During and after the Gulf War, people reported that they had been exposed to chemical warfare agents. To investigate these incidents and to determine if chemical weapons were used, the DOD developed a methodology for investigation and validation based on work done by the United Nations and the international community where the criteria include:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site.
• Physical evidence from the site such as weapons fragments, soil, water, vegetation or human/animal tissue samples.
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence.
• Testimony of eyewitnesses.
• Multiple analyses.
• Review of the evidence by experts.

While the DOD methodology (Tab D) for investigating chemical incidents is based on these protocols, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence was often not collected at the time of an event. Accordingly, our methodology is designed to provide a thorough, investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and determine what happened. Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical agent presence, nor is a single individual’s observation sufficient to validate a chemical agent presence.

By following our methodology and accumulating anecdotal, documentary, and physical evidence, and by interviewing eyewitnesses and key personnel, and analyzing the results, the investigator can assess the validity of the presence of chemical warfare agents on the battlefield. Because information from various sources may be contradictory, we have developed an assessment scale (Figure 1) ranging from "Definitely" to "Definitely Not" with intermediate assessments of "Likely," "Unlikely," and "Indeterminate." This assessment is tentative, based on facts available as of the date of the report publication; each case is reassessed over time based on new information and feedback.

Figure 1. Assessment of Chemical Warfare Agent Presence

The standard for making the assessment is based on common sense: do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that chemical warfare agents were or were not present? When insufficient information is available, the assessment is "Indeterminate" until more evidence can be found.

U.S. Marines reported several instances of suspected chemical warfare agent use during combat operations to retake the Kuwaiti Air Base of Al Jaber. Al Jaber is located approximately 50 miles southwest of Kuwait City. From the evening of February 24 through the morning of Feb. 26, 1991, seven chemical alerts resulted in units near Al Jaber increasing chemical protective posture and donning additional equipment while testing for the presence of chemical agents. The initial source of five of the alerts was traced to observation of friendly artillery smoke that was mis-identified as chemical weapons smoke. The specific source of one alert is still under investigation and will be reported upon in the case narrative about the 11th Marines.

The most notable alarm was reported by a Fox vehicle (#5604) in Task Force Ripper, commanded by Gunnery Sergeant George Grass, during the night of Feb. 25, 1991. U.S. armed forces were just integrating the German-made Fox vehicle at the time of Operation Desert Storm and it represented the most sophisticated detection equipment available. As the Fox sat under skies black with the smoke from oil well fires, the MM-1 mass spectrometer alerted for a blister agent (a persistent chemical agent). The alert ceased after several minutes and the source of the alert was not identified.

All of the units in the proximity of each of these alerts initiated the proscribed procedures of taking proper protective posture while testing for chemical agent. The Fox alert as well as the other six alerts were not confirmed by M256A1 Chemical Weapons Detector Kits throughout the area in which Task Force Ripper was deployed. Additionally, no evidence of chemical weapons delivery means, chemical injuries, chemical weapons storage, or actual use anywhere in Kuwait including the Al Jaber area was found during or after the war. Therefore, the assessment that chemical weapons incidents occurred near Al Jaber air base during the ground war is "Unlikely".

In May 1996[2] and May 1997[3], Gunnery Sergeant (GySgt) George Grass, testified before the Presidential Advisory Committee Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses about several suspected chemical weapons incidents of which he had personal knowledge of during the Gulf War. GySgt Grass was a Marine Corps nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons defense specialist and Fox Vehicle Commander. He also testified in December 1996[4] before the Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee of the House of Representatives. In each testimony, GySgt Grass discussed one specific Fox alert for chemical warfare agents (CWA) at Al Jaber air base in Kuwait. The first public discussion of this event occurred in 1993, when a Marine linked his service with Marine units during the Gulf War to a severe disease he was suffering. He asked several Marine NBC specialists including GySgt Grass to make statements about any CWA exposures they may have detected during the war. Several Marines were then asked to testify in front of congressional committees in 1993[5] and 1994—which they did. In 1994, the Marine Corps initiated an investigation in response that concluded the Marine was not suffering from any classical chemical warfare exposures.[6, 7]

Figure 2. - Al Jaber Air Base, Kuwait.

This current investigation was initiated in response to these statements and testimony regarding the CWA incident at Al Jaber, located at 28� 56� N, 47� 47� E. During the course of the investigation of the Fox alert, several other chemical warfare agent alerts near the base were identified. These incidents were investigated as part of the Al Jaber case. Because of his high public visibility in discussing this case, GySgt Grass is identified by name. All other personnel are identified by Gulf War position level to protect their privacy.

Before the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, Al Jaber served as a Kuwaiti military air base. After the Iraqi invasion in August 1990, U.S. intelligence reported that the airfield might be used for the storage of chemical munitions--mainly because Iraqi ground forces had deployed 30 GHN-45 155mm howitzers and employed the Kuwaiti hardened hangarettes for munitions storage.[8] The GHN-45 is a top-of-the-line, Austrian-manufactured artillery piece with a range of 38-40 km., used primarily by Iraqi Republican Guard units.[9] A Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) paper published before the war notes that, "Iraq regards its 155mm artillery as the weapon of choice for ground force delivery of CW [Chemical Weapons]...".[10] Post-war analysis of UN inspection data shows that the Iraqi 155mm was the sole ground force delivery system of the Mustard chemical weapon agent.[11] Before the war, Iraqi artillery assets consisted of approximately 3600 Soviet Bloc artillery tubes (122mm, 130mm, 152mm) and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) artillery tubes (105mm and 155mm). Of these, only 450 were thought to be 155mm.[12]

During the air war (Jan. 17 - Feb. 23, 1991) coalition aircraft struck Al Jaber several times--attacking bunkers on the air base suspected as chemical weapons storage facilities.[13] Aircraft also dropped anti-personnel mines to impede Iraqi movement in and around the base.[14]

To coalition ground-war planners, the early capture of Al Jaber was a primary goal because of the dense concentration of Iraqi long-range artillery in the vicinity. The 1st Marine Division (1st MarDiv) Commander considered the Iraqi artillery around the base to be the "nerve center of Iraqi defenses."[15] Consequently, Al Jaber became the Marine Expeditionary Force’s (MEF) Objective "Alpha"—a principal liberation goal for elements of the 1st MarDiv once they crossed the minefields on the first day of the ground war. The Marines intended to neutralize the Iraqi artillery threat by overrunning Al Jaber and then to use the captured air base as a forward air base for Marine Corps aircraft. It was assumed that Al Jaber would be a crucial staging area for the liberation of Kuwait City.[16]

Figure 3. I Marine Expeditionary Force Table of Organization

Most of the units discussed in this narrative were in the 1st MarDiv or under this division’s operational control. (See Figure 3). For the assault into Kuwait, the 1st MarDiv was organized into Task Forces. Two of these, Task Force Ripper and Task Force Grizzly, played roles in capturing Al Jaber air base from Iraqi forces. Task Force Ripper consisted of the three battalions of the 7th Marine Regiment. These units were the 3rd Tank Battalion, the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marine Regiment (1/5), and the 1st Battalion of the 7th Marine Regiment (1/7). Task Force Ripper was augmented with forces from the 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, the 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion, and the 3rd Battalion of the 11th Marine Regiment (3/11), which provided artillery support. The 1st MarDiv also gave Task Force Ripper one of the four Fox NBC Detection vehicles attached to the division.[17]

During the course of combat on the first day of the ground war, Iraqi forces set fire to the nearby Al Burqan oil fields. The heavy black smoke from these fires sharply reduced visibility during the combat operations to secure Al Jaber. Despite crossing a second mine field, Iraqi ground force resistance, artillery and the smoke, Task Force Ripper surrounded the air base by 6:00 p.m. on February 24th (the first day of the ground war). Iraqi forces, however, still held the base.[18] Because of the reduced visibility, operations to take the base were postponed until the following day, February 25.[19] A number of Iraqi soldiers surrendered to Task Force Ripper units during the afternoon and evening of February 24. These prisoners revealed that only conventional munitions—not chemical warfare rounds—were stored in Al Jaber’s bunkers.[20]

The night of February 24-25 was tense for the Marines encircling Al Jaber. Task Force Ripper troops had been warned that Iraq might use chemical weapons, and this knowledge, combined with the expectation of a pitched battle the next day (or sooner), set nerves on edge.[21] Interviews conducted for this investigation indicate that several units around Al Jaber donned chemical protective equipment to a Mission Oriented Protective Posture level 4 (MOPP-4[22]) five times between 2000 hours on February 24 and 2:00 a.m hours on the Feb. 25.[23] However, no records of these alerts appear in any of the unit chronologies. None of those interviewed remember any alerts to go to MOPP-4 being broadcast over any of the radio nets. Those interviewed about these events remember being told of a "gas" alert verbally.[24]

The 1st MarDiv NBC NCO stated that atmospheric conditions that night caused the smoke from outgoing artillery to hug the ground rather than dissipate. On several occasions, Marines mistook this artillery smoke for Iraqi chemical attacks and this was erroneously reported.[25] However, they took no chances and followed normal procedures for confirming a chemical alert while investigating the cause. 1st MarDiv Headquarters Forward Command Post—sometimes called the "Bravo" CP—was located outside the base (See Figure 4) and the NBC staff performed tests with their M256A1 chemical warfare agent detector kit after each "gas" alert.[26] Each of the five M256 tests produced no positive results—indicating no chemical agents were present. Following standard procedure, a few individuals were selected to remove their gas masks. These men were then observed for several minutes to see if they experienced any chemical warfare agent exposure symptoms. When they did not exhibit symptoms, a general "all clear" was sounded, returning all the Marines to MOPP-2.[27]

Figure 4. Unit deployment around Al Jaber, Night of Feb. 24/25, 1991.[28]

Although some of those involved believed there was a Fox detection vehicle at Al Jaber, none of the 1st MarDiv’s Fox vehicles were present. The four Fox Vehicles were deployed as follows: Task Force Ripper, Task Force Papa Bear, and two with 1st MarDiv Mobile Command Post. Only the Task Force Ripper Fox was close to the air base - probably within five miles, but they reported no alerts on this night.[29]

Task Force Grizzly captured over 1000 Iraqi soldiers during this first day of the ground war and they were being held just outside the gates of Al Jaber. Few of these prisoners had chemical protective equipment, and following the five alarms, none appeared to have suffered any ill effects that would be reflective of chemical exposure. Task Force Grizzly Marines observed no chemical warfare agent exposure effects among the prisoners. Similarly, several Marines reported sleeping through some of the alarms without donning their masks and suffered no ill effects.[30]

Task Force Grizzly was given the task of clearing the enemy from the base on the 25th. The attack began at 4:00 p.m. and, by the morning of February 26, (Figure 5) Task Force Grizzly occupied or controlled most of the base. Most of the Iraqi defenders gave up, but resistance continued on February 25, particularly from long-range artillery north of the base. The ensuing artillery battle between the Marines and the Iraqi III Corps produced more Coalition force casualties (none chemical) than any other single engagement of the war. This heightened the tension and combined with the previous intelligence about possible chemical attacks added to cause for concern over Iraqi use of chemicals. At one point, the Task Force Grizzly Commander requested permission to use riot control agents ("tear gas") to subdue the remaining base defenders, but this request was denied by higher authorities out of concern that the Iraqis might retaliate with chemical weapons.[31]

Figure 5. Timeline of Events for February 24-26, 1991.

As the fighting continued, Task Force Ripper heard from the Iraqi prisoners that an Iraqi counterattack would come "out of the flames."[32] The Task Force Ripper command thought this meant that a counterattack would be coming from out of the smoke of the burning oil fields. Task Force Ripper established a defensive mobile screening force north of the air base to prepare for the anticipated counterattack. The Iraqi attack never developed, but Marines were still anticipating an attack when a chemical alert occurred.[33]

At 6:00 p.m., Task Force Ripper was alerted to a possible gas attack and went to MOPP-4 (Figure 6). The Task Force Ripper NBC Officer was careful to record "went to MOPP-4" and not "gas attack," as he had no confirmation of a chemical weapons attack. It is possible that the initial radio announcements declared a gas attack rather than a change in proscribed protective measures.[34] Consider, for instance, the way the 1st Combat Engineers Battalion reported the same alert:

• 6:00 p.m. - Flash! Flash! Gas! Gas! 3d Tk Bn log train reports they have been gassed. TF Ripper goes to MOPP 4.
• 6:30 p.m. - All clear[35]

Figure 6. "Ripper" in MOPP-4[36]

The Task Force Ripper NBC Officer reemphasized reporting discipline throughout the Task Force, but for the first several days of the ground conflict, many suspected chemical attacks were reported as "confirmed attacks" over the radio nets. This left personnel in many units under the impression that actual chemical attacks had occurred and had been confirmed. Clearly, this is not the case as this was only a suspected attack and as will be described, cannot be confirmed by 3d Tank Battalion or anyone else.

The alert at 6:00 p.m. was investigated as one of the seven events at Al Jaber, but it is currently unclear who the source of the alert was and where it occurred on the battlefield. Although the log quoted from above attributes it to the 3d Tank Battalion, no mention of the incident appears in the 3rd Tank Battalion’s logs.[37] Interviews of the 3d Tank Battalion Commander, the resupply officer (S-4), and NBC officer also failed to shed any light on the report. In fact, the NBC officer was quite emphatic, stating that the attribution of this report to 3d Tanks was incorrect.[38] The Task Force Ripper NBC Officer remembers the alert coming from the resupply convoy in the rear, approximately 20 miles behind the main body of the Task Force located at Al Jaber.[39] Investigators have been unable to locate anyone who recalls the specifics of this alert.[40]

Nevertheless, the 6:00 p.m. alert was taken seriously and standard operating procedures were initiated: All affected units went to MOPP-4 and NBC personnel began checking for chemical agents. The Task Force Ripper NBC Officer recalls establishing an NBC "picket line" of two or three Marines several hundred yards upwind of the Task Force Command Post. These Marines used M256 kits to test the air for chemical agents. The tests took approximately 23 minutes to perform. All local monitoring by subordinate units resulted in negative tests—no agents detected. At that point (6:30 p.m.), Task Force Ripper returned to MOPP-2[41](Figure 7).

Figure 7. Timeline of Events—Fox Alert

The Initial Alert

Less than an hour later, at 7:08 p.m. on the 25th, the Fox vehicle[42] (Figure 8) attached to Task Force Ripper and operating north of Al Jaber air base alerted to a blister agent. At the time of the alert, wind conditions were 10-15 mph or higher, with gusts reaching 30-40 mph. GySgt Grass, the Fox Commander, and the driver were on the roof of the vehicle in MOPP-2. The MM-1 (mass spectrometer) operator and the "wheel-man" or alternate MM-1 operator were inside the vehicle. The Fox, still under the control of Task Force Ripper was deployed with 3rd Tanks in a stationary position approximately 1 kilometer northwest of the air base, awaiting the possible Iraqi counterattack.[43]

Figure 8. A Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle in Desert Storm Camouflage.

Smoke from the oil well fires obscured everything, limiting visibility to a few feet. Some reports state that the flashes of weapons fire could be observed through the smoke. The Fox driver recalls an artillery round landing upwind approximately four kilometers away. Five to six minutes passed and then the blister alert sounded.[44]GySgt Grass states that there was fighting but no shelling in the area.[45]

Fox Capabilities

The primary chemical agent detector on the Fox vehicle is the MM-1 mass spectrometer. The MM-1 detects chemical agents by analyzing the ionic activity of a sample collected through a retractable probe. The probe can collect samples by "sniffing" the surrounding air (the "Air/Hi" method) or by taking them from a silicone wheel which is lifted from the ground to the probe (the "Surface/Lo" method). At the time of the alert at Al Jaber, the Fox was employing the least sensitive "Air-Hi" method. For example, this Fox method is more than 100 times less sensitive than an M256 kit in detecting nerve agent (Table 1). In the "Air-Hi" method, the MM-1 is performing a "quick-look" analysis of air samples, looking for ions that resemble chemical agents.

Table 1. Vapor Chemical Agent Detector Characteristics

If the MM-1 alerts to a possible chemical agent, there is an audible alarm. A full spectrum analysis must then be performed to confirm or deny the presence of chemical agents. The preferred method for performing a full spectrum is the "Surface-Lo" method: The MM-1 probe is extended to the ground (usually to a suspected liquid chemical agent) and the operating temperature of the MM-1 is lowered. Only by performing a full spectrum can an alert be confirmed or denied solely by the Fox vehicle. A "tape," which provides details of the MM-1’s findings, can be printed as a permanent record of the initial alert and the full spectrum.

During the Gulf War, the Fox vehicle was manned by a crew of four—the Fox vehicle commander, a driver, an MM-1 operator and a wheel operator. The wheel operator uses levers inside the vehicle to lift the silicone wheels from the ground to the probe for sampling. The driver and commander sit in the front of the vehicle, while the MM-1 and wheel operators sit in the rear. The two areas are connected by a narrow crawl-through.[49]

According to the Fox "wheel man", he and the MM-1 operator were inside the Fox, sampling the air in the "Air-Hi" method, when they saw the MM-1 screen flash an alert for an airborne chemical warfare agent. They called to the driver and GySgt Grass outside on the roof of the vehicle to get inside and close the hatches so the protective overpressure system could be engaged. The Fox crew noted no characteristic chemical agents odors and reported no symptoms or illness.[50]

Accordingly, the MM-1 operator started the full spectrum analysis. Either during (or immediately after) the full-spectrum procedure, the alarm ceased and the MM-1 returned to "normal" readings. There is a difference in opinion of the crew as GySgt Grass and the wheel man report that a spectrum confirmed chemical warfare agent presence. The driver states that as the MM-1 operator changed methods, the alert ceased, precluding a spectrum being performed.[51]

Reporting the Alert

While the MM-1 operator performed his analysis, GySgt Grass reported the blister alert to Task Force Ripper’s NBC Officer. The 3rd Tanks NBC Officer was also notified. GySgt Grass remains certain that he reported a Mustard gas detection.[52] None of the other Fox crew members interviewed remember for certain what type of chemical agent was detected.[53] The Task Force Ripper NBC Officer thought it was a Lewisite detection and states that a mistake in the reporting was probably his, since GySgt Grass was an actual witness.[54]

When the Task Force Ripper NBC Officer was notified of the alert, he immediately attempted to determine the wind speed and direction to alert units downwind of the Fox. For some reason, he was unable to ascertain any wind speed or direction so as a precaution he placed the entire Task Force at MOPP-4 and ordered each battalion to begin local testing with M256 detector kits.[55]

Without stating that a possible gas attack had occurred, the Task Force Ripper NBC Officer directed the Task Force Ripper Operations Officer (S3) to announce over the radio that that all units go to MOPP-4. He did not want to cause panic, but he wanted to make sure that protective measures were taken. Regardless of his concern, the message left many listeners with the impression that an actual gas attack occurred at 7:10 p.m.[56]

Each unit within Task Force Ripper reported the details of the blister alert differently. (The log reports of these units can be found in Tab E.) Oddly, although the Fox was deployed with 3rd Tanks, this battalion does not have a log entry that notes this alert at all.[57] Many of the alerts designate Lewisite, not Mustard; this may derive from the discrepancy between Grass’s and the Task Force Ripper NBC Officer’s reports.

Attempts of Confirmation

Most of the unit logs report "all clear" within 10-12 minutes of the initial report. This is difficult to understand since an M256 Test Kit takes 15 minutes to test for nerve and blister agents and up to 25 minutes to test for blood agents.[58] (Iraq had no blood agents.) Both Task Force Ripper’s and 3rd Tanks’ NBC Officers are sure that individual units performed M256 tests after the Fox alert to completion. Neither of these men can explain how the "all clear" could have been sounded 10-12 minutes after MOPP-4 had been ordered. They are sure, however, that the tests were fully performed, that all proved negative, and that selective unmasking was performed before the unit returned to MOPP-2. At Task Force Ripper Headquarters, the NBC Officer ordered two M256 tests to be performed 10 minutes apart. When both tested negative for chemical warfare agents and selective unmasking produced no symptoms, he ordered a return to MOPP-2.[59] At the earliest, this would have been at 1935 hours. The 3rd Tanks logs show unmasking beginning at 1959 hours, presumably after this alert.[60]

While all the units of Task Force Ripper were testing with M256 kits, the Fox crew attempted to locate the source of the original alert. Under normal circumstances, the Fox would have searched the surrounding area, attempting to find additional evidence of any chemical agent contamination (NBC units are trained to locate and isolate a contaminated area, then detour troops and traffic around it until decontamination or normal dissipation renders the area safe for normal operations.) Mustard and Lewisite are both persistent agents—usually existing in a liquid form—so the Fox crew hoped this search would identify the source. A number of circumstances limited this search. The smoke from the burning oil fields made identification of friendly and enemy vehicles very difficult. The Fox looks like a Soviet-made, Iraqi Army BTR-60 Armored Personnel Carrier and there were concerns that Marines might mistake it for an enemy vehicle. To avoid this possibility, the Task Force Ripper Fox vehicle was given a security escort during most of the ground war. At this point in the ground combat action at Al Jaber, the security detail left the Fox to engage in a firefight. Consequently, the Fox was limited in the area it could safely search and the source of the alert was not found.[61]

Mustard, the agent alerted on in the Fox alert, is classified as a persistent agent and would therefore probably leave a detectable residue for some time after an attack. Table 2 displays some of the characteristics of chemical warfare agents. Mustard (HD and HN) and Lewisite(L) are both blister agents that are used in liquid form and have similar characteristics.[62] A drop of the liquid on exposed skin will cause large blisters to form. Inhalation of tiny droplets will cause scarring on the lungs. Blister agents on the battlefield would normally be found in pools of liquid agent, noticeable for days to weeks after an attack. Additionally, blister agents can cause casualties for several days after an attack.

Table 2. Chemical Warfare Agent Symptoms and Characteristics.[63]

Analysis of the Fox Tape

The Task Force Ripper Fox printed either an initial alert tape or a full spectrum tape.[64] It is possible to print a tape of an initial alert, before a full spectrum analysis is performed. Only a full spectrum analysis will confirm an initial alert. It is unclear if a full spectrum analysis was performed and which type of tape was printed.

A difference of opinion exists about the handling of the tape. GySgt Grass recalls talking via radio to the 1st MarDiv NBC Officer about this alert. After the conversation, Grass kept the tape until the night of February 28, when he gave this tape and several others to the 1st MarDiv NBC Officer.[65] The Task Force Ripper and 1st MarDiv NBC Officers both recall that the tape was forwarded by GySgt Grass to the Ripper NBC Officer who personally showed the tape to the 1st MarDiv NBC Officer during a meeting sometime around 0830 hours on February 26.[66]

Several hours earlier, at around 4:00 a.m., the 1st MarDiv NBC Officer viewed a tape from another Fox. Although originally believed to be a chemical alert the alert on this tape was subsequently determined to be a "false positive" caused by the burning Al Burqan oil field.[67] With this false positive in mind, the 1st MarDiv NBC Officer examined the Al Jaber tape. There was no other evidence to substantiate the alert, so the 1st MarDiv NBC Officer concluded that the Al Jaber alert was also caused by oil smoke.[68]

At the time of the Gulf War, the Marine Corps had not established procedures for analysis and archiving of Fox tapes. Unfortunately, the whereabouts of the Al Jaber Fox tape is unknown. The 1st MarDiv NBC Officer either destroyed the tape on February 26 or filed it with records that were subsequently destroyed. He considered the case closed and saw no need to keep this tape.[69]

GySgt Grass and the Task Force Ripper NBC Officer don’t agree with the 1st MarDiv NBC Officer’s oil smoke assessment. Grass has stated that the oil fires were constantly being detected at a low level. He had assigned the label "Unknown 1" to oil fires for detection by the spectrometer, and he clearly remembers this alert being different than the normal screen image of oil fire ion activity. He also states that this alert was not like the readings of exhaust smoke that produce alerts of "Fat, Oil, Wax."[70] The Task Force Ripper NBC Officer agreed with GySgt Grass’s assessment due to Grass’s expertise with the Fox vehicle.[71]

Other Relevant Log Entries

The 3rd Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment (3/11) Command Chronology reports that at 10:30 p.m. on the 25th, the 1st MarDiv reported that the blister agent was a false alarm. According the Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, it was the unit above, the I MEF (the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters), not the division, that made this pronouncement. The Task Force Ripper and the 1st MarDiv NBC Officers wondered how higher headquarters personnel could make a determination from the rear area. It did not matter though, for by 10:30 p.m. the Task Force Ripper NBC Officer had already decided that if there had been a valid detection, it was no longer detectable and there was therefore no need to stay in MOPP-4.[72]

One additional record of possible chemical warfare agents came from the 1st Battalion of the 12th Marine Regiment (1/12), assigned to the 11th Marine Regiment. An entry in the 1/12 command chronology recorded that on February 26 at 2:20 a.m., the Task Force Ripper Fox vehicle reported lewisite vapor.[73] However, the Task Force Ripper NBC Officer states that there was only one Task Force Ripper Fox alert during the ground war and that was at 1908 hours on February 25.[74] This is consistent with all the testimony of GySgt Grass who never reported any detection of lewisite and only alerted to Mustard near Al Jaber. This incident will be covered in the case on the 11th Marines.

After Al Jaber was cleared of Iraqi forces by Task Force Grizzly on February 26, the Marines began to ready the base as a forward base for Marine aircraft. Task Force Grizzly maintained the base and the perimeter until March 3rd (Figure 9). The commander of Task Force Grizzly set up his headquarters in a former air-to-air missile ammunition storage point. According to the commander, the Marines of Task Force Grizzly reported no signs of chemical weapons storage or chemical warfare symptoms from use.[75]

Figure 9. Timeline of Events, Feb.24 - March 3, 1991.

In order to prepare the base for offensive actions, Marine Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams were sent to the base to clear away hazardous weapons. The Marine Air Logistics Squadron 16 (MALS 16) EOD Team arrived at Al Jaber by helicopter early on February 26. Their primary mission was to collect and destroy unexploded munitions on the runways. Most of the munitions they encountered were "area denial" mines and bomblets dropped on the base by Coalition aircraft during the air war or Kuwaiti Air Force munitions left from before the war. The EOD team also found Iraqi munitions. After inspecting and testing these munitions (with M-8 chemical detection paper[76] where appropriate), none were found to be chemical and all were subsequently destroyed.[77] Although the EOD team was concerned primarily with preparing the air base for operations, the commander stated that they were "ammunition curious" and looked into everything they could. The MALS 16 team left the air base on March 3rd.[78]

In addition to Task Force Grizzly and MALS 16, the 1st and 2nd EOD Platoons of the 7th Engineer Detachment performed cleanup operations on the base. They went through all storage areas looking for anything suspicious such as leaking munitions or weapons that might have chemical agent filler plugs. Most of the ammunition in these facilities was Kuwaiti Air Force ammunition of various manufacture. The 1st Platoon worked outside the base, while the 2nd Platoon cleared inside the base. The 2nd Platoon left the area on March 1st and the 1st Platoon then took over the base and cleared munitions found in the area through April. Neither the 1st nor the 2nd Platoons report finding any chemical weapons (persistent or non-persistent) or evidence of persistent chemical weapons use. Additionally, no one recalls finding any Iraqi 155mm shells—later confirmed as a the primary ground delivery system of Mustard weapons.[79] Some of the unit files were routinely destroyed on a two year cycle, so records of all destroyed munitions are not available.[80]

The focus of this section will be on the Fox alert. However, most of this section presents facts and analysis that are applicable to all seven alerts. This analysis can be separated into three areas:

1. Did Iraq have the capability to use chemical agents—particularly blister agents like Mustard and Lewisite— in Kuwait near Al Jaber?
2. If a detector did alert to possible agent presence, could the detector have registered a false alarm?
3. Did attempts at confirmation supply any additional information that aids in confirmation or denial of a detection?

Analysis of Iraqi Chemical Weapons Capabilities

The Iraqi armed forces could deliver chemical weapons in a variety of ways: artillery, aircraft, and surface-to-surface missiles. Although U.S. intelligence reported that chemical mines also might be used, none were found by the United Nations (UN) Special Commission, coalition military forces, or civilian Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) teams; over 300,000 conventional (non-chemical) mines were cleared from Kuwait.[81] In response to a question of the Presidential Advisory Committee asking if there was any evidence that Iraq deployed any land mines that had chemical weapons, Mr. Mitrokhin representing UNSCOM said, "We've seen nothing, absolutely nothing."[82] Iraq did produce and deploy Mustard munitions within Iraq borders, with the closest chemical munitions found 200 kilometers away at Khamisiyah. Iraq used Mustard munitions during the war with Iran (1983 - 1988). No Lewisite was found in the Iraqi inventory by the UN Special Commission after the war.[83]

As noted above, the Iraqi Army had 155mm artillery for Mustard delivery. After the war, UN Inspection Teams found and destroyed 12,792 Mustard filled 155mm projectiles in Iraq.[84] No other Mustard ground delivery munitions were located. Most of the Marines interviewed noted the absence of Iraqi 155mm artillery near the base. All available Marine EOD records show no Iraqi 155mm ammunition was found or destroyed in this area after the war. Additionally, EOD did not find any chemical munitions in the vicinity of Al Jaber. However, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) cannot definitively give the location of all Iraqi 155mm artillery pieces in Kuwait at the time of the event, so there is a possibility that there were some within shelling range of Al Jaber on the night of February 25. These systems did have non-chemical roles and conventional (non-chemical) 155mm ammunition may have been found in an ammunition supply point near Kuwait City.[85]

Iraqi aircraft did not fly ground attack sorties after January 25.[86] This rules out the possibility of an air-delivered chemical strike on February 25th. Additionally, no SCUD Surface-to-Surface Missiles were fired during the period in question.[87]

DIA has made the following statement:

Our current understanding is that Iraq did not deploy CW into Kuwait during the Gulf War. The furthest south Iraqi CW has been found is at Khamisiyah, Iraq.[88]

There are several reasons to believe that the Iraqis never deployed CW into Kuwait. First, there is no confirmed evidence that they did so. Neither Kuwait nor the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) companies assisting the Kuwaitis have reported finding any CW during cleanup operations. Iraqi troops stationed in Kuwait often did not have the best CW defensive equipment. This indicates they were not prepared to fight in a contaminated environment.

The Iraqis also feared U.S. retaliation if they used chemical weapons, and may have decided to use them only if the regime’s survival were threatened. This would explain why Iraq deployed CW to Khamisiyah and An Nasiriyah, but not to Kuwait. Finally, Iraq’s most well-trained and trusted forces, the Republican Guard - who were in Iraq, not Kuwait - were the units best equipped to deliver CW. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that any CW were stored behind these forces, not in front of them.[89]

Fox Detection and Confirmation

The Fox vehicle used by U.S. forces during Operation Desert Storm was a sophisticated chemical warfare agent detector. According to the manufacturer, it is possible that smoke from the nearby oil well fires could have resulted in a "false positive" detection for chemical warfare agents.[90] Only a thorough analysis of the printed tape can provide positive verification.

Unfortunately, the MM-1 tape is lost. It is possible to retrieve a spectrum from the Fox, since the last 72 spectra are saved in the MM-1’s memory. In 1994, in response to questions raised by Congress, the Army dispatched a team to read the memory of all of the Desert Storm-era Fox vehicles. GySgt Grass’s Fox Vehicle (#5604) was located and inspected in Okinawa. A memorandum states:

No spectra or extra substances were found in USMC S/N 5604 which was the vehicle which reported Lewisite and benzyl bromide detections during ODS.[91]

The absence of spectra could have been the result of routine maintenance done by an MM-1 operator. Two frequently performed maintenance procedures erase all data on previously performed spectra.

Other Attempts at Confirmation

Task Force Ripper’s M256 testing for all seven of the incidents resulted in no positive detections of chemical agents being reported to the Task Force Ripper NBC Officer. The procedures the Task Force operated under would have required that he be informed of a positive detection. Again, it should be noted that according to US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM), when it comes to detecting Mustard, the M256 is over one hundred times more sensitive than the Fox’s "Air-Hi" method.[92]

The Fox crew’s physical reaction during the alarm is noteworthy. There were no casualties and no one recalls any garlic (Mustard) or fruity/germanium (Lewisite) smells characteristic of those chemical agents.[93]

The quantity of Mustard required for the MM-1 to alert in the "Air-Hi" method would be substantial. This amount of Mustard should have caused (at the least) blisters on the unprotected skin of the men on the Fox’s roof and the others on the ground around the Fox.[94] There were no recorded blister agent casualties in Task Force Ripper during the war.[95] In 1993, a Marine thought his illness was caused by chemical warfare agents he was exposed to during the Gulf War. However, the Marine Corps investigation in 1994 that examined several incidents including Al Jaber concluded that the Marine’s reported illnesses did not exhibit "...any of the classical signs of exposure to chemical warfare agents at any time, on or since Feb. 24, 1991." [96]

Al Jaber was the scene of intense activity during the ground war and in the month that followed. Yet none of the units at or around Al Jaber found any evidence of chemical weapons storage or use. Additionally, Marines in the area reported no chemical warfare casualties.

Over a three-day period, February 24-26, 1991, U.S. Marines were alerted seven times to don higher chemical protective clothing in response to possible chemical warfare agents. In each case, the Marines responded by following the appropriate procedures to evaluate and attempt to confirm the presence of these agents, but this investigation has uncovered no evidence to confirm the possibility. No one who conducted an M256 test reported a positive result. In the one alert reported by the Fox reconnaissance vehicle commander, the indications of an alert passed so rapidly that no spectrum was obtained, without which confirmation is not possible. Further, the Fox tape that might have provided additional information for analysis (even without the spectrum) was discarded after a senior NBC officer evaluated the tape and determined that the alert was caused by smoke from the oil well fires, not by a chemical warfare agent. Nevertheless, the Fox reconnaissance vehicle commander who saw the tape is certain that the Fox alerted to a Mustard agent.

Our efforts to find evidence of Iraqi chemical weapons in and around Al Jaber air base verified only that the Iraqis did possess chemical weapons and specifically Mustard munitions, but there is no sign that any were moved into Kuwait. After the war demolition of munitions found in Kuwait failed to turn up any chemical weapons. There are no reported chemical warfare casualties due to any of the alerts, including the Fox crew members who were outside the vehicle when the Fox’s spectrometer alarmed. Finally, Mustard is a persistent agent, so some detectable traces of Mustard should have remained for days to weeks following an attack. None was reported. Based upon the information that is available and despite the seven alerts around Al Jaber air base, the presence of chemical warfare agents is "Unlikely".

This assessment is tentative, based on the information available to us to date. This case will be reassessed over time in accordance with any new information and feedback from the publication of this narrative.

This case is still being investigated. As additional information becomes available, it will be incorporated. If you have records, photographs, recollections, or find errors in the details reported, please contact the DOD Persian Gulf Task Force Hot Line at 800-472-6719.

ARCENT U.S. Army Central Command

ASP Ammunition Supply Point

CAM Chemical Agent Monitor

CBDCOM Chemical Biological Defense Command

COMUSARCENT Commander, U.S. Army Central Command

CW Chemical Weapon

CWA Chemical Warfare Agent

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DOD Department of Defense

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

FSSG Force Service Support Group

GWAPS Gulf War Air Power Supply

IAD Investigation and Analysis Division

HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle

LAI Light Amphibious Infantry

LAV Light Armored Vehicle

MALS Marine Air Logistics Squadron

MarDiv Marine Division

MARCENT U.S. Marine Corps Central Command

MEF/IMEF Marine Expeditionary Force

MM-1 Fox Mass Spectrometer

MOPP Mission Oriented Protective Posture

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVEODETCH U.S. Navy Explosive Ordnance Demolition Technician

Blister Agents

Mustard (H) gas was used during the later parts of World War I. In its pure state, mustard is colorless and almost odorless. The name mustard comes from earlier methods of production that yielded an impure, mustard or rotten-onion smelling product.

Distilled mustard (HD) was originally produced from H by a purification process of washing and vacuum distillation. HD is a colorless to amber colored liquid with a garlic-like odor. It has less odor and a slightly greater blistering power than H and is more stable in storage. It is used as a delayed action casualty agent, the duration of which depends upon the munitions used and the weather. HD is heavier than water, but small droplets will float on the water surface and present a hazard.

Heavily splashed liquid mustard persists one to two days or more in concentrations that produce casualties of military significance under average weather conditions and a week to months under very cold conditions. HD on soil remains vesicant for about two weeks. The persistency in running water is only a few days, while the persistency in stagnant water can be several months. HD is about twice as persistent in seawater.

Mustard acts first as a cell irritant and finally as a cell poison on all tissue surfaces contacted. Early symptoms include inflammation of the eyes; inflammation of the nose, throat, trachea, bronchi and lung tissue; and redness of the skin. Blistering or ulceration is also likely to occur. Other effects may include vomiting and fever that begin around the same time as the skin starts to redden.

Eyes are very sensitive to mustard in low concentrations: Skin damage requires a much larger concentration. HD causes casualties at lower concentrations in hot, humid weather, because the body is moist with perspiration. Wet skin absorbs more mustard than dry skin absorbs. HD has a very low detoxification rate. Repeated exposures, therefore, are cumulative in the body.

Individuals can protect themselves from small mustard droplets or vapor by wearing protective masks and permeable protective clothing. The use of impermeable clothing and masks can protect against large droplets, splashes and smears.

Detection paper

Detection paper works because certain dyes are soluble in chemical warfare agents. Normally, two dyes and one pH indicator are mixed with cellulose fibers in a paper without special coloring (unbleached). When the paper absorbs a drop of chemical warfare agent, it dissolves one of the pigments. Mustard agent dissolves a red dye and nerve agent a yellow dye. In addition, VX nerve agent causes the indicator to turn to blue—which, together with the yellow, will become green or green-black. Detection paper can thus be used to distinguish between three different types of chemical warfare agents. A disadvantage with the papers is that many other substances can also dissolve the pigments. Consequently, detection papers should not be located in places where drops of solvent, fat, oil, or fuel can fall on them. Drops of water cause no reaction.

M256A1 Chemical Agent Detection Kit

The M256A1 kit is a portable, expendable item capable of detecting and identifying hazardous concentrations of chemical agent. The M256 kit is used after a chemical attack to determine if it is safe to unmask. The M256A1 kit has replaced the M256 kit. The only difference between the two kits is that the M256A1 kit will detect lower levels of nerve agent. This improvement was accomplished by using an eel enzyme for the nerve test in the M256A1 kit in place of the horse enzyme used in the M256 kit.

Reference: Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, p. 430.

Mission Oriented Protective Posture

Mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) is a flexible system used to direct the wearing of chemical protective garments and mask—a system that balances mission requirements with the chemical warfare agent threat. Wearing chemical protective garments and mask provides soldiers protection against most known chemical warfare agents, biological agents, and toxins.

At MOPP Level 0 soldiers carry their protective mask while their remaining MOPP gear must be readily available (e.g., within the work area, fighting position, living space, etc.) At MOPP Level 1, soldiers wear their overgarment and carry the rest of their MOPP gear. At MOPP Level 2, soldiers wear their overgarment and overboots while carrying the mask with hood and gloves. At MOPP Level 3, soldiers wear their overgarment, overboots, and mask with hood, but not the gloves. At MOPP Level 4, soldiers wear all their MOPP gear. Commanders can raise or lower the amount of protection through five levels of MOPP. In addition, commanders, under certain situations, can exercise a mask-only option.

• 7th Marine Regiment (Task Force Ripper)
  • 1/7 Marine Battalion
  • /5 Marine Battalion 3rd Tank Battalion
  • 3/11 Marine Artillery Battalion
  • 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion (-)
  • 1st Combat Engineer Battalion (-)
• 4th Marines (TF Grizzly)
• 1st MarDiv Forward Command Post
• 245th Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) Detachment - U.S. Army

1^st Battalion, 12^th Marine Regiment Command Chronology.

3^rd Amphibious Assault Battalion Logs.

11^th Marines Chronology.

11^th Marines War Journal.

"7th Marines Log" for Feb. 24, 1991.

Bermudez, Joseph S., Jr, . "Iraqi Missile Operations During ‘Desert Storm’ - Update." Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 1991, p. 225.

"Breaching Operations, 7th Marines Log", Feb. 24, 1991.

Chemical and Biological Warfare in the Kuwait Theater of Operations: Iraq’s Capability and Posturing, Defense Intelligence Agency, Undated (but 1990).

"Chemical Warfare Agent Detectors Probe the Fogs of War," Chemical and Engineering News, Aug. 1, 1994.

"Command Chronology for Period Jan. 1 to Feb. 28, 1991," 7th Marines.

"Command Chronology for the 1st Combat Engineering Battalion, Jan. 1 to 28 Feb. 28, 1991," March 15, 1991.

"DIA Answers to Questions from OSAGWI" , Undated,(but 1997).

DIA Intelligence Information Report, June 2, 1997, Subject: "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait."

Department of Defense Final Report to Congress, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April, 1992.

"Fox Reconnaissance Vehicle," Information Paper, July 31, 1997.

Gulf War Weather, United States Air Force Tactical Air Command/TN - 92/003, March, 1992.

Heflin, Ron CWO3, Ordnance destroyed in SWA, NAVEODTECHEN, 1997. Note, Table A shows all USMC ordnance found to be unfit for transport back to the U.S. and were destroyed in place as well as some foreign ordnance on the bottom of this list.

Intelligence Report, Iraqis Prepositioned Chemical Munitions, ARCENT, March, 1991.

Investigation to Inquire into the Circumstances surrounding the Possible Exposure of Sergeant [Name Deleted] USMC to Chemical Agents During Operation Desert Storm. 1^st MEF, USMC, 22 Feb 1994.

Iraqi Chemical Warfare: Analysis of Information Available to DOD (U), Section 11 (U) Possible CW Agent Release, Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Committee Report, June 16, 1997.

Lead Sheet 748, Interview with Fox Expert, April 30, 1996.

Lead Sheet 3873, Interview with the 3^rd Tank Battalion Commander, May 15, 1997.

Lead sheets 5156, Interview with OIC of the 245^th PSYOPS Detachment, U.S. Army, May 20, 1997.

Lead sheets 5181, Interview with member of the 245^th PSYOPS Detachment, U.S. Army, May 30, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5273, Interview with the 3^rd Tank Battalion Logistician (S4), June 17, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5274, Interview with 1^st MarDiv NBC Officer, June 13, 1997 and other dates.

Lead Sheet 5277, Interview with OIC 1^st Platoon, 2 FSSG EOD, May 16, 1996 and June 17, 1997

Lead Sheet 5278, Interview with Major from 2 FSSG EOD, May 16, 1996 and June 18, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5279, Interview with MALS 16 Officer in Charge, June 17,1997.

Lead Sheet 5296, Interview with member of 1^st Platoon EOD, June 17,1997.

Lead Sheet 5299, Interview with 1^st MarDiv NBC Staff, June 18, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5310, Interview with 1^st MarDiv Fox MM-1 Operator, June 19, 1997.

Lead sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, June 18, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5331, Interview with member of 1^st Platoon EOD, June 24, 1997.

Lead Sheets 5337, Interview with 1^st MarDiv NBC Staff, June 24, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5354, Interview with Task Force Grizzly Commander, June 30, 1997.

Lead Sheets 5353 and 5359, Interview with Fox 5604 driver, Dec. 7 1993, May 31, 1996 and June 27, 1997.

Lead Sheets 5357, Interview with 1^st MarDiv Executive Officer, June 30, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5358, Interview with the 3^rd Tank Battalion NBC officer, June 30, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5390, Interview with member of 1^st and 2^nd Platoon EOD, July 2, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5391, Interview with Fox 5604 Wheel man, July 2, 1997.

Letter by Fox Vehicle 5604 Driver Concerning Possible Chemical Attack, Dec. 22, 1993.

Letter by Task Force Task Force Ripper NBC Officer Concerning Possible Chemical Attack, Undated - but prepared in 1993.

"Marine Corps NBC Defense in Southwest Asia," Marine Corps Research Center Research Paper #92-0009, Captain T. F. Manley, July 1991.

Memorandum from Marine Corps Casualty Section, Subject: "Chemical Casualties During Desert Shield/Desert Storm," March 11, 1996.

Message from COMUSMARCENT - G-3, 0313592 February 1991.

"Mission Oriented Protective Posture and Chemical Protection," Aug. 30 1997.

"Persian Gulf Special Summary," Central Intelligence Agency, September 1990.

Task Force Ripper (1st Battalion, 7th Marines) Command Chronology for the Period Jan. 1 to Feb. 28, 1991.

Testimony of CWO Joseph P. Cottrell, USMC, at the Hearing before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Nov. 18, 1993.

Testimony of Fox Subject Matter Expert, Mr. Richard Vigus, CBDCOM, before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Nov. 18, 1993.

Testimony of Fox Vehicle 5604 Driver Concerning Possible Chemical Attack, Investigation to Inquire into the Circumstances surrounding the Possible Exposure of Sergeant [Name Deleted] USMC to Chemical Agents During Operation Desert Storm,  Sept. 22, 1993.

Testimony of GySgt George J. Grass, Task Force Ripper Fox Vehicle Commander, May 7, 1997, to the Presidential Advisory Committee.

Testimony of GySgt George J. Grass, Task Force Ripper Fox Vehicle Commander, Investigation to Inquire into the Circumstances surrounding the Possible Exposure of Sergeant [Name Deleted] USMC to Chemical Agents During Operation Desert Storm, Jan. 11, 1994.

Testimony of GySgt George J. Grass, Task Force Ripper Fox Vehicle Commander, December, 1996, Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee, U.S. House of Representatives.

Testimony of Mr. James Kenny, Task Force Ripper Fox MM-1 Operator, to the Presidential Advisory Committee, May 7, 1997.

Testimony of Lt. Gen. Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., before the Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, Feb. 27, 1997.

Testimony of Task Force Ripper NBC Officer Concerning Possible Chemical Attack, Investigation to Inquire into the Circumstances surrounding the Possible Exposure of Sergeant [Name Deleted] USMC to Chemical Agents During Operation Desert Storm, Dec. 14, 1993.

The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, United Nations, New York, 1996.

The Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects, June, 1994.

U.S. Army/Marine Corps FM 3-4/FMFM 11-9, "NBC Protection."

U.S. Army FM 3-9 U.S. Navy NAVFAC Publication P-467 U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990.

U.S. Army, FM 3-100, "NBC Operations." 1985.

U.S. Army FM 3-101-2, "NBC Reconnaissance Squad/Platoon (FOX) Operations - Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures," Aug. 10, 1994.

U.S. Army, Message Form, Subject: MARCENT Report, 240955C Feb 1991.

U. S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C., 1993.

U. S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C., 1993.

U.S. Navy Ships Technical Manual Chapter 470 Change 4, September 91, "Shipboard BW/CW Defense and Countermeasures."

Vigus, Richard, Summary of MM-1 Spectra, U.S. Army Chemical Biological Defense Command, Feb.15, 1994.

Watts, Barry D. And Kearny, Dr. Thomas A., Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), Volume II, Effects and Effectiveness, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.

Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995.

Wronka, Dr. John, Analysis of MM-1 Data, Bruker DALTRONICS, July 15, 1997.

The DOD requires a common framework for our investigations and assessments of chemical warfare agent incident reports, so we turned to the United Nations and the international community which had experience concerning chemical weapons. Because the modern battlefield is complex, the international community developed investigation and validation protocols[97] to provide objective procedures for possible chemical weapons incidents. The standard that we are using is based on these protocols that include:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site;
• Physical evidence from the site, e.g., weapons fragments and soil, water, vegetation, human, or animal tissue samples;
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence;
• Testimony of witnesses;
• Several analyses; and
• A review of the evidence by an expert panel.

While the DOD methodology for investigating chemical incidents is based on these protocols, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence was often not collected at the time of an event. Accordingly, the methodology is designed to provide a thorough, investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and determine what happened. The major efforts in this methodology are:

• To substantiate the incident;
• To document available medical reports about the incident;
• To interview appropriate people;
• To obtain information available to external organizations; and
• To assess the results

Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical agent presence, nor is a single individual’s observation sufficient to validate a chemical agent presence.

To substantiate the circumstances surrounding an incident, the investigator searches for documentation from operational, intelligence, and environmental logs. This focuses the investigation on a specific time, date, and location, clarifies the conditions under which the incident occurred, and determines whether there is "hard" as well as anecdotal evidence. Additionally, the investigator looks for physical evidence that might indicate that chemical agents were present in the vicinity of the incident, including samples (or the results of analyses of samples) collected at the time of the incident.

The investigator searches the medical records to determine if personnel were injured as a result of the incident. Deaths, injuries, sicknesses, etc. near the time and location of an incident may be telling. Medical experts should provide information about alleged chemical casualties.

Figure 10. Chemical warfare incident investigation methodology

Interviews of incident victims (or direct observers) are conducted. First-hand witnesses provide valuable insight into the conditions surrounding the incident and the mind-set of the personnel involved, and are particularly important if physical evidence is lacking. NBC officers or personnel trained in chemical and biological testing, confirmation, and reporting are interviewed to identify the unit’s response, the tests that were run, the injuries sustained, and the reports submitted. Commanders are contacted to ascertain what they knew, what decisions they made concerning the events surrounding the incident, and their assessment of the incident. Where appropriate, subject matter experts also provide opinions on the capabilities, limitations, and operation of technical equipment, and submit their evaluations of selected topics of interest.

Additionally, the investigator contacts agencies and organizations that may be able to provide additional clarifying information about the case. These would include, but not be limited to:

• Intelligence agencies that might be able to provide insight into events leading to the event, imagery of the area of the incident, and assessments of factors affecting the case.
• The DOD and Veterans’ clinical registries, which may provide data about the medical condition of personnel involved in the incident.

Most of the units in the general vicinity of Al Jaber have recorded this alert in the unit logs. Note that the 3rd Tank Battalion did not record the event in their logs.

The 7th Marines (Task Force Ripper) noted the alert as follows:

1910 - WENT TO MOPP-4

1920 - ALL CLEAR SOUNDED[98]

The 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion recorded it as follows:

1908 Fox vehicle detected and identified Lewicite [sic]agent. Ripper6 believes that chemical weapons were used but not sure if Ripper was the target. These chemical munitions could have been exploded by our own artillery, thus causing secondary explosions.

1910 Going to MOPP-4

1920 All clear sounded.[99]

The 1st Combat Engineer (CE) Battalion recorded it as follows:

1910 - Fox vehicle detects Lewicite [sic]. TF Ripper returns to MOPP 4

1920 -All clear[100]

The 11th Marines Command Chronology, which had one battalion (3/11) assigned to Task Force Ripper reports:

1911 - 3/11 REPORTS POSSIBLE GAS ATTACK; UNITS GO TO MOPP LEVEL 4. TF RIPPER FOX VEHICLE REPORTS DETECTING BLISTER AGENT LEWISITE AT 1918. AT 2030 DIVISION REPORTED THAT BLISTER AGENT WAS FALSE ALARM. UNITS RETURN TO MOPP LEVEL 1.[101]

The 11th Marines War Journal also reports:

1911: 3/11 RPTS A GAS ATK. PRIDE MAIN ALSO RPTS A GAS ATK.

1918: RIPPER RPTS A BLISTER AGENT WHICH IS CONFIRMED BY A FOX VEHICLE. RPT SENT TO ALL BNS.[102]

The 11th Marines War Journal entries imply that multiple attacks/alerts are happening at the same time. Actually, 3/11 was on the Task Force Ripper communications net and would have passed along the Fox alert to its regimental headquarters. PRIDE MAIN was the call sign for the 1st MarDiv Headquarters Command Post-Main. They did not report a chemical alert at their location but were probably passing the Fox alert along. They received the Task Force Ripper report at 1918 (or possibly 1908 with an error in the time reporting) and recorded it without realizing that all were the same alert.

1. An acronym listing/glossary is at Tab A.
2. Testimony of GySgt George J. Grass, May 1, 1996, Presidential Advisory Committee.
3. Testimony of GySgt George J. Grass, May 7, 1997, to the Presidential Advisory Committee.
4. Testimony of GySgt George J. Grass, December 1996, Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee of the House of Representatives.
5. Testimony of Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, November 18, 1993, Hearing before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
6. Investigation to Inquire into the Circumstances surrounding the Possible Exposure of Sergeant [Name Deleted] USMC to Chemical Agents During Operation Desert Storm. Finding 36, 1st MEF, USMC, 22 Feb 1994.
7. This same event was referenced in the Iraqi Chemical Warfare: Analysis of Information Available to DOD (U), Chapter 11, Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release, Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Committee Report, p. 26. In this report, this event was referenced in Appendix A as three different events: Event 36, 37 and 39. These three events are actually the same singular Fox alert discussed in this narrative.
8. Persian Gulf Special Summary, September 1990, CIA. p. 8.
9. Chemical and Biological Warfare in the Kuwait Theater of Operations: Iraq's Capability and Posturing, Defense Intelligence Agency, undated (but prewar), p. 3.
10. Chemical and Biological Warfare in the Kuwait Theater of Operations: Iraq's Capability and Posturing, Defense Intelligence Agency, undated (but prewar), p. 3.
11. The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, United Nations, New York, 1996, Document 189, p.656-657.
12. Intelligence Report, Iraqis Prepositioned Chemical Munitions, ARCENT, March, 1991.
13. Message from COMUSMARCENT - G-3, 0313592 Feb 91.
14. Interview with MALS 16 Officer in Charge, Lead Sheet 5279.
15. 1st Marine Division Command Chronology, p. 49.
16. 1st Marine Division Command Chronology, p. 49.
17. Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead sheet 5325.
18. 1st Marine Division Command Chronology, p. 80.
19. 1st Marine Division Command Chronology, p. 97-98.
20. 7th Marines Log. Log entry times for the Iraqi prisoner disclosures: 1643 and 1733 hours.
21. Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5325.
22. Described in the Glossary.
23. Interview with 1st MarDiv NBC Staff, Lead Sheet 5299.
24. Interview with members of the 245th Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) Detachment, U.S. Army, Lead Sheets 5156 and 5181.
25. Interview with 1st MarDiv NBC Staff, Lead Sheet 5299.
26. Description of M256A1 in Glossary.
27. Interview with 1st MarDiv NBC Staff and Executive Officer, Lead Sheets 5299 and 5357.
28. 1st Marine Division Command Chronology, p. 89.
29. Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead sheet 5325.
30. Interview with Task Force Grizzly Commander, Lead Sheet 5354.
31. 1st Marine Division Command Chronology, p. 94.
32. 1st Marine Division Command Chronology, p. 90.
33. 1st Marine Division Command Chronology, p. 90.
34. 7th Marines Logs.
35. Command Chronology of the 1st Combat Engineer Battalion.
36. "Ripper" goes to MOPP -4, with permission of the US Marine Corps Historical Center, Artist Col. Avery Cheneweth, USMCR.
37. 3rd Tank Logs.
38. Interviews with the 3rd Tank Battalion Commander, logistician (S-4) and NBC officer, Lead Sheets 3873, 5358, 5273.
39. Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5325.
40. Attempts to discuss this matter with those in the resupply train of Task Force Ripper have not resulted in additional knowledge of this alert. Interviews with Task Force Ripper NBC Staff and 3rd Tank S-4, Lead sheets 5337, 5273.
41. Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer and 3rd Tank Battalion NBC Officer, Lead Sheets 5325, 5358.
42. For a better understanding of the Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle, see the Fox Information Paper.
43. Interviews with Fox 5604 Crew, Lead Sheets 5359, 5353, 5391 and Interview with GySgt Grass, February 1997, p.11.
44. Interview with Fox 5604 driver, Lead Sheets 5353, 5359.
45. Interview with GySgt Grass, Feb. 1997, p.12.
46. Because the minimum detectable amount is calculated from the background and backgrounds vary-dependent on environmental and atmospheric conditions-the minimum detectable amounts will vary. The sensitivities listed in Table 2 are relevant only for the specific conditions they were calculated from.
47. At this level unprotected personnel would experience moderate to severe symptoms from Sarin before the MM-1 would alert.
48. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects; June 1994 Table 18.
49. For more information on the Fox vehicle, please refer to the Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle Information Paper.
50. Interviews with Fox 5604 Crew, Lead Sheets 5359, 5353, 5391, 5336 and Interview with GySgt Grass, Feb. 1997, p.19.
51. Interviews with Fox 5604 Crew, Lead Sheets 5359, 5353, 5391, 5336 and Interview with GySgt Grass, Feb. 1997, p.19. Driver Statement to 1994 Marine Corps Investigation, p. 3 of Lead Sheet 5353.
52. Interview with GySgt Grass, Feb. 1997, p.21. GySgt Grass says he reported the alert to the 3rd Tank NBC Officer, but both the 3rd Tank and Ripper NBC Officers remember him reporting to Ripper while 3rd Tanks NBC Officer was monitoring. Lead Sheets 5325, 5358.
53. Interview with Fox 5604 Crew,Lead Sheets 5359, 5353, 5391, 5336.
54. Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5325.
55. Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5325.
56. Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5325.
57. 3rd Tank Bn Logs.
58. Some agents types such as nerve and blister will be detected within 15 minutes, but to ensure no CWA (including blood agent types) are present, the test should be run to its conclusion. The Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects, June, 1994, p. 35.
59. Interview with Task Force Ripper and 3rd Tank NBC Officers, Lead Sheets 5325, 5358.
60. 3rd Tank Bn Logs.
61. Interview with GySgt Grass, Feb. 1997, p. 22-25.
62. There are pre-war reports that Iraq possessed "Dusty Mustard"-a powder form of Mustard -but this CWA was not found by UNSCOM after the war. The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, United Nations, New York, 1996, Document 189, p.656-657.
63. FM 3-100, NBC Operations, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 17 Sept. 1985.[
64. See also the Fox Vehicle Information Paper for further discussion and examples of Fox tapes.
65. Interview with GySgt Grass, Feb. 1997, p. 29. See also the ASP/Orchard Case Narrative.
66. Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5325.
67. Interview with 1st MarDiv NBC Officer and Fox MM-1 operator, Lead Sheets 5274 and 5310.
68. Interview with 1st MarDiv NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5274.
69. Interview with 1st MarDiv NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5274.
70. Interview with GySgt Grass, Feb. 1997, p. 28.
71. Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5325.
72. Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5325.
73. 1/12 Command Chronology.
74. Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5325.
75. Interview with Grizzly Commander, Lead Sheet 5354.
76. Description of the M-8 Detection Paper found in the Glossary.
77. EOD Situation Report for the period 23 February 1991 through 31 March 1991, MALS-16, 10 April 1991, enclosure 1 and enclosure 3.
78. Interview with MALS-16 Officer in Charge, Lead Sheet 5279.
79. Interviews with EOD Technicians from the 1st and 2nd Platoons, Lead Sheets 5277, 5278, 5296, 5331, 5390.
80. Ordnance destroyed in SWA, NAVEODTECHEN,1997. Note, Table A shows all USMC ordnance found to be unfit for transport back to the U.S. and destroyed in place as well as some foreign ordnance on the bottom of this list.
81. Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait, IIR 7 7171 0082 97, Defense Intelligence Agency, June 1997.
82. Statement by Mr. Igor Mitrokhin, UN Special Commission, to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, July 29, 1997.
83. The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, United Nations, New York, 1996, Document 189, p.656-657.
84. Ibid. p.656-657.
85. ASP/Orchard Investigation.
86. Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), Volume II, Effects and Effectiveness, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993, p.109.
87. Iraqi Missile Operations During 'Desert Storm' - Update. Jane's Intelligence Review, May 1991, p. 225.
88. This was confirmed in a statement by Mr. Charles Duefler, UN Special Commission, to the Presidential Advisory Committee (PAC) on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, July 29, 1997. Major Cross of the PAC asked, "Do you see any evidence where any weapons were moved from the three lower depots, actually down into Kuwait, maybe brought back at some time?" Mr. Duefler answered, "We have seen no evidence of that and Iraqis have said that no movements took place other than what is described here." Mr. Duefler was referring to movements of munitions to and from the depots near Baghdad and the three lower depots, of which the southernmost (and closest to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) was Khamisiyah.
89. DIA Answers to Questions from OSAGWI , Undated, 1997.
90. Analysis of MM-1 Data, Bruker DALTRONICS, 15 July 1997.
91. Summary of MM-1 Spectra, U.S. Army Chemical Biological Defense Command, 15 Feb 1994.
92. Interview with CBDCOM Expert, Lead Sheet 748.
93. Interviews with Fox #5604 Crew, Lead Sheets 5359, 5391, 5353; GySgt Grass Interview, February 1997, p. 18.
94. Interview with CBDCOM Expert, Lead Sheet 748.
95. Interviews with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead sheet 5325.
96. MEF, USMC, 22 Feb 1994.
97. "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This Chemical Weapons Convention was opened for signature in Paris, France, on January 13, 1993. It has been signed by 165 States and ratified by 93 States (as of June 1997). It was signed by the U.S. on Jan 13, 1993 and ratified on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the Convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. [http://www.unog.ch/frames/disarm/distreat/chemical.htm
98. 7th Marine Logs.
99. 3rd AA Bn Logs.
100. Command Chronology of the 1st Combat Engineer Battalion.
101. 11th Marines Chronology.
102. 11th Marines War Journal.