloted remotely, and are either expendable or recoverable. During the Gulf War, the Marine Corps used the RQ-2A Pioneer UAV. A 26 horsepower gasoline engine powered the RQ-2A, and it launched after either a rolling takeoff or rocket assisted takeoff. The Pioneer had a wingspan of 16.9 feet, a length of 14 feet, and a height of 3.3 feet.

The UAV is capable of locating and identifying major enemy forces, moving vehicles, weapons systems that are firing, and other targets. It can also help designate targets, detect mines, relay communications/data, or intercept enemy signals. The UAV can carry a variety of non-lethal payloads (including real-time imagery equipment for target acquisition and airborne data relay) and lethal payloads.

During the Gulf War, UAV companies deployed to the theater to support of Marine forces. These companies performed Battle Damage Assessments (BDA), airborne search and rescue surveillance, and route and landing zone reconnaissance. Artillery battalions during the war successfully used UAVs to locate targets and adjust artillery fires on the enemy. UAV information went to a separate Ground Control Station or directly to the artillery unit’s Video Terminal. This provided the unit commander immediate access to real time information.

XM21 Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL)

At the time of the Gulf War, the XM21 was a prototype (experimental) device--hence the "X"M21. It detects nerve and blister agent vapor clouds at line-of-sight distances out to 5 km. The XM21 alarm automatically scans a 60-degree arc, in seven field-of-view segments, to detect agent clouds. It is a passive infrared device, which operates by analyzing emission and absorption spectra in the 8-12 micron range. Due to its infrared technology, the environment in which it is employed affects the XM21. A difference in temperature between the background and an agent cloud is required for detection. While temperature differences always exist, the difference is small during certain periods, e.g., dusk, dawn, and periods of significant cloud cover. Water vapor levels in the atmosphere also effect the detector’s sensitivity level.

False Responses/Interferents: While the XM21 is designed to recognize chemical warfare agents in the presence of common battlefield interferents, certain interferents, such as organophosphorous insecticides and large quantities of military Halon (a fire suppressant) could cause false positives. It is also possible that certain contaminants or a low power supply could cause false alarms.[252]

Total Guns: 120

Note: During Desert Storm, the 11th Marines included two battalions from the 12th Marines, the 1st Battalion, 12th Marines (1/12) and the 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines (3/12). Most of the 10th Marines batteries supported the 2d Marine Division. The batteries of the 14th Marines, H Battery and I Battery, were Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) units activated for the Gulf War.

The additional units listed below were not necessarily involved in 11th Marines chemical alerts. Some were directly involved in a few alerts, i.e. Task Force Papa Bear in incident Q. Others were mentioned in logs, journals, etc., and were at times located near 11th Marine positions. We list them here because they are referenced in either the 11th Marines Case Narrative or supporting documentation. A minus sign (-) indicates that only a portion of the unit was included.

Regimental Combat Team 7 (Task Force Ripper)

• Headquarters, 7th Marines
• 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1/7) (-)
• Company D, 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion
• Company A, 3rd Tank Battalion
• Obstacle Clearing Detachment, 1st Combat Engineer Battalion
• 3rd Tank Battalion (-)
• Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (A/1/7)
• 1st Combat Engineer Battalion (-)
• Detachment, 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion
• Company D, 3rd Light Armored Infantry Battalion
• 2d Platoon (motorized), Company C, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion

Regimental Combat Team 1 (Task Force Papa Bear)

• Headquarters, 1st Marines1st Battalion
• 1st Marines (1/1)
• Company B, 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion
• 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines (3/9) (-)
• Company C, 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion
• Company B, 1st Tank Battalion
• Obstacle Clearing Detachment, 1st Combat Engineer Battalion
• 1st Tank Battalion (-)
• Company I, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines (I/3/9)
• Engineer Task Force (1st Combat Engineer Detachment)
• Company A, 1st Combat Engineer Battalion
• Company A, 7th Engineer Support Battalion
• Detachment, 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion
• 1st Platoon, Battery B, 3rd Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion

Regimental Combat Team 3 (Task Force Taro)

• Headquarters, 3rd Marines
• 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines
• 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines
• Section C, 1st Platoon, Battery B, 3rd Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion
• 3rd Platoon, Company A, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion
• 3rd Platoon (motorized), Company C, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion
• Team 2, 1st Platoon, Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion

Regimental Combat Team 4 (Task Force Grizzly)

• Headquarters, 4th Marines
• 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines
• 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines
• Detachment, Truck Company, Headquarters Battalion
• 2nd Platoon, Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion
• 1st Platoon (motorized), Company D, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion

11th Marine Regiment

1st Marine Expeditionary Force (1MEF)

Initial Reporting

A log entry at 3:00 a.m. on Jan. 18, 1991, originally thought to be from an 11th Marines element, contained the entry, "NBC team on 100% alert." At 4:00 a.m., another entry indicated "NBC Team going to 50% alert."[255]

Additional Evidence

After the Gulf War, this log was archived with materials associated with the 1/12. However, on closer inspection, it was determined that the operations officers for the 3rd Marines (Task Force Taro) kept the log. An authoritative source indicated that there were no SCUD launches into the coastal areas of Saudi Arabia at the cited time.[256]

Assessment

This incident was set aside and was not investigated further. It may be considered for analysis as part of another investigation.

Initial Reporting

A log entry for 11:10 p.m. on Jan. 29, noted that a gas alert was passed. It was not clear if the message was outgoing or incoming. Thirty minutes later, the log recorded an "all clear." Approximately 35 minutes after the alert, the log indicated an NBC-1 report came in from the 3/3 (in Task Force Taro).[257]

Assessment

As with event 1A, this alert was initially misidentified as associated with the 11th Marines. Therefore, it was set aside.

Initial Reporting

Just before noon on the first day of the ground campaign (Feb. 24), Marine Air Group 26 (MAG-26) reported nerve agent about 11 miles southwest of Al Jaber airfield. A few minutes later, an NBC-1 (initial incident report) was filed.[258] Another official chronology echoed these events verbatim.[259]

Additional Evidence

Available reporting contained nothing further on the detection process, who masked as a result, or if an "all clear" was sounded. At the time, the nearest 11th Marines element was a forward-deployed component of the 3/11 located about nine miles to the southeast of the reported CW threat.[260] No documentation or testimony indicated that this alert affected any part of the 11th Marines or that they even received it.

Assessment

This incident was set aside and was not investigated further.

Initial Reporting

At 1:00 p.m. on February 26, a command chronology for the 1st Combat Engineer Battalion noted a report of "Flash! Gas!" and that Task Force Papa Bear went to MOPP Level 4. The "all clear" came an hour later.[261]

Additional Evidence

There is no evidence that the 11th Marines recorded or reacted to this alert, although the 1/11 directly supported Task Force Papa Bear at the time. No witness recalled an alert at this time.

Assessment

Because there was no evidence that this incident affected 11th Marine units, this incident was set aside and was not investigated further.

Initial Reporting

At 1:00 p.m. on February 26, a command chronology for the 1st Combat Engineer Battalion noted a report of "Flash! Gas!" and that Task Force Papa Bear went to MOPP Level 4. The "all clear" came an hour later.[261]

Additional Evidence

There is no evidence that the 11th Marines recorded or reacted to this alert, although the 1/11 directly supported Task Force Papa Bear at the time. No witness recalled an alert at this time.

Assessment

Because there was no evidence that this incident affected 11th Marine units, this incident was set aside and was not investigated further.

Initial Reporting

At 10:20 a.m., on the morning the Coalition attack through the obstacle belts in Kuwait began (Feb. 24), 11th Marine elements were instructed to go to MOPP Level 2.[263] During the same timeframe, intelligence reported preparation for, and conduct of, Iraqi NBC attacks.[264] It was not initially clear whether the transition to MOPP Level 2 involved an increase or decrease in protective posture.

Additional Evidence

Analysis determined that this was the initial precautionary upgrade from MOPP Level 0 to MOPP Level 2. This upgrade occurred as 11th Marines battalions were approaching the first obstacle belt about 13 miles north of the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia border. As they approached the first obstacle belt, the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions took such precautions.[265]

Assessment

As this "incident" was a precautionary MOPP upgrade and not the result of agent detection, incoming fire, or other alert, the potential presence of CWA is assessed as "Definitely Not." There were no reports of actual delivery of Iraqi chemical weapons associated with the intelligence reports.

1 MARDIV - Situation Chronology.

1/11, Command Chronology for Period 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, March 11, 1991.

1/11, Summary of Action 1^st Bn 11^th Mar.

1/11, Summary of Action 1^st Bn 11^th MAR.

1/12, Command Chronology 16-28 Feb 91, March 7, 1991.

1/12, Command Chronology for Period 1 January to 15 February 1991, February 15, 1991.

11^th Marines, 11^th Marines Oper DS Summary of Significant Events.

11^th Marines, 11^th Marines War Journal G Day 24 Feb 91.

11^th Marines, Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, March 13, 1991.

1^st Combat Engineer Battalion, Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, March 15, 1991.

1^st MARDIV, Ripper 24 Feb 91.

1^st MARDIV, Significant Events for 2400 1026 on 24 Feb 91.

1^st Marine Division Fire Support Coordination Center, "Journal," January 28-30, 1991.

1^st Marine Division, Situation Chronology.

3/11, Command Chronology for Period 1 January to 28 February 1991, March 12, 1991, Enclosure 1.

3/12, Command Chronology for Period 1 January to 30 Jun 1991, June 27, 1991, Section 1.

3^rd Assault Amphibian Battalion, Command Chronology 3^rd Assault Amphibian Battalion Jan - Jun 1991.

3^rd Marines, "Incidents Messages Journal Orders," January 18, 1991.

3^rd Marines, "Incidents Messages Journal Orders," January 19, 1991.

3^rd Marines, "Incidents, Messages, Journal, Orders," January 29, 1991.

5/11, Command Chronology for Period 1 January to 28 February 1991, March 12, 1991, Enclosure 1.

6^th Draft Additional Notes, March 9, 1991.

Army Field Manual No. 3-9, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, Chapter 2, "Chemical Agents and Their Properties," December 12, 1990.

Army Field Manual No. 8-285/NAVY NAVMED P-5041/AFJMAN 44-149/MARINE CORPS FM 11-11 (adopted as NATO FM 8-285), Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries.

Attachment to 1/12 Command Chronology 1 January - 15 February, February 15, 1991, Time Line for Raid, 20-21 January 1991.

Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October, 1995.

Case Narrative, Al Jaber Air Base, Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, September 22, 1997.

Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence, 9 April 1997.

"CINCs Press Interview," February 4, 1991.

"Command Chronology 3^rd Battalion 12^th Marine Regiment Jan - Jun 1991."

"Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997.

Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1^st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1993.

Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center message 271603 Feb 91, subject: "Mideast Conflict: Iraqi SRBM Launch Summary through 25 February 1991," SECRET.

Field Manual No. 3-4, NBC Protection, Headquarters, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., October 21, 1985.

Fleet Marine Force Field Manual, FMFM 3-22-1, UAV Company Operations, November 4, 1993.

General Dynamics Situation Report #116, February 6, 1991.

Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) Mission Database, USAF, 1993 (SECRET)

Handbook for the Investigation Of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, Department of External Affairs, Department of National Defense, Health and Welfare Canada, and Agriculture Canada, November 1985.

Headquarters, Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, FM 3-9/Navy Publication No P-467/AF Manual No 355-7, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, Washington, D.C., December 12, 1990.

"Incidents, Messages, Orders Journal," 3d Marines, January 17, 1991.

Index to 3/12, Command Chronology January to June 1991.

Intelligence Information Report (IIR) 6 884 0825 90/ "Iraqi Corps Boundaries Identified." From Joint Staff Wash DC, To DIA WASHDC, DTG [Date/Time Group] 181418 Z SEP 90, forwarded by Joint Staff Washington DC to numerous commands, DTG 181423Z SEP 90.

Initial Call Report for field radio operator, Incident ID#460001225. November 3, 1995.

Initial Call Report from survey officer, 5/11, Incident ID#651001124, April 4, 1997.

Interview of the NBC officer, 1^st Marine Regiment (Task Force Papa Bear), Headquarters Company, March 7, 1991.

Lead Sheet #13797, interview of commanding officer, Task Force Papa Bear, December 22, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5530, interview of artillery fire direction controlman/NBC NCO, A Battery, 1/11, July 31, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5531, interview of NBC NCO, 1/12, July 30-31, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5555, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Ripper, July 23, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5614, interview of NBC officer, 1^st Marine Division (Forward), December 12, 1996.

Lead Sheet #5658, interview of NBC officer, 1/7 (TF Ripper), August 14, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5702, interview of field radio operator, 1/12, August 15, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5783, interview of S-3Z (operations officer), 1/11, August 20, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5803, interview of NBC NCO, 1^st Marine Division, August 21, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5823, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 3/11, August 22, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5863, interview of commanding officer, 11^th Marines, August 21, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5883, interview of commanding officer, 1/11, August 21, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5903, interview of commanding officer, A Battery, 1/11, August 25, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5950, interview of field radio operator, HQ Battery, 1/12, September 2, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5952, interview of commanding officer, 1/12, September 5, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5953, interview of assistant fire support coordinator, 11^th Marines, September 3, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5955, interview of communications officer, 1/12, September 3, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5968, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 11^th Marines, September 3, 1997.

Lead Sheet #5969, interview of NBC NCO, 1/12, September 5, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6000, interview of commanding officer, 1/7 (TF Ripper), September 11, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6029, interview of S-3A (operations officer), 1/12 September 16, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6030, interview of NBC/survey officer, 1/11, September 15, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6031, interview of survey officer, 3/11, September 15, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6033, interview of executive officer, A Battery, 1/11, September 17, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6036, interview of NBC officer, 5/11, September 30, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6070, interview of NBC NCO, A Battery, 1/12, September 13, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6150, interview of commanding officer, F Battery, 2/12, October 17, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6171, interview of S-2 (intelligence officer), 1/12, September 22, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6195, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Papa Bear, October 7, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6271, interview of NBC NCO, 5/11, November 3, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6310, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 1/12, September 24, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6311, interview of S-2 (intelligence officer), 1/11, October 3, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6312, interview of NBC NCO, 1/11, October 3, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6316, interview of commanding officer, 3/12, October 6, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11^th Marines, October 6, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6370, interview of NBC officer, I Marine Expeditionary Force, October 8, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6371, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 1/12, October 8, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6492, interview of EOD specialist, 2^nd EOD Platoon, 2^nd MEF, October 20, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6493, interview of survey officer, 5/11, December 15, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6496, interview of S-3A (operations officer), Task Force Papa Bear, October 21, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6530, interview of commanding officer, H Battery, 3/14, October 22, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6552, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 5/11, October 28, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6612, interview of field radio operator, Headquarters Company, 7^th Marines, December 17, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6690, interview of NBC officer, I Marine Expeditionary Force, October 31, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6970, interview of executive officer, Task Force Papa Bear, November 11, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6990, interview of commanding officer, Task Force Ripper, January 27, 1997.

Lead Sheet #6997, interview of S-3 (operations officer) 1/11, September 3, 1997.

Lead Sheet #7003, interview of commanding officer, 5/11, November 10/13, 1997.

Lead Sheet #7010, interview of NCO, S Battery, 5/11, November 14, 1997.

Lead Sheet #7114, interview with commanding officer, A Battery, 1/12, November 19, 1997.

Lead Sheet #7130, interview of armor officer, 2^nd ACR, 7^th Corps, November 12, 1997.

Lead Sheet #8942, interview of NBC officer, 11^th Marines, January 8, 1998.

Lead Sheet #14144, interview of executive officer, S Battery, 5/11, March 18, 1998.

Lead Sheet #15155, interview of commanding officer, S Battery, 5/11, March 19, 1998.

Lead Sheet #15783, interview of commanding officer, T Battery, 5/11, March 31, 1998.

Lead Sheet #16083, interview of chief corpsman, 11^th Marines, April 15, 1998.

Lead Sheet #16123, interview of NBC equipment expert, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, April 20, 1998.

Lead Sheet #16158, interview of regimental surgeon, 11^th Marines, April 22, 1998.

Lead Sheet #16178, interview of NBC NCO, 11^th Marines, April 24, 1998.

"Lucky TAC Spot Report" dated January 30, 1991 at 2112C (9:12 PM local).

Manley, Captain T. F., Marine Corps NBC Defense in Southwest Asia, Marine Corps Research Center, Research Paper # 92-0009, July 1991.

Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Breaching Operations 7^th Marines Log 24 Feb 91.

Marine Division, Situation Chronology, Task Force Ripper section.

Memorandum from 11^th Marines regimental surgeon to commanding officer, 11^th Marines, Chronological Report - Regimental Medical for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, March 11, 1991.

Methodology and Instrumentation for Sampling and Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki, Finland, 1985.

Mroczkowski, Dennis P., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 2^d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1993.

Natural Emirates, "Geology and Fossils." [www.uaeinteract.com/nature/geology/ geo02.html].

NBC Battle Assessment Study Group (Manley Report), Interview of the NBC Defense Officer, 1^st Marine Regiment (Task Force Papa Bear), Headquarters Company, March 7, 1991.

Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses Information Paper, Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection, October 30, 1997.

Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses Information Paper, The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle, July 31, 1997.

Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses Information Paper, M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm, October 30, 1997.

Personal Journal of 1/11 Battalion S-3Z (operations officer).

"Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects," June 1994.

Sonneman, George B., Bendix Corporation Phase I Report, July 1974 - April 15, 1975 Development of the XM256 Chemical Agent Detection Kit, Edgewood Arsenal, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, July 1975.

"Summary of Action for Operation Desert Storm," February 24-27, 1991 (various Marine Corps).

Testimony of Charles Duelfer and Igor A. Mitrokhin, United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses, Buffalo, NY, July 29, 1997.

Testimony of Sylvia Copeland, Central Intelligence Agency, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses, July 9, 1996.

The United Nations, Blue Books Series, Volume IX, The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996, Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York.

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-4, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC, October 21, 1985.

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-7, NBC Field Handbook, Headquarters Department of the Army, WashingtonD.C., September 29, 1994.

United Nations Special Commission Document 141, Fourth Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, No S/24984, December 17, 1992, Appendix IV, "Destruction of Iraq’s Chemical Agents and Munitions."

United States Marine Corps FactFile, MK19 40MM Machine Gun, MOD 3, October 15, 1995.

US Army FM 19-20, Law Enforcement Investigations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 25, 1985.

US Central Command, NBC Desk Log, February 26, 1991.

Verification Methods, Handling, and Assessment Of Unusual Events In Relation To Allegations of the Use of Novel Chemical Warfare Agents, Consultant University of Saskatchewan in conjunction with the Verification Research Unit of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, March 1990.

Walters, Kenneth R., Sr., Major Kathleen M. Traxler, Michael T. Gilford, Capt Richard D Arnold, TSgt Richard C. Bonam, TSgt Kenneth R. Gibson, Gulf War Weather, USAF Environmental Technical Applications Center, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, March 1992.

XVIII Airborne Corps, "Message from Journal Log."

A detailed written record of the conditions at the site

• Physical evidence from the site such as weapon fragments, soil, water, vegetation, or human or animal tissue samples
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence
• Testimony of eye witnesses
• Multiple analyses
• Review of the evidence by an expert panel

While the DOD methodology for investigating chemical incidents (Figure 35) is based on these protocols, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence often was not collected at the time of an event.

Therefore, we cannot apply a rigid template to all incidents, and each investigation must be tailored to its unique circumstances. Accordingly, we designed our methodology to provide a thorough, investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and determine what happened. The major efforts in our methodology are:

• Substantiate the incident
• Document the medical reports related to the incident
• Interview appropriate people
• Obtain information available to external organizations
• Assess the results.

A case usually starts with a report of a possible chemical incident, usually from a veteran. To substantiate the circumstances surrounding an incident, the investigator searches for documentation from operational, intelligence, and environmental logs. This focuses the investigation on a specific time, date, and location, clarifies the conditions under which the incident occurred, and determines whether there is "hard," as well as anecdotal evidence.

Figure 35. chemical Incident Investigation Methodology

Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical agent presence, nor is a single individual’s observation sufficient to validate a chemical agent presence. Additionally, the investigator looks for physical evidence that might indicate that chemical agents were present in the vicinity of the incident, including samples (or the results of analyses of samples) collected at the time of the incident.

The investigator searches the medical records to determine if personnel were injured as a result of the incident. Deaths, injuries, sicknesses, etc. near the time and location of an incident may be telling. Medical experts should provide information about alleged chemical casualties.

Interviews of incident victims (or direct observers) are conducted. First-hand witnesses provide valuable insight into the conditions surrounding the incident and the mind-set of the personnel involved, and are particularly important if physical evidence is lacking. NBC officers or personnel trained in chemical testing, confirmation, and reporting are interviewed to identify the unit’s response, the tests that were run, the injuries sustained, and the reports submitted. Commanders are contacted to ascertain what they knew, what decisions they made concerning the events surrounding the incident, and their assessment of the incident. Where appropriate, subject matter experts also provide opinions on the capabilities, limitations, and operation of technical equipment, and submit their evaluations of selected topics of interest.

Additionally, the investigator contacts agencies and organizations that may be able to provide additional clarifying information about the case. These would include, but not be limited to:

• Intelligence agencies that might be able to provide insight into events leading to the event, imagery of the area of the incident, and assessments of factors affecting the case
• The DOD and Veterans’ clinical registries, which may provide data about the medical condition of personnel involved in the incident.

1. 11th Marines, Command Chronology for 1 January to 28 February 1991, March 13, 1991, Attachment P.
2. Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1993, p. 130.
3. 11th Marines, Command Chronology for 1 January to 28 February 1991, March 13, 1991, Attachment P; 1/11, Command Chronology for Period 1 January to 28 February 1991, March 11, 1991, Enclosure 1, p. 1-1; 5/11, Command Chronology for Period 1 January to 28 February 1991, March 12, 1991, Enclosure 1, p. 1-1; 3/11, Command Chronology for Period 1 January to 28 February 1991, March 12, 1991, Enclosure 1, p. 2; 1/12, Command Chronology for Period 1 January to 15 February 1991, February 15, 1991; 3/12, Command Chronology for Period 1 January to 30 Jun 1991, June 27, 1991, Section 1, p. 2.
4. Lead Sheet #5863, interview of commanding officer, 11th Marines, August 21, 1997, p. 2.
5. Lead Sheet #5863, interview of commanding officer, 11th Marines, August 21, 1997, p. 2.
6. For this and other maps in this narrative, unit and other locations are generally based on multiple sources. Primary among these is: Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1993, augmented by various logs, journals, and command chronologies. Locations are approximate at the scales displayed.
7. Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1993, pp. 26-27.
8. Lead Sheet #6150, interview of commanding officer, F Battery, 2/12, October 17, 1997, p. 3.
9. Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1993, p. 89.
10. Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses Information Paper, Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection, October 30, 1997, p. 4.
11. Lead Sheet #6036, interview of NBC officer, 5/11, September 30, 1997, p. 2; General Dynamics Situation Report #116, February 6, 1991, p. 1; "Command Chronology 3rd Battalion 12th Marine Regiment Jan - Jun 1991."
12. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October, 1995, pp. 390-391, 408-409, 412-414, 426-428, 430-431. "Copies of the Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook may be purchased from the CBIAC. To order, please contact Judi Shetterly, CBIAC Administrator, via phone (410-676-9030), fax (410-676-9703), e-mail (cbiac@battelle.org), or use the interactive request form on the CBIAC website (http://www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil/)."
13. Lead Sheet #5863, interview of commanding officer, 11th Marines, April 15, 1998, p. 3.
14. Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence, April 9, 1997.
15. Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence, 9 April 1997; "Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program;" Testimony of Sylvia Copeland, Central Intelligence Agency, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, July 9, 1996; testimony of Charles Duelfer and Igor A. Mitrokhin, United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, July 29, 1997.
16. United Nations Special Commission Document 141, Fourth Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, No S/24984, December 17, 1992, Appendix IV, "Destruction of Iraq's Chemical Agents and Munitions," paragraphs 2 and 3. CS is a riot control agent ("tear gas") and is not considered to be a chemical warfare agent.
17. During the investigation, we discovered some incidents did not involve the 11th Marines and we added others based on witness testimony. In two cases (D and E) investigators corrected the dates of the events, and this reordered the sequence. Because various testimony texts (lead sheets) included the original serialization, we have retained the original numbering in parentheses after a letter indicating current sequence. All dates are for 1991, and all times are local.
18. In some cases, one incident involved more than one battalion.
19. 11th Marines message, subject: "Situation Report Number 135," Date-Time Group 181200C Jan 91.
20. "Condition Red" meant attack is imminent; go to MOPP Level 4. "Condition Yellow" meant attack probable, units maintain MOPP Level 0 (no protection worn). Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, information paper on Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection, p. 16.
21. "Incidents, Messages Journal Orders," 3rd Marines S-3 (operations officer) (but archived as 1/12), January 17, 1991, p. 1.
22. Lead Sheet #5969, interview of NBC NCO, 1/12, September 5, 1997, pp. 1-2.
23. Lead Sheet #5952, interview of commanding officer, 1/12, September 5, 1997, p. 2.
24. 11th Marines, Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, March 13, 1991.
25. 3rd Marines, "Incidents Messages Journal Orders," 1st 12th, January 18, 1991, p. 1 (but archived as 1/12).
26. Lead Sheet #5952, interview of commanding officer, 1/12 Marines, September 5, 1997, p. 3.
27. 3rd Marines, "Incidents Messages Journal Orders," January 19, 1991 (but archived as 1/12).
28. This incident initially was reported for a later date and subsequently tied to an earlier timeframe. Initial serialization has been retained in parentheses because numerous lead sheets from interviews include the shorthand of incident numbers.
29. Initial Call Report for field radio operator, Incident ID#460001225, November 3, 1995; Lead Sheet #5702, interview of (same) field radio operator, 1/12, August 15, 1997, p. 3.
30. Attachment to 1/12 Command Chronology 1 January - 15 February, February 15, 1991, Time Line for Raid 20-21 Jan 1991, p. 2.
31. 11th Marines, Command Chronology Jan Feb 91, March 13, 1991.
32. Lead Sheet #6029, interview of S-3A (operations officer), 1/12, September 16, 1997, p. 1.
33. Lead Sheet #6150, interview of commanding officer, F Battery, 2/12, October 17, 1997, pp. 3, 4.
34. Lead Sheet #6029, interview of operations officer, 1/12, September 16, 1997, p. 1.
35. Attachment to 1/12 Command Chronology 1 January - 15 February, February 15, 1991, Time Line for Raid 20-21 Jan 1991, p. 2.
36. Lead Sheet #6150, interview of commanding officer, F Battery, 2/12, October 17, 1997, p. 3.
37. Lead Sheet #5702, interview of field radio operator, 1/12, September 11, 1997, pp. 1, 2.
38. Attachment to 1/12 Command Chronology 1 January - 15 February, February 15, 1991, Time Line for Raid 20-21 Jan 1991, p. 2.
39. Lead Sheet #5702, interview of field radio operator, 1/12 September 16, 1997, p. 3.
40. Lead Sheet #5952, interview of commanding officer, 1/12, September 5, 1997, p. 3.
41. Lead Sheet #6171, interview of S-2 (intelligence officer), 1/12, September 22, 1997, p. 3.
42. Lead Sheet #6150, interview of commanding officer, F Battery, 2/12, October 17, 1997, pp. 2-4.
43. Lead Sheet #6029, interview of S-3A (operations officer), 1/12, September 16, 1997, p. 1-2.
44. Lead Sheet #6150, interview of commanding officer, F Battery, 2/12, October 17, 1997, p. 3.
45. United Nations Special Commission Document 141, Fourth Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, No S/24984, December 17, 1992, Appendix IV, "Destruction of Iraq's Chemical Agents and Munitions," paragraphs 2 and 3; The United Nations, Blue Books Series, Volume IX, The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996, Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York, pp. 358, 584, 656; testimony of Charles Duelfer and Igor A. Mitrokhin, United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, Buffalo, NY, July 29, 1997.
46. Lead Sheet #6150, interview of commanding officer, F Battery, 2/12, October 17, 1997, p. 3; Lead Sheet #6171, interview of S-2 (intelligence officer), 1/12, September 22, 1997, p. 2.
47. Lead Sheet #5955, interview of communications officer, 1/12, September 3, 1997, p. 2.
48. Lead Sheet #6310, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 1/12, September 24, 1997, p. 2.
49. Walters, Kenneth R., Sr., Major Kathleen M. Traxler, Michael T. Gilford, Capt Richard D Arnold, TSgt Richard C. Bonam, TSgt Kenneth R. Gibson, Gulf War Weather, USAF Environmental Technical Applications Center, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, March 1992, p. 3-14.
50. Attachment to 1/12 Command Chronology 1 January - 15 February, February 15, 1991, Time Line for Raid 20-21 January 1991, p. 2; Lead Sheet #6029, interview of S-3A (operations officer), 1/12, September 16, 1997, p. 1.
51. Attachment to 1/12 Command Chronology 1 January - 15 February, February 15, 1991, Time Line for Raid 20-21 Jan 1991, p. 2.
52. Initial Call Report from veteran, Incident ID# 460001225, November 3, 1995; Lead Sheet #5702, interview of field radio operator, 1/12, August 15, 1997, p. 1, 2, 3.
53. Lead Sheet #6171, interview of S-2 (intelligence officer), 1/12, September 22 and October 23, 1997, pp. 2-3; Lead Sheet #5955, interview of communications officer, 1/12, September 3, 1997, pp. 2, 3.
54. Lead Sheet #6310, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 1/12, September 24, 1997 and April 27, 1998, pp. 2, 3.
55. Lead Sheet #5952, Interview of commanding officer, 1/12, September 5, 1997, p. 4.
56. Lead Sheet #6029, interview of S-3A (operations officer), 1/12, September 16, 1997, p. 2.
57. Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, October 6, 1997, p. 6.
58. Lead Sheet #5955, interview of communications officer, 1/12, September 3, 1997, p. 2.
59. Lead Sheet #6029, interview of S-3A (operations officer), 1/12 September 16, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, October 6, 1997, p. 6; Lead Sheet #5955, interview of communications officer, 1/12, September 3, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #6310, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 1/12, September 24, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #6150, interview of commanding officer, F Battery, 2/12, October 17, 1997, p. 3.
60. Lead Sheet #5702, interview of field radio operator, 1/12, August 15, 1997, pp. 1, 2.
61. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 431.
62. Lead Sheet #6150, interview of commanding officer, F Battery, 2/12, October 17, 1997, p. 3.
63. Lead Sheet #5955, interview of communications officer, 1/12, September 3, 1997, p. 2.
64. Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) Mission Database, USAF, 1993, SECRET.
65. 11th Marines, Command Chronology Jan Feb 91, March 13, 1991.
66. Army Field Manual No. 3-9, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, Chapter 2, "Chemical Agents and Their Properties," pp. 14-51 excluding pp. 17, 20, 24, 29, and 36, (also known as Navy Publication No. P-467 and Air Force Manual No. 355-7), December 12, 1990.
67. In his initial interview, this witness stated that the unit did not increase MOPP level to MOPP Level 4. In a follow-on interview, he stated that the unit did "mask-up". See Lead Sheet #5531, interview of NBC NCO, 1/12, July 30, 1997 and January 29, 1998, pp. 3, 4.
68. Lead Sheet #5531, interview of NBC NCO, 1/12, July 30, 1997, p. 4; Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., p. 104.
69. Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, October 6, 1997, pp. 2-3.
70. 1/12, Attachment to Command Chronology 16 February - 28 February 1991, Time Line for Raid 20-21 Jan 1991, p. 2.
71. Lead Sheet #5531, interview of NBC NCO, 1/12, July 30, 1997, p. 4.
72. Lead Sheet #8942, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, January 8, 1998, pp. 3-4.
73. XVIII Airborne Corps, "Message from Journal Log."
74. 1st Marine Division Fire Support Coordination Center, "Journal," January 28-30, 1991.
75. 1st Marine Division Fire Support Coordination Center, "Journal," January 28-30, 1991.
76. "Lucky TAC Spot Report" dated January 30, 1991 at 2112C (9:12 PM local).
77. 11th Marines Message, Subject Situation Report Number 148, Date-Time Group 311200C Jan 91.
78. 5/11, Command Chronology for the Period 1 January to 28 February 1991, March 12, 1991, pp. 3-1.
79. Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., p. 85.
80. The 11th Marines War Journal, G Day 24 Feb 91, contained the following entries. "1507- 5/11 detected nerve vapor. 1510- 3/11 sends 'gas gas gas'".
81. Initial Call Report from survey officer, 5/11, Incident ID# 651001124, April 4, 1997, p. 1.
82. 11th Marines War Journal G Day 24 Feb. 91.; "1st MARDIV Situation Chronology;" 11th Marines Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, 13 Mar 91.
83. Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., p. 81.
84. 11th Marines Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, 13 Mar 91.
85. Lead Sheet #6036, interview of NBC officer, 5/11, September 30, 1997, p. 2. The S Battery did not have a qualified 5711 (chemical NCO). The Battery executive officer stated that the XM21 was fielded "on the fly" with only a small amount of training. See Lead Sheet #14144, interview of executive officer, S Battery, 5/11, November 12, 1997, p. 1. None of the witnesses interviewed have been able to identify the Marine who operated the XM21.
86. Lead Sheet #6552, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 5/11, October 28, 1997, p. 2.
87. The 11th Marine Command Chronologies recorded that the "all-clear" was sounded at 3:41 PM, 34 minutes following the XM21 alert. See 11th Marines Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, 13 Mar 91.
88. Lead Sheet #14144, interview of executive officer, S Battery, 5/11, November 12, 1997, p. 1.; Lead Sheet #15515, interview of commanding officer, S Battery, 5/11, November 10, 1997, p. 1.
89. In another interview, a Marine NCO assigned to the S Battery, 5/11 cited problems with the XM21, e.g., it went off at least once or twice a day. His unit was worried that the XM21 would detect fumes from the oil well fires. See Lead Sheet #7010, interview of NCO, S Battery, 5/11, November 14, 1997, p. 1. The commanding officer of T Battery, 5/11, also cited problems with the XM21. He noted recurring false alarms. See Lead Sheet #15783, interview of commanding officer, T Battery, 5/11, March 31, 1998, p. 2.
90. Lead Sheet #6036, interview of NBC officer, 5/11, September 30, 1997, p. 2.
91. No other personnel interviewed stated that they recalled hearing an M8 alarm sound.
92. The NBC NCO recalled that the convoy was moving at the time of the incident. He conducted his test after the convoy stopped, although he could not recall exactly how long after the incident he did the test. See Lead Sheet #6271, interview of NBC NCO, 5/11, October 2, 1997, p.2. The 5/11 S-3 (operations officer) recalled that the convoy he was in was stopped, waiting for units up ahead to move out. See Lead Sheet #6552, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 5/11, October 28, 1997, p. 2.
93. Lead Sheet #15783, interview of commanding officer, T Battery, 5/11, March 31, 1998, p. 1.
94. The survey officer of the 5/11 and the executive officer of the battalion's S Battery recalled two airbursts. The CO of the 5/11 recalled four. The operations officer remembered two to three. See Lead Sheet #10228, interview of survey officer, 5/11, April 17, 1997, p. 1; Lead Sheet #14144, interview of executive officer, S Battery, 5/11, November 12, 1997, p. 1; Lead Sheet #7003, interview of commanding officer, 5/11, November 10/13, 1997, p. 2; and Lead Sheet #6552, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 5/11, October 28, 1997, p 2.
95. Lead Sheet #7003, interview of commanding officer, 5/11, November 10, 1997, p. 2.; See also Lead Sheet #6552, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 5/11, October 28, 1997, p. 2.
96. Lead Sheet #7003, interview of commanding officer, 5/11, November 13, 1997, p. 2. This witness could not recall the exact date of the incident he described.
97. Walters, Kenneth R., Sr., Major Kathleen M. Traxler, Michael T. Gilford, Capt Richard D Arnold, TSgt Richard C. Bonam, TSgt Kenneth R. Gibson, Gulf War Weather, USAF Environmental Technical Applications Center, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, March 1992, p. 3-87.
98. Lead Sheet #6552, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 5/11, October 28, 1997, p. 2. The Al Burqan Oil Fields were just beyond the second obstacle belt. The smoke from the oil well fires would affect Marines during the offensive against Al Jaber airfield, and later during the trip towards Kuwait City.
99. Lead Sheet #6271, interview of NBC NCO, 5/11, November 3, 1997, p 2.
100. Lead Sheet #5614, interview of NBC officer, 1st Marine Division (Forward), April 9, 1998, p. 5. This witness added that what he saw would not have been an effective Chemical Warfare Agent delivery system.
101. Lead Sheet #6612, interview of field radio operator, Headquarters Company, 7th Marines, December 17, 1997, p. 2-3.
102. Lead Sheet #6493, interview of survey officer, 5/11, December 15, 1997, p. 3.
103. Lead Sheet #5555, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Ripper, April 14, 1998, p. 6.
104. Lead Sheet #5614, interview of NBC officer, 1st Marine Division, April 9, 1998, p. 5.
105. Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, March 17, 1998, pp. 1-2. This witness later clarified that he was referring to the 1st sergeant of the 5/11, not the S Battery 1st sergeant.
106. Lead Sheet #15155, interview of commanding officer, S Battery, 5/11, March 19, 1998, p. 2.
107. Lead Sheet #14144, interview of executive officer, S Battery, 5/11, March 18, 1998, p. 2.
108. Memorandum from 11th Marines regimental surgeon to commanding officer, 11th Marines, Chronological Report - Regimental Medical for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, March 11, 1991.
109. Lead Sheet #16083, interview of chief hospital corpsman, 11th Marines, April 15, 1998, p. 1.
110. For example, canaries have been used in the past as sensitive detectors of methane gas in coal mines.
111. 5/11, Command Chronology for period 1 January to 28 February, 1991, March 12, 1991.
112. Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, March 17, 1998, p. 2.
113. Lead Sheet #5968, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 11th Marines, September 3, 1997, p. 2.
114. Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., pp. 99-100.
115. Lead Sheet #6530, interview of commanding officer, H Battery, 3/14, October 22, 1997, p. 1.
116. Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence, April 9, 1997.
117. Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., p. 101.
118. The United Nations, Blue Books Series, Volume IX, The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996, Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York, pp. 358, 584, 656.
119. Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, March 17, 1998, p. 2.
120. Index to 3/12, Command Chronology January to June, 1991, p.3.
121. 11th Marines, 11th Marines War Journal G Day 24 Feb 91 (but for February 25).
122. 11th Marines, 11th Marines War Journal G Day 24 Feb 91 (but for February 25).
123. 11th Marines, 11th Marines War Journal G Day 24 Feb 91 (but for February 25).
124. 6th Draft Additional Notes, March 9, 1991.
125. Lead Sheet #5968, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 11th Marines, September 3, 1997, p. 1.
126. Lead Sheet #6316, interview of commanding officer, 3/12, October 6, 1997, p. 2.
127. Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, March 19, 1998, p. 3.
128. 11th Marines, 11th Marines War Journal G Day 24 Feb 91 (but for February 25).
129. 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, March 15, 1991.
130. 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, March 15, 1991; 1st Marine Division, Ripper 24 Feb 91; 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion, Command Chronology 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion Jan - Jun 1991.
131. 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion, Command Chronology 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion Jan - Jun 1991.
132. Lead Sheet #5863, interview of commanding officer, 11th Marines, August 21, 1997, p. 3; Lead Sheet #6316, interview of commanding officer, 3/12, October 6, 1997, p. 2; and Lead Sheet #5555, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Ripper, July 23, 1997, p. 5.
133. Lead Sheet #6150, interview of commanding officer, F Battery, 2/12, October 17, 1997, p. 4.
134. Lead Sheet #6071, interview of commanding officer, A Battery, 1/12, November 19, 1997, p. 2.
135. Case Narrative, "Al Jaber Air Base," Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, pp. 12-18.
136. Lead Sheet #6990, interview of commanding officer, Task Force Ripper, November 4/5, 1997, pp. 2, 3; Lead Sheet #5555, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Ripper, July 23, 1997, pp. 4-5
137. 1st Marine Division, Situation Chronology; 1/11, Summary of Action 1st Bn 11th Mar.
138. 11th Marines, Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, March 13, 1991; 11th Marines, 11th Marines Oper DS Summary of Significant Events; 1-11, Summary of Action 1st Bn 11th Mar; US Central Command, NBC Desk Log, February 26, 1991.
139. Lead Sheet #5968, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 11th Marines, September 3, 1997, p. 2.
140. Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, March 19, 1998, p. 3.
141. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 431.
142. Lead Sheet #8942, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, January 8, 1998, p. 4.
143. Lead Sheet #13797, interview of commanding officer, Task Force Papa Bear, December 22, 1997, p. 2.
144. NBC Battle Assessment Study Group (Manley Report), Interview of the NBC Defense Officer, 1st Marine Regiment (Task Force Papa Bear), Headquarters Company, March 7, 1991, pp. 10-11
145. Lead Sheet #6195, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Papa Bear, October 7, 1997, p. 4.
146. Lead Sheet #5823, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 3/11, August 22, 1997, p. 1.
147. Lead Sheet #5903, interview of commanding officer, A Battery, 1/11, August 25, 1997, pp. 1-2.
148. Lead Sheet #5883, interview of commanding officer, 1/11, August 21, 1997, p. 2.
149. Lead Sheet #5903, interview of commanding officer, A Battery, 1/11, August 25, 1997, pp. 1-2.
150. Lead Sheet #6033, interview of executive officer, A Battery, 1/11, September 17, 1997, p. 2.
151. Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, March 19, 1998, p. 3.
152. Lead Sheet #6997, interview of S-3 (operations officer) 1/11, September 3, 1997, p. 2.
153. 11th Marines, Command Chronology for 1 January to 28 February 1991, Enclosure 1, Section 3.
154. Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, October 6, 1997, p. 6.
155. Walters, Kenneth R. Sr., Maj Kathleen M. Traxler, Michael T. Gilford, Capt Richard D. Arnold, TSgt Richard C. Bonam, and TSgt Kenneth R. Gibson, Gulf War Weather, USAF Environmental Technical Applications Center, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, March 1992, p. 3-26.
156. Lead Sheet #8942, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, January 8, 1998, p. 3.
157. The United Nations, Blue Books Series, Volume IX, The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996, Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York, pp. 358, 584, 656
158. 1st Marine Division, Situation Chronology, Task Force Ripper section; 1st CE Battalion, Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, March 15, 1991.
159. Lead Sheet #5883, interview of commanding officer, 1/11, August 21, 1997, p. 3.
160. 1500 "TF (Papa Bear) went to MOPP-4 on a report from 1/11. After ten minutes the FOX vehicle sounded the "all clear." 1 MARDIV - Situation Chronology: 1510: "Flash! Gas! TF Ripper goes to MOPP 4;" and 1520: "All clear" 1st Combat Engineering Battalion, Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, 15 Mar 91.
161. "Summary of Action for Operation Desert Storm," February 24-27, 1991 (various Marine Corps).
162. NBC Battle Assessment Study Group (Manley Report), Interview of the NBC Defense Officer, 1st Marine Regiment (Task Force Papa Bear), Headquarters Company, March 7, 1991, p. 13
163. Lead Sheet #6195, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Papa Bear, October 7, 1997, p. 3.
164. Regarding the intelligence report that warned of the Iraqi the use of yellow smoke, the Papa Bear NBC officer stated in his interview that his unit received this intelligence perhaps one or two months prior to crossing the line of departure. (See NBC Battle Assessment Study Group (Manley Report), Interview of the NBC Defense Officer, 1st Marine Regiment (Task Force Papa Bear), Headquarters Company, March 7, 1991, pp. 11-12.).
165. NBC Battle Assessment Study Group (Manley Report), Interview of the NBC Defense Officer, 1st Marine Regiment (Task Force Papa Bear), Headquarters Company, March 7, 1991, pp. 11-12
166. Lead Sheet #6997, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 1/11, November 12, 1997, p. 3.
167. Lead Sheet #6312, interview of NBC NCO, 1/11, October 9, 1997, p. 2.
168. Lead Sheet #6311, interview of S-2 (intelligence officer), 1/11, October 3, 1997, p. 2.
169. Lead Sheet #5783, interview of S-3Z (operations officer), 1/11, November 17, 1997, p. 2.
170. Lead Sheet #6195, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Papa Bear, October 7, 1997, pp. 2-3.
171. Lead Sheet #6496, interview of S-3A (operations officer), Task Force Papa Bear, October 21, 1997, pp. 1-2.
172. NBC Battle Assessment Study Group (Manley Report) Interview of the NBC Defense Officer, 1st Marine Regiment (Task Force Papa Bear), Headquarters Company, March 7, 1991, p. 13
173. Personal Journal of 1/11 Battalion S-3Z (operations officer), p. 6. This witness explained that he wrote numerous journal entries after the fact. His February 28 entry included many events that had occurred over the previous 4 days. He noted he was simply too busy with the ground war to make timely entries in his personal journal.
174. Lead Sheet #6195, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Papa Bear, October 7, 1997, p. 3.
175. NBC Battle Assessment Study Group (Manley Report) Interview of the NBC Defense Officer, 1st Marine Regiment (Task Force Papa Bear), Headquarters Company, March 7, 1991, pp. 12-13.
176. Lead Sheet #6195, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Papa Bear, October 7, 1997, p. 3.
177. Lead Sheet #6496, interview of S-3A (operations officer), Task Force Papa Bear, October 21, 1997, p. 2.
178. Lead Sheet #6970, interview of executive officer, Task Force Papa Bear, November 11, 1997, p. 1.
179. Lead Sheet #6312, interview of NBC NCO, 1/11, October 3, 1997, p. 2. This witness did not recall conducting any M256 tests or operating a CAM in response to this incident.
180. Lead Sheet #6496, interview of S-3A (operations officer), Task Force Papa Bear, October 21, 1997, p. 2.
181. Lead Sheet #5555, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Ripper, July 23, 1997, p. 4.
182. Initial Intelligence Report (IIR) 6 884 0825 90/ "Iraqi Corps Boundaries Identified." From Joint Staff Wash DC, To DIA WASHDC, DTG [Date/Time Group] 181418 Z SEP 90, forwarded by Joint Staff Washington DC to numerous commands, DTG 181423Z SEP 90, para 8.
183. Lead Sheet #5555, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Ripper, July 23, 1997, p. 4.
184. Lead Sheet #6312, interview of NBC NCO, 1/11, October 9, 1997, p. 2.
185. Lead Sheet #6195, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Papa Bear, October 7, 1997, p. 3.
186. Lead Sheet #6492, interview of EOD specialist, 2nd EOD Platoon, 2nd MEF, October 20, 1997, p. 2.
187. Lead Sheet #7130, interview of armor officer, 2nd ACR, 7th Corps., November 12, 1997, p. 1.
188. 1/11, Command Chronology for Period 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, March 11, 1991.
189. Lead Sheet #6195, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Papa Bear, October 7, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5803, interview of NBC NCO, 1st Marine Division, August 20, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #6370, interview of NBC officer, I Marine Expeditionary Force, October 8, 1997, p. 2; The S-3 (operations officer), 1/12, thought the Fox NBC reconnaissance vehicle was the best thing for chemical detection (Lead Sheet #6371, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 1/12, October 8, 1997, p. 2.
190. Lead Sheet #5614, interview of NBC officer, 1st Marine Division (Forward), December 12, 1996, p. 4.
191. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects," June 1994, Table 18.
192. Because the minimum detectable amount is calculated from the background and backgrounds vary dependent on environmental and atmospheric conditions, the minimum detectable amounts will vary. The sensitivities listed in Table 2 are relevant only for the specific conditions they were calculated from.
193. At this level unprotected personnel would experience symptoms from Sarin before the MM-1 would alert.
194. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October, 1995, p. 431.
195. Lead Sheet #6195, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Papa Bear, October 7, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5903, interview of commanding officer, A Battery, 1/11, August 25, 1997, p. 1; Lead Sheet #6371, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 1/12, October 8, 1997, p. 2.
196. Lead Sheet #5803, interview of NBC NCO, 1st Marine Division, August 20, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #6036, interview of NBC officer, 5/11, September 30, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #6690, interview of NBC officer, I Marine Expeditionary Force, October 31, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #6271, interview of NBC NCO, 5/11, November 3, 1997, p. 3.
197. Lead Sheet #5903, interview of commanding officer, A Battery, 1/11, August 25, 1997, p. 2.
198. Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, April 21, 1998, p. 4.
199. Sonneman, George B., Bendix Corporation, Phase I Report, July 1974 - April 15, 1975, Development of the XM256 Chemical Agent Detection Kit, Edgewood Arsenal, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, July 1975, P. 128.
200. Lead Sheet #5614, interview of NBC officer, 1st Marine Division (forward), July 25, 1997, p. 4; Lead Sheet #6195, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Papa Bear, October 7, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5555, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Ripper, April 26, 1996, p. 3; Lead Sheet #6030, interview of NBC/survey officer, 1/11, September 15, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #6031, interview of survey officer, 3/11, September 15, 1997, pp. 1-2.
201. Lead Sheet #5555, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Ripper, July 23, 1997, p. 3.
202. Lead Sheet #5531, interview of NBC NCO, 1/12, April 27, 1998, p. 5.
203. Lead Sheet #5531, interview of NBC NCO, 1/12, July 30, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, October 6, 1997, p. 5-6.
204. Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, October 6, 1997, p. 6; Lead Sheet #6690, interview of NBC officer, I Marine Expeditionary Force, October 31, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5531, interview of NBC NCO, 1/12, July 31, 1997, p. 3.
205. Lead Sheet #6036, interview of NBC officer, 5/11, September 30, 1997, p. 2.
206. Lead Sheet #16123, interview of NBC equipment expert, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, April 20, 1998, p. 1.
207. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October, 1995, pp. 412-414.
208. Lead Sheet #6316, interview of commanding officer, 3/12, October 6, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5658, interview of NBC officer, 1/7, August 14, 1997, p. 2.
209. Lead Sheet #5863, interview of commanding officer, 11th Marines, April 15, 1998, p. 3.
210. Memorandum from 11th Marines regimental surgeon to commanding officer, 11th Marines, Chronological Report - Regimental Medical for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, March 11, 1991.
211. Lead Sheet #16158, interview of regimental surgeon, 11th Marines, April 22, 1998, p. 1. Investigators also checked the Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program database and discovered only 123 Marines registered out of over 35,000 Marines from units involved with events recounted in this narrative.
212. Lead Sheet #16083, interview of chief corpsman, 11th Marines, April 15, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet #16173, interview of Medical Team Member, 11th Marines, April 24, 1998, p. 1.
213. Lead Sheet #6997, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 1/11, September 3, 1997, p. 3; Lead Sheet #6371, interview of S-3 (operations officer), 1/12, October 8, 1997, p. 3.
214. Lead Sheet #5863, interview of commanding officer, 11th Marines, April 15, 1998, p. 4.
215. Lead Sheet #5863, interview of commanding officer, 11th Marines, August 21, 1997, p. 2.
216. Lead Sheet #5555, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Ripper, July 23, 1997, p. 4; Lead Sheet #6030, interview of NBC/survey officer, 1/11, September 15, 1997, pp. 2-3.
217. Lead Sheet #6036, interview of NBC officer, 5/11, September 30, 1997, p. 3.
218. Lead Sheet #6316, interview of commanding officer, 3/12, October 6, 1997, p. 2.
219. Lead Sheet #6311, interview of S-2 (intelligence officer), 1/11, October 3, 1997, p. 1. So far, we have been unable to contact the NBC NCO.
220. Lead Sheet #5531, interview of NBC NCO, 1/12, July 30, 1997, p. 2.
221. Lead Sheet #5555, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Ripper, July 23, 1997, pp. 2, 5.
222. Lead Sheet #5530, interview of fire direction controlman/NBC NCO, A Battery, 1/11, July 31, 1997, p. 2.
223. Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, October 6, 1997, pp. 4, 5.
224. Lead Sheet #6030, interview of NBC/survey officer, 1/11, September 15, 1997, p. 3.
225. Lead Sheet #5614, interview of NBC officer, 1st Marine Division (Forward), July 25, 1997, p. 4.
226. Lead Sheet #5863, interview of commanding officer, 11th Marines, April 15, 1998, p. 3.
227. Lead Sheet #5863, interview of commanding officer, 11th Marines, April 15, 1998, pp. 3-4.
228. Lead Sheet #6195, interview of NBC officer, Task Force Papa Bear, October 7, 1997, p. 3.
229. Lead Sheet #5883, interview of commanding officer, 1/11, August 21, 1997, pp. 2, 3.
230. Lead Sheet #6030, interview of NBC/survey officer, 1/11, September 15, 1997, p. 2.
231. Lead Sheet #5969, interview of NBC NCO, 1/12, September 5, 1997, p. 4.
232. Lead Sheet #6316, interview of commanding officer, 3/12, October 6, 1997, p. 2.
233. Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, October 6, 1997, p. 5.
234. Lead Sheet #6312, interview of NBC NCO, 1/11, October 9, 1997, p. 3.
235. Lead Sheet #5863, interview of commanding officer, 11th Marines, August 21, 1997, p. 3.
236. Headquarters, Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, FM 3-9/Navy Publication No P-467/AF Manual No 355-7, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, Washington, D.C., December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, Section 2, p. 30, 32.
237. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October, 1995, pp. 390-391.
238. Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses Information Paper, The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle, July 31, 1997, pp. 2, 8-9.
239. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October, 1995, pp. 430-431.
240. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October, 1995, pp. 408-409.
241. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October, 1995, pp. 412-413.
242. Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses Information Paper, M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm, October 30, 1997.
243. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October, 1995, pp. 418-419.
244. United States Marine Corps FactFile, MK19 40MM Machine Gun, MOD 3, October 15, 1995.
245. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-4, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC, October 21, 1985, Chapter 2, pp. 2-1, 2-3.
246. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-7, NBC Field Handbook, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington D.C., September 29, 1994, pp. 1-13, 1-14.
247. Headquarters, Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, FM 3-9/Navy Publication No P-467/AF Manual No 355-7, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, Washington, D.C., December 12, 1990, pp. 17-18.
248. Derived from Natural Emirates, "Geology and Fossils."
249. Derived from Field Manual No. 3-4, NBC Protection, Headquarters, Department of the Army/US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 21 October 1985, p. 5-2.
250. Fleet Marine Force Field Manual, FMFM 3-22-1, UAV Company Operations, November 4, 1993.
251. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October, 1995, pp. 426-428.
252. Lead Sheet #6330, interview of NBC officer, 11th Marines, October 6, 1997, pp. 5-6; Lead Sheet #6690, interview of NBC officer, I Marine Expeditionary Force, October 31, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet #5531, interview of NBC NCO, 1/12, July 31, 1997, p. 3.
253. Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., pp. 20-21.
254. Entire units or only some individuals from the unit may have been in the vicinity of the 11th Marines.
255. "Incidents, Messages, Orders Journal," 3d Marines, January 17, 1991 (but archived as 1/12). Percents refer to proportion of NBC personnel on alert.
256. Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center message 271603 Feb 91, subject: "Mideast Conflict: Iraqi SRBM Launch Summary through 25 February 1991," SECRET
257. 3rd Marines, "Incidents, Messages, Journal, Orders," January 29, 1991.
258. 1st MARDIV, Ripper 24 Feb 91.
259. Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Breaching Operations 7th Marines Log 24 Feb 91.
260. Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1993, p. 69.
261. 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, March 15, 1991.
262. 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, March 15, 1991.
263. 1st MARDIV, Situation Chronology, Task Force Taro Section; 1/12, Command Chronology 16-28 Feb 91, March 7, 1991; 1/11, Command Chronology for Period 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91, March 11, 1991.
264. 1st MARDIV, Significant Events for 2400 1026 on 24 Feb 91.
265. Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1993, p. 66; Mroczkowski, Dennis P., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991; With the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1993, p. 45
266. "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This Chemical Weapons Convention was opened for signature in Paris, France, on January 13, 1993. It has been signed by 165 States and ratified or acceded by 106 States (as of February 1998). It was signed by the U.S. on Jan 13, 1993 and ratified on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the Convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. Other protocols and guidelines were found in Methodology and Instrumentation for Sampling and Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki, Finland, 1985; Verification Methods, Handling, and Assessment Of Unusual Events In Relation To Allegations of the Use of Novel Chemical Warfare Agents, Consultant University of Saskatchewan in conjunction with the Verification Research Unit of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, March 1990; and Handbook for the Investigation Of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, Department of External Affairs, Department of National Defence, Health and Welfare Canada, and Agriculture Canada, November 1985. US Army FM 3-4/USMC FMFM 11-9, NBC Protection, May 1992; Army FM 8-285/NAVY NAVMED P-5041/AFJMAN 44-149/MARINE CORPS FMFM 11-11 (adopted as NATO FM 8-285), Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Injuries, US Army FM 19-20, Law Enforcement Investigations, Headquarters , Department of The Army, November 25, 1985, and other DOD investigational procedures contributed ideas for the development of this DOD methodology.