One prominent hypothesis about illnesses among Gulf War veterans is that some reported symptoms may have resulted from exposure to chemical warfare agents. During and after the Gulf War, some veterans reported they had been exposed to chemical warfare agents. To investigate these incidents and assess the likelihood of chemical warfare agents' presence in the Gulf, the Department of Defense developed a methodology for investigation and validation based on work done by the United Nations and the international community. The investigation examines these factors:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site;
• Physical evidence from the site, e.g., weapons fragments and soil, water, vegetation, human, or animal tissue samples;
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence;
• Testimony of witnesses;
• Several analyses; and
• A review of the evidence by experts.

While our investigative methodology (more fully described in Tab D) is based on these factors, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence often was not collected when an event occurred. Therefore, we cannot apply a rigid template to all incidents and must tailor each investigation to its unique circumstances. Accordingly, we designed our methodology to provide a thorough, investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and to determine what happened. Alarms alone are not certain evidence of chemical warfare agent presence, nor is a single observation sufficient to validate the presence of a chemical warfare agent.

Following our methodology, we accumulate anecdotal, documentary, and physical evidence; interview witnesses and key servicemembers; and analyze the results of all available information. The investigator then assesses the possibility of the presence of chemical warfare agents on the battlefield. Because we do not expect to always have conclusive evidence, we developed an assessment scale (Figure 1) ranging from Definitely Not to Definitely, with intermediate assessments of Unlikely, Indeterminate, and Likely. This assessment is our best judgment, based on facts available on the report publication date; we reassess each case over time based on new information and feedback.

Figure 1. Assessment of chemical warfare agent presence

The standard for making the assessment is based on common sense: do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that chemical warfare agents were present or not? If insufficient information is available, the assessment is Indeterminate until more evidence emerges.

During the liberation of Kuwait in February 1991, US Marines of the 1st Marine Division reported several suspected chemical warfare agent incidents, some of which occurred during combat operations near Kuwait’s Al Jaber air base, approximately 50 kilometers southwest of Kuwait City. From the evening of February 24 through the morning of Feb. 26, 1991, seven chemical warfare agent alerts resulted in units near Al Jaber donning protective equipment while testing for the presence of chemical warfare agents.

On the night of February 24 and morning of February 25, Marines five times misidentified artillery smoke from Marine guns as possible Iraqi chemical warfare agents. This misidentified artillery smoke was the only indicator of a possible chemical warfare attack. Our investigation found no evidence of chemical warfare agent exposure in any of these alerts. Tests using M256A1 chemical agent detector kits identified no chemical warfare agent presence. No one reported any symptoms indicative of chemical warfare agents, despite some Marines and Iraqi prisoners not taking full protective measures during some of these alerts. We consider chemical warfare agent presence in these five alerts unlikely.

The specific source of a sixth alert reported at 6:00 p.m. on February 25 eluded our identification. Although contemporaneous written record places this alert with Marine units near Al Jaber, none of this unit’s Marines who should have remembered this incident could recall any specifics. Additional examination of this incident in a separate investigation produced no additional specifics but ascertained the M256A1 chemical agent detector kits did not identify agent presence. For this reason, we assess the presence of chemical warfare agent in this incident as unlikely.

The most-discussed alert—it originally prompted this investigation—occurred during the night of Feb. 25, 1991, and was reported by Task Force Ripper’s XM93 Fox Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle commander. US armed forces initially deployed this German-made reconnaissance vehicle, the most sophisticated liquid chemical warfare agent detector available to U.S. forces in Operation Desert Storm. As the reconnaissance vehicle sat under skies black with the smoke from oil well fires, its chemical warfare agent detector alerted to the possible vapor presence of a blister agent (a persistent chemical warfare agent). The alert ceased after several minutes. It is unclear if the crew had sufficient time to perform additional testing. All units in this vehicle’s vicinity complied with prescribed procedures by donning protective equipment and testing for chemical warfare agents.

Although the initial chemical warfare agent alert indicated the possible presence of chemical warfare agent, we found no evidence corroborating this alert. The M256A1 chemical agent detector kits, which are more sensitive to chemical warfare vapor than the reconnaissance vehicle, did not identify the presence of chemical warfare agents. The Fox vehicle found no contamination. This investigation could not find any source for chemical warfare agent at this location. Post-war US and United Nations investigators found no evidence of chemical munitions storage or use in Kuwait. In addition, we found that no servicemembers in the area who reported symptoms at that time indicating chemical warfare presence. Therefore, we assess the chemical warfare agent presence in this incident as unlikely.

In 1993, a Marine, whose Desert Storm mission included providing security to a XM93 Fox Nuclear Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle (Fox), believed an exposure to chemical warfare agents during the Gulf War caused his disease.[2] In response to this Marine, the Marine Corps asked several Marine nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons defense specialists, including Gunnery Sergeant (GySgt) George Grass to make statements about any chemical warfare agent exposures they suspected during the war. During the Gulf War, GySgt Grass commanded a Fox vehicle, the most sophisticated liquid chemical warfare agent detector available to US forces. In a written statement, GySgt Grass discussed a specific Fox alert for chemical warfare agents at Al Jaber air base, located at 28� 56’N, 47� 47’E in Kuwait (Figure 2). In 1993 and 1994, several Marines who testified before Congressional committees also mentioned GySgt Grass’s Fox alert at Al Jaber.[3] In May 1996 and May 1997, GySgt Grass testified before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses about several suspected Gulf War chemical warfare agent incidents about which he personally knew, including the Fox alert at Al Jaber.[4,5] GySgt Grass also testified in December 1996 before the Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee of the House of Representatives about these incidents.[6] The June 9, 1997,MITRE Corporation report, "Iraqi Chemical Warfare: Analysis of Information Available to DOD," and at least one other book also discuss this Fox alert.[7,8]

Figure 2. Al Jber Air Base, Kuwait

In response to these statements and testimony, we initiated our investigation in 1996. While probing the Fox alert, we identified several other chemical warfare agent alerts near Al Jaber air base. Due to their proximity in distance and time to the Fox alert, we incorporated these alerts in our investigation. Our interim narrative, published in 1997, documented seven alerts altogether. The General Accounting Office and the Presidential Special Oversight Board (PSOB) reviewed this narrative and recommended specific improvements to it. The PSOB further recommended publishing this narrative as final after incorporating changes for their comments.

Because of his high public visibility in discussing this case, we have named GySgt Grass, but we identify all other personnel by Gulf War position to protect their privacy.

Before Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Al Jaber was a Kuwaiti military air base. After the invasion, U.S. intelligence reported that the airfield might contain chemical munitions because Iraq’s ground forces had deployed 30 155mm howitzers near Al Jaber and used the airbase’s hardened hangarettes for munitions storage.[9] A Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) paper published before the war notes, "Iraq regards its 155mm artillery as the weapon of choice for ground force delivery of CW [chemical weapons]."[10] United Nations (UN) inspectors’ post-war analysis identified Iraq’s 155mm artillery as the sole ground force delivery system for mustard chemical warfare agent.[11] Before the war, Iraq’s artillery assets consisted of approximately 3600 Soviet Bloc artillery weapons and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) artillery weapons (105mm and 155mm). Of these, the DIA identified only 452 as 155mm artillery pieces.[12]

During the air war (Jan. 17 - Feb. 23, 1991) Coalition aircraft struck Al Jaber several times, attacking both the air base and suspected chemical munitions storage facilities west of the airfield.[13] Aircraft also dropped anti-personnel mines to impede Iraq’s forces’ movements in and around the base.

The dense concentration of Iraq’s long-range artillery near Al Jaber caused Coalition ground-war planners to make Al Jaber’s early capture a primary goal. The 1st Marine Division (1st MARDIV) commander considered Iraq’s artillery emplaced around the base the "nerve center of Iraqi defenses."[14] Consequently, Al Jaber became the Marine Expeditionary Force’s Objective Alpha - a goal for 1st MARDIV elements once they crossed the minefields on the first day of the ground war. The Marines intended to neutralize Iraq’s artillery threat by overrunning Al Jaber and then using the captured base as a forward air base for Marine Corps aircraft.[15]

Most of the units discussed in this narrative were part of the 1st MARDIV or under its operational control (Figure 3). For the assault of Kuwait, the 1st MARDIV organized into task forces, two of which, Task Forces Ripper and Grizzly, played roles in capturing Al Jaber air base. Task Force Ripper was comprised of the 7th Marine Regiment’s headquarters; the 3d Tank Battalion; the 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (the 1/7); and the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment (the 1/5). Task Force Ripper augmented these maneuver battalions with forces from the 1st Combat Engineer Battalion (1st CEB), the 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion (3d AAB), and the 3d Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment (the 3/11), which provided artillery support.[16] The 1st MARDIV also gave Task Force Ripper one of its four Fox vehicles.[17]

On Feb. 24, 1991, the first day of the ground war, Iraq’s forces set fire to the Al Burqan oil fields near Al Jaber. These fires’ heavy black smoke sharply reduced visibility during combat operations to secure the base. After crossing a second minefield and encountering enemy ground force resistance, artillery, and oil smoke, Task Force Ripper surrounded the base by 6:00 p.m. Iraq’s forces, however, still held the base. At 9:00 p.m. Marine commanders postponed operations to take the base until the next day, February 25.[18] During the afternoon and evening of February 24, many of Iraq’s soldiers surrendered to Task Force Ripper units. These prisoners revealed that only conventional munitions—not chemical warfare rounds—were stored in Al Jaber’s bunkers.[19]

Figure 3. I Marine Expeditionary Force Table of Organization

On the night of February 24, Marines surrounding Al Jaber prepared for further operations knowing Iraq had the capability to use chemical munitions.[20] Our interviews indicate several U.S. Marine and Army units around Al Jaber donned chemical protective equipment to Mission Oriented Protective Posture level 4 (MOPP-4)[21] five times between 8:00 p.m. on February 24 and 3:00 a.m. on February 25 in response to verbal alerts about smoke thought to be chemical warfare agents.[22] However, no records of these alerts appear in any unit chronologies or logs. None of those interviewed remembered broadcasts of any chemical warfare agent alerts over any radio networks, although some did recall telephoned alerts. Some of those interviewed about these events remembered hearing by word of mouth of a "gas" alert.[23]

A 1st MARDIV NBC non-commissioned officer (NCO) said atmospheric conditions on February 24 caused outgoing artillery smoke to hug the ground rather than dissipate. The 1st MARDIV Headquarters Forward Command Post (CP), sometimes called the Bravo CP, was southeast [24] of the air base (Figure 4); the wind was from the south to the north. According to the NBC NCO, on several occasions Marines mistook this outgoing artillery smoke from a 3/11 battery for Iraq’s chemical warfare agent attacks and erroneously reported an attack to the units around Al Jaber. [25] The Marines followed normal protective procedures by increasing their MOPP level while attempting to confirm the chemical warfare agent alert. The NBC NCO at the Bravo CP performed several tests with his M256A1 chemical warfare agent detector kits after each alert.[26] Each of the five sets of M256 tests produced negative results—indicating no chemical warfare agent presence. Following standard procedure, a few Marines unmasked and observed each other for several minutes to see if they experienced any nerve agent exposure symptoms. When they did not exhibit symptoms of nerve agent, the Marines removed their gas masks and reduced their protective posture.[27]

Figure 4. Units around Al Jaber, night of Feb. 24, 1991

No 1st MARDIV Fox vehicle reported a chemical warfare agent alert related to this incident, although some interviewees believed a Fox vehicle was present during these alerts.[28] The four Fox vehicles were deployed one each to Task Forces Ripper and Papa Bear and two with the 1st MARDIV mobile command post. The Task Force Ripper Fox was nearest the air base, although several miles from it, but its commander reported no alerts that night.[29]

Task Force Grizzly captured more than 1000 of Iraq’s soldiers during this first day of the ground war and held them just outside Al Jaber. Few of these prisoners had chemical protective equipment; witnesses said none of the prisoners had chemical warfare agent exposure symptoms after the five alerts. Several Marines reported sleeping through some of the alerts without donning their masks and reported no chemical warfare agent symptoms.[30]

The 1st MARDIV assigned Task Force Grizzly to clear the enemy from the base on February 25. Figure 5 shows a timeline of events on this date. The attack began at 4:02 p.m.; by the late evening, Task Force Grizzly occupied much of the base, although resistance continued into the evening, particularly from long-range artillery north of the base. This artillery battle around Al Jaber between the Marines and Iraq’s III Corps produced more Coalition casualties (none from chemical warfare agents) than any other single engagement of the war.[31] At one point, the Task Force Grizzly commander requested permission to use riot control agents (tear gas) to subdue the remaining defenders on the base, but higher authorities, concerned that Iraq’s soldiers might retaliate with chemical warfare agents, denied this request.[32]

As the fighting continued, prisoners told the Task Force Ripper leadership Iraq’s counterattack would come "out of the flames."[33] The Task Force Ripper commander thought this meant Iraq would counterattack through the smoke from the burning oil fields and ordered a defensive mobile screening force north of the air base in anticipation of the counterattack. The attack never developed.[34]

At 6:00 p.m., Task Force Ripper alerted to a possible chemical warfare agent attack and went to MOPP-4 (Figure 6). In the command chronology the Task Force Ripper NBC officer carefully recorded "went to MOPP-4" and not "gas attack," as he had no confirmation of a chemical warfare attack.[35] It is possible the initial radio announcements declared a gas attack rather than a change in prescribed protective measures.[36] 

Figure 5. Timeline of events for Feb. 24-26, 1991

The 1st Combat Engineers Battalion reported the same alert as follows:

• 6:00 p.m. - Flash! Flash! Gas! Gas! 3d Tk Bn log train reports they have been gassed. TF Ripper goes to MOPP 4.
• 6:30 p.m. - All clear[37]

The Task Force Ripper NBC officer said that in the ground conflict, the radio networks reported many suspected chemical warfare agent attacks as confirmed. These reports, such as the one above, made some 1st Marine Division Marines believe confirmed chemical warfare agent attacks had occurred.

We investigated the 6:00 p.m. alert as one of seven Al Jaber events, but the location and source of this alert currently are unclear. Although the 1st Combat Engineer Battalion log entry quoted above attributes the alert to the 3d Tank Battalion, the 3d Tank Battalion’s logs do not mention the incident.[38] Interviews of the 3d Tank Battalion’s commander, resupply officer, and NBC officer also failed to shed any light on the report. On the contrary, the 3d Tank Battalion NBC officer emphatically stated that attributing this report to 3d Tank Battalion was incorrect.[39] The Task Force Ripper NBC officer remembers the alert coming from the resupply convoy in the rear,[40] approximately 20 miles behind the main body of the task force at Al Jaber. We have been unable to locate anyone who recalls any other specifics of the location of this alert.[41]

Figure 6. "'Ripper' in MOPP-4" by Lt.Col. H. A. Chenwoeth, USMCR

Regardless of the source of this alert, Task Force Ripper initiated their standard operating procedures after a suspected chemical warfare incident: all the task force’s subordinate units went to MOPP-4 and NBC personnel began testing for chemical warfare agents. The Task Force Ripper NBC officer recalled positioning several Marines in a line several hundred yards upwind of the Task Force command post, where two or three Marines used M256 kits to test the air for chemical warfare agents. All M256 tests, which took 23 minutes to perform,[42] resulted in negative results—no agents detected. At that point (6:30 p.m.), Task Force Ripper returned to MOPP-2[43]. See Figure 7 for a timeline of events. The "11th Marines" Case Narrative, Event K, discusses additional details of this alert.[44]

Figure 7. Timeline of events for Fox alert

1. The Initial Alert

Shortly after the 6:00 p.m. alert, at 7:08 p.m. on the 25th, the Task Force Ripper Fox vehicle (Figure 8)[45] alerted to the possible presence of a blister agent.[46] This Fox awaited Iraq’s possible counterattack positioned with the 3d Tank Battalion in a stationary position about one kilometer northwest of the air base. GySgt Grass, the Fox commander, and the driver were in MOPP-2 on the vehicle’s roof, while the MM-1 mass spectrometer operator and alternate MM-1 operator (sometimes called the wheelman) were inside the vehicle when the MM-1 alerted. According to interviews, at the time of the alert the winds were northwesterly, through recollections of the wind speed varied from 10 to over 50 mph.[47]

Nevertheless, smoke from the oil well fires obscured everything, limiting visibility to a few feet. However, some reports state the Marines could observe flashes of weapons fire through the smoke. The Fox driver recalls an artillery round landed upwind approximately four kilometers away five to six minutes before the Fox alerted for blister agents.[48] GySgt Grass says fighting but no shelling occurred within those four kilometers.[49]

2. Fox Alert Procedures

The Fox’s primary chemical warfare agent detection system consists of the MM-1 Mobile Mass Spectrometer and an air-and-surface sampler. The MM-1’s most effective capability was to detect liquid chemical warfare agent contamination on the surface using the sampling wheel, but during the Gulf War it sometimes was used as a vapor detector. It is not optimized for this mission, nor is its alerting capability in this operating method as good as that of other chemical warfare agent detectors (e.g., the M43A1 chemical vapor detector).[51] The MM-1 continuously monitors samples passing through it, checking for the presence of chemical warfare agents identified on a pre-selected target list of 1 to 22 chemical compounds.

Figure 8. A Fox NBC Reconnaissance vehicle

According to the Fox wheelman, he and the MM-1 operator sat inside the Fox sampling the air when they saw the MM-1 screen flash an initial alert for an airborne chemical warfare agent. They called to the driver and GySgt Grass outside on the vehicle’s roof to get inside and close the hatches so they could engage the protective overpressure system. The Fox crew noted no characteristic chemical agents' odors and reported no symptoms or illness indicating chemical warfare agent exposure (e.g., watery eyes, runny nose, or breathing trouble).[52]

This initial Fox alert, however, does not verify the presence of a chemical warfare agent, since many chemical compounds, including common solvents, insecticides, riot control agents, hydrocarbons (e.g., oil well smoke and diesel fuel), and explosive fumes have the same or similar ions as the compounds on the chemical warfare agent target list and cause the MM-1 to issue false initial alerts.[53,54] The MM-1 operator must perform a spectrum analysis[55] to increase confidence in the detection of chemical warfare agent presence.[56,57]

Using procedures necessary to properly evaluate the sample for any suspected chemical warfare agent and assure battlefield contaminants (e.g., smoke, diesel exhaust, and oil) do not affect initial indications, an MM-1 operator takes several minutes to obtain spectrum results for analysis.[58] The MM-1 operator also should print a tape that saves the spectrum details as a hard copy historical record.[59] Should the properly performed spectrum analysis identify a chemical warfare agent, the MM-1 operator and Fox commander can be confident, though not certain, the agent is present.

In accordance with standard procedures, the MM-1 operator started a full spectrum analysis. Either during or immediately after the full spectrum procedure, the alarm ceased and the MM-1 returned to normal readings. The crew’s recollections of the results differ: GySgt Grass, the MM-1 operator, and the wheelman reported a spectrum confirmed chemical warfare agent presence, specifically sulfur mustard, while the driver said that while the MM-1 operator was changing methods, the alert ceased, precluding performing a spectrum analysis.[60]

3. Reporting the Fox Alert

While the MM-1 operator performed this analysis, GySgt Grass reported the blister alert to the Task Force Ripper and the 3d Tank Battalion NBC officers. GySgt Grass remains certain he reported an S-mustard or sulfur mustard alert.[61] The MM-1 operator also believes the substance identified in the alert was S-mustard.[62] The Fox driver recalled the substance as lewisite.[63] The Task Force Ripper NBC officer thought lewisite caused the alert and said, if a mistake occurred in reporting the type of suspected chemical warfare agent, he was at fault. He deferred to GySgt Grass because he was present during the alert and the officer was not.[64]

On notice of the alert, the Task Force Ripper NBC officer immediately attempted to determine the wind speed and direction to alert units downwind of the Fox. For a reason he could not identify, he was unable to ascertain any wind speed or direction, so he put the entire Task Force at MOPP-4 and ordered each battalion to begin local testing in each of its three companies with M256 detector kits.[65] In 1994, the Task Force Ripper NBC officer drew the diagram shown in Figure 9,[66] illustrating at least 12 companies (3 per battalion) and an artillery battalion surrounding the area in which the Fox alerted for chemical warfare agents.

Figure 9. Task Force Ripper deployment at 7:08PM as drawn by Task Force Ripper NBC officer

Without stating a possible chemical warfare agent attack had occurred, the Task Force NBC officer directed the Task Force operations officer to use the radio to order all units to MOPP-4. He wanted to avoid panic but ensure the Marines took protective measures.[67] While the log only indicates they went to MOPP-4, the message left many listeners with the impression an actual chemical warfare agent vapor attack had occurred.[68]

Each Task Force Ripper unit reported the details of the blister agent alert differently. (Tab E contains these units’ log reports.) Oddly, although the Fox was deployed with the 3d Tank Battalion, this battalion’s logs do not have an entry noting this alert.[69] Many entries from other units designate lewisite, not S-mustard, possibly caused by the discrepancy between GySgt Grass’s and the Task Force Ripper NBC officer’s reports.[70]

4. Additional Testing and Attempts to Locate the Source of the Alert

Most of the unit logs report an all clear announcement within 10 to 12 minutes (7:18 to 7:20 p.m.) after the initial Fox alert.[71] This is difficult to understand because it takes 15 minutes to properly use an M256 test kit to test for nerve and blister agents and up to 25 minutes for blood agents.[72] United Nations inspectors found no blood agents in Iraq’s inventory.[73] Both the Task Force Ripper and 3d Tank Battalion NBC officers state individual units completed M256 tests after the Fox alert, and neither Marine can explain how the all-clear could have sounded 10 to 12 minutes after MOPP-4 was ordered. They are sure, however, the fully performed tests all proved negative, and that before returning to MOPP-2 the unit performed selective unmasking. At Task Force Ripper Headquarters, the NBC officer ordered two M256 tests to be performed 10 minutes apart. When both tested negative for chemical warfare agents and selective unmasking produced no symptoms, he ordered a return to MOPP-2,[74] perhaps as early as 7:35 PM. The 3d Tank Battalion logs show this unit unmasking beginning at 7:59 PM, however we do not know if this was in response to the Fox alert.[75]

While all Task Force Ripper units tested with M256 kits, the Fox crew attempted to locate the source of the original alert. Under normal circumstances, the Fox would systematically search the surrounding area to attempt to find additional evidence of any liquid chemical warfare agent contamination. NBC units’ training includes locating and isolating a contaminated area and establishing routes around it until decontamination or dissipation renders the area safe for normal operations. Both mustard and lewisite are persistent liquid agents,[76] so the Fox crew hoped it could identify the source. Several operational circumstances limited the search. The oil field smoke made identifying friendly and enemy vehicles very difficult. The Fox looks like a Soviet-made, Iraqi Army BTR-60 Armored Personnel Carrier and there were concerns Marines might mistake it for an enemy vehicle. To avoid this possibility, a security escort protected the Task Force Ripper Fox vehicle during most of the ground war. Just before the alert, the security detail left the Fox to engage in a firefight with Iraq’s forces, limiting the area the Fox could search safely. Consequently, the Fox searched only the area immediately around the air base and did not identify the source of the alert in this area.[77]

Persistent chemical warfare agents (e.g., mustard and lewisite), the agents to which the Fox alerted, leave a detectable residue for some time after an attack (see Table 1). Both Sulfur mustard (S-mustard or HD) and lewisite(L) are liquid blister agents with similar characteristics.[78] A drop of either liquid on exposed skin causes large blisters to form. Inhaling tiny droplets scars the lungs. Blister agents on the battlefield can create hazardous puddles of liquid agent capable of causing casualties for days after an attack.[79]

Table 1. Chemical Warfare Agent Symptoms and Characteristics

5. The Fox Tape

The Fox crew printed a tape of either the initial alert or a full spectrum documenting the alert.[81] GySgt Grass recalled telling the 1st MARDIV NBC officer about this tape over the radio but says he did not show the tape to anyone until the night of February 28, when he gave this tape and several others to the 1st MARDIV NBC officer.[82] The Task Force Ripper and 1st MARDIV NBC officers recall events differently: they believe GySgt Grass immediately sent the tape to the Task Force Ripper NBC officer, who personally showed the tape to the 1st MARDIV NBC officer during a meeting sometime around 8:30 a.m. on Feb. 26, 1991.[83]

At around 4:00 a.m. February 26, several hours before his meeting with the Task Force Ripper NBC officer, the 1st MARDIV NBC officer viewed a tape of another initial alert from a second Fox supporting the 1st MARDIV. Although some of this Fox’s crew believed the tape showed an alert for chemical warfare agent, the NBC officer believed the alert showed a false positive caused by the oil smoke from the burning Al Burqan oil field, basing this determination on the lack of other indicators of chemical warfare agent presence (e.g., enemy attacks or chemical warfare exposure symptoms).[84] With this recent false positive in mind, the 1st MARDIV NBC officer examined the Fox MM-1 tape from the Al Jaber incident. In the Al Jaber incident, no other evidence substantiated the alert (e.g., casualties or positive M256 tests), so the 1st MARDIV NBC officer concluded oil smoke also caused the Al Jaber incident, basing his assessment on the lack of other indications of chemical warfare exposure, but not anything on the tape itself, as this officer had no expertise or experience with the Fox vehicle.[85]

GySgt Grass and the Task Force Ripper NBC officer do not agree with the 1st MARDIV NBC officer’s oil smoke assessment. GySgt Grass has stated the Fox repeatedly detected smoke from the oil fires at a low level. He assigned the label "Unknown 1" to oil fires in the spectrometer and remembered this alert differed from the normal screen image of oil fire ion activity. He also stated this alert was unlike the readings of exhaust smoke that produced "Fat, Oil, Wax" alerts.[86] The Task Force Ripper NBC officer accepted GySgt Grass’s assessment based on Grass’s expertise with the Fox vehicle.

At the time of the Gulf War, procedures to analyze and archive Fox tapes were not established.[87] Unfortunately, the whereabouts of the Al Jaber Fox tape are unknown. The 1st MARDIV NBC officer destroyed the tape either on February 26 or later, as he considered this alert a false positive and saw no need to keep the tape.[88]

6. Other Relevant Log Entries

The 3d Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment (3/11) command chronology reports at 8:30 p.m. February 25, the 1st MARDIV reported the blister agent alert was a false alarm.[89] According to the Task Force Ripper NBC officer, a higher echelon unit, the I Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters, not the 1st MARDIV, made this pronouncement. The Task Force Ripper and 1st MARDIV NBC officers wondered how higher headquarters personnel could so determine from the rear area.[90] It didn’t matter though, because based on the negative M256 results the Task Force NBC officer already had decided there was no chemical warfare threat to the task force and therefore the Marines did not need to stay in MOPP-4.

One additional report of possible chemical warfare agent presence came from the 1st Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment (1/12), assigned to the 11th Marine Regiment supporting Task Forces Xray and Taro. A 1/12 command chronology entry states that on February 26 at 2:20 a.m. the Task Force Ripper Fox vehicle reported lewisite vapor.[91] However, the Task Force Ripper NBC officer stated there was only one Task Force Ripper Fox alert during the ground war, at 7:30 p.m. on February 25.[92] This is consistent with all of GySgt Grass’s testimonies and statements. He never reported detecting any lewisite and discussed only his Fox vehicle’s alert for mustard near Al Jaber. This 2:20 a.m. command chronology reference may be an alert by Task Force Papa Bear not Task Force Ripper. For further information see Incident M in the "11th Marines" Case Narrative.[93]

After Task Force Grizzly cleared Al Jaber of Iraq’s forces on February 26 (Figure 10, the Marines began to prepare the base as a forward base for Marine aircraft. Task Force Grizzly occupied the base and secured the perimeter until March 3. The Task Force Grizzly commander set up his headquarters in a former air-to-air missile ammunition storage point. According to this officer, the Task Force Grizzly Marines reported no signs of chemical weapons, chemical warfare agent storage, or symptoms of chemical warfare agent exposure.[94]

Figure 10. Timeline of events, Feb. 24 - March 3, 1991

In preparing for Marine offensive air actions, several Marine explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, among them the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 (MALS 16) EOD team, arrived at Al Jaber early on February 26. These teams cleared hazardous munitions from the runways and collected and destroyed unexploded munitions, most of which were "area denial" mines and bomblets that Coalition aircraft dropped on the base during the air war or munitions Kuwait’s Air Force left behind before the war. The EOD team also found Iraq’s munitions.[95] Despite inspecting and testing them for chemical warfare agent presence with M-8 chemical detection paper,[96] where appropriate, the team identified no chemical munitions and subsequently destroyed many conventional munitions.[97] Although the EOD team primarily prepared the air base for Coalition operations, the commander stated they were "ammunition curious" and looked into everything they could. The MALS 16 team left the air base March 3.[98]

In addition to Task Force Grizzly and air logistics squadron EOD team, the 1st and 2d EOD Platoons of the 7th Engineer Detachment also cleaned up the base. The 1st EOD Platoon worked outside the base, while the 2d EOD Platoon cleared inside it, searching storage areas for any unusual munitions (e.g., leaking weapons or those with chemical agent filler plugs). Most of the munitions in these facilities belonged to Kuwait’s Air Force and were of various manufacture. The 2d EOD Platoon left the area on March 1 and the 1st EOD Platoon then took over the base and cleared munitions found locally through April. Neither the 1st nor the 2d EOD Platoon reported finding any chemical weapons or evidence of chemical warfare agent presence. Additionally, no one recalled finding any 155mm artillery shells—later confirmed as the primary ground system for delivering mustard-filled weapons.[99] The 7th Engineer Detachment routinely destroyed some unit files on a two-year cycle, limiting the number of records of destroyed munitions available to investigator review.[100]

1. Iraq's Chemical Weapons Capabilities

After the war, United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) inspection teams found and supervised the destruction of Iraq’s chemical warfare munitions, including 12,792 mustard-filled 155mm projectiles in Iraq. UNSCOM teams found neither other mustard ground delivery munitions nor lewisite in Iraq’s inventory.[101] The inspectors found the chemical warfare agent munitions nearest to Al Jaber were more than 200 kilometers away at the Khamisiyah Ammunition Supply Point in Iraq. UNSCOM has not identified any chemical munitions moved into or located in Kuwait.[102]

Most Marines interviewed noted the absence of Iraq’s 155mm artillery near the base, although a possibility remains that some 155mm artillery were deployed near Al Jaber on the night of February 25. These artillery systems have conventional (non-chemical) as well as chemical delivery capabilities. The available Marine EOD records do not note identifying or destroying any of Iraq’s 155mm munitions in this area after the war.[103] Iraq’s aircraft did not fly ground attack sorties after January 24,[104] ruling out the possibility of an air-delivered chemical strike on February 25. Additionally, no Scud surface-to-surface missile launches at this area occurred during this period.[105]

Asked for information about Iraq’s chemical weapons deployment, representatives from the UN Special Commission stated:

Our current [1997] understanding is that Iraq did not deploy CW [chemical weapons] into Kuwait during the Gulf War. The furthest south Iraqi CW has been found is at Khamisiyah, Iraq.[106]

The Defense Intelligence Agency supported this assertion with the following statement:

There are several reasons to believe that the Iraqis never deployed CW into Kuwait. First, there is no confirmed evidence that they did so. Neither Kuwait nor the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) companies assisting the Kuwaitis have reported finding any CW during cleanup operations. Iraqi troops stationed in Kuwait often did not have the best CW defensive equipment. This indicates they were not prepared to fight in a contaminated environment.

The Iraqis also feared US retaliation if they used chemical weapons, and may have decided to use them only if the regime’s survival were threatened. This would explain why Iraq deployed CW to Khamisiyah and An Nasiriyah, but not to Kuwait. Finally, Iraq’s most well-trained and trusted forces, the Republican Guard - who were in Iraq, not Kuwait - were the units best equipped to deliver CW. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that any CW were stored behind these forces, not in front of them.[107]

2. Fox Alert Analysis

As previously stated, the Fox crew disagrees about whether they performed a spectrum analysis or only recorded an initial alert. The tape that could answer this question no longer exists. In 1994 in response to reports of Fox detections during the Gulf War, the Army dispatched a team to read the stored memory of all Desert Storm-era MM-1s. Although it is possible to retrieve a previously run spectrum from a Fox MM-1, the Army team reported about GySgt Grass’s Fox, "No spectra or extra substances were found in USMC S/N 5604."[108] This is not surprising, because certain frequently performed maintenance or startup procedures erase the stored spectra.[109]

We know the MM-1 at least initially alerted for the possible presence of chemical warfare agent; however, this alert alone does not constitute proof of agent presence. An initial alert indicates only the possible presence of a chemical warfare agent. Since many chemical compounds have some of the same or similar ion masses as those on the MM-1 chemical warfare agent target list, the possibility exists that the MM-1 detected another substance with similar ions.[110]

According to the MM-1 manufacturer, it is possible smoke from the nearby oil well fires could have produced an initial alert for chemical warfare agents.[111] If so, performing a spectrum analysis in response to that initial alert would identify the presence of fats, oils, and wax or an unknown chemical substance (not a warfare agent) and establish the absence of chemical warfare agents. A spectrum analysis indicating mustard provides a higher probability, though not absolute, of a chemical warfare agent’s presence. Because we don’t know whether the Fox crew recorded only an initial alert or a spectrum, we cannot use the Fox alert as strong evidence of chemical warfare agent presence in this incident.

3. Other Attempts to Identify Chemical Warfare Agents

Task Force Ripper and 1st MARDIV followed procedures requiring crews to inform NBC officers of any positive chemical warfare detection. None of the seven incidents produced reports of positive detections in the M256 tests to the Task Force Ripper or 1st MARDIV NBC officers. Moreover, in attempting to confirm the Fox alert, more than 12 test crews (one per company) testing with M256 kits around the Fox did not detect chemical warfare agents.[112]

Mustard vapor exposure can cause eye lesions, skin burns, blisters, respiratory tract difficulties, or death, depending on the dosage received.[113] The exposed Fox crew members on the roof of the vehicle exhibited no chemical warfare agent symptoms. Task Force Ripper recorded no blister agent casualties during the war.[114] Additionally, blister agents can have distinctive odors, but none of the Fox crew recalls any garlicky (mustard) or geranium-like (lewisite) smells characteristic of those chemical agents.[115]

A Mustard characteristic is low volatility; thus, liquid mustard produces little vapor hazard. Experts believe a mustard vapor detection would require an identifiable source, such as a pool of liquid mustard agent or a nearby attack with mustard weapons causing noticeable ground contamination.[116] Low volatility of persistent chemical warfare agents (e.g., mustard) results in identifiable traces lingering for days to weeks after an attack.[117] While the liquid sits, it continuously emits a nearly steady concentration of mustard vapor. For this reason, a Fox detection of mustard vapor would not occur for the reported duration of three minutes, but would continue as a persistent hazard for several days near the identifiable liquid source. The lack of an identifiable source and singularly short Fox alert conflict with this expectation

The Fox MM-1 is not an effective chemical warfare agent vapor detector. In 1994, the Defense Science Board stated in this mode "the Fox is not a suitable warning device; very high concentrations of chemical agents would have to be present, such that unprotected troops in the vicinity would be adversely and acutely affected."[118] The Board based this finding on pre-Gulf War US Army Fox tests with nerve vapor hazards and did not test for mustard vapor.[119]

On the night of February 24-25 Marines initiated and responded to five chemical warfare agent alerts near Al Jaber air base. According to the Marines we interviewed, misidentifying artillery smoke as chemical warfare agents caused these alerts. No other evidence corroborates agent presence during these alerts. Marines with the 1st MARDIV headquarters element conducted M256 tests for each alert outside the air base and recorded no positive results for chemical warfare agents. Neither Marines nor unprotected Iraqi prisoners at Al Jaber reported any injuries characteristic of chemical warfare agent exposure. The lack of casualties and negative test results strongly indicate the presence of chemical warfare agents is unlikely.

We examined the circumstances surrounding the 6:00 p.m. event on February 25. The identity of this alert’s original reporting source eluded investigators. The 3d Tank Battalion, Task Force Ripper, and 1st MARDIV NBC officers knew of no positive M256 tests in this alert and would have been notified had one occurred. No chemical warfare casualties resulted from this alert. No evidence supports the chemical warfare agent’s presence except for a log entry. Based on the lack of evidence corroborating chemical warfare presence and NBC officers’ statements contradicting the log entry, we assess this incident as unlikely.

In the alert the Fox NBC vehicle commander reported, it is unclear if the crew obtained a spectrum. The Fox tape that might have provided additional information for analysis (even without the spectrum) no longer exists. Nevertheless, the Fox vehicle commander and several crew members state the Fox performed a spectrum analysis indicating mustard agent presence, while another crew member recalled only recording an initial alert. An initial alert signals only the possibility of chemical warfare agent presence, while a spectrum analysis indicating mustard is strong evidence chemical warfare agent is present. The crew’s sometimes-contradictory recollections of the mustard spectrum are the only evidence we have pointing to a possible chemical warfare agent exposure.

Other evidence conflicts with the Fox alert. Had mustard been present, we would expect casualties. We found no reports of chemical warfare agent exposure symptoms to Task Force Ripper Marines. The M256 tests around the Fox vehicle did not identify mustard presence. The alert report contradicts expert expectations about a mustard exposure in two critical aspects: although mustard persists for weeks, especially in temperatures encountered in Kuwait in February, this alert lasted only minutes; and, although mustard is primarily a liquid hazard with minimal vapor volatility, a liquid source of this mustard vapor could not be identified.

Additional information supports the evidence contradicting the Fox alert. Our efforts to find evidence of Iraq’s chemical weapons in and around Al Jaber air base verified only Iraq possessed chemical weapons, specifically mustard munitions. We uncovered no indications Iraq moved chemical munitions to Kuwait and disposal experts did not identify any during clean up. Therefore, based on all available information, we assess the presence of chemical warfare agents in the Fox alert near Al Jaber air base is unlikely.

A.  Fox MM-1 Tapes

In Operation Desert Storm, no procedures were established to collect and archive Fox MM-1 tapes. Unfortunately, the tapes for this incident were destroyed. If they had been available, the investigation would have benefited.

B. Documenting Chemical Warfare Agents’ Presence

In the Al Jaber chemical warfare agent alerts, the Fox crew responded exactly as they were trained: they alerted fellow Marines to possible contamination in the area and attempted to locate the source. Continuing combat in the area limited this search. The Fox crew took steps to mitigate the effects of possible chemical warfare agent presence. It was not their task to seek confirming evidence of a chemical warfare attack after they had moved through the area. In future conflicts, gathering strategic and operational evidence of an enemy’s chemical warfare agent use might be as important as taking proper tactical protective measures. The armed forces should establish procedures to send follow-on teams to areas suspected of chemical warfare agent contamination to either verify or disprove rumors of enemy chemical warfare agent use.

C. Organizational and Administrative Record-keeping

Some organizational and administrative records to corroborate interviews were unavailable in this case. Many Marine Corps Gulf War EOD records were routinely destroyed in compliance with Service directives. Instruction effective during the Gulf War dictated destroying most reports after two years. Current policy retains the two-year retention requirement.[120] The Department of Defense should consider requiring maintaining unit operational records from contingency deployments on electronic media for 10 years.

This is a final report. However, if you believe you have information that may change this Case Narrative, please contact this office by calling 1-800-497-6261.

AAB assault amphibian battalion

ASP ammunition supply point

CBDCOM Chemical Biological Defense Command

CBIAC Chemical and Biological Information and Analysis Center

CEB combat engineer battalion

COMUSARCENT Commander, U.S. Army Central Command

COMUSMARCENT Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Central Command

CP command post

CWA chemical warfare detachment

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DOD Department of Defense

EOD explosive ordinance disposal

FSSG force service support group

GySgt gunnery sergeant

MALS Marine air logistics squadron

MARDIV Marine division

MEF Marine expeditionary force

MM-1 Fox MM-1 Mobile Mass Spectrometer

MOPP mission oriented protective posture

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVEODTECHCEN Navy Explosive Ordnance Demolition Technical Center

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical

NCO non-commissioned officer

ODS Operation Desert Storm

PSYOPS psychological operations

SBCCOM Soldier Biological and Chemical Command

UN United Nations

UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission on Iraq

US United States

USMC United States Marine Corps

Blister Agents

Mustard (H) gas was used during the later parts of World War I. In its pure state, mustard is colorless and almost odorless. The name mustard comes from earlier methods of production that yielded an impure, mustard or rotten-onion smelling product.

Distilled mustard (HD) was originally produced from H by a purification process of washing and vacuum distillation. HD is a colorless to amber colored liquid with a garlic-like odor. It has less odor and a slightly greater blistering power than H and is more stable in storage. It is used as a delayed action casualty agent, the duration of which depends upon the munitions used and the weather. HD is heavier than water, but small droplets will float on the water surface and present a hazard.

Heavily splashed liquid mustard persists one to two days or more in concentrations that produce casualties of military significance under average weather conditions and a week to months under very cold conditions. HD on soil remains vesicant for about two weeks. The persistency in running water is only a few days, while the persistency in stagnant water can be several months. HD is about twice as persistent in seawater.

Mustard acts first as a cell irritant and finally as a cell poison on all tissue surfaces contacted. Early symptoms include inflammation of the eyes; inflammation of the nose, throat, trachea, bronchi and lung tissue; and redness of the skin. Blistering or ulceration is also likely to occur. Other effects may include vomiting and fever that begin around the same time as the skin starts to redden.

Eyes are very sensitive to mustard in low concentrations: Skin damage requires a much larger concentration. HD causes casualties at lower concentrations in hot, humid weather, because the body is moist with perspiration. Wet skin absorbs more mustard than dry skin absorbs. HD has a very low detoxification rate. Repeated exposures, therefore, are cumulative in the body.

Individuals can protect themselves from small mustard droplets or vapor by wearing protective masks and permeable protective clothing. The use of impermeable clothing and masks can protect against large droplets, splashes and smears.

Chemical contamination

The deposit, absorption, or adsorption of chemical agents on or by structures, areas, personnel, or objects.

Chemical warfare agent (CWA)

A chemical warfare agent is a chemical substance used in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate through its physiological effects. Excluded are riot control agents, herbicides, smoke, and flame. Included are blood, nerve, blister, choking, and incapacitating agents.

CS

A riot control agent
Chemical Name: O-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile

Detection paper

Detection paper works because certain dyes are soluble in chemical warfare agents. Normally, two dyes and one pH indicator are mixed with cellulose fibers in a paper without special coloring (unbleached). When the paper absorbs a drop of chemical warfare agent, it dissolves one of the pigments. Mustard agent dissolves a red dye and nerve agent a yellow dye. In addition, VX nerve agent causes the indicator to turn to blue—which, together with the yellow, will become green or green-black. Detection paper can thus be used to distinguish between three different types of chemical warfare agents. A disadvantage with the papers is that many other substances can also dissolve the pigments. Consequently, detection papers should not be located in places where drops of solvent, fat, oil, or fuel can fall on them. Drops of water cause no reaction.

Fox Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Reconnaissance System

The Fox is a six-wheeled, light armored vehicle designed primarily for reconnaissance of liquid chemical warfare agent hazards. On-board chemical warfare agent detection capabilities include the MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer, which is the primary detection device, the M43A1 chemical agent detector, which is an integral component of the M8 alarm system, and the M256A1 chemical agent detector kit. The Fox is also equipped with two radiation detectors. The Fox does not provide any biological warfare agent detection capability, but it does protect the crew from biological hazards, and it allows the crew to mark areas of potential hazard and safely take samples for laboratories to analyze for biological hazards.

HD

A blister agent known as distilled mustard
Chemical name: Bis-(2-chloroethyl) sulfide

HQ

A blister agent known as sulfur-mustard/sesqui-mustard
Chemical names: HD: Bis-(2-chloroethyl) sulfide
Q: 1,2-Bis (2-chloroethylthio) ethane

L

A blister agent known as lewisite
Chemical Name: Dichloro-(2-chlorovinyl)arsine

M256 Chemical Warfare agent detector kit

n the field, the M256-series chemical warfare agent detector kit is simply referred to as the M256 kit. The M256 kit is a portable, expendable item capable of detecting and identifying hazardous concentrations of blister, blood, and nerve agents. The M256 kit is used after a chemical warfare agent warning to test for and confirm the presence and type of chemical warfare agent, and to determine if it is safe to unmask. The M256A1 kit has replaced the M256 kit. The only difference between the two kits is that the M256A1 kit will detect lower levels of nerve agent. US forces used both the M256 kit and the M256A1 kit during the Gulf War.

Some smokes, high temperatures, standard US decontamination solution number two (DS2), and petroleum products may cause false readings. Results may be inaccurate when sampling is performed in smoke from burning debris.

Mission Oriented Protective Posture

Mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) is a flexible system used to direct the wearing of chemical protective garments and mask—a system that balances mission requirements with the chemical warfare agent threat. Wearing chemical protective garments and mask provides soldiers protection against most known chemical warfare agents, biological agents, and toxins.

At MOPP Level 0 soldiers carry their protective mask while their remaining MOPP gear must be readily available (e.g., within the work area, fighting position, living space, etc.) At MOPP Level 1, soldiers wear their overgarment and carry the rest of their MOPP gear. At MOPP Level 2, soldiers wear their overgarment and overboots while carrying the mask with hood and gloves. At MOPP Level 3, soldiers wear their overgarment, overboots, and mask with hood, but not the gloves. At MOPP Level 4, soldiers wear all their MOPP gear. Commanders can raise or lower the amount of protection through five levels of MOPP. In addition, commanders, under certain situations, can exercise a mask-only option.

Persistent chemical agent

A liquid or dust-like compound that remains hazardous for hours, days or, in exceptional cases, weeks or more. It can be both a surface contact hazard or an airborne (vapor or particle) hazard. It can be picked up on a surface and might not be removed through decontamination; it can be spread to noncontaminated areas retaining its original lethality.

MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer

The MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer is the primary chemical warfare agent detector in the Fox reconnaissance vehicle. During Operation Desert Storm, the MM-1 monitored against a target list of approximately ten selected chemical warfare agents most likely to be present, based on intelligence reports of the suspected chemical warfare agent threat. To speed the initial search, the sampling probe operates at 180� C and the MM-1 looks for only four ion peaks of each detected chemical warfare agent and attempts to match the target list of chemicals against the pattern and ratio of these peaks. If an initial match is made with these four ion peaks at a pre-determined intensity and relationship, the MM-1 sounds an alarm. However, this first alarm does not confirm the presence of a chemical warfare agent, since there are many chemicals that have similar ion peaks and many combinations of chemicals that may yield ion patterns similar to those in the target list. Consequently, the MM-1 can falsely indicate the presence of dangerous chemical warfare agents. To more conclusively determine what chemical is present, the operator must lower the sampling probe temperature to 120� C, re-acquire a sample of the suspected substance, and run a spectrum analysis with the MM-1 against all the detection algorithms stored in the MM-1 chemical library. For more detailed analysis later, the complete ion spectrum of the suspected sample can be printed on a paper tape.

Riot control agent

A riot control agent is a chemical that produces transient effects that disappear within minutes after exposure and rarely require medical treatment. Riot control agents are effective in quelling civil disturbances and in some military operations, in preventing unnecessary loss of life.

Task force

A temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed to carry out a specific operation or mission; a semi-permanent organization of units, under one commander, formed to carry out a continuing specific task; or a component of a fleet organized by the commander of a task fleet or higher authority to accomplish a specific task or tasks.

• 7th Marine Regiment (Task Force Ripper)
  • 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment
  • 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment
  • 3d Tank Battalion
  • 3d Artillery Battalion
  • 11th Marine Regiment
  • 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion
  • 1st Combat Engineer Battalion
• 4th Marine Regiment (Task Force Grizzly)
  • 2d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment
  • 3d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment
  • 1st Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment
• 1st Marine Division Forward Command Post
• 245th Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) Detachment, U.S. Army

11th Marine Regiment, "11th Marines War Journal, G-Day (Feb. 24, 1991)," undated.

11th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for 1 January to 28 February 1991," March 13, 1991.

1st Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment, "1st Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment," Feb. 26, 1991.

1st Combat Engineer Battalion, "1st Combat Engineer Battalion Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91," March 15, 1991.

3d Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment, "3d Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment Logs," Feb. 25, 1991.

3d Assault Amphibian Battalion, "Command Chronology 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion, January-June, 1991," Feb. 23, 1991.

3d Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment, "3d Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment Log," Feb. 25, 1991.

7th Marine Regiment, "7th Marine Regiment Log," Feb. 24, 1991."

Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, and Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995.

Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Report on Intelligence Related to Gulf War Illnesses," Aug. 2, 1996.

Central Intelligence Agency, "Persian Gulf Special Summary, Iraq: Chemical Warfare Summary," September 1990.

"Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997.

Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993.

Defense Intelligence Agency, "Answers to Questions from Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses," June 23, 1997.

Defense Intelligence Agency, "Chemical and Biological Warfare in the Kuwait Theater of Operations: Iraq's Capability and Posturing," undated (but prewar).

Defense Intelligence Agency, "Subject: Questions Submitted by Persian Gulf Illness Group," June 19, 1997.

Defense Science Board, "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects," June 1994, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/dsbrpt/table18.gif (as of July 28, 1999).

Department of Defense, Intelligence Oversight Committee Report, "Iraqi Chemical Warfare: Analysis of Information Available to DOD," Chapter 11, "Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release."

Departments of External Affairs, National Defence, Health and Welfare Canada, and Agriculture Canada, "Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons," Ottawa, Canada: November 1985.

Eddington, Patrick, Gassed in the Gulf, Washington, DC: Insignia Publishing, 1997.

Facsimile from program manager, NBC Defense Systems, Subject: "Interferents," Dec. 7, 1998.

Ford, Michael S. and W. E. Newton, "International Materiel Evaluation (IME) of the German NBC Reconnaissance System," US Army Test and Evaluation Command Test Report, abstract, April 1989.

I Marine Expeditionary Force, "Investigation to Inquire into the Circumstances surrounding the Possible Exposure of Sergeant [Redacted] USMC to Chemical Agents During Operation Desert Storm. Finding 36," Feb. 22, 1994.

Interview of 1st Marine Division NBC NCO, May 9, 1997.

Interview with GySgt Grass, February 20, 1997.

Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military Terms," Department of Defense, April 6, 1999, web site www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/t/06258.html (as of Sept. 2, 1999).

Lead Sheet 764, Interview of Fox expert, Chemical and Biological Defense Command May 28, 1996.

Lead Sheet 3873, Interview with 3d Tank Battalion commander, May 15, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5156, Interview of commander, 245th Psychological Operations Detachment, US Army, May 20, 1997, p. 1.

Lead Sheet 5181, Interview with member, 245th Psychological Operations Detachment, US Army, May 30, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5273, Interview with 3d Tank Battalion logistician, June 17, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5274, Interview with 1st Marine Division NBC officer, June 13, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5277, Interview with commander, 1st Platoon, 2d Force Service Support Group, Explosive Ordinance Disposal, May 16, 1996, and June 17, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5278, Interview with major, 2d Force Service Support Group, Explosive Ordinance Disposal, May 16, 1996, and June 18, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5279, Interview with Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 commander, June 19, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5296, Interview with member of 1st Platoon, Explosive Ordinance Disposal, June 17, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5299, Interview with 1st Marine Division NBC NCO, June 17, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5310, Interview with 1st Marine Division Fox MM-1 operator, June 19, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5331, Interview with member of 1st Platoon Explosive Ordinance Disposal, June 24, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5353, Interview with Fox 5604 driver, June 27, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5354, Interview with Task Force Grizzly commander, June 30, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5357, Interview with 1st Marine Division NBC Executive Officer.

Lead Sheet 5358, Interview with 3d Tank Battalion NBC officer, June 30, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5359, Interview with Fox 5604 driver, May 31, 1996.

Lead Sheet 5390, Interview with member of 1st and 2d Platoon Explosive Ordinance Disposal, July 2, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5391, Interview with Fox 5604 wheelman, July 2, 1997.

Lead Sheet 5431, Interview of Fox expert, July 9, 1997.

Lead Sheet 10899, Interview of MM-1 operator, December 12, 1997.

Lead Sheet 23181, Meeting with Fox subject matter experts, May 6, 1999.

Memorandum from Fox driver, Subject: "Possible chemical weapons use in Desert Storm," December 10, 1993.

Memorandum from Bruker Daltonics to Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Analysis of MM-1 Data," July 15, 1997

Memorandum from Fox driver, Subject: "Request of Information Concerning Possibility of Chemical Attack during Operation Desert Storm," Sept. 22, 1993.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, "Methodology and Instrumentation for Sampling and Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament," Helsinki, Finland: 1985.

Office of the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) for Gulf War Illnesses, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployments, "11th Marines" (Case Narrative), May 31, 2001.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "Detection of Chemical Weapons: An overview of methods for the detection of chemical warfare agents," web site www.opcw.nl/chemhaz/detect.htm (as of Oct. 12, 1999).

Personal notes of Task Force Ripper commander, undated.

Quilter, Charles J., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993.

Research and Technical Directorate, Edgewood Research, Development, and Engineering Center, Technical Report #489, "Evaluation of Airborne Exposure Limits for G-Agents: Occupational and General Population Exposure Criteria," Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: April 1998.

Secretary of the Navy, Instruction 5212.5D, "Navy and Marine Corps Records Disposition Manual," April 22, 1998.

Sidell, Frederick R., John S. Urbanetti, William S. Smith, and Charles G. Hurst, "Vesicants," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, eds., Part I: "Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, eds., Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 1997.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Fox Detections in an ASP Orchard" (Case Narrative), Sept. 25, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/asporchard/.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Al Jaber Air Base" (Case Narrative), Sept. 25, 1997.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Iraq's Scud Ballistic Missiles" (Information Paper), July 27, 2000, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/scud/.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "M256 Series Chemical Agent Detector Kit" (Information Paper), July 23, 1999, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/m256/.

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection" (Information Paper), Oct. 30, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/mopp/.

"Statement of GySgt George Grass from Lieutenant General [redacted]'s investigation on possible exposure of [redacted] to chemical agents during Operation Desert Storm," Jan. 11, 1994.

"Statement of Task Force Ripper NBC officer for investigation on possible exposure of [redacted] to chemical agents while serving in South West Asia," Dec. 14, 1993.

Testimony of MM-1 operator before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses, May 7, 1997.

Testimony of Mr. Richard Vigus, Fox subject matter expert, before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veteran's Illnesses, May 7, 1997.

Testimony of Gunnery Sergeant George Grass before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Affairs Subcommittee, House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, December 10, 1996.

Testimony of Gunnery Sergeant George Grass before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 1, 1996.

Testimony of Gunnery Sergeant George Grass before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997.

Testimony of Task Force Ripper Commander to Senate Committee on Armed Services Hearing, Feb. 27, 1997.

Testimony of Task Force Ripper NBC Officer before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, House Committee on Armed Services, Nov. 18, 1993.

The United Nations, Blue Book Series, Volume IX, "The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996," New York, NY: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1996.

US Army Central Command, Intelligence Report, "Iraqis Prepositioned Chemical Munitions," March, 1991.

US Army Chemical Biological Defense Command Memorandum for Record, Subject: "Summary of MM-1 Spectra Checked re: Chemical Warfare Agents (CWA) in Operation Desert Storm (ODS)," Feb. 15, 1994.

US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-09, "NBC Protection," May 29, 1992.

US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990.

US Army Field Manual 3-100, NBC Operations, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, Sept. 17, 1985.

US Army Field Manual 3-101-2, "NBC Reconnaissance Squad/Platoon (FOX) Operations - Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures," Aug. 10, 1994.

US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Dec. 22, 1995, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I (as of Aug. 23, 1999).

US Army Field Manual 19-20, "Law Enforcement Investigations," Nov. 25, 1985.

US Army Field Manual 101-5-1, US Marine Corps Reference Publication 5-2A, "Operational Terms and Graphics," Sept. 30, 1997, web site, http://www-cgsc.army.mil/cdd/F545/f545-m.htm (as of Aug. 2, 2000).

US Army Material Safety Data Sheet on HQ Mustard, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, June 30, 1995.

US Army Technical Manual 3-6665-342-10, "Operators Manual, Nuclear-Biological-Chemical Reconnaissance System (NBCRS) Fox XM93," Washington, DC, Change 2, April 21, 1995.

US Marine Corps Central Command, Message, 0313592 Feb 1991.

US Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center, Memorandum, "Ordnance Destroyed in SWA," June 19, 1997.

US Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16, "EOD Situation Report for the period 23 February 1991 through 31 March 1991," April 10, 1991.

Watts, Barry D., and Dr. Thomas A. Kearny, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume II: "Effects and Effectiveness," Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993.

The Department of Defense (DOD) requires a common framework for our investigations and assessments of chemical warfare agent reports, so we turned to the United Nations and the international community, which had chemical weapons experience (e.g., the United Nations’ investigation of the chemical weapons used during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war). Because the modern battlefield is complex, the international community developed investigative and validation procedures[138] to provide objective information about possible chemical weapons incidents. Based on these international procedures and guidelines, our methodology includes these factors:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site;
• Physical evidence from the site, e.g., weapons fragments and soil, water, vegetation, human, or animal tissue samples;
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence;
• Testimony of witnesses;
• Several analyses; and
• A review of the evidence by an expert panel.

While we base our investigation methodology (Figure 11) on these procedures, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence often was not collected when an event occurred. Therefore, we cannot apply a rigid template to all incidents and must tailor each investigation to its unique circumstances. Accordingly, we designed our methodology to provide a thorough investigative process to define each incident's circumstances and determine what happened. Our methodology's major efforts are:

• To substantiate the incident;
• To document available medical reports about the incident;
• To interview appropriate people;
• To obtain information available to external organizations; and
• To assess the results

Figure 11. Chemical warfare incident investigation methodology

A case usually starts with a report of a possible chemical warfare agent incident, often from a veteran. To substantiate the circumstances surrounding an incident, the investigator searches operational, intelligence, and environmental logs for documentation. This focuses the investigation on a specific time, date, and location, clarifies the conditions under which the incident occurred, and determines whether there is "hard," as well as anecdotal, evidence.

Alarms alone are not certain evidence of chemical warfare agent presence, nor is a single observation sufficient to validate a chemical warfare agent's presence. The investigator looks for physical evidence collected at the time of the incident possibly indicating whether chemical agents were present in its vicinity. Such evidence might include tissue samples, body fluid samples, clothing, environmental samples of soil or vegetation, weapons parts, and Fox MM-1 tapes with properly documented spectrums.

The investigator searches available medical records to determine if the incident injured anyone and notes deaths, injuries, sicknesses, etc., near an incident's time and location. We ask medical experts to asked to provide information about any possible chemical warfare agent casualties.

We interview those involved in or near the incident (participants or witnesses). First-hand witnesses provide valuable insight into the conditions surrounding the incident and the mind-set of those involved, and are particularly important if physical evidence is lacking. We interview nuclear, biological, and chemical officers or specialists trained in chemical testing, confirmation, and reporting to identify the unit’s response, tests conducted, injuries sustained, and reports submitted. We contact commanders to ascertain what they knew, what decisions they made about the events surrounding the incident, and their assessment of it. If appropriate, subject matter experts provide opinions on the capabilities, limitations, and operation of technical equipment and evaluate selected topics of interest.

Additionally, the investigator contacts agencies and organizations that may be able to further clarify details of the case, including, but not limited to:

• Intelligence agencies that might be able to provide insight into events leading to the event, imagery of the area of the incident, and assessments of factors affecting the case;
• The clinical registries of the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs which may provide data about the medical condition of those involved in the incident; and
• Agencies capable of computer modeling meteorological and source characterization data in cases in which we suspect airborne dispersion of agent.

Once the investigation is complete, the investigator evaluates the available evidence to assess it objectively. The available evidence is often incomplete or contradictory, so we must looked at it in the total context of what we know about the incident. Physical evidence collected when the incident occurred, for example, can be tremendously valuable to an investigation. We generally would give properly documented physical evidence the greatest weight in any assessment. The testimony of witnesses and contemporaneous operational documentation also is significant when making an assessment. Testimony from witnesses who also happen to be subject matter experts is usually more meaningful than testimony from untrained observers. Typically, we give secondhand accounts less weight than witnesses' testimony. If witnesses' accounts conflict, investigators look for other information supporting the witnesses' statements. Investigators evaluate the supporting information to determine how it corroborates any conflicting position. Generally, such supporting information will fit into a pattern corroborating one of the conflicting accounts of the incident over the others. Where the bulk of corroborating evidence supports one witness more than another, that person's information would be considered more compelling.

In each investigation our assessment relies on the investigator’s evaluation of the available information. Because we do not expect to always have conclusive evidence, we have developed an assessment scale (Figure 12) ranging from Definitely Not to Definitely, with intermediate assessments of Unlikely, Indeterminate, and Likely. The investigator uses this scale to make an assessment, which is our best judgment, based on facts available on the report publication date; we reassess each case over time based on new information and feedback.

Figure 12. Assessment of chemical warfare agent presence

The standard for making the assessment is common sense: do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that chemical warfare agents were present or not? If insufficient information is available, the assessment is Indeterminate until more evidence emerges.

The 7th Marines (Task Force Ripper) noted the alert as follows:

• 1910 -WENT TO MOPP-4<
• 1920 -ALL CLEAR SOUNDED[139]

The 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion recorded it as follows:

• 1908 -Fox vehicle detected and identified Lewicite [sic] agent. Ripper 6 believes that chemical weapons were used but not sure if Ripper was the target. These chemical munitions could have been exploded by our own artilleryfire, thus causing secondary explosions.
• 1910 -Going to MOPP-4.
• 1920 -All clear sounded.[140]

The 1st Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB) recorded it as follows:

• 1910 -Fox vehicle detects Lewicite [sic]. TF Ripper returns to MOPP 4
• 1920 -All clear[141]

The 11th Marines, which had one battalion, the 3/11, assigned to Task Force Ripper, reports in its command chronology:

• 1911 -3/11 REPORTS POSSIBLE GAS ATTACK; UNITS GO TO MOPP LEVEL 4. TF RIPPER FOX VEHICLE REPORTED DETECTING BLISTER AGENT LEWISITE AT 1918. AT 2030 DIVISION REPORTED THAT BLISTER AGENT WAS FALSE ALARM. UNITS RETURN TO MOPP LEVEL ONE [sic].[142]

The 11th Marines War Journal also reports:

• 1911 -3/11 RPTS [reports] A GAS ATK [attack]. PRIDE MAIN ALSO RPTS [reports] A GAS ATK [attack].
• 1918 -RIPPER RPTS [reports] A BLISTER AGENT WHICH IS CONFIRMED BY A FOX VEHICLE. RPT [report] SENT TO ALL BNS [battalions].[143]>

The 11th Marines War Journal could mean two attacks are being recorded simultaneously. Actually, 3/11 was on the Task Force Ripper communications network and would have passed along the Fox alert to its regimental headquarters. Pride Main was the 1st MARDIV Headquarters Command Post’s call sign. It did not report a chemical alert at its location, but passed the Fox alert along. The 1st Marine Division Headquarters Command Post received the Task Force Ripper report at 1918 (or possibly 1908, with a time or transcription reporting error) and recorded it without realizing it was the same alert.

The General Accounting Office reviewed the original narrative and recommended additional footnotes and comments to aid in clarity. Additionally, the Presidential Special Oversight Board reviewed the narrative and recommended we republish it as a final report.

• We rewrote the narrative to reflect the updated methodology and footnoting standards of the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployments.
• We referred to new source documents to enhance the narrative’s accuracy.

1. Tab A lists acronyms, abbreviations, and a glossary.
2. In 1994, a Marine Corps investigation concluded this Marine was not suffering from any classical chemical warfare exposures. I Marine Expeditionary Force, "Investigation to Inquire into the Circumstances surrounding the Possible Exposure of Sergeant [Redacted], USMC, to Chemical Agents During Operation Desert Storm, Finding 36," Feb. 22, 1994; and "Statement of GySgt George Grass from Lieutenant General [redacted]'s investigation on possible exposure of [redacted] to chemical agents during Operation Desert Storm," Jan. 11, 1994.
3. Testimony of Task Force Ripper NBC officer before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, Nov. 18, 1993.
4. Testimony of Gunnery Sergeant George Grass before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 1, 1996.
5. Testimony of Gunnery Sergeant George Grass before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997.
6. Testimony of Gunnery Sergeant George Grass before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee, Government Reform and Oversight House Committee, December 10, 1996.
7. Department of Defense, Intelligence Oversight Committee Report, "Iraqi Chemical Warfare: Analysis of Information Available to DoD," Chapter 11, "Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release," p. 9.
8. Eddington, Patrick, Gassed in the Gulf, Washington, DC: Insignia Publishing, 1997, p. 38.
9. Central Intelligence Agency, "Persian Gulf Special Summary, Iraq: Chemical Warfare Summary," September 1990, p. 8.
10. Defense Intelligence Agency, "Chemical and Biological Warfare in the Kuwait Theater of Operations: Iraq's Capability and Posturing," undated [but prewar], p. 2-3.
11. The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq did not identify any other ground munitions as mustard-filled. The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume IX, "The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996," New York, NY: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 656-657.
12. US Army Central Command, Intelligence Report, "Iraqis Prepositioned Chemical Munitions," March, 1991. p. 1.
13. US Marine Corps Central Command, Message 0313592 Feb 1991, p. 1.
14. Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993, p. 49.
15. Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993, p.18-19.
16. Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993, p. 20.
17. Personal notes of Task Force Ripper commander, undated, p. 1.
18. Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993, p. 80, 97-98.
19. 7th Marines Regiment, "7th Marine Regiment Log," February 24, 1991, p. 1. See entry times for the prisoner disclosures at 1643 (4:43 PM) and 1733 hours (5:33 PM).
20. Testimony of Task Force Ripper Commander to Senate Committee on Armed Services Hearing, February 27, 1997, p. 36.
21. MOPP-4 is the highest protective posture and includes wearing a gas mask and rubber gloves. The glossary further explains MOPP.
22. Lead Sheet 5299, Interview with 1st Marine Division NBC NCO, June 17, 1997, p. 1; Interview of 1st Marine Division NBC NCO, May 9, 1997, p. 11; and Lead Sheet 5156, Interview with commander, 245th Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) Detachment, US Army, May 20, 1997, p. 1.
23. Lead Sheet 5156, Interview of commander, 245th Psychological Operations Detachment, US Army, May 20, 1997, p. 1; and Lead Sheet 5181, Interview with member of the 245th Psychological Operations Detachment, US Army, May 30, 1997, p. 1.
24. Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993, p. 89.
25. Interview of 1st Marine Division NBC NCO, May 9, 1997, p. 7.
26. Interview of 1st Marine Division NBC NCO, May 9, 1997, p. 8, 9, 13-14. The glossary more completely describes the M256A1.
27. Lead Sheet 5357, Interview with 1st Marine Division NBC Executive Officer, p. 1; Interview of 1st MARDIV NBC NCO, May 9, 1997, p. 39-40.
28. Lead Sheets 5156 and 10320, Interview of commander, 245th Psychological Operations Detachment, US Army, May 20, 1997, p. 1 and 3.
29. There were three 1st MARDIV command posts: the main which was located towards the division rear; the forward command post which was with the main force body and the mobile command post which was closest to the front. Interview of 1st Marine Division NBC NCO, May 9, 1997, p. 10.
30. Lead Sheet 5354, Interview with Task Force Grizzly commander, June 30, 1997, p. 1.
31. Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993, p. 97.
32. Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993, p. 94.
33. Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993, p. 83.
34. Cureton, Charles H., US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993, p. 90.
35. Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2.
36. 7th Marine Regiment, "7th Marine Regiment Log," February 24, 1991, p. 1. Although dated February 24, this log actually details both February 24 and February 25, 1991.
37. 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, "1st Combat Engineer Battalion Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91," March 15, 1991, p. 1.
38. 3d Tank Battalion, "3d Marine Tank Log," February 25, 1991, p. 69.
39. Lead Sheet 3873, Intervew with 3d Tank Battalion commander, May 15, 1997, p. 1; Lead Sheet 5273, Interview with 3d Tank Battalion logistician, June 17, 1997, p. 1; and Lead Sheet 5358, Interview with 3d Tank Battalion NBC officer, June 30, 1997, p. 2.
40. Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 1.
41. Interviews with those in the Task Force Ripper resupply train have not resulted in additional knowledge about this alert. Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2; and Lead Sheet 5273, Interview with 3d Tank Battalion logistician, June 17, 1997, p. 1
42. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects," June 1994, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/dsbrpt/warfare (as of June 28, 1999)
43. Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2; and Lead Sheet 5358, Interview with 3d Tank Battalion NBC officer, June 30, 1997, p. 2; and 7th Marines Regiment, "7th Marine Regiment Log for February 24, 1991," p. 2.
44. For more information on this alert see Office of the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) for Gulf War Illnesses, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployments, "11th Marines" (Case Narrative), May 31, 2001, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/11marines_ii.
45. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii.
46. 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion, "Command Chronology 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion, January-June, 1991," February 23, 1991, p. 1.
47. Lead Sheets 5353 and 5359, Interview with Fox 5604 driver, June 27, 1997, and May 31, 1996, p. 1 and 1; Lead Sheet 5391, Interview with Fox 5604 wheelman, July 2, 1997, p. 1; Interview with GySgt Grass, February 1997, p.11; Memorandum from the Fox driver, Subject: "Request of Information Concerning Possibility of Chemical Attack During Operation Desert Storm," September 22, 1993, p. 1; and Memorandum from Fox driver, Subject: "Possible Chemical Weapons Use in Desert Storm," undated but in response to a December 10, 1993 request, p. 1.
48. Lead Sheets 5353 and 5359, Interview with Fox 5604 driver, June 27, 1997, and May 31, 1996, p. 1 and 1; Memorandum from the Fox driver, Subject: "Request of Information Concerning Possibility of Chemical Attack During Operation Desert Storm," September 22, 1993, p. 1; and Memorandum from Fox driver, Subject: "Possible Chemical Weapons use in Desert Storm," Undated but in response to a December 10, 1993 request, p. 1.
49. Interview with GySgt Grass, February 20, 1997, p. 12.
50. See Tab F for more information on the Fox Vehicle; also Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii.
51. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects," June 1994, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/dsbrpt/warfare (as of June 28, 1999); and Lead Sheet 764, Interview of Fox expert, NBC Reconnaissance Systems, US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, now the US Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM), Edgewood, Maryland, May 28, 1996, p. 1-2. The sampling tube draws in approximately 300 times LESS air volume than do other detectors, such as the M43A1 specifically designed to detect vapor.
52. Lead Sheets 5353 and 5359, Interview with Fox 5604 driver, June 27, 1997, and May 31, 1996, p. 1 and 1; Memorandum from the Fox driver, Subject: "Request of Information Concerning Possibility of Chemical Attack During Operation Desert Storm," September 22, 1993, p. 1; and Memorandum from Fox driver, Subject: "Possible Chemical Weapons Use in Desert Storm," undated but in response to a December 10, 1993 request, p. 1; and Interview with GySgt Grass, February 20, 1997, p. 19.
53. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, p. 8 and 15, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii.
54. Facsimile from program manager, NBC Defense Systems, Subject: "Interferents," December 7, 1998, p. 2.
55. US Army Field Manual 3-101-2, "NBC Reconnaissance Squad/Platoon (FOX) Operations - Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures," August 10, 1994, p. 5-2, 5-3.
56. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, Tab C, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii.
57. US Army Field Manual 3-101-2, "NBC Reconnaissance Squad/Platoon (FOX) Operations - Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures," August 10, 1994, p. 5-2, 5-3.
58. Lead Sheet 23181, Meeting with Fox subject matter experts, May 6, 1999, p. 2.
59. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, p. 9, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii.
60. Lead Sheets 5353 and 5359, Interview with Fox 5604 driver, June 27, 1997, and May 31, 1996, p. 3 and 1; Memorandum from the Fox driver, Subject: "Request of Information Concerning Possibility of Chemical Attack During Operation Desert Storm," September 22, 1993, p. 1; and Memorandum from Fox driver, Subject: "Possible Chemical Weapons Use in Desert Storm," undated but in response to a December 10, 1993 request, p. 1; Lead Sheet 5391, Interview with Fox 5604 wheelman, July 2, 1997, p. 1; Interview with GySgt Grass, February 20, 1997, p.19; and Testimony of MM-1 operator to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997, p. 142-143.
61. Interview with GySgt Grass, February 20, 1997, p. 21. GySgt Grass says he reported the alert to the 3d Tank NBC officer, but both the 3d Tank and Ripper NBC officers remember him reporting to Ripper while the 3d Tank NBC officer monitored. Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2; and Lead Sheet 5358, Interview with 3d Tank Battalion NBC officer, 30 June 1997, p. 2.
62. Lead Sheet 10899, Interview of MM-1 operator, December 12, 1997, p. 3; and Testimony of MM-1 operator to the Presidential Advisory Committee, May 7, 1997, p. 142-143.
63. Memorandum from Fox driver, Subject: "Request of Information Concerning Possibility of Chemical Attack During Operation Desert Storm," September 22, 1993, p. 1.
64. Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2.
65. Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2.
66. This graphic is as the Task Force Ripper NBC officer drew it for "Statement for the Investigation into the Possible Exposure of Sergeant [redacted] to Chemical Agents While Serving in South West Asia," December 14, 1993, p. 3.
67. Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2.
68. 7th Marine Regiment, "7th Marine Regiment Log," February 24, 1991, p. 2.
69. 3d Tank Battalion, "3d Marine Tank Log," February 25, 1991, p. 69-70.
70. 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion, "Command Chronology 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion, January-June, 1991," February 23, 1991, p. 1.
71. 7th Marine Regiment, "7th Marine Regiment Log," February 24, 1991, p. 7.
72. The M-256 will detect some agent types (e.g., nerve and blister) within 15 minutes, but to ensure no chemical warfare agents (including blood agent types) are present, the test should be run to its conclusion. "The Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects," June, 1994, p. 35.
73. After the war United Nations Special Commission inspectors did not find this chemical warfare agent. The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume IX, "The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996," New York, NY: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 656-657.
74. Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2; and Lead Sheet 5358, Interview with 3d Tank Battalion NBC officer, June 30, 1997, p. 2.
75. 3d Tank Battalion, "3d Marine Tank Logs," February 25, 1991, p. 1.
76. US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, "Definitions and Terms," p. 4-5, web site www.nbc-med.org/; Sidell, Frederick R., John S. Urbanetti, William S. Smith, and Charles G. Hurst, "Vesicants," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, eds., Part I: "Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, eds., Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 1997, p. 201. web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999).
77. Interview with GySgt Grass, February 20, 1997, p. 22-25.
78. Pre-war reports stated Iraq possessed "Dusty Mustard," a powder form, but United Nations Special Commission inspectors did not find this chemical warfare agent after the war. The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume IX, "The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996," New York, NY: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 656-657.
79. US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, p. 4-5, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999); Sidell, Frederick R., John S. Urbanetti, William S. Smith, and Charles G. Hurst, "Vesicants," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, eds., Part I: "Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, eds., Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 1997, p. 201.
80. US Army Field Manual 3-100, "NBC Operations," Washington, D.C., 17 September 1985.
81. Interview with GySgt Grass, February 20, 1997, p. 27; Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2; See also the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii.
82. Interview with GySgt Grass, February 20, 1997, p. 29; and Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Fox Detections in an ASP Orchard" (Case Narrative), September 25, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/asporchard/.
83. Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2.
84. Lead Sheet 5274, Interview with 1st Marine Division NBC officer, June 13, 1997, p. 2; and Lead Sheet 5310, Interview with 1st Marine Division Fox MM-1 operator, June 19, 1997, p. 1.
85. Lead Sheet 5274, Interview with 1st Marine Division NBC officer, June 13, 1997, p. 2.
86. Interview with GySgt Grass, February 20, 1997, p. 28.
87. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, p. 6, 7, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii.
88. Lead Sheet 5274, Interview with 1st Marine Division NBC officer, June 13, 1997, p. 1
89. 3d Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment, "3d Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment Log," February 25, 1991.
90. Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2.
91. 1st Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology, 1st Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment," February 26, 1991.
92. Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2.
93. Office of the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) for Gulf War Illnesses, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployments, "11th Marines" (Case Narrative), May 31, 2001, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/11marines_ii.
94. Lead Sheet 5354, Interview with Task Force Grizzly commander, June 30, 1997, p. 1.
95. Lead Sheet 5279, Interview with Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 commander, June 19, 1997, p. 1.
96. The glossary describes M-8 Detection Paper.
97. For an explanation of the procedures used to identify and destroy unexploded ordnance, see Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Fox Detections in an ASP Orchard" (Case Narrative), September 25, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/asporchard/. Also see "EOD Situation Report for the period 23 February 1991 through 31 March 1991," Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16, April 10, 1991, enclosures 1 and 3; and Lead Sheet 5279, Interview with Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 commander, June 19, 1997, p. 1.
98. Lead Sheet 5279, Interview with Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 commander, June 19, 1997, p. 2.
99. Lead Sheet 5277, Interview with commander, 1st Platoon, 2d Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordnance Disposal, May 16, 1996, and June 17, 1997, p. 2, 4; Lead Sheet 5278, Interview with major, 2d Force Service Support Group Explosive Ordinance Disposal, May 16, 1996, and June 18, 1997, p. 1, 2; Lead Sheet 5296, Interview with member of 1st Platoon Explosive Ordinance Disposal, June 17, 1997, p. 1; Lead Sheet 5331, Interview with member of 1st Platoon Explosive Ordinance Disposal, June 24, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet 5390, Interview with member of 1st and 2d Platoon Explosive Ordinance Disposal, July 2, 1997, p. 1.
100. US Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center, Memorandum, "Ordnance Destroyed in SWA,", June 19, 1997. Note, Table A shows all US Marine Corps ordnance found unfit to transport back to the US and destroyed in place, as well as some foreign ordnance.
101. The United Nations, Blue Book Series, Volume IX, "The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996," United Nations, Department of Public Information, New York, 1996, p. 656-657.
102. Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Report on Intelligence Related to Gulf War Illnesses," August 2, 1996, p. 2.
103. Defense Intelligence Agency, "Subject: Questions Submitted by Persian Gulf Illness Group," June 19, 1997, p. 1.
104. Watts, Barry D., and Dr. Thomas A. Kearny, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume II: "Operations and Effects and Effectiveness," Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 109.
105. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Iraq's Scud BallisticMissiles" (Information Paper), February 22, 2001, p.18-19, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/scud_info_ii/.
106. In a statement before the Presidential Advisory Committee (PAC) on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses on July 29, 1997, Mr. Charles Duelfer, UN Special Commission, confirmed this assessment. Major Thomas P. Cross of the PAC asked, "Do you see any evidence where any weapons were moved from the three lower depots, actually down into Kuwait, maybe brought back at some time?" Mr Duelfer answered, "We have seen no evidence of that and Iraqis have said that no movements took place other than what is described here," referring to munitions' movements to and from depots near Baghdad and three closer depots, of which the southernmost (and closest to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) was Khamisiyah.
107. Defense Intelligence Agency, "Answers to Questions from Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses," June 23, 1997, p. 1.
108. The chemical substance to which this Fox Vehicle alerted at an ammunition supply point in Kuwait City was benzyl bromide. See Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Fox Detections in an ASP Orchard" (Case Narrative), September 25, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/asporchard/; and US Army Chemical Biological Defense Command Memorandum for Record, Subject: "Summary of MM-1 Spectra Checked re: Chemical Warfare Agents (CWA) in Operation Desert Storm (ODS) ," February 15, 1994.
109. Lead Sheet 5431, Interview of Fox expert, July 9, 1997, p. 1.
110. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 27, 2001, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii.
111. Memorandum from Bruker Daltonics to Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Analysis of MM-1 Data," July 15, 1997, p. 1 .
112. Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2.
113. Sidell, Frederick R., John S. Urbanetti, William S. Smith, and Charles G. Hurst, "Vesicants," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, eds., Part I: "Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, eds., Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 1997, p. 208-212.
114.  Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC officer, June 18, 1997, p. 2; Lead Sheet 5391, Interview with Fox 5604 wheelman, July 2, 1997, p. 1; Lead Sheet 5359, Interview with Fox driver, June 27, 1997, p. 1; and Interview with GySgt Grass, February 20, 1997, p.11.
115. Lead Sheets 5353, Interview with Fox driver, May 31, 1996, p. 1.
116. Lead Sheet 23181, Meeting with Fox subject matter experts, May 6, 1999, p. 2.
117. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, p. 32.
118. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects," June 1994, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/dsbrpt/warfare.html (as of July 2, 1999).
119. Ford, Michael S. and W. E. Newton, "International Materiel Evaluation (IME) of the German NBC Reconnaissance System," US Army Test and Evaluation Command Test Report, abstract, April 1989, p. 21.
120. Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5212.5D, "Navy and Marine Corps Records Disposition Manual," April 22, 1998, p. III-6-3.
121. US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, p. 4-5, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999).
122. US Army Material Safety Data Sheet on HQ Mustard, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, June 30, 1995.
123. US Army Field Manual 101-5-1, US Marine Corps Reference Publication 5-2A, "Operational Terms and Graphics," September 30, 1997, p. 1-37, web site, http://www-cgsc.army.mil/cdd/F545/f545-m.htm (as of August 2, 2000).
124. US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, p. 6, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999).
125. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 3, p. 57.
126. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "Detection of Chemical Weapons: An overview of methods for the detection of chemical warfare agents," p. 4, web site www.opcw.nl/chemhaz/detect.htm (as of October 12, 1999).
127. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper),March 27, 2001, p. 3-4, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii.
128. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 31.
129. US Army Material Safety Data Sheet on HQ Mustard, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, June 30, 1995.
130. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 39.
131. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, and Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 430-431. Copies of the Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook may be purchased from the CBIAC. To order, please contact the CBIAC Administrator, via phone (410-676-9030), fax (410-676-9703), e-mail (cbiac@battelle.org), or use the interactive request form on the CBIAC web site www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil (as of October 19, 1999). See also Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "M256 Series Chemical Agent Detector Kit" (Information Paper), July 23, 1999, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/m256/.
132. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection" (Information Paper), October 30, 1997.
133. US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-09, "NBC Protection," May 29, 1992, Chapter 2, p. 4.
134. US Army Field Manual 101-5-1, US Marine Corps Reference Publication 5-2A, "Operational Terms and Graphics," September 30, 1997, p. 1-120, web site, http://www-cgsc.army.mil/cdd/F545/f545-m.htm (as of August 2, 2000).
135. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper),March 27, 2001, p. 2, 8, 9, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/fox_vehicle_ii.
136. US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, December 22, 1995, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I (as of August 23, 1999).
137. Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military Terms," Department of Defense, April 6, 1999, web site www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/t/06258.html (as of September 2, 1999).
138. "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This chemical weapons convention opened for signature in Paris, France, on January 13, 1993. As of June 26, 2001, 174 states have signed, ratified, or accepted to it. The United States signed on January 13, 1993, and ratified the Convention on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. We found other protocols and guidelines in Methodology and Instrumentation for Sampling and Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki, Finland, 1985; Verification Methods, Handling, and Assessment Of Unusual Events In Relation To Allegations of the Use of Novel Chemical Warfare Agents, Consultant University of Saskatchewan in conjunction with the Verification Research Unit of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, March 1990; and Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, Department of External Affairs, Department of National Defence, Health and Welfare Canada, and Agriculture Canada, November 1985. US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-9, "NBC Protection," May 1992; US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy NAVMED P-5041, US Air Force Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11 (adopted as NATO Field Manual 8-285), "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995; US Army Field Manual 19-20, "Law Enforcement Investigations," November 25, 1985; and other DoD investigational procedures contributed ideas for developing this methodology.
139. 7th Marine Regiment, "7th Marine Regiment Log," February 24, 1991, p. 7.
140. 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion, "Command Chronology 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion Jan-Jun 1991," undated.
141. 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, "1st Combat Engineer Battalion Command Chronology for 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91," March 15, 1991, p. 1.
142. 11th Marine Regiment, "Command Chronology for 1 January to 28 February 1991," March 13, 1991.
143. 11th Marine Regiment, "11th Marines War Journal, G-Day (24 February 1991)," undated.