Figure 8 shows the key events of the Pre-Desert Shield period. As previously mentioned, when the U.S. Intelligence Community first discovered the Khamisiyah ASP in 1976, they identified it as a storage depot for conventional[12] (i.e., non-chemical, non-biological, and non-nuclear) munitions.

Figure 8. Pre-Desert Shield period

In May 1986, the CIA received and distributed a translated Iraqi document to some policy, intelligence, and DOD officials. That document stated that Iraq had used the "al-Khamisiyah warehouses" in 1984 and 1985 to store chemical weapons used against Iran. The document also stated:

3,975 155-mm mustard-loaded artillery grenades [sic] have been issued (from June 1984 to March 1985) to al-Khamisiyah warehouses. We do not have official data about using this quantity by the third army corps. The warehouses currently have 6,293 150-mm [sic] mustard bombs, enough to meet front demands for four days on a 15-minute mission.[13]

In November 1986, the CIA produced an assessment that used the information from this report to conclude that Iraq had indeed stored chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war "at the southern forward ammunition depot located at Tall al Lahm."[14] In this assessment, the CIA not only identified Tall al Lahm as a chemical storage site, but also made the connection between the ammunition depot they called "Tall al Lahm" and Iraq called "al Khamisiyah." However, this connection did not permanently resolve the earlier disconnect in names, which would persist until after the Gulf War. In the same assessment, the CIA also stated that "a new generation of 16 bunkers will expand Iraq's capability to store CW [chemical warfare] munitions at six airfields and at three ammunition storage depots that are strategically located throughout the country." The Intelligence Community called these new bunkers S-shaped bunkers.[15] Khamisiyah had no S-shaped bunkers; the nearest ones were at Tallil airfield and An Nasiriyah ASP SW. The CIA’s assessment of Iraq’s report established an important link between chemical weapons storage and al Khamisiyah/Tall al Lahm. However, it also shifted future analyses of potential chemical storage sites to concentrate on locations that had S-shaped bunkers. The analytical bias toward S-shaped bunkers may explain why Khamisiyah was not on any of the lists of suspected chemical storage facilities generated from 1986 to the beginning of the Gulf War in 1990.[16]

By the middle of 1993, Gulf War veterans’ complaints of undiagnosed illnesses had gained the attention of the public and government. Figure 37 shows government agencies and Congress creating panels, holding Congressional hearings, and increasing its emphasis on federally funded medical research. Highlights of 1993 include:

• May – The Department of Veterans Affairs Blue Ribbon Panel met to discuss the mystery illness.
• June – The House Committee on Veterans Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation held hearings on Health Care Issues of Persian Gulf Veterans.
• August – President Clinton designated the VA as the lead agency for all federally funded Gulf War research.
• August – The staff of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (known as the Riegle Committee) interviewed Brian Martin, a former member of the 37th Engineer Battalion and vehicle operator for the battalion commander. Interviewed by phone, he recounted his numerous illnesses but did not mention the demolition activities at Khamisiyah.
• November – The House and Senate Committees on Veterans Affairs held three hearings.
• November – Brian Martin testified in person before the Riegle Committee; again he did not discuss the demolition activities at Khamisiyah.
• December – John Deutch, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, established the Defense Science Board Task Force on Chemical Weapons.[169]

Figure 37. Governmental and Congressional events, 1993-1994

1994

In February 1994, Congressman Browder requested the UN to provide any reports about the disposition of Iraq’s chemical weapons and biological warfare research. The UN response, dated April 5, 1994, listed sites where UNSCOM had found chemical warfare agents and weapons. In Table 2, "CW Munition Storage Sites," UNSCOM listed 122mm rockets filled with sarin nerve agent at two sets of coordinates as destroyed at "Khamisiyah Stores."[170]

Senior DOD officials’ testimony to Congress indicated a general state of confusion about activities at An Nasiriyah ASP SW and Khamisiyah. On May 25, 1994, senior DOD officials testified before the Riegle Committee about Iraq’s chemical, biological, and radiological warfare programs and their effect on Gulf War veterans’ health. Among those who testified were Dr. Edwin Dorn, Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Dr. Theodore M. Prociv, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Weapons; and Dr. John Kriese, Chief Officer for Ground Forces, DIA. The government’s lack of knowledge about the presence of chemical weapons near US troop units and the continuing confusion over the location of Khamisiyah (Tall al Lahm) versus An Nasiriyah ASP SW were particularly noteworthy. In his opening statement, Under Secretary Dorn testified, "All of the chemical agents and related equipment were found stored at locations a great distance from the Kuwait theater of operations."[171]

Undersecretary Dorn’s statement referred to known chemical storage sites located in Iraq’s interior and not to the Khamisiyah ASP, which was located in the KTO. Later in the hearing, the Chairman of the committee questioned Drs. Dorn and Kriese about chemical weapons located at An Nasiriyah SW and US troops’ proximity to that location:

Chairman: Now, earlier, you made a statement or a statement was made by one of the three of you that all of the chemical agents and related equipment that was discovered was found stored far from the Kuwait field of operations….

Dr [Kriese]:…I’ll say frankly the word, far, got in the last draft of Dr. Dorn’s testimony this morning. I thought we had that fixed to be stricken from the draft testimony that he was given. It is not correct to say that all munitions were found far from the KTL [sic], sir.

Chairman: Well, that’s an important clarification. So there were instances, then, where some of the munitions were found close to where we had troop deployments?

Dr. [Kriese]: That’s correct.

Chairman: But in terms of An Nasiriyah here, we did find them there. Do I assume that we continued to use our forces to secure that area as the War went along? We would not have just been in that area and then left, would we?

Dr. [Kriese]: I don’t know those details of how long we were in that area. My understanding is that munitions were found not at the site we bombed [referring to An Nasiriyah ASP SW], but some 15 nautical miles away from where we attacked [referring to the Khamisiyah ASP].

Chairman: How close would US forces have been stationed to that?

Dr. [Kriese]: I think they were across the river. Not stationed, but during the ground force phase of the campaign, that’s as close as we got.

Chairman: Our troops were right across the narrow river from where we found these things. Is that right?

Dr. [Kriese]: They got that close but I don’t know how long they were there.[172]

Questions submitted for the record by DoD in September and October 1994 revealed continued confusion over the location of Khamisiyah and its proximity to US forces. DoD’s answer to Question 19 perpetuated this confusion:

Question: Were chemical munitions or binary precursor materials capable of being used in chemical warfare discovered in any area of Iraq, Kuwait, or Saudi Arabia before, during, or after the war by US forces, civilian personnel, or other Coalition participants?

Answer: The Kuwaiti Theater of Operations includes southern Iraq south of 31� 00' N [Latitude], Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. This was the area eventually occupied by Coalition ground forces before, during and after Operation Desert Storm. No chemical munitions, bulk agent, or binary precursors were discovered in the KTO before, during, or after the war by US Forces, civilian personnel, or Coalition participants.... Finally, it has been widely circulated that UN inspection teams found thousands of destroyed and intact chemical rounds in an ammunition depot at Nasiriyah, and that this discovery contradicts our statement in paragraph one of this answer. Nasiriyah technically is outside the KTO, being north of 31� 00' N and the Euphrates River. More importantly, it was not in the territory occupied by Coalition Forces after the war. Moreover, the following points are relevant because UN inspectors did not really "find" the subject munitions. In reality, the Iraqis declared the munitions to the UN and the inspectors eventually went to that location to check what the Iraqis had reported:

1. The UN inspection occurred at least eight months after the war;
2. The location of the "found" chemical rounds was 15 miles from the widely discussed CBW bunkers bombed at Nasiriyah (the site which was originally expected to be inspected). The bombed bunkers were not inspected until one year later in October 1991 and found to contain no chemical or biological weapons.[173]

Several inaccuracies in these testimonies are evident today:

• DOD stated no chemical munitions were south of 31� north, which was incorrect, since both An Nasiriyah and Khamisiyah are south of 31� north.
• DOD stated thousands of chemical munitions had been found at An Nasiriyah, but did not mention Khamisiyah.
• DOD stated no U.S. troops were in that area after the war, which was incorrect, since elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps both operated in the area in March and April, 1991.

These inaccuracies distorted the history of events at Khamisiyah since, in June 1994, these beliefs formed the basis of information DoD provided to the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects. The Task Force report stated in part:

There were also reports of damage by the United Nations Special Commission inspection team that visited a different location [referring to Khamisiyah] in the general vicinity of An Nasiriyah several months after the cessation of hostilities. There are indications that the site visited by the UNSCOM team was not a site targeted during the air war but may have been specially constructed for the UN inspectors.

It appeared this was a separate site constructed by Iraq after the war to show to the UN inspectors. The Iraqis claimed that munitions containing 16 tons of Sarin were destroyed in the bombing….There was also some indication that the munitions were only destroyed subsequent to the ground war by the Iraqis. The uncertainty stems from the fact that it is not clear whether the site the UN inspection team was shown was in fact this subject of bomb damage.[174]

The information reflected DOD’s, UNSCOM’s, and the Intelligence Community’s suspicion that Iraq had fabricated the entire incident at Khamisiyah to try to conceal their weapons of mass destruction from UNSCOM inspectors.

In June 1994, DOD established the Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program to provide an in-depth medical evaluation for all eligible beneficiaries who had health concerns after service in the Gulf and a toll-free information line whose operators assist veterans with care and benefits questions and scheduling examinations for either DOD or VA hospitals.

This investigation sought the answers to two important questions:

• Did U.S. forces destroy chemical weapons stored at Khamisiyah?
• Were U.S. forces exposed to nerve agents as a result of demolition activities?

To assess the likelihood that U.S. forces destroyed chemical weapons stored at Khamisiyah, we wanted to establish that U.S. troops conducted demolition operations there and that chemical warfare agents were present during the demolitions.

U.S. Army engineers and explosive ordnance disposal personnel conducted two large-scale demolitions at Khamisiyah: one on March 4, 1991, and a second on March 10, 1991. Only bunkers were destroyed on March 4, 1991. The Pit, warehouses, and most of the remaining bunkers were destroyed on March 10, 1991. Hundreds of personal interviews of commanders, operations officers, noncommissioned officers, enlisted personnel, and NBC specialists from the engineer and EOD units confirmed the demolition operations. The 37th Engineer Battalion videotape of March 4, 1991, bunker inventories and subsequent bunker explosions, narrated by an engineer unit commander, provides insight into the magnitude of the effort required to destroy the Khamisiyah ASP. Personal diaries added details to the daily events of US units involved in destroying the bunkers and warehouses. Unit logs and records and declassified intelligence documents further identified US participants in the Khamisiyah demolition operations.

During this investigation, we discovered significant evidence to support the presence of chemical weapons at Khamisiyah. Although U.S. forces did not identify chemical weapons during their inventory or demolition activities, subsequent UNSCOM inspections from October 1991 through the summer of 1998 documented chemical weapons in Bunker 73, the Pit, and at an open storage location three kilometers west of the main storage area. At the open storage location, UNSCOM inspectors tested a leaking 155mm artillery shell with a CAM and determined it contained the blister agent mustard. They also tested the 122mm rockets in the Pit and found they contained a mixture of the nerve agents sarin and cyclosarin. In May 1996, UNSCOM inspectors determined that some damaged rockets in the remains of Bunker 73 were chemical weapons, based on the rockets’ physical characteristics (high-density polyethylene inserts, burster tubes, and fill plugs). UNSCOM inspectors found additional nerve agent-filled rockets during their 1998 excavation of Bunker 73 and the Pit.

Intelligence Community reports and photographs and UNSCOM information were crucial in assessing whether U.S. forces destroyed chemical weapons at Khamisiyah. Bunker 73’s debris contained whole and fragmentary 122mm rockets bearing characteristics of chemical weapons. The rockets were thoroughly mixed in the debris and it is unlikely Iraq placed them there after the demolition to discredit the U.S. or deceive UNSCOM inspectors. UNSCOM unearthed chemical rockets in Bunker 73’s location, leaving no doubt that at least some of the munitions in the bunker were chemical weapons when U.S. Army engineers destroyed it. We are less certain about the existence of chemical weapons in the Pit. Iraq claimed that they moved chemical rockets from Al Muthanna to Bunker 73 and then moved them to the Pit when some began to leak. Iraq’s officials took UNSCOM inspectors to the Pit in October 1991 and showed them several piles of rockets, which UNSCOM tested and found to contain chemical warfare agents. In February 1992, UNSCOM found additional chemical warfare weapons buried in the Pit’s sand walls. The inspectors also found chemical weapons in a 1998 excavation of the Pit. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for Iraq to have buried those chemical weapons in the Pit, either to embarrass the U.S. or deceive the UNSCOM inspectors.

We have assessed that chemical warfare agents were present at Khamisiyah and U.S. soldiers definitely destroyed many, but not all, of the chemical agent weapons in the Pit and Bunker 73. It is likely that the demolition of rockets in the Pit exposed some U.S. units to very low levels of chemical warfare agents. UNSCOM inspectors verified the presence of chemical warfare agent rockets in the Pit, and our own investigation, supported by other DOD organizations and Intelligence Community investigations, have left no doubt that U.S. units damaged or destroyed some of these rockets on March 10, 1991.

It is unlikely that the destruction of Bunker 73 exposed any U.S. military units to a chemical warfare agent. Units in the area evacuated to a safe distance from the storage area before the explosion. The demolition virtually destroyed Bunker 73 and the rains that followed would effectively have dissipated any chemical warfare agent vapors that might have escaped the force of the demolition. Winds blew whatever chemical agent vapors were present in the atmosphere away from U.S. units. In 1999, the CIA's estimated amount of agent release was 5 percent of that estimated in 1996, further reducing the possibility for exposure. No evidence exists that any soldiers at Khamisiyah exhibited symptoms consistent with exposure to a chemical warfare agent.

At the time of the cease-fire, the Coalition ground campaign had proceeded at an unprecedented rate, without Iraq using chemical weapons and with relatively few Coalition forces’ combat deaths. USCENTCOM assigned both VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps the missions to establish security in their respective operating areas and quickly destroy as much enemy equipment and as many munitions as possible. Explosive ordnance disposal detachments had the specific tasks of identifying and destroying munitions in the theater of operations. Unfortunately, the task of destroying the vast quantities of munitions and equipment captured during Desert Storm was too large for the small number of EOD personnel in the KTO in the time available, and therefore fell to those not fully technically equipped for the task—combat engineers, combat soldiers, and support personnel. The limited time available in which to conduct the demolition operations and the shortages of explosives, such as C4, among units further complicated the demolition tasks. Consequently, some units handled or destroyed munitions using procedures that created additional hazards and even loss of life, such as occurred at As Salman. At many locations, engineers destroyed bunkers full of munitions, conducted hurried inventories and used improper amounts of explosives, resulting in flyouts or ejection of partially destroyed munitions that created unsafe conditions for everyone. Safe removal of ordnance from the battlefield requires technical expertise, time, and proper explosives, and should remain an EOD function. However, the EOD specialist community would require additional resources to conduct munitions destruction operations on a scale similar to those in the post-cease-fire KTO. The Army should review manpower requirements for future likely scenarios involving EOD. Combat engineer officer basic training and NCO training should include enhanced EOD instruction to provide a supplemental force with the requisite technical expertise to assist the EOD in similar situations.

During the Gulf War, intelligence staffs at all echelons received numerous reports of Iraq’s chemical warfare agent munitions markings. Command and operations staffs included information from some of these intelligence reports in their messages, which were widely distributed among U.S. forces in the Gulf.

Since the Gulf War, the Army Declassification Office received and declassified most of these command and operational messages about Iraq’s chemical warfare munitions markings. They accurately reflect similar messages sent within intelligence channels. All of these messages contained contradictory descriptions of how Iraq marked chemical warfare agent munitions:

• Iraq marked chemical weapons without specifying how;
• Iraq used no markings; and
• Iraq used a particular color, but the reported colors varied.

The existence of contradictory information on a single topic is an inherent part of intelligence collection; it does not reflect poorly on intelligence collection operations. However, recognizing—and calling attention to—the existence of such contradictory information is the responsibility of intelligence analysis. After searching thousands of intelligence documents, we found none that informed staffs of the existence of contradictory information on Iraq’s chemical munitions markings. Identifying the existence of contradictory information would have helped planners recognize the danger of destroying Iraq’s munitions in the absence of definitive munitions recognition data. Intelligence analysts need to seek out and call attention to information gaps. Ultimately, it is the commander’s responsibility to ensure his or her command has accurate, timely intelligence to accomplish the mission. It is the intelligence staff officer who must provide that intelligence.

At the conclusion of the Gulf War, the UN created UNSCOM to identify and destroy Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles. UNSCOM obtained Iraq’s weapons declarations and inspected nuclear, biological, and chemical production facilities. In October 1999, the United Nations discontinued UNSCOM inspections and weapons destruction missions.

Sections III E through H of this narrative and the CIA’s "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence" (posted on GulfLINK on April 9, 1997), recount in detail the events that led to the discovery of chemical weapons destruction at Khamisiyah. Analysis of historical documents indicates that DOD received and retransmitted messages containing details of UNSCOM inspections to USCENTCOM and other unified and specified commands. DOD, USCENTCOM, and the State Department did not recognize the significance of UNSCOM’s discovery of chemical munitions destruction at Khamisiyah. DOD, in conjunction with the Intelligence Community and State Department, should monitor events in U.S.-occupied areas during deployments and after redeployments to prevent another incident like Khamisiyah.

Abn Airborne (type of unit)

ACIS Arms Control Intelligence Staff

ACR Armored Cavalry Regiment (Army unit)

ARCENT U.S. Army Component, Central Command

ASP Ammunition supply point

BW biological warfare

C4 Compound 4 (an explosive)

CAM Chemical Agent Monitor

CBW chemical and biological warfare

CCEP Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program

CENTAF Air Force Component, Central Command

CHPPM U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion & Preventive Medicine

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

COAMPS Coupled Ocean-Atmosphere Mesoscale Prediction System

COMUSARCENT Commander, U.S. Army Central Command

CW chemical warfare

CW/BW Chemical weapons/biological weapons

DCI Director, Central Intelligence

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

Div Division (type of unit)

DMDC Defense Manpower Data Center

DOD Department of Defense

DSWA Defense Special Weapons Agency

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

DVA Department of Veterans Affairs

ECMWF European Centre for Medium-Range Forecasts

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

ESG Environmental Support Group

FRAGO fragment order

GDAS Global Data Assimilation System

HPAC Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability

IDA Institute for Defense Analyses 

KKMC King Khalid Military City

KTO Kuwait Theater of Operations

MARCENT Marine Corps Component, Central Command 

mm millimeter

MM5 Mesoscale Model, Version 5

NAVCENT Navy Component, Central Command

NCAR National Center for Atmospheric Research 

NCO Noncommissioned Officer

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NOGAPS Naval Operational Global Atmospheric Prediction System

NRL Naval Research Laboratory

NSA National Security Agency

NSC National Security Council

NSWC Naval Surface Warfare Center

NUSSE4 Non-uniform Simple Surface Evaporation 4 transport & diffusion

NW northwest

OMEGA Operational Multi-scale Environmental Model w/ Grid Adaptivity

OPLAN Operations Plan

OPORD Operations Order

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PAC Presidential Advisory Commission on Gulfwar Veterans' Illness

PGIT Persian Gulf Investigation Team

PSOB Presidential Special Oversite Board 

RGFC Republican Guard Forces Command

SAIC Science Applications International Corporation

SCIPUFF Second Order Closure, Integrated Puff

SE southeast

SITREP Situation Report

SOCCENT Special Operations Component, CENTCOM

SW southwest

US United States

USCENTCOM U.S. Central Command

UN United Nations

UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission on Iraq

USASCURR U.S. Armed Services Center for Unit Records Research

USCINCCENT Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command

UTM Universal Transverse Mercator

UXO unexposed ordnance

VLSTRACK Vapor, Liquid, and Solid Tracking

The following identifies those units of the XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps identified by investigators as participants during the demolition operations at Khamisiyah:

• 1-319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment
• 146th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment
• 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment
• 2-505th Parachute Infantry Regiment
• 3-505th Parachute Infantry Regiment
• 3-73rd Armor Battalion
• 307th Engineer Battalion
• 307th Medical Battalion
• 313th Military Intelligence Battalion
• 37th Engineer Battalion
• 450th Civil Affairs Battalion
• 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment
• 82nd Engineer Battalion
• 84th Engineer Company
• 92nd Chemical Platoon
• HQ, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment
• HQ, 82nd Airborne Division
• Various direct support or attached units to the above

In 1996, the Central Intelligence Agency reported on computer modeling it had used to simulate possible releases of chemical warfare agents from several sites. Because the CIA used only a single model approach, their results reflected the strengths and weaknesses of only that model. On Nov. 2, 1996, to improve computer modeling over the earlier CIA results, the DOD asked the Institute for Defense Analyses to convene an independent panel of experts in meteorology, physics, chemistry, and related disciplines.[253] The panel reviewed previous modeling analyses and recommended using multiple atmospheric models and data sources for future modeling to generate a more robust result than produced by a single model.[254] The Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses agreed to new modeling to estimate the areas of possible exposure to chemical warfare agents that may have been released during Gulf War air operations and post-war demolitions.

The Special Assistant used computer simulations because on-site measurements of chemical agent exposure were unavailable and the local weather conditions were not always measured or recorded. To implement the recommendations of the IDA panel, the DOD and CIA asked other agencies with extensive modeling experience to participate in the modeling process. The modeling team consists of scientists from the:

• Defense Threat Reduction Agency (formerly the Defense Special Weapons Agency)
• Naval Research Laboratory; the Naval Surface Warfare Center
• National Center for Atmospheric Research
• Science Applications International Corporation (supporting the CIA and DTRA)

The team used existing sophisticated computer models, as recommended by the IDA panel, to develop potential exposure areas specific to each incident under investigation. The team combined these models (referred to as an ensemble) to compensate for the bias that is inherent in each model, that is, to produce a more robust result by maximizing the strengths of each model and minimizing its weaknesses.

We send the hazard projection graphics derived from the dispersion models to the US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine.[266] CHPPM overlays the hazard projection graphics with data on U.S. unit locations to create an exposure plot showing the areas and levels of possible exposure.

Two DOD organizations, the U.S. Armed Services Center for Unit Records Research and the Defense Manpower Data Center, provide the databases used to determine unit locations during the Gulf War and who was in each unit in the possible exposure hazard areas. We cross-reference, validate, refine, and update the unit location data to ensure the accuracy of whether a unit was in an exposure area at a specific time.

Weather models represent our best attempts to approximate actual atmospheric conditions. They do not replicate reality with absolute certainty, but modern modeling techniques enable us to generate reasonably close approximations. We simulate regional weather conditions using weather modeling. Dispersion models then work with the simulated weather to project the overall agent distribution in the area. The composite hazard projection area represents an average picture. Since the atmosphere is inherently turbulent in nature, the actual concentration of agent within the hazard area might not be the same throughout the projected area. As a result, modeling predicts that the concentration of chemical warfare agent is at the exposure threshold throughout the hazard area, even though the agent may not necessarily be everywhere in the area. We can only conclude that individuals within the hazard projection area may have been exposed to the calculated concentration of agent multiplied by the time of exposure across the entire hazard area.

CIA estimated the quantity, type, and storage configuration of chemical warfare agents stored at the sites under investigation. The source characterizations tend to overstate the size of the release to minimize risk of failing to identify all of the agent that might have been released. Presenting a composite of the different modeling results is another method to minimize the risk of missing veterans who may have been in a hazard area. This is because, if we are to err, we would prefer to identify a veteran incorrectly as possibly exposed rather than fail to recognize a veteran who was exposed

Interim Report – December 7, 2000

We originally published this narrative on Feb. 21, 1997. After that time, we intensified our efforts to address the five questions that had remained unanswered in the first publication and to fully understand the effect of the demolition operations on U.S. soldiers. Hundreds of additional veterans’ interviews provided answers to the remaining questions from the first publication. Research added insight into Iraq’s chemical munitions markings and the ambiguous information that existed among U.S. forces on the last day of the war. We greatly expanded the discussion of the government’s response to an increased number of unexplained illnesses among Gulf War veterans and the subsequent discovery of the Khamisiyah demolitions. The intelligence community provided new details that enabled us to remodel the Pit demolition with greater confidence and publish refined potential hazard areas. Improved source term data from the CIA, better unit location data, and revised modeling techniques contribute critical improvements to the revised modeling efforts, which we address in this updated narrative.

We published a second interim report of this narrative on Dec. 7, 2000, and made the following additional changes to the paper:

• Referenced new source documents to enhance the accuracy and level of detail;
• Added improved graphics to exemplify information;
• Expanded the narrative with "Assessment," "Lessons Learned," and "Methodology for Modeling a Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release at Khamisiyah," sections to aid understanding; and
• Revised the narrative to correct editorial errors, and to reflect the updated methodology and footnoting standards of the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) for Gulf War Illnesses, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployments.

Final Report – April 2002

We occasionally received new information from veterans inquiring about their inclusion or exclusion from the possible hazard area. After reviewing each request, we have notified the veteran (and any others affected) of the results of the review, including any change in their possible exposure status. Accounting for these changes has revised the number of possibly exposed personnel to 101,752 versus the previous 100,923. Examples of some of the reasons for change include:

• Personnel deployed with a provisional designation (507th Tactical Air Wing (Prov)).
• Personnel identified on a unit manning list who did not actually deploy with the unit.
• Air Force personnel attached to Army units who were not on Army personnel lists (e.g., the 227th Aviation Company).
• Army reserve civil affairs units attached to military police brigades (401st Civil Affairs Company to 14th Military Police Brigade).

As a result of the updates since the previous publication, the number of possibly exposed personnel now stands at 101,752 versus the previous 100,923. Otherwise, except for minor editorial changes, we have not changed information provided in this report.