During and after the Gulf War, people reported that they had been exposed to chemical warfare agents. To investigate these incidents, and to determine if chemical weapons were used, the DOD developed a methodology for investigation and validation based on work done by the United Nations and the international community where the criteria include:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site
• Physical evidence from the site such as weapons fragments, soil, water, vegetation or human/animal tissue samples
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence
• Testimony of eyewitnesses
• Multiple analyses
• Review of the evidence by experts.

While the DOD methodology (TAB C) for investigating chemical incidents is based on these protocols, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence was often not collected at the time of an event. Therefore, we cannot apply a rigid template to all incidents, and each investigation must be tailored to its unique circumstances. Accordingly, we designed our methodology to provide a thorough, investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and determine what happened. Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical agent presence, nor is a single individual’s observation sufficient to validate a chemical agent presence. The MOD has conducted its investigation along similar lines, relying on documentary evidence and the testimony of key eyewitnesses.

By following our methodology and accumulating anecdotal, documentary, and physical evidence, and by interviewing eyewitnesses and key personnel, and analyzing the results, the investigator can assess the validity of the presence of chemical warfare agents on the battlefield. Because information from various sources may be contradictory, we have developed an assessment scale (Figure 1) ranging from "Definitely" to "Definitely Not" with intermediate assessments of "Likely," "Unlikely," and "Indeterminate." This assessment is tentative, based on facts available as of the date of the report publication; each case is reassessed over time based on new information and feedback.

Figure 1. Assessment of chemical warfare agent presence

The standard for making the assessment is based on common sense: do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that chemical warfare agents were or were not present? When insufficient information is available, the assessment is "Indeterminate" until more evidence can be found.

This Case Narrative provides information concerning significant events relating to the discovery and testing of a storage tank suspected of containing chemical warfare agent. The reported discovery and testing of the storage tank, which was located next to the outside wall of the Kuwaiti Girls’ School in Kuwait City, Kuwait, took place in early August 1991. Both UK and U.S. military elements tested the contents of the tank. Concern over the contents of the tank, coupled with the overlap in jurisdiction at the national and organizational level, resulted in four separate operations being conducted at the tank. These operations were carried out under the command of Major John Watkinson, 21st EOD Squadron, British Royal Engineers, as the UK had overall responsibility for EOD clearance in the area in which the tank was located. Various elements of 21st EOD Squadron along with other U.S. and UK elements conducted these operations. The operations were as follows:

1. Maj. Watkinson’s testing,
2. the Fox vehicle testing,
3. sampling of the tank, and
4. permanent sealing of the tank.

These operations were not necessarily conducted by the same individuals and these individuals were not always aware of the other operations. This meant that some individuals ended their involvement with limited information and unanswered questions about the nature of the tank’s contents. For a brief listing of the major individuals and organizations involved in the testing of the tank’s contents see TAB E. For graphical representations of the involvement of the key individuals and organizations, see TABs F and G.

During these four operations, multiple tests were conducted using several chemical detectors, including two Fox nuclear, chemical and biological reconnaissance vehicles. Many of these tests gave positive indications for mustard agent, with the two Fox vehicles alarming for phosgene as well. A contemporary press report in the British newspaper The Sunday Observer also covered the story and reported that a container full of mustard agent had been discovered in Kuwait City.

In 1994, when Iraqi chemical weapons were suggested as a possible cause of Gulf War illnesses, events at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School became a focus of government and media scrutiny. After reviewing materials provided by the DOD-including the data from multiple positive tests and hearing the testimony of those involved in testing the tank-the Senate Committee reviewing the incident concluded that chemical warfare agent was present in the storage tank. In the United Kingdom, Parliamentary questions born out of the U.S. Senate Committee examination have repeatedly been raised.

A joint U.S.-UK investigation, which began in 1997, uncovered evidence indicating the events at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School in 1991 were not as simple as they seemed, nor were the results of the on-site 1991 testing definitive. Included in this evidence was a copy of the Fox vehicles’ mass spectrometer tapes from the testing on Aug. 9, 1991, as well as analysis of samples taken from the tank for laboratory testing, both of which were passed on request to DOD by the UK Ministry of Defence in 1997. Analysis of the Fox mass spectrometer tapes by military chemical experts at the Edgewood Research, Development, and Engineering Center, molecular weight experts at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the manufacturer of the mass spectrometer used on the FOX, definitively and consistently shows that no known chemical warfare agent was present in the tank. Analysis of the Fox tapes did, however, indicate the presence of inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA). In addition, 1991 British analysis of samples taken from the tank stated that "the samples were entirely consistent with the contents of the tank being nitric acid."

Our investigation has unearthed further evidence which significantly bolsters the assessment that it was nitric acid not chemical warfare agent in the tank. Research revealed that Iraqi forces used the school as a test and maintenance facility for SILKWORM anti-ship missiles, which use IRFNA as their fuel oxidizer. This provides a plausible reason for positioning the tank at the school. In addition, the physical descriptions of the substance provided by those directly involved were not indicative of any known chemical warfare agent but are consistent with the presence of IRFNA.

Based on currently available information, we assess that chemical warfare agent was "definitely not" present in the storage tank at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School. We also assess that IRFNA "definitely" was present in the tank.

We further assess that all personnel involved in the testing of the tank at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School performed their duties in an exemplary manner. The equipment utilized by UK and U.S. Armed Forces operated as it was designed, and all technical resources were employed properly.

Figure 2. Map of the Al Ahmadi district. Red arrow indicates location of the Kuwaiti Girls' School.

In early March 1991, coalition forces in the Kuwaiti theater of operations explored the Al Badawiyah Girls Sciences School in the Al Badawiyah suburb of Kuwait City at coordinates 2904N4806E (UTM Grid 18832039).[2] (Figure 2) During our investigation we found that the Al Badawiyah Girls Sciences School has also been known as the Sabahiyah High School for Girls[3] , the Ansarieh Banat Kebeed School[4] , and the Al Nasser School for Secondary Curriculum. In 1991, the school was known as the Ansarieh Banat Kabeed School. The school falls within the Sabahiyah municipality and the Badawiyah district and thus, may also be referred to by locality.[5] (Figure 2) In 1997, however, the school was known as the Al Nasser School for Secondary Curriculum. (Figure 3) UK Parliamentary and U.S. Senate Committee investigators, as well as the media, have routinely referred to the building as the Kuwaiti Girls’ School. For purposes of this report, the school will be referred to as the Kuwaiti Girls’ School.

Figure 3. Photograph of the front of the school circa October 1997. The sign at the top of the building reads: Al Nasser School for Secondary Curriculum.

During the Gulf War the Kuwaiti Girls’ School was used by the Iraqis as a SILKWORM missile test and maintenance facility. An initial intelligence report of March 29, 1991 from coalition forces who had been present at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School, stated six Chinese-made SILKWORM anti-ship missiles were found inside the building. (Figure 4) In addition to these six missiles, the retreating Iraqi forces abandoned much support equipment-such as the missile test carts, cabling and a Chinese-manufactured generator vehicle-which was discovered inside the school. Two abandoned Soviet missile transport trucks were located next to a truck-mounted crane 100 meters west of the school, and a Chinese generator was positioned 600 meters west of the school. The initial intelligence report noted that the auditorium appeared to have been used as a troop messing/berthing area. The condition of the area indicated that the Iraqi troops had departed hastily.[7]

Iraqi use of the Kuwaiti Girls’ School as a SILKWORM test and maintenance facility was treated as classified. According to written and oral statements, none of the individuals and organizations who would come to be involved with events at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School in August, 1991, had any knowledge of what purpose, if any, the Iraqis had used the school. To date, none of the coalition forces present at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School on March 29, 1991, have been located for interviews. Efforts to contact them continue.

Figure 4. Captured Iraqi SILKWORM anti-ship missile at the Kuwaiti Girls' School.

The detailed report of March 29, 1991, made no reference to any missile fuel or oxidizer storage tank located in or around the school. However, photography from March 1, 1991, clearly shows that the tank was present at the time. (Figure 5) As a test and maintenance facility, the presence of a storage container for the highly volatile oxidizer used in these missiles would be expected. The SILKWORM anti-ship missile uses Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid (IRFNA) as its oxidizer.[8] According to the Chemical Propulsion Information Agency, IRFNA is a highly corrosive oxidizing agent, light-orange to orange-red in color, transparent, strongly fuming and unstable. It will react with many organic materials, resulting in spontaneous combustion.[9] (TAB D)

Figure 5. U2 reconnaissance photo of the Kuwaiti Girls' School from March 1, 1991. The obstructed view is due to oil well fire smoke over the area.

Prior to Operation Desert Storm, the United States’ Defense Intelligence Agency assessed that Iraq was "likely to have a CW [chemical warfare] warhead for its SILKWORMs."[11] Examination of captured Iraqi SILKWORM warheads indicated that they were only high-explosive in nature. (Figure 6) A US report on captured Iraqi military hardware dated September 12, 1991, stated that thirty SILKWORM warheads would be available for evaluation and other use upon their arrival in the continental United States in September/October 1991.[12] A subsequent report dated October 29, 1991, stated that the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, Terra Group, was to receive nineteen warheads; nine were to go to the Naval Warfare Center, China Lake, California; and the remaining two would go to the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center at Indian Head, Maryland.[13] According to the Head of Security for the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, the paperwork for all nineteen warheads indicated they were all high-explosive.[14] A representative from the Naval Warfare Center, China Lake, California, indicated that all warheads received were destroyed as high-explosive warheads.[15] Likewise, a representative from the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center at Indian Head, Maryland, stated that both SILKWORM warheads received were definitely high-explosive in nature. He indicated that he "had heard of no CW [chemical weapons] warheads for Iraqi SILKWORMs," noting that if they did exist, they would definitely have been evaluated.[16]

Figure 6. Photograph of six SILKWORM missiles captured at the Kuwaiti Girls' School awaiting transport to the US. Note the serial number on the first missile matches that of the missile at the Girls' School in Figure 4.

Following the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the Government of Kuwait set about the reconstruction of the infrastructure damaged during the Iraqi occupation. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers established the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office and the Kuwaiti Emergency Recovery Office to direct the majority of these operations. Efforts to clear unexploded ordnance ran in tandem with efforts to carry out physical repair to essential infrastructure. The Government of Kuwait issued its own contracts to clear unexploded ordnance (called Explosive Ordnance Disposal, or EOD) within Kuwait. It divided the country into six large sectors and spread the work among the coalition forces, specifically the UK, US, France, Egypt, Bangladesh and Pakistan.[18] A weekly meeting was established to assess clearance progress and allocate new tasks.

Each country involved approached the EOD task slightly differently. Egypt, Bangladesh, and Pakistan used their own EOD trained soldiers. France and the U.S. planned to use contractors. The UK used a British contractor called Royal Ordnance who in turn hired trained British soldiers from the UK MOD to clear its sector.[19] However, it should be noted that the sectors delineated for ordnance clearing did not correspond to those delineated for reconstruction efforts.

The schools in Kuwait were the main focus of civil infrastructure repair. The schools had been closed for nearly a year and their reopening was considered an important indicator of a return to normality within the country.

In early August 1991, a British explosive ordnance disposal firm known as Passive Barriers subcontracted by Brown & Root, an American firm carrying out reconstruction tasks on schools in Kuwait, discovered a suspicious metal storage tank alongside the perimeter wall of the Kuwaiti Girls’ School.[20] Both Passive Barriers and Brown & Root were unaware that in March this site was explored by coalition forces and that Iraqi military equipment, including the SILKWORM missiles, was taken away. According to the Brown & Root supervisor, the protocol for the reconstruction effort called for Passive Barriers to clear the area before Brown & Root commenced work. While clearing the area, Passive Barriers personnel discovered the tank and notified Brown & Root, which contacted KERO. The KERO safety officer was dispatched to inspect the tank.[21]

When interviewed, the safety officer stated that fumes were escaping from the tank through two holes, which had been caused by a single bullet. The bullet had broken in half on entry and was stuck in the exit hole. The safety officer stated that the rust-colored vapors puffing from the bullet holes in the tank smelled like acid. Based on the color of the fumes and their smell, he determined the contents to be nitric acid. Pinging the tank to check the fill level, he estimated that it was about one-third full. Despite not wearing protective gear and being close enough to identify the smell of the vapor, the safety officer exhibited no symptoms corresponding to chemical weapons exposure.[22] All subsequent contact with the vapor from the tank was by individuals who were wearing nuclear, biological and chemical Individual Protective Equipment including respirators, and thus were not able to identify the smell of the vapor.

 Figures 7 and 8. Photographs of the storage tank at the Kuwaiti Girls' School taken by the safety officer. Encircled area shows the movement of the fumes out of the bullet hole.

The safety officer took several pictures of the area, including two of the tank. These photographs were handed over to the DRAO operations officer. (Figures 7 and 8). The safety officer informed the operations officer that, based on the smell and color of the fumes, he believed the tank contained nitric acid. The safety officer never documented of his inspection of the tank.[24] According to a military policeman[25] involved in DRAO’s weekly situation reports, the storage was thought to contain fuel, however, not wanting to take any unnecessary risks, the operations officer ordered the contents to be tested.[26]According to Major General Patrick Kelly, who was in command of DRAO, they contacted someone in Saudi Arabia to inspect the tank and asked the Kuwaiti Army Chief of Staff to secure the area.[27] Rather than pass his assessment on to those testing the tank, the safety officer was instructed to deal with the DRAO’s operations officer.[28]

DRAO informed Col. John Macel, who was the U.S. Army Liaison Officer Kuwait, about the tank. Col. Macel indicated that he visited the site and sealed off the area, pending a determination of a course of action. Military police from DRAO and personnel from Task Force Victory were summoned to seal off the area.[29] However, the area was not sealed nor were any U.S. or Kuwaiti military personnel present when Major Watkinson, the commanding officer of 21St EOD Squadron, British Royal Engineers, conducted his initial reconnaissance and testing of the tank (see below).

Concern over the contents of the tank coupled with the overlap in jurisdiction at the national and organizational level resulted in four separate operations being conducted at the tank:

1. Major Watkinson’s testing,
2. the Fox vehicle testing,
3. sampling of the tank, and
4. permanent sealing of the tank.

These operations were not necessarily conducted by the same individuals and these individuals were not always aware of the other operations. This meant that some individuals ended their involvement with limited information and unanswered questions about the nature of the tank’s contents. For a brief listing of the major individuals and organizations involved in the testing of the tank’s contents see TAB E. For graphical representations of the involvement of the key individuals and organizations, see TABs F and G.

As stated above, post-war efforts to clear unexploded ordnance were conducted simultaneously with efforts to carry out physical repairs to essential infrastructure in Kuwait. However, the sectors delineated for ordnance clearing did not correspond to the boundaries used for reconstruction efforts. Thus, the school, while in the US sector for reconstruction, was in the British sector for ordnance clearing.

Maj. Watkinson first became aware of the tank at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School on the morning of Aug. 5, 1991 during one of the regular meetings held between the Kuwaiti MOD and various EOD agencies involved in the reconstruction of Kuwait. Kuwaiti military officers specifically tasked a British company, Royal Ordnance, to investigate the tank. 21st EOD Squadron was one of the British military units on loan to this company to conduct EOD operations. As Major Watkinson was present at the meeting, the task was immediately referred to him.

Regarding the British EOD tasking, Maj. Watkinson stated:

"I attended a meeting on the 5th of August [1991] with the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense which was a regular meeting, between Kuwaiti Army Officers and various agencies in Kuwait, who were involved in EOD operations. It was at that meeting that I first became aware of the container, because one of the Kuwaiti officers specifically asked Royal Ordnance if they could investigate it. A member of the Royal Ordnance Management Team was at that meeting and they immediately referred the problem to me, to investigate, which I subsequently did. Royal Ordnance was a UK firm which effectively subcontracted [with] the UK Ministry of Defence to have British military forces in theater assist with the clearance."[30]

The commanding officer of the U.S. 146th EOD Detachment indicated that he was first informed about the tank by a Brigadier General in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.[31] At the same time, the senior EOD officer in theater was ordered by Maj. Gen. Kelly from the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office to examine the tank.[32] The senior EOD officer directed the commander of the 146th EOD detachment to examine the tank and search the site for additional tanks and other suspicious items.[33]

According to the commander of the 146th EOD detachment, on Aug. 5, 1991, he and Maj. Watkinson, who was the commanding officer of 21st EOD Squadron, British Royal Engineers, examined the tank.[34] However, Maj. Watkinson has no recollection of any U.S. personnel being present during the first operation, nor is their presence recorded in his post-operation report.

After some initial confusion in locating the school, Maj. Watkinson accompanied by his bomb disposal engineer found a metal storage tank with a capacity of approximately 2000 liters outside the perimeter walls of the Kuwaiti Girls’ School.[35] The school was not in use, but the school security officer was present. Also in the area was a British EOD subcontractor employed by an American firm to clear explosive ordnance and rubbish.

Wearing full IPE, which consisted of the British Mk IV NBC suit and S10 respirator, Maj. Watkinson approached the tank. Following standard practice, where minimum numbers of personnel necessary go forward, the bomb disposal engineer remained at a safe distance in radio contact. Maj. Watkinson then tested the tank with a chemical agent monitor (CAM) (Figure 9), British one-color detector paper (Figure 10), and an M18A2 kit (Figure 11).[36] A chemical agent monitor is a portable, hand-held instrument used to monitor the presence of nerve or blister agents. It operates by drawing air into the unit, which is ionized by a weak radioactive source. The level of toxic hazard is assessed by an on-board micro computer and indicated by a liquid crystal display.[37] The M18A2 kit is a portable, expendable item capable of surface and vapor analyses. The presence of chemical agent is indicated by distinctive color changes.[38]

The vapor escaping from the tank through the bullet hole tested positive on the chemical agent monitor, giving a reading of eight bars for mustard agent,[39] which is the highest possible reading. Next, Maj. Watkinson tested the vapor using one-color detector paper. This gave no response, which was not surprising as the paper is a liquid detector paper and is not designed to react to vapor. Recognizing this, he then conducted a further test using liquid extracted from the tank by dipping a piece of wire into the tank through one of the bullet holes. He wiped the wire on the one-color detector paper, which caused it to turn brown. This is a negative result for UK one-color detector paper, which turns blue in the presence of chemical warfare agent. He then wiped some of the tank’s contents on to the U.S. three-color detector paper from the M18A2 kit.[40] The three-color paper, however, turned pink, which Maj. Watkinson took to indicate that chemical warfare agent might be present.[41] Three-color paper is designed to turn red in the presence of blister (it turns yellow in the presence of G-series nerve agent, and green in the presence of V-series nerve agent).

Figure 9. Chemical Agent Monitor

Figure 10. British one-color detector paper

Maj. Watkinson followed up the CAM and detector papers tests with an M18A2 kit. Regarding that test, he stated:

"The M18A2 kit has glass tubes that contain, sort of the cotton wool type substance, which is impregnated with certain chemicals. Obviously there are a whole series of different tubes which are designed to detect for different agents. One can go through those tubes in sequence, in order to eliminate various chemicals and decide what it is you've got. I didn't go through that process fully, because I'd got a reading with the CAM [chemical agent monitor] and therefore I narrowed straight in on the H [mustard] agent."[44]

Maj. Watkinson tested the vapor six times with the M18A2 kit by sucking the vapor through glass tubes using a rubber bulb. Maj. Watkinson stated that to test positive for mustard agent, the tube would have to turn blue; and as some of them did not, he ended up testing it six times.[45] Four of the tubes turned blue, indicating mustard agent. The remaining two tubes turned yellow, but then turned blue some hours later.[46]

Figure 11. M18A2 chemical agent detector kit

Maj. Watkinson, like all others involved in the August 1991 testing of the tank, was unaware the school had been used as a SILKWORM facility, and thus that the tank may have contained IRFNA. Additionally Maj. Watkinson, like all others involved in the testing, was unaware that IRFNA would cause the CAM to register a false positive for blister agent. A U.S. Army message dated Feb. 19, 1991, indicated "fuming nitric acid will drive the CAM [chemical agent monitor] to 8 bars on the mustard scale."[48] This message was based on experience using CAMs with residual IRFNA from a SCUD that impacted at Hafir Al Batin. The US Army VII Corps chemical officer forwarded this information to all units via e-mail and recommended using the M256 kit if the CAM gives a positive reading of eight bars on mustard agent.[49] Neither Maj. Watkinson nor any other units involved in testing the tank at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School was ever informed of this message. It is important to note the message was disseminated in February 1991, but Maj. Watkinson and 21st EOD Squadron did not arrive in theater until May 1991. Likewise, none of the U.S. units that would subsequently become involved in the testing of the tank were in theater in February 1991, nor were any informed of the message.

During the testing Maj. Watkinson inadvertently came into contact with the tank’s contents. He stated,

"There was some of the liquid on the wire, which I then wiped onto the detector paper. I can only assume that in the process of doing that, I got some of the liquid onto the back of my thigh, and it went through [penetrated] my suit."[50] (Figure 12)

"It wasn't something that I was immediately aware of. In fact, it wasn't until I got back to the camp that evening that I noticed I'd been burnt. But it wasn't particularly painful, it was more a question of being uncomfortable."

He noted that it was just a red mark approximately 4 cm x 2.5 cm[51] , and did not blister at all.[52] He sought medical attention for the injury on Aug. 9, 1991, four days after he sustained the injury. According to the medical report, the burn did not blister but was slightly raised and very red. It responded well to treatment with sulphadiazine cream[53] and had completely healed within seven to 10 days.[54]

Maj. Watkinson further noted:

"The significance of the injury is... relevant, because I was dressed in all the full NBC (Nuclear, Biological & Chemical) protective equipment, and I at the time couldn't understand how I managed to get burned on a part of my body where there was no joint in the NBC clothing. The implication was that the chemical had gone through the NBC suit. This was a bit of a concern, because obviously our NBC suit was designed to protect us and clearly on this occasion it hadn't."[55]

Figure 12. British NBC suit

Maj. Watkinson concluded the operation by sealing both bullet holes using an industrial silicone filler and plaster of Paris bandages. He checked the tank for leaks with a chemical agent monitor; none were found.[57]

According to Maj. Watkinson’s report dated Aug. 7, 1991, the security officer employed at the school prior to the conflict, first noticed the container on March 20, 1991. At that time, the security officer believed the container to be leaking.[58]

Additionally, Maj. Watkinson stated that Kuwaiti Police reportedly attempted to take some samples to the Kuwait Oil Company for testing.[59] [60] He went on to describe efforts to confirm or deny this information stating:

"One of the considerations early on was to try and establish whether there were any results from the Kuwaiti Oil Company, because we weren't sure what the chemical contents of the tank were. Although some inquiries were made along those directions, they didn't come to anything. Things need to perhaps be put in perspective. Kuwait, in the aftermath of the war, was in a state of disorganization... So, we didn't really pursue it to any great extent."[61]

Efforts to confirm or deny whether the Kuwaiti Oil Company or any other Kuwaiti organization obtained and analyzed samples of the material in the tank continue.

Despite conducting several tests using a CAM, M18A2 kit, and one- and three-color detector paper it was not possible positively to identify the substance in the tank. The CAM had indicated the presence of mustard agent, but the one-color detector paper gave a negative response. Although the three-color detector paper and the M18A2 kit had given a possible indication of mustard agent, the results were not conclusive.

Based on these results, Maj. Watkinson concluded that the tank probably contained mustard agent. His post-operation report recommended that a discrete guard of the tank should be mounted until the samples which the Kuwaiti Oil Company had apparently taken could be analyzed and the tank and its contents destroyed. It appears that following Maj. Watkinson’s initial tests and his recommendation that the area should be secured, Col. Macel called in military police from DRAO and personnel from Task Force Victory to seal off the area.

In his interview, Maj. Watkinson recently summarized the initial testing as follows:

"As far as I'm concerned, the CAM [chemical agent monitor] test was positive. It was eight bars on H [mustard]. Both the one-color and three-color detector paper changed color, but the colors weren't entirely appropriate with the color that I would have expected. So, that was a positive result, but with question marks. The M18A2 detector kit gave a test which again could've been interpreted as positive, but wasn't as conclusive as one would hope."[62]

Based on the results of Maj. Watkinson’s initial tests, a meeting was held on Aug. 6, 1991, to determine an appropriate course of action. Those in attendance included Kuwaiti military personnel, British personnel including Maj. Watkinson, Col. Macel and the Chief of Staff for Task Force Victory, Lt. Col. Donnie Killgore.[63]

The initial proposal recommended removing the container from the city and destroying it in the desert.[64] This, however, was deemed premature. Maj. Watkinson was aware that a UN Chemical Weapons Evaluation Team was in Iraq attempting to determine the Iraqi chemical posture and the container could have been useful to the team’s efforts. In particular, if the container did contain chemical warfare agent it would clearly demonstrate Iraqi forward deployment of bulk chemical warfare agent. It was therefore decided that a UN team should be invited to take samples from the tank. Headquarters British Forces Kuwait agreed to make the arrangements.[65] This prompted Lt. Col. Killgore to suggest using Fox nuclear, biological and chemical reconnaissance vehicles assigned to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to confirm or deny the presence of chemical warfare agent in the container.[66]

While the chemical agent monitor and many other chemical detection kits available to military forces can positively identify only a few chemical warfare agents or groups of agents, such as blister and nerve agents, the Fox reconnaissance vehicle can identify 60 known chemical agents using a computerized mobile mass spectrometer.[67] This device is helpful in identifying the individual component chemical compounds by providing the molecular composition and weight of ions of those compounds. The use of the Fox vehicles was approved, and on Aug. 7, 1991, the 54th Chemical Troop received a tasking memorandum from Headquarters, Task Force Victory, directing them to support 21st EOD Squadron, British Royal Engineers during the second operation to conduct tests on the tank’s contents.[68]

In his report, the Commander of the 54th Chemical Troop, then Capt. Michael Johnson, noted that, upon receipt of the tasking, the troop leadership went to the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait and received a complete mission brief by Col. Macel. Additionally, the troop leadership briefed Col. Macel on the capabilities of the Fox vehicle and how the troop would conduct the mission.[69] The operation was to be the first live joint detection operation between American and British forces. As such, rehearsals were staged to ensure that differences in tactics, doctrine, and other areas were properly addressed.[70] It was determined that Maj. Watkinson, who had originally tested the tank, would be the Commanding Officer for the second operation, while Capt. Johnson would direct the Fox operations.[71]

According to the commander of the 146th EOD Detachment, a few days after the initial testing of the tank, he obtained information which called into question the suggestion, based on Maj. Watkinson’s test results, that the tank might contain mustard agent.[72] The commander of the 146th stated that an Egyptian EOD officer identified a picture of the tank as being that of a Soviet rocket fuel container. According to the commander, the Egyptian EOD officer was reportedly Soviet-trained in rocketry prior to EOD training. The Egyptian EOD officer was killed by a mine shortly after making this assessment and no record of this assessment could be located.[73] Maj. Watkinson stated that he was not aware of this assessment.[74]

During another meeting of the Kuwaiti MOD and EOD agencies at which Maj. Watkinson was not present, the suggestion that the tank did not contain chemical warfare agent, but rather a highly-reactive industrial chemical was apparently discussed.[75] This was based on the Egyptian officer’s assessment of the container, the ability of the material to penetrate Maj. Watkinson’s protective clothing, and the nature of the subsequent injury. The commander of the 146th EOD Detachment did not know why this assessment was not passed on to units tasked to test the tank. Likewise, there was no confirmation that anyone received the U.S. EOD incident report that the senior U.S. EOD officer in theater claims was furnished to Col. Macel at the Embassy.[76] According to the senior U.S. EOD officer in theater, upon reporting the findings to Col. Macel, he was informed that the matter was deemed classified. Col. Macel, however, reports he received no EOD incident report or any other assessment that would indicate the tank did not contain chemical warfare agent.[77]In addition, he stated that the reason for classifying the issue was not based on the nature of the incident. According to Col. Macel:

"Virtually everything we were sending out of the embassy at that point [was] all classified...that was just sort of how things were being reported particularly … sensitive Iraqi issues involved. Nothing to do with this particular incident the way it was unfolding, but rather to ensure we protected sensitive information."[78]

Based on interviews with personnel subsequently involved with the tank, it was determined that knowledge of either the contractors’ or U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ involvement was limited to Maj. Gen. Kelly, Col. Macel, the staff of US Central Command via reporting from Col. Macel, and the U.S. Country Team at the Embassy in Kuwait. In an interview with Col. Macel, he pointed out that, given its classified status and the fact that the Corps of Engineers was not charged with handling this type of operation,[79] he did not inform the U.S. EOD officers, Brown & Root, or the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers about any subsequent testing of the tank or the results. The Chief Operations Officer for the DRAO confirmed that, to his knowledge, no one outside of his office was involved in inspecting the tank.[80]

On Aug. 9, 1991,[81] U.S. and UK forces converged on the site of the tank. The British forces consisted of the Commanding Officer of the Second Operation, Maj. Watkinson, and 1 Troop, 21st EOD Squadron: a Captain serving as the Bomb Disposal Officer, a Sergeant serving as the Bomb Disposal Engineer, and other soldiers who, between them, formed the command post and decontamination team. U.S. forces present included Capt. Johnson and two Fox crews, a decontamination unit, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regimental Chemical Officer, Lt. Col. Killgore, and Col. Macel. An American Sergeant First Class, assigned to the 54th Chemical Troop, directed the Fox vehicle decontamination. He was in full protective equipment along with the BDO, the BDENGR and the two British soldiers who formed the UK decontamination team.[82] (Figure 12) The Fox vehicles, BDO and BDENGR were the only elements beyond the hot line. The hot line separates the area of active operation from the decontamination area. Apart from the soldiers in the decontamination area and those beyond the hot line, all other U.S. and UK forces observed the operation from the safety of the incident command post (ICP), approximately 200 meters N/NE (upwind) and were not in protective suits at the time.[83] (Figure 13)

Figure 13. Major Watkinson's sketch of UK and US elements during the Fox testing.

The BDO and the BDENGR unplugged the holes sealed by Maj. Watkinson during the first operation. On breaking the seals, large quantities of vapor emerged from the tank for approximately two minutes before subsiding to a small vapor emission.[85] This suggested that the vapor pressure inside the tank had increased significantly while it had been sealed.

Using a long piece of rubber catheter tubing, the BDO, and the BDENGR took three samples from the tank and placed them in glass vials. Two of the samples were placed into two brown glass bottles which were then placed in a steel ammunition box filled with Fullers Earth.[86] The lid of the ammunition box was closed and left by the tank to be collected later. The third sample was placed in a stainless steel dish for analysis by the Fox vehicles.[87] This sample evaporated rapidly, which meant there was insufficient liquid to be tested by the Fox probe. This raised questions concerning the nature of the substance. According to Maj. Watkinson:

"One of the problems we were having was that the liquid, when put onto a stainless steel kidney tray, was evaporating quite quickly, and we hadn't anticipated this … mustard gas as I have dealt with it, seen it, and understand it, is fairly viscous, and I wouldn't have expected it to evaporate as quickly as it did. So, in my mind the rapid evaporation of the chemical was another indicator that suggested that this may not be mustard gas."[88]

The BDO and BDENGR therefore extracted a fourth, larger sample of the liquid and placed it into the stainless steel dish.[89] They presented this sample to each of the Fox probes for analysis. (Figure 14) The Fox vehicles, identified as Vehicle C-23 and Vehicle C-26,[90] had communications between them severed so as not to bias the results.[91]The MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer located on Vehicle C-23 alarmed for phosgene, a choking agent.[92] The Fox team took another sample test to validate the previous identification. The second test also alarmed for phosgene. In accordance with standard operating procedure, the C-23 crew ran full spectrum printouts to confirm the detections.[93] The spectrum run by the MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer onboard the first Fox vehicle was printed to a hard copy tape for later, more detailed analysis. From this point forward, the hard copy tapes generated by the Fox vehicles are referred to as the Fox tapes. (TAB H) With radio communications still cut off, Vehicle C-26 executed the same procedures. The second Fox alarmed for higher levels of phosgene, as well as mustard agent. Additionally it alarmed for a mustard agent. The C-26 crew, like the first, ran full spectrum printouts to confirm the exact substance present.[94] Fox tapes were also generated by this vehicle’s mass spectrometer. (TAB H)

Figure 14. Photograph of Fox vehicle testing taken by a US Army Lieutenant, 54th Chemical Troop.

While the Fox vehicle testing was underway, a fifth sample was taken from the tank in case the Fox vehicle crews required further material to test. This fifth sample was not in fact required and was therefore added to the samples within the two bottles contained in the ammunition box.[96]

During the extraction phase, both the BDO and BDENGR received liquid agent contamination on their hands. They both noticed heat penetrating through their gloves and considered this to be a result of an exothermic chemical reaction between the agent and their rubber NBC gloves. Both operators returned to the decontamination area to change their gloves before continuing with the operation.[97]

According to the BDO taking the samples, after the Fox testing was complete, he and the BDENGR sealed the holes using luting (quick drying putty) and plaster of paris strips.[98] After the plaster of paris hardened, they used a mixture of super topical bleach and water to decontaminate the tank and the immediate area.[99]

The Fox vehicles were decontaminated and checked using CAMs before moving out of the hot line. The BDO and BDENGR picked up the steel ammunition box containing the samples and their equipment, and returned to the Emergency Personnel Decontamination Station (EPDS). In accordance with standard procedure, the box containing the samples was decontaminated, sealed inside three large clear plastic bags, taped up, and clearly labeled on the outer plastic bag. The BDO and BDENGR moved through the shuffle pit and were undressed by the EPDS Team. They went through full decontamination in the EPDS, including showers and a change of clothing. According to the BDO’s statement, all clothes and non-durable equipment used during the operation were destroyed at the EPDS hot line.[100] None of the protective suits used in the operation were saved for analysis; they were all destroyed at the scene.

During the decontamination of the BDO and BDENGR, the Lance Corporal in charge of the EPDS felt a burning sensation on his right wrist. He was decontaminated and his NBC suit and clothing were removed. An on site medical team tended to a 3mm blister which had appeared on his wrist and treated him for heat stress. He was then taken to Beteal Camp where a doctor attended him.[101] This event suggests that a small amount of liquid had been transferred from either the BDO or BDENGR and that this had penetrated the inner glove, suit and outer glove of the Mk IV NBC suit he was wearing.

The BDO stated that, after he had processed through the decontamination line, a British Lance Corporal in charge of the EPDS was injured while conducting the decontamination.

"I was watching the EPDS party finishing the task from the CP (Command Post). At the point when only the [ Lance Corporal in charge] IC of the EPDS was left to decontaminate and undress himself he fainted (this I believe was due to the heat and the time spent in [individual protective equipment] IPE). Myself and another went to his assistance pouring vast quantities of water and decontaminant on his bare skin (arm) which was blistering. He was taken to a local … hospital [21st Squadron Medical Center]…."[102]

A report dated Jan. 4, 1994, submitted by Capt. Johnson stated that a British team member had come in contact with the liquid. The soldier had an immediate reaction, causing extreme pain and sending him into shock. According to Capt. Johnson:

"Within one minute, we observed that the soldier had a small blister forming on his wrist the size of a sticker head. Five minutes later, the blister reached the size of a (U.S.) half-dollar coin."[103]

None of the American forces present (who have been contacted regarding this matter) can recall being advised of the British soldier’s treatment or outcome. Furthermore, the injured British soldier stated that:

"No one came to debrief me about the operation and I was not told about the likely effects of my exposure to the agent in the tank. During my time there [the medical facility] no tests were taken to see if I had been exposed to mustard agent. I was told not to speak to anyone about the incident."[104]

The medical report on the British soldier’s injury reads as follows:

"The burn on his wrist was 0.5 x 1.0 cm in diameter (Figure 15), comprising an area of erythema with a centralized pin head erupted zone. This injury is compatible with a variety of chemical or thermal insults ranging from contact with household disinfectants to perhaps more potent corrosive agents. The lesion did not propagate further, and responded quickly to silver sulphadiazine 1% (flamazine). The patient was fully recovered…the following day and was fit to return to duty."[105]

According to the injured soldier, while he was only at the medical facility for one night, he did not return to duty until the following week. In his report, he indicated that, "The scab on my right wrist took some 2 to 3 weeks to heal, but a red mark remained for 3 to 4 months."[106]

Figure 15. Injury sustained by British soldier during Fox testing.

At the end of this operation the tank was assessed to contain a chemical agent which tests had indicated as being a mixture of mustard and phosgene agents. Both sets of Fox tapes indicated an alarm for phosgene, not phosgene oxime, and one also indicated mustard. The phosgene alarm was, however, inconsistent with the agent’s known characteristics. Phosgene is a choking agent that produces pulmonary edema (fluid in the lungs) in those exposed to it. It is transported as a liquid and has a boiling point of 7.5� C (45.5� F). This means it would be a gas, not a liquid in the desert heat. It has a characteristic odor of sweet, newly mown hay. During World War I, shells filled with vaporized phosgene produced a white cloud which spontaneously converted to a colorless, low-lying gas.[108] The relatively low boiling point of phosgene makes its presence in the tank, which had been fuming for over four months in a desert environment, at temperatures up to 50� C implausible. Furthermore, phosgene’s the characteristics did not match the odor and color of the substance in the tank. Likewise, the injury sustained by Major Watkinson was in no way similar to that of a pulmonary agent. Finally, Iraq was not known to have phosgene in its chemical weapons inventory.[109]

As neither mustard nor phosgene would have produced immediate symptoms as this had upon contact with the Lance Cpl. in charge of the EPDS, Capt. Johnson questioned the identification of the substance. Based on the immediacy of reaction and the burning sensation, Capt. Johnson concluded in his report of Jan. 4, 1994 that phosgene oxime was the likely content.[110] Phosgene oxime causes a corrosive type of skin and tissue lesion. It is not a true vesicant, since it does not cause blisters. The vapor is extremely irritating and upon contact, both the vapor and solid cause immediate burning and irritation, followed by wheal-like skin lesions and eye and airway damage. Phosgene oxime is a solid at temperatures below 95 degrees F, and vaporizes at temperatures greater than 95 degrees F (39� C).[111]

Capt. Johnson recently stated that representatives from his unit were unable thoroughly to review the Fox tapes to confirm the presence of chemical warfare agent or any other substance because Lt. Col. Killgore ordered that the Fox tapes be released to him.[112] According to Lt. Col. Killgore who had previous Fox training, the tapes indicated the presence of phosgene and mustard but not phosgene oxime.[113] Not having reviewed the tapes himself, Capt. Johnson was unaware that the Fox vehicles did not register an alarm for phosgene oxime.

The spectra on both sets of Fox tapes indicated a predominant unknown substance in the tank.[114] Because the spectra clearly showed this unknown substance as predominant, the alarms for phosgene and mustard were not a definitive indication that chemical warfare agent was present. The Fox vehicle’s mobile mass spectrometer works in such a way that it is pre-programmed to search and alarm for known chemical warfare agents including phosgene and mustard. Since IRFNA is not a chemical warfare agent and is not recorded in the mobile mass spectrometer’s library, the Fox could not positively identify it. The mobile mass spectrometer is programmed so that if a substance is detected that is not in its library it will assign it an unknown reading, which duly appeared on both sets of tapes.[115]

Figure 16. Ammunition box containing samples of material in tank

American and British soldiers’ noted that their gloves became warm and softened after contact with the material from the tank. This caused concern because there is no known chemical warfare agent capable of breaking down the glove’s material.[117] According to Major Watkinson:

"…[the British] Sergeant reported afterwards that he had to come out of the immediate area of contamination to change his gloves. This was as a result of gross contamination on his gloves, and he noted that the gloves started warming up. The implication was that the chemical was reacting with his NBC gloves. He did the obvious and sensible thing, which was to decontaminate them and to exchange them. This again was one of several indications that caused me a little concern, because this chemical that we were dealing with seemed to firstly penetrate NBC cloth, or the cloth of our NBC suit and secondly, in the case of gross contamination it seemed to react with our NBC gloves. If the chemical had been mustard gas, the NBC gloves should have provided sufficient protection and this was another factor that caused doubt about the chemical in the tank being Mustard."[118]

The American Sergeant in the hot line stated that the only conclusion he drew from the condition of his protective gloves was that, "there may have been some acid mixed in the tank."[119] In truth, if IRFNA was present in the tank, then mustard agent could not have been present, because IRFNA would have reacted with it. According to the U.S. Army’s Program Manager for NBC Defense Systems, "The presence of chemical [warfare] agents, especially HD [sulfur mustard] in [red fuming nitric acid] RFNA[120] is extremely unlikely. Prior to 1980, RFNA was [apparently] the decontamination material of choice, both in laboratory and HD production facilities."[121]

According to Capt. Johnson, all U.S. forces, with the exception of the 54th, departed the area after the Fox tapes were taken. On orders, the 54th Chemical Troop secured the area until military police arrived.[122] In the interim, the 54th conducted its after action review; recounting events and evaluating operational procedure and equipment functioning. British forces were still active in the area and soldiers from 21st EOD Squadron were detailed to provide a guard on the tank and ammunition box to ensure that the samples in the ammunition box were not tampered with or removed.[123]

During the 54th’s review several unidentified individuals reportedly approached the tank. Capt. Johnson stated that they were located 100-150 meters away and did not approach these individuals because they had already processed through the British command point.[124] They were reportedly Caucasian, wearing desert camouflage uniforms with no noticeable markings or patches. When the men approached the tank, Capt. Johnson assumed that they were there to collect the samples. From his vantage point, he was unable to view the men’s actions fully.[125] In fact, the samples were not taken away by anyone that day. None of the British forces present that day can recall this incident or any individuals as described by Capt. Johnson having passed through the British command point.

However, it is highly likely that these individuals were actually British soldiers from 21st EOD Squadron. Unlike U.S. Army units, the British Army does not tend to mark combat jackets with unit insignia. Unit markings, as a rule, are limited to beret badges. In the Gulf these were often substituted for camouflage cloth caps without markings. Officers wear subdued rank markings on their sleeves. At a distance of 100 to 150 meters it would be difficult to see these rank markings. Enlisted soldiers, with the possible exception of a name tag on the left breast, do not wear any markings. It is entirely possible, therefore, that what Captain Johnson saw was in fact British servicemen from 21st EOD Squadron carrying out their normal duties.

Several hours later, Task Force Victory military police arrived and the 54th returned to Camp Doha. They were debriefed by the Squadron Commander and the Regimental Commander.[126] The Regimental Commander indicated that he was briefed that the 54th Chemical Troop had detected chemical warfare agents in the tank.[127] These results were based on the Fox vehicle alarms. Since Lt. Col. Killgore had taken the Fox tapes, these alarms could not be confirmed.

In reviewing the Fox tapes, Lt. Col. Killgore noticed that there was considerable interference - meaning that the tapes did not give a clean analysis. Based on this interference, he decided that the tapes should be analyzed by a lab with more sophisticated capabilities.[128] Lt. Col. Killgore also stated that he intended to maintain custody of at least one set of samples from the tank. However, because the substance might have been phosgene, he decided that the samples may be too volatile to store at headquarters and that it would be imprudent to transport a sample in his vehicle.[129] Instead, the samples remained in the ammunition box next to the tank. (Figure 16)

Upon returning to headquarters, Lt. Col. Killgore contacted the Chemical Research, Development, and Engineering Center (CRDEC) at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. He faxed the Fox tapes, along with a brief paper describing the operation, to the CRDEC for analysis.[130] The CRDEC acknowledged receiving the tapes and conducting an analysis, but to date has not been able to locate copies of this fax or the subsequent analysis done at that time. Likewise, none of the U.S. or UK elements in the Kuwait theater of operations interviewed acknowledged receiving the CRDEC’s analysis of the tapes.

On the evening of August 9, Maj. Watkinson contacted the United Nations Special Commission cell in Bahrain and informed Col. Macel. Col. Macel informed Lt. Col. Killgore that the UN would be inspecting the tank.[131] According to the Sampling Team Leader’s statement, when Maj. Watkinson contacted the Chemical Weapons Evaluation Team, they were still part of a UN mission. However, when they arrived at the school, they were acting on behalf of the Chemical and Biological Defense Establishment, Porton Down, UK; their mission on behalf of the UN had ended. Aside from the members of the Sampling Team, none of the individuals contacted were aware of this, and thus believed the team was acting on behalf of the UN. The UN denies any involvement in the testing of the tank or taking any of the samples. According to the UN:

"Although it is possible that the people involved in taking samples were at one time temporary UNSCOM inspectors, UNSCOM was not involved in the taking of samples from the tank at the [Kuwaiti] Girls School in Kuwait. Chemicals in Kuwait are clearly not part of UNSCOM’s purview although UNSCOM does have interest in the contents of the tank as they probably originated from Iraq."[132]

On Aug. 10, 1991, four members of the Sampling Team met with British EOD personnel, Col. Macel and Lt. Col. Killgore at Beteal Camp, where 21st EOD Squadron was located. At the camp, Maj. Watkinson briefed them about the first and second operations; an officer with EOD experience from the Kuwaiti Army was present during this briefing.[133] They were then briefed by Lt. Col. Killgore and were given a copy of the Fox tapes.[134] The Sampling Team stated that they would take custody of the samples and provide an analysis of the contents of the tank.[135] The Sampling Team then interviewed Maj. Watkinson, the BDO and BDENGER of the second operation and the injured British soldier.[136]

The Sampling Team, accompanied by Co. Macel, Lt. Col. Killgore, Maj. Watkinson and members of 21st EOD Squadron then traveled to the Kuwaiti Girls’ School to conduct the sampling operation.[137] It was decided that the Sampling Team would take their samples from the bottles stored in the ammunition box rather than reopening the tank. This was accepted by the Sampling Team because the ammunition box had been under 24-hour guard since the second operation to ensure that its contents were not tampered with in any way.[138] The Sampling Team Leader labeled four tubes from a Sampling and Identification of Biological and Chemical Agents (SIBCA) kit in sequential order. (TAB I) The tubes contained XAD-4 resin[139] which had been sent to the Gulf as a means of transporting samples of chemical warfare agents safely.[140]

The Sampling Team Leader, plus a member of his team and Maj. Watkinson donned full IPE. They approached the ammunition box carrying further equipment from the SIBCA kit. Using a glass syringe with a four-inch stainless steel internal tube, the two members of the Sampling Team withdrew a sample from one of the bottles within the ammunition box.[141] Maj. Watkinson stood back and observed this activity. The Sampling Team then selected one of the pre-prepared tubes containing XAD-4 resin at random and proceeded to inject the sample into it through the rubber seal.[142] The first sample reacted violently when introduced into the tube, breaking both the tube and the syringe.

This reaction had potentially exposed the two Sampling Team members to a small amount of liquid agent contamination. They therefore conducted personal decontamination using hypochlorite solution and fuller’s earth.[143] They then retired to the decontamination line to assess the events. The Sampling Team decided to remove the rubber seals from the screw top of the pre-prepared tubes so as to attempt to place further liquid samples onto the absorbent contained within them. On returning to the ammunition box this method proved successful and two samples were taken in this way.

The first successful samples were captured in tubes #1 and #3. Therefore, either tube #2 or #4 was broken. The remaining unbroken tube was never utilized.[144]

While Maj. Watkinson was observing the Sampling Team’s activities, he noticed that vapor was again leaking from the tank. Once the Sampling Team had completed its activities, Maj. Watkinson and a Lance Corporal from 21st EOD Squadron acting as BDENGR attempted to reseal the tank. The two members of the Sampling Team remained in IPE and observed Maj. Watkinson’s activities. He removed each seal and, as no silicone sealant was available, he used chewing gum (this had similar properties to silicone sealant) and plaster of paris to fashion new seals.[145] Maj. Watkinson, the BDENGR and the two members of the Sampling Team then returned to the dirty line and were decontaminated.

The samples taken by the Sampling Team were then sealed in suitable containers to ensure they could not be tampered with. (Figure 17) The Sampling Team Leader, Maj. Watkinson, and Col. Macel then signed the seals. The remaining bottles of liquid agent stored in the ammunition box were sealed over to the U.S. Military Police who were now guarding the site.[146]

At the end of this operation, the Sampling Team Leader advised that a guard be maintained on the tank pending advice on destruction from the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment (CBDE) Porton Down, UK. He stated that the samples his team had taken would be treated as forensic evidence and that they would be accompanied by a signatory at all times.[147] They would not be opened until they arrived at CBDE Porton Down, where the seals would be broken in front of witnesses.

Figure 17. Samples taken for further analysis in the UK

In his statement, the Sampling Team Leader noted that:

"The original sample we were trying to take was onto an adsorbent, which is designed to take up chemical weapon agents. My theory, to which I still adhere, is that the nitric acid components reacted very quickly with the adsorbents and they gave off a gas, which just gave an enormous overpressure. So, the overpressure actually exploded the syringe. Chemical weapon agents in general are not actually very reactive chemicals. They have specific organic receptors on which they have their effect. So, they're not reactive. Our sampling kit was designed to deal with CW agents, which, as I say, are not reactive, whereas, this of course was obviously a very reactive chemical."[149]

Additional factors led the Sampling Team Leader to question the likelihood of this material being chemical warfare agent. According to him:

"In addition, my description of the liquid in the bottle was that it was of very low viscosity. Mustard is a very high viscosity liquid, similar to an engine oil. On top of that, of course I had the descriptions of the injuries that [the British soldier] and Maj. Watkinson had suffered, and these were again inconsistent with mustard derived burns, but were wholly consistent with a powerful acid, such as nitric."[150]

The sampling Team Leader did not discuss his views on the content of the tank with Maj. Watkinson or Col. Macel.

However, once the Sampling Team Leader had had a chance to discuss the third operation with colleagues in Bahrain, he thought that the agent in the tank may be "fuming nitric acid".[151] This would be consistent with the use of similar tanks found in Iraq and may account for the detection of mustard agent by some of the detection equipment used during the first two operations. These points are recorded in the Sampling Team Leader’s post-operational report, but this was not copied to Maj. Watkinson or Col. Macel at the time.

After the conclusion of the third operation, the samples taken by the Sampling Team were flown back to Bahrain in the custody of the Sampling Team. There they were eventually handed over to a member of the UK Consulate while efforts were made to secure their passage to CBDE Porton Down, UK.[152] As mentioned above, the samples were treated as forensic evidence. Each person to whom the samples were transferred had to sign a custody sheet and ensure that there was no opportunity for the samples to be tampered with in any way.[153]

Meanwhile, 21st EOD Squadron regularly inspected the seals on the tank to ensure there was no further leakage.[154] On Aug. 12, 1991 an inspection found that one of the seals had failed. The continued failure of the seals was probably due to the high temperature and the build up of vapor pressure inside the tank. According to Major Watkinson:

"Although we'd done lots of testing, we still hadn't fulfilled our original mission, which was to stop the vapor coming out of the tank. The various seals [used] should have been fairly robust. This again raised question marks. What appeared to be happening was that vapor pressure was building up inside the sealed container, which was pressurizing the seals and bursting them. I wouldn't have anticipated that this would occur with mustard gas, which is essentially not volatile and is quite oily. So, the chemical seemed to have quite a high vapor pressure, which was surprising."[155]

Maj. Watkinson therefore tasked the Commanding Officer of 3rd Troop 21 EOD Squadron, British Royal Engineers to seal the tank again so that it would be suitable for transportation should this be required.[156] Also, as two people had received minor injuries (Maj. Watkinson and another British soldier) during the first two operations, British Forces were concerned as to whether their IPE could provide adequate protection against the agent in the tank. Maj. Watkinson therefore tasked the CO of 3rd Troop to conduct tests on the British Mk IV NBC suit using the remaining liquid agent stored in the ammunition box. [157] Once these tests had been conducted he was instructed to dispose of any remaining liquid in the bottles for security reasons. The tank itself was deemed too large for anybody to remove.

This operation was slightly delayed in order to allow time for the fabrication of lead dowel plugs. These plugs were machine-tapered pieces of lead that were designed to fit the two bullet holes in the tank.[158]

The fourth operation was mounted on Aug. 14, 1991. The CO 3rd Troop decided to conduct the testing of the Mk IV suit material first. A test sample of Mk IV suit material and cotton was prepared, representing the inner and outer layers of the normal NBC IPE in service with the British Forces at that time. Three-color detector paper was included between the various layers.[159]

The CO 3rd Troop then approached the ammunition box wearing full IPE. A BDENGR, also in IPE, observed the CO’s actions. The CO 3rd Troop removed the two sample bottles from the ammunition box. He found that the liquid agent had corroded the bottle tops and that only a small amount of liquid agent now remained.[160] Nevertheless, there was still enough to conduct the test.

On contact with the suit, the liquid burned the outer fabric causing it to tear. Within three minutes, the liquid had seeped through the charcoal layer. The suit layers then fused together. On examination it was found that the charcoal layer had absorbed much of the liquid agent. However, the inner cotton layer was stained and slightly burnt. The three-color detector paper had turned red which suggested the presence of blister agent.[161]

Once the test was complete, the remaining liquid was poured into the sand and mixed with fuller’s earth and bleach.[162] This is the standard method of decontaminating blister agent contamination. The bottles were burned at the end of the operation.

During the tests, the CO 3rd Troop received a small amount of liquid contamination on his gloves. He noticed heat from areas that had been contaminated and therefore replaced his gloves as soon as possible.[163]

The CO 3rd Troop and the BDENGR then commenced the tank sealing operation. They removed the old seals and replaced them with lead dowel plugs. These were hammered in and fixed with self-tapping screws. The seals were then covered with epoxy resin. Once the resin hardened, the areas around the seals were checked with a CAM and three-color detector paper to ensure there were no leaks. There were none.[164]

The CO 3rd Troop and the BDENGR then returned to the EPDS and were decontaminated. Following usual procedure, only re-useable items were retained, the rest being destroyed by burning. However, exceptionally the sample of Mk IV suit used to test the liquid agent was decontaminated and retained by 21st EOD Squadron.[165] To date, the UK MOD has been unable to locate the sample of Mk IV suit retained at that time by 21st EOD.

The liquid agent was found to have corroded the tops of both bottles stored in the ammunition box and, more importantly, rapidly penetrated the sample of Mk IV NBC suit used by the CO 3rd Troop in the test. As in previous operations, contamination on the gloves of those handling the liquid agent had caused heat to be produced and the gloves needed replacing. The fact that the three-color detector paper turned red again suggested the presence of blister agent. The method used by the CO 3rd Troop to dispose of the remaining liquid from bottles suggests that he thought this was the case.

It is important to note that the end of operation report prepared by the CO 3rd Troop was only copied to the British personnel involved in the tank.

After the fourth operation, 21st EOD Squadron continued to monitor the tank regularly for leaks.

On Aug. 18, 1991, The Sunday Observer, a British newspaper, reported:

"A massive drum containing mustard gas agent has been discovered in Kuwait City, providing the first proof that Iraq had chemical weapons ready for use in the Gulf War."[166]

It went on to say:

"The chemicals would be destroyed by a team from Royal Ordnance."

In fact, no decision had yet been made about the destruction of the tank because results from CBDE Porton Down’s analysis were still awaited. It was not possible, therefore, to formulate a suitable method of disposal for the tank and its contents.

As reported earlier, the Sampling Team took the samples they had collected from Kuwait to Bahrain. From here it was envisaged that they could be flown direct to the UK. However, the Royal Air Force was no longer operating flights from Bahrain and was, therefore, unable to transport the samples. This caused some considerable delay while alternative travel arrangements were made for the samples. Eventually, the German Luftwaffe flew the samples as far as Munster, Germany.[167] The samples arrived at Munster on Sept. 12, 1991 where two members of CBDE were waiting to collect them. The CBDE staff signed for the samples and returned to CBDE Porton Down which is located in Wiltshire in the UK. The samples arrived at Porton Down on Sept. 13, 1991 where they were signed over to the analytical team.[168]

At CBDE Porton Down the analytical team noted that the two samples had been collected on XAD-4 resin and were labeled sample 1 and sample 3, both dated Aug. 10, 1991.[169]

The Porton Down initial report dated Sept. 24, 1991, stated that: "the samples had a definite yellow/brownish color compared to the original white of the resin. Extraction of the resin with dichloromethane and analysis by gas chromatography/mass spectrometry showed no material of CW [chemical warfare] interest. Extraction of the resin from sample 1 showed 16 mg of nitrate and a pH of 2.2. Resin from sample 3 showed 35 mg of nitrate and a pH of 2.0. An extract of blank resin of similar weight contained less than 0.2 mg of nitrate and had a pH of 6.5. The samples were entirely consistent with the contents of the tank being nitric acid and there is no evidence of any CW dimension."[170] (TAB J)

Although the Porton Down initial report indicated that a detailed report would follow, no such detailed report was ever produced. This is probably because once it had been established that the tank’s contents contained no material of chemical warfare interest the matter assumed a low priority, and the aim of producing a detailed reported was overtaken by other, more pressing, commitments.

Maj. Watkinson indicated that he was notified of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment’s findings in late September 1991.[171] He, in turn, notified Col. Macel of these results (that the tank did not contain chemical warfare agent, but rather nitric acid).[172] Col. Macel informed the U.S. military’s Central Command, the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office, the Director of Operations for the Kuwaiti military’s general headquarters, and Task Force Victory.[173] However, by the time the results of the sampling had reached the Gulf, Lt. Col. Killgore, along with the 54th Chemical Troop had already left the region. None of the Americans or Britons contacted recalled seeing a formal report of the CBDE Porton Down sampling results from either the UK or the U.S.

On Sept. 27, 1991, CBDE Porton Down were informed by Headquarters British Forces Kuwait that they were still concerned about the disposal of the tank. 21st EOD Squadron was due to return to the UK on Oct. 2, 1991 and all of its equipment had been packed ready for shipping. It could not therefore carry out procedures to dispose of the tank and its contents. HQBF Kuwait stated that they needed to pass on the correct disposal procedure to the Kuwaiti Army before 21st EOD Squadron left Kuwait.[174]

CBDE Porton Down responded on Sept. 30 1991. They advised that the tank may contain up to two tons of nitric acid and that this would be extremely difficult to dispose of safely.[175] Untrained personnel should not attempt it, nor should disposal be attempted in place. As the tank was in good condition and the bullet holes effectively sealed, it was suggested that the tank could be sold to the local chemical industry or, if this failed, that the chemical industry might be paid to remove the tank. Another option was to invite Iraq to dispose of the tank. Contemporary evidence suggests that the Kuwaiti MOD decided to let companies tender for the disposal of the contract.[176]

On Oct. 29, 1991, Passive Barriers, which had originally discovered the tank, notified Brown & Root that the container held fuming nitric acid.[177] According to the Brown & Root supervisor, Passive Barriers had access to a laboratory in the UK that had received samples of the tank’s contents.[178] A statement made by an employee of Passive Barriers suggests that another sample of the tank’s contents had been sent to CBDE Porton Down for analysis.[179] The UK MOD researched this claim and could find no evidence that any samples, other than those taken by the Sampling Team on Aug. 10, 1991, were taken from the tank and returned to the UK for analysis. It was more likely that advice was sought from HQBF Kuwait who were already aware of the CBDE Porton Down analysis and that the results of this analysis was passed to Passive Barriers.

On Oct. 30, 1991, the Brown & Root supervisor informed KERO of the contents of the tank. KERO then requested that Brown & Root provide disposal options and cost estimates. However, neither Brown & Root nor Passive Barriers handled the tank’s disposal. A Passive Barriers employee has stated that the Kuwaiti Fire Service removed the tank while his company was still tendering for disposal for the contract. According to him, the tank was taken into the desert and burned.[180]

Efforts to confirm Kuwaiti Fire Service involvement in the tank’s disposal continue.

In January 1994, then-Captain Johnson, who had been the Commander of the 54th Chemical Troop, was troubled by the absence of a formal report on the events at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School. This was because "the history of my unit’s chemical detection actions with 21st British EOD Royal Engineers, was not properly documented. I had not seen any official or unofficial record of those actions."[181] He drafted a report detailing events at the school for use in course instruction focusing on lessons learned in NBC defensive operations during the Gulf War. The report was reviewed by the chain-of-command, U.S. Army Infantry Training School, which authorized its use in instruction.[182] This report was eventually obtained by staff members of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, who were investigating allegations of chemical agent use in the Gulf War. Senate hearings held in the summer of 1994, thrust the events at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School into the public eye.

Senate investigators focused on three key points:

1. the validity of the tests run,
2. the nature of the material in question, and
3. the injury sustained by the British soldier during testing.

The Committee staff pointed out that multiple tests were conducted, using various different types of detection equipment, all of which provided positive alarms for chemical warfare agent.[183]

Committee staff members maintained that the substance in the container was oily in nature and brown in color, both of which are indicators for mustard agent.[184] Regarding the British soldier’s injury, the staff members concluded that the immediate reaction and burn associated with contact to the material was consistent with phosgene oxime.[185] Based on the evidence presented, the Senate Committee concluded that it was likely that the tank had contained a mix of chemical warfare agents.[186]

The Senate Committee concluded that 21 tests were conducted on the contents of the tank.[187] However, it appears that the Committee counted the Fox alarms and their corresponding spectrum printouts as separate tests, when in fact, they are not. Additionally, the Committee noted MM-1 alarms for phosgene oxime when, in fact, the MM-1s alarmed for phosgene not phosgene oxime.[188] A table illustrating the tests conducted at the Girls’ School in August 1991, the different detectors used for each, their respective outcomes, and reasons to question these outcomes is at Figure 18.

Figure 18. Tests conducted at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School in August 1991.

In committee testimony, DOD stated that when American scientists at CRDEC learned of the British determination that the content was nitric acid, they compared the Fox tapes to the mass spectrum of nitric acid. The spectrum reportedly matched nitric acid in all four categories and in the correct proportions.[194] The scientists also confirmed that neither mustard agent nor phosgene oxime were present in the tank.[195] These statements made by DOD were incorrect and somewhat misleading. In truth, only a single peak, not three or four, would register for nitric acid on the Fox vehicle’s MM-1. Additionally, the Fox tapes, which DOD was unable to produce for review by the Committee, clearly show no alarm was received for phosgene oxime. Alarms were received only for mustard agent and phosgene. (TAB G)

DOD asked CBDE Porton Down, UK for an account of, and results from, the testing procedure which it had carried out on the samples taken from the tank. Based on Porton Down’s response, the DOD incorrectly inferred that portions of the NBC suit worn by the injured British soldier had been returned to CBDE Porton Down for testing.[196] The Committee heard testimony to the contrary. In fact, DOD officials had misinterpreted the information supplied by CBDE Porton Down. The suit, like all other used protective clothing, was burned in accordance with standard operating procedure. The information in CBDE Porton Down’s letter referred rather to the testing of the NBC suit materials during the fourth operation. However, DOD were unaware that this operation had ever been conducted and therefore assumed that CBDE Porton Down must be referring to the injured soldier’s NBC suit material.

Despite the information DOD presented indicating that the tank’s content was not chemical warfare agent, but rather IRFNA, it lacked contemporary evidence to prove or disprove the prior testing.[197] There was no apparent explanation for why IRFNA would be present at the school, the tank’s disposition remained unknown, and neither the original Fox tapes faxed to CRDEC in 1991 nor CBDE Porton Down’s analysis of the samples taken from the tank, could be accounted for. Further, the Senate Committee could not understand how the DOD could issue awards to the 54th Chemical Troop for discovery of chemical warfare agent in Kuwait if, as it was now claiming, agent was never present. This apparent contradiction was cited by reporters and authors suspicious of DOD’s conclusions.[198] Lastly, all evidence presented by either the UK or U.S. against chemical warfare agent being in the tank was dated 1994 rather than 1991[199] - raising concerns that the analysis was biased.

At the time, neither the Committee nor the DOD was aware that the UK’s practice on the release of official information is governed by the non-statutory Code of Practice.[200] The British government is obliged to provide information on its policies, actions and decisions, but there is no commitment to the disclosure of pre-existing documents. Consequently, requests for information are often met by drawing the necessary information from existing documents rather than providing the documents themselves. When the letters provided to the DOD by the UK in 1994 are compared to the source documents dated 1991, the texts are virtually identical.

In addition to Senate Committee review, the case was investigated by the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses. The PACGWVI was established by President Clinton to ensure an independent, open, and comprehensive examination of health concerns related to Gulf War service. In May 1997, this 12-member panel, consisting of specialists in a variety of disciplines, concluded that the tank at the Girls School contained chemical warfare agent. This determination was based on multiple positive detections as well as the lack of any contrary analysis contemporary with events in 1991.[201] In July 1997, UNSCOM officials testified to the PACGWVI that their inspections of Iraq’s chemical weapons program had yielded no evidence that Iraq moved chemical weapons into Kuwait.[202] In September 1997, DOD testified on the events as described in this narrative providing insight into the school’s use by the Iraqis, and the discovery of the previously lost Fox tapes.[203] The PACGWVI did not amend its May 1997 conclusion.

In October 1994, the investigations and concerns of the U.S. Senate Committee were taken up in the United Kingdom. On Oct. 13 and 14, 1994, press articles appeared in the Evening Standard and The Times newspapers which reported details of the Kuwaiti Girls’ School incident.[204] These articles quoted from Maj. Watkinson’s initial report on the first operation at the tank. This had suggested that the liquid in the tank might have been mustard agent. This report had been published during the U.S. Senate investigation without the knowledge of the UK MOD. The articles also quoted from the testimony of then-Capt. Johnson. As a result of these press articles, British Members of Parliament raised questions regarding the presence of chemical agent at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School.

The British Government responded that the contents of the tank had been analyzed at CBDE Porton Down and the results were consistent with the presence of nitric acid; there was no evidence of chemical warfare agent(s). On Nov. 12, 1995, The Mail on Sunday published an interview with an ex-member of the British Army who had formerly served as a sergeant in 21st EOD Squadron.[205] This sergeant was the Bomb Disposal Engineer involved in removing samples from the tank during the second operation. He specifically referred to the results of the testing that had indicated the presence of mustard agent. He also questioned CBDE Porton Down’s letter to Parliament of Jan. 25, 1995, which he thought had suggested that CBDE Porton Down had tested the injured British soldier’s NBC suit.[206] In fact, as indicated above, CBDE Porton Down’s letter had simply referred to "damage to the NBC suit material" and stated that "samples collected in Kuwait City were provided to CBDE Porton Down for analysis."[207] The samples referred to were the liquid samples taken by the Sampling Team during the third operation. The damage to the NBC suit material was based on anecdotal reporting, as well as the testing undertaken by the CO 3rd Troop, 21st EOD Squadron during the fourth operation at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School.

Despite reassurances by both UK and U.S. governments, questions have continued to be raised about this incident. This, coupled with the overlap in jurisdiction at the national and organizational level during the four separate operations at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School prompted the DOD and UK MOD to conduct a joint review of the events surrounding the discovery, testing and disposal of the tank. Investigators from the U.S.’s Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses working in conjunction with the UK’s Gulf Veterans’ Illnesses Unit and analysts from the U.S. Intelligence Community set about trying to address issues of concern. Obtaining contemporary information about the testing and analysis of the liquid in the tank was a priority. In addition, it was important to determine whether the equipment which had been used at the time would register a false positive in the presence of a strong oxidizer such as IRFNA.

The UK/U.S. investigation involved interviewing at least twenty-seven people who had been directly involved with the discovery, investigation and disposal of the tank in 1991, at least thirteen UK and fifteen U.S. Government agencies, the United Nations, the Government of Kuwait and three non-governmental organizations.

In early 1997, unable to account for the original Fox tapes, the DOD initiated tests utilizing the MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer to determine whether if IRFNA could cause the Fox vehicle to false alarm.[208] The DOD was not at that time aware that a copy of the Fox tapes was still held on file at Porton Down and the MOD was not aware of DOD’s difficulty in producing a copy. Since IRFNA was not readily available, the tests were conducted using red fuming nitric acid (RFNA).[209] The difference between inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA) and red fuming nitric acid (RFNA) is that IRFNA contains an inhibitor such as hydrogen fluoride or hydrogen iodine to impede corrosion of the container.

During the 1997 testing, the MM-1, which is used on the Fox vehicle, initially alarmed for cyclosarin. The PACGWVI could not understand why the MM-1 alarmed for cyclosarin when exposed to RFNA during the 1997 testing, yet it alarmed for mustard agent and phosgene at the Girls’ School in 1991, which the DOD claimed was IRFNA.[210] Again, it is important to note that these tests were conducted using research grade RFNA rather than operational Iraqi IRFNA. According to the Project Manager, NBC Defense Systems at the U.S. Army Chemical Biological Defense Command [211] , this difference may account for a variant in the alarm between the MM-1 laboratory trials versus the testing at the Kuwaiti Girls School; however, the spectrum remained the same.[212] Analysts at the CIA and DOD are also concerned about possible contamination of the samples used during the Fox testing at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School. Contamination could be caused by the corrosive effects of IRFNA on the sampling tube or the plunger used to take the sample. This difference in chemical composition, resulting from IRFNA reacting with the sampling tube or plunger, from that of the controlled CBDCOM sample, could have caused the Fox vehicles at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School to register a different alarm than the Fox vehicle used in CBDCOM testing. Regardless, when comparing the 1991 Girls’ School testing to that in 1997, one must note that both the 1991 and the 1997 spectrum analysis of the respective samples confirmed the presence of an unknown substance.[213] The 1997 testing also yielded valuable information in the form of a detection algorithm for RFNA. This unknown substance, as it was recorded, had an atomic mass unit 46 at 100% relative intensity, which is reflective of the pure RFNA.

In July 1997, during routine contact between DOD and MOD, DOD reported their difficulty in tracing copies of the Fox tapes from the second operation in 1991. The MOD therefore retrieved copies from CBDE Porton Down, where they were held, and forwarded them to DOD. The tapes were resubmitted to CBDCOM, and the Project Manager for NBC Defense Systems there responded as follows:

"None of the initial warnings for either phosgene or mustard agent were verified by the MM-1 mass spectrometers located in either of the two Fox NBC reconnaissance vehicles that were at the site. Personnel followed the proper and complete suspected agent verification scenario which included a second sample analysis and comparison to an internal library. In every retest, the MM-1 reported the spectrum analysis as ‘unknown.’ In the cases where the crew renamed this ‘unknown’ as an ‘extra substance’ in the library, the MM-1 identified the spectra as that ‘extra substance’. Ion mass 46 at 100% intensity was reported on every MM-1 tape, except one, and is identical to trials conducted at CBDCOM [Chemical/Biological Defense Command] using research grade red fuming nitric acid (RFNA) … The tapes from one of the Fox NBC reconnaissance vehicles indicate a mass 69 ion with 100% intensity. While this is a deviation from all other analyses which had mass 46 at 100%, it is easily explained. Coupled with the presence of other specific ions in significant amounts, this duplicates other known incidents of the fluorocarbon calibration gas escaping into the analysis system. Each of the three tapes from the MM-1 on this vehicle contains the presence of these peaks, indicating sample contamination with calibration gas. Subtraction of the calibration gas results in spectra which are similar to those of the other vehicle where ion mass 46 is the major component in the sample."[214]

Additional analysis of the 1991 Fox tapes conducted by Bruker Daltonics, the manufacturer of the MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer, and by the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, confirmed this assessment. According to a representative from the National Institute of Standards and Technology:

"After examining the tapes from two Fox vehicles ... it is clear that there is no mass spectral evidence confirming the presence of either of the two CW [chemical warfare] agents reported (phosgene and HD [sulfur mustard]). ... the general finding that the largest peak is m/z 46, the principal peak in nitrogen dioxide, is consistent with the introduction of [inhibited] red fuming nitric acid into the mass spectrometers of both vehicles."[215]

A representative from Bruker Daltonics offered the following assessment:

"The tape [from vehicle C-23] shows that the system passed its automatic test on start-up indicating there were no major system failures. Approximately thirty minutes later, the system indicates an initial alarm that phosgene may be present.... Immediately, as called for to confirm the alarm in SOP [standard operating procedure], a spectrum is taken ... and the search of the 60 compound library indicates that the compound is unknown (not in the library of [chemical warfare] agents). Furthermore, it assigns the unknown compound a concentration ... approximately 200 times as intense as the ions used to initially alarm for Phosgene.... The most intense ion in the spectrum is mass 46 (100%).... For vehicle C-26, it appears from the spectrum at 12:51, that this system may have both hydrocarbon background and calibration compound. In this spectrum [mass] 69 is actually larger than the mass 46 (100% versus 62.3%).... At 13:01, mass 46 is now 100% ... the complete spectra in these tapes do not confirm the presence of CWA in the tank in question, but rather [are] consistent with the independent analysis that the brown oily liquid was in fact [inhibited red] fuming nitric acid."[216]

The assessment for this incident is that chemical warfare agent was "definitely not" present at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School. This assessment is based on the following facts that have already been addressed:

• Analysis of the Fox tapes indicates chemical warfare agent was not present;
• Contemporary CBDE Porton Down analysis of the samples on resin shows no chemical weapons material present;
• Safety Officer for the US Army Corps of Engineers, Kuwaiti Emergency Recovery Office exhibited no symptoms corresponding to chemical agent exposure after unprotected contact with the tank;
• Injuries sustained by Major Watkinson and the British soldier were not consistent with the chemical agents alarmed for (though the soldier’s injury was potentially similar to effects of phosgene oxime exposure, no alarm was ever received for phosgene oxime being present);
• No known chemical warfare agent is capable of destroying NBC protective gear;
• No known chemical warfare agent gives off brown or red-brown vapor;
• Mustard agent is physically too persistent to have evaporated from the sample dish used during the Fox testing;
• Phosgene rapidly evaporates, and given the high temperatures in the desert, it would have diffused out of the tank before the initial investigation of the tank by 21st EOD Squadron;
• Iraq is not known to have had phosgene in its inventory.

The possibility that the tank actually contained IRFNA is assessed as "definitely." This is based on the following facts:

• The Fox tapes clearly show the presence of mass 46 ion at 100%, which is indicative of IRFNA;
• Contemporary CBDE Porton Down analysis of the samples on the resin shows high nitrate readings, consistent with the contents being nitric acid;
• The chemical agent monitor was known to register a false positive (8 bars on mustard) for IRFNA;
• IRFNA would be expected at the school, because it was used as a SILKWORM missile maintenance and test facility by the Iraqis;
• The tank itself was identified by the Sampling Team Leader as a type used by the Iraqis to store IRFNA
• The Safety Officer for the US Army Corps of Engineers, Kuwaiti Emergency Recovery Office indicated that the vapor smelled like nitric acid;
• IRFNA fumes are a red-brown vapor;
• IRFNA can cause immediate blistering of skin upon contact as happened on the British soldier;
• IRFNA can penetrate and destroy material used in NBC protective gear as happened in this case.

All personnel involved in the testing of the tank at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School performed their duties in an exemplary manner. Proper planning and coordination were made between UK and U.S. forces; all field equipment was used properly; all technical resources were employed; and following proper NATO procedures, samples were taken and transported for laboratory analysis.

The equipment utilized by UK and U.S. Armed Forces operated in accordance with its design. The Fox did not have a spectrum for IRFNA in its library, and thus could not positively identify it as such. The other detectors were overwhelmed by such a strong interferent as IRFNA, for which none of the detectors were designed. It is the policy of both the UK and U.S. militaries to set chemical weapons detector parameters loosely so as to err on the side of caution - i.e. to accept a false positive response, rather than run the risk that a genuine positive might be overlooked. From the safety perspective, it is more preferable to have a small number of false positives, which cause soldiers to take an additional measurement or don protective gear, rather than to take the chance that a false negative would result in injury to troops. This incident was clearly a case in point. While IRFNA is not a chemical warfare agent, it poses a serious health hazard to anyone in contact with it. A description of IRFNA and its related health hazards is at TAB D.

Several key factors prevented a rapid inquiry and assessment of these events. The sensitive nature of the testing limited distribution of pertinent information. This meant that some individuals ended their involvement with limited information and unanswered questions about the nature of the tank’s contents. A summary of individuals’ knowledge regarding the Kuwaiti Girls’ School is at TAB F. The numerous and varied groups having contact with the tank further hindered investigations, as it was thought for a while that the various operations may have been unrelated incidents. Finally, inconsistencies in reporting made an early assessment impossible. Individuals often had to be interviewed several times, and documents were repeatedly analyzed. This process led to several issues of concern being identified and addressed. This, in turn, led to a more complete picture of events at the school from March 1991 until November 1991. A breakout of events and those involved is at TAB G. The key lessons learned by the U.S. DOD from this investigation are at TAB K.

ACR Armored Cavalry Regiment

BDENGR Bomb Disposal Engineer

BDO Bomb Disposal Officer

CAM Chemical Agent Monitor

CBDCOM Chemical/Biological Defense Command

CBDE Chemical and Biological Defense Establishment

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CO Commanding Officer

CP Command Post

CRDEC Chemical, Research, Development and Engineering Center

CW Chemical Warfare

CWA Chemical Warfare Agent

DOD Department of Defense

DRAO Defense Reconstruction Disposal

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EPDS Emergency Personnel Decontamination Station

ERDEC Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center

GVIU Gulf Veterans Illnesses Unit

H Mustard

HD Sulfur Mustard

IAD Investigation and Analysis Directorate

ICP Incident Command Post

IPE Individual Protection Equipment

IRFNA Inhibited Red Fuming

KERO Kuwaiti Emergency Recovery Office

MOD Ministry of Defence

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC Nuclear, Biological, & Chemical

OSAGWI Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses

PACGWVI Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses 

PGWITF Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force

RFNA Red Fuming Nitric Acid

SIBCA Sampling and Identification of Biological & Chemical Agents

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

UN United Nations

UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission on Iraq

USALOK US Army Liaison Officer Kuwait

121910Z Sep 91, "Captive Foreign Hardware from Desert Storm"

291338Z Oct 91, "Distribution of Explosive Components from Desert Storm Captive Hardware"

"Allies Found Iraq Stored Blister Agent in Kuwait", The Times, Oct. 14, 1994.

Analysis of Samples from Kuwait: Preliminary Report, Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, Porton Down, UK, Sept. 24, 1991

Clarification of the Sampling Team Leader’s Interview, Dec. 17, 1997

"Chemical Weapons Used in Gulf War", Evening Standard, Oct. 13, 1994.

"CW Agents at the Kuwaiti Girls School: Why and Why Not," Information Summary, Persian Gulf War Illness Task Force, Aug. 24, 1997

Deposition of Injured British Soldier, Dec. 5, 1997

Dr. Janet McDonnel, (Draft) After Desert Storm, The US Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait, Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, October 1997

"Drumbeat of Denial," Soldier of Fortune, May 1997

Eddington, Patrick G., Gassed in the Gulf, Insignia Publishing Company, Washington, DC, March 1997

Email message from VII Corps RBBS to all MSC’s, CAM burnout, 191741 Feb 91

"Extraction of Testimony to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses in Buffalo", July 29, 1997

Field Manual 3-9, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, Blister Agents (Urticants): Phosgene Oxime (CX)

Field Manual 3-9, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, Blister Agents (Vesicants): Phosgene Oxime (CX)

Field Manual 3-9, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, Choking Agents: Phosgene (CG)

Fox Information Paper, Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, July 29, 1997

Fox Tapes from testing at the Girls’ School

"Gulf war sequel: Claims, counterclaims," USA Today, March 12, 1995

GVIU investigators’ telephone conversations with the Sampling Team Leader and Major Watkinson, March 5, 1998.

Hazards of Chemical Rockets and Propellants, Vol. III Liquid Propellants, Chemical Propulsion Information Agency, September 1984

Initial Report: Sampling and Assessment of Suspected Chemical Container, Aug. 11, 1991.

IIR 5380 005 91, 290938Z Mar 91, "Silkworm Test Facility"

Lead Sheet 5981, Interview with program manager for US firm conducting Kuwaiti school reconstruction

Lead Sheet 5982, Interview with US soldier inside the hot line on the day of the Fox testing

Lead Sheet 5984, Interview with Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office military policeman

Lead Sheet 5987, Interview with US State Department Kuwaiti Desk Officer

Lead Sheet 5988, Interview with US Army Corps of Engineers historian

Lead Sheet 6025, Interview with commander of the 146th EOD detachment

Lead Sheet 6430, Interview with senior EOD officer in theater

Lead Sheet 6510, Interview with U.S. officer in charge of decontamination operations on the day of the Fox testing

Lead Sheet 6753, Interview with Maj. Johnson

Lead Sheet 6870, Interview with regimental commander, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Lead Sheet 7005, Interview with Major General Kelly, USA (Ret.)

Lead Sheet 7131, Interview with the operations officer for the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office

Lead Sheet 7213, Interview with US Army Corps of Engineers safety officer

Letter from American prime contractor to Contracting Officer, Kuwaiti Emergency Reconstruction Office dated Oct. 30, 1991

Letter from British EOD subcontractor to American prime contractor dated Aug. 24, 1991

Letter from Bruker Daltonics, December 15, 1997

Letter from Deputy for Chemical/Biological Matters, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

Letter from the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Dec. 19, 1997

Letter from Project Manager, NBC Defense Systems to Director of Investigation and Analysis, Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Sept. 11, 1997

Major Watkinson’s Initial Report, Aug. 7, 1991

Major Watkinson’s Subsequent Report, Aug. 18, 1991

Memorandum for Commander, 11th ACR, ATTN: RS3, Tasking Number 91-047, Aug. 7, 1991

Memorandum through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical/Biological Matters, Testing Response of Chemical Detection Equipment to Red Fuming Nitric Acid, April 11, 1997

Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents - Information Paper, Jan. 4, 1994

Memorandum on collection of samples taken from Kuwaiti Girls School, Dec. 8, 1997

Memorandum for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical Biological Matters [OASD (CBM)], Suspect Chemical Container found in Kuwait City, Kuwait in August 1991, July 29, 1994

Memorandum for record regarding silkworm warheads, OSAGWI, Oct. 21, 1997

"Mustard Gas Reveals Iraqi Chemical War Plan", The Sunday Observer, Aug. 18, 1991.

"The ongoing saga of the ‘Styx’", Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1, 1997

Operation Pinseeker 1991, Chemical Container Sealing Operation at Sabahiyah Girls School

Photograph of the ammunition box used to store samples taken from the tank. Photo taken by sampling team leader on Aug. 10, 1991

Photograph of British NBC protective gear, UK Ministry of Defence

Photograph of British one color detector paper, UK Ministry of Defence

Photograph of Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM), UK Ministry of Defence

Photograph of Fox testing taken by the US officer in charge of decontamination operations

Photograph of the front of the school taken during the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses trip to Kuwait in October 1997

Photograph of injured British soldier taken by the sampling team leader, Aug. 10, 1991

Photograph of M18A2 chemical agent detector kit, UK Ministry of Defence

Photograph of the samples taken for further analysis in the UK. Photo taken by sampling ream leader on Aug. 10, 1991

Photographs of the storage tank at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School taken by the safety officer, August 1991

Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, Public Meeting transcript, Charleston, South Carolina, May 7, 1997.

Report on the Resealing of the Salabiyah Chemical Container, Aug. 25, 1991.

RII-1488, Mating Chemical Warheads to Frogs/Silkworms (CENTAF RFI #803)

Sheet K7611, 5684-III, Al Ahmadi, Edition 5-GSGS, Directorate of Military Survey, Ministry of Defence, UK

Signal traffic from HQBF Kuwait to CBDE Porton Down, PR271100Z September 1991.

Signal traffic from CBDE Porton Down to HQBF Kuwait, 301530Z September 1991.

Statement of Passive Barriers employee, Feb. 10, 1998.

Statement of Troop Commander of 1st Troop, 21 EOD Squadron, Nov. 10, 1997

Transcript of interview with Colonel Macel, Oct. 16, 1997

Transcript of interview with LTC Killgore, Oct. 15, 1997

Transcript of interview with Major Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997

Transcript of interview with Sampling Team Leader, Oct. 9, 1997

U2 reconnaissance photo of the Kuwaiti Girls’ School, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, March 1, 1991

U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, Oct. 7, 1994

"Why is the Government lying?" The Mail On Sunday - Night and Day, Nov. 12, 1995.

Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, October 1995

Written Answers, Jan. 25, 1995.

Written Testimony by the former Commander of the 54th Chemical Troop, US Army, before the Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, United States House of Representatives, Dec. 10, 1996

The DOD requires a common framework for our investigations and assessments of chemical warfare agent incident reports, so we turned to the United Nations and the international community which had experience concerning chemical weapons, e.g. the United Nations’ investigation of the use of chemical weapons during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. Because the modern battlefield is complex, the international community developed investigation and validation protocols to provide objective procedures for possible chemical weapons incidents. The standard that we are using is based on these international protocols and guidelines that includes:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site
• Physical evidence from the site such as weapons fragments, soil, water, vegetation, or human or animal tissue samples
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence.
• Testimony of eyewitnesses
• Multiple analyses
• Review of the evidence by an expert panel.

While the DOD methodology for investigating chemical incidents (Figure 1) is based on these protocols, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence often was not collected at the time of an event. Therefore, we cannot apply a rigid template to all incidents, and each investigation must be tailored to its unique circumstances. Accordingly, we designed our methodology to provide a thorough, investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and determine what happened. The major efforts in our methodology are:

• Substantiate the incident
• Document the medical reports related to the incident
• Interview appropriate people
• Obtain information available to external organizations
• Assess the results.

A case usually starts with a report of a possible chemical incident, usually from a veteran. To substantiate the circumstances surrounding an incident, the investigator searches for documentation from operational, intelligence, and environmental logs. This focuses the investigation on a specific time, date, and location, clarifies the conditions under which the incident occurred, and determines whether there is "hard," as well as anecdotal evidence.

Figure 19. Chemical Incident Investigation Methodology

Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical agent presence, nor is a single individual’s observation sufficient to validate a chemical agent presence. Additionally, the investigator looks for physical evidence that might indicate that chemical agents were present in the vicinity of the incident, including samples (or the results of analyses of samples) collected at the time of the incident.

The investigator searches the medical records to determine if personnel were injured as a result of the incident. Deaths, injuries, sicknesses, etc. near the time and location of an incident may be telling. Medical experts should provide information about alleged chemical casualties.

Interviews of incident victims (or direct observers) are conducted. First-hand witnesses provide valuable insight into the conditions surrounding the incident and the mind-set of the personnel involved, and are particularly important if physical evidence is lacking. NBC officers or personnel trained in chemical testing, confirmation, and reporting are interviewed to identify the unit’s response, the tests that were run, the injuries sustained, and the reports submitted. Commanders are contacted to ascertain what they knew, what decisions they made concerning the events surrounding the incident, and their assessment of the incident. Where appropriate, subject matter experts also provide opinions on the capabilities, limitations, and operation of technical equipment, and submit their evaluations of selected topics of interest.

Additionally, the investigator contacts agencies and organizations that may be able to provide additional clarifying information about the case. These would include, but not be limited to:

• Intelligence agencies that might be able to provide insight into events leading to the event, imagery of the area of the incident, and assessments of factors affecting the case
• The DOD and Veterans’ clinical registries, which may provide data about the medical condition of personnel involved in the incident.

Introduction

Inhibited red fuming nitric acid, known as type IIIB fuming nitric acid in the U.S., is used as a liquid propellant rocket engine oxidizer. It is light-orange to orange-red in color, clear, strongly fuming, and evolves toxic nitric acid vapor and yellow-red vapors of nitrogen oxides. Fuming nitric acids are unstable releasing nitrogen dioxide, nitric oxide, and nitric acid mist into the atmosphere. Fuming nitric acids are highly corrosive oxidizing agents and will vigorously attack most metals. They also react with many organic materials resulting in spontaneous combustion. IRFNA has the following chemical composition (by weight) and physical properties:

Health Hazards and Symptoms of Exposure

Toxicity: IRFNA, in contact with any surface of the body (skin, mucous membrane, eyes), destroys tissue by direct contact. It stains the skin or surface into a yellow or yellowish-brown and sustained contact results in a chemical burn. The vapors are highly irritating and toxic to the respiratory tract. Immediately after exposure to dangerous concentrations, there may be coughing, increased respiratory rate, asthmatic-type breathing, nausea, vomiting, and marked fatigue. A fatal pulmonary edema may develop.

Special Medical Information: Exposure to dangerous atmospheric concentrations of the oxides of nitrogen may cause spasm of the terminal bronchioles and disturbances of reflexes causing respiration. Circulatory collapse may ensue, or the symptoms may subside and reappear several hours later with the onset of pulmonary edema. Certain signs indicating that severe lung damage has occurred may appear within the first few hours. These are an increase in platelets in the venous blood, often as great as 60 to 100 percent, a decrease in blood pressure, and an increase in the hemoglobin content of the blood. Spasmodic cough and dyspnea appearing several hours after the exposure are evidence of the development of pulmonary edema Bronchopneumonia may be a complication. IRFNA contact with the eyes causes irreparable damage within seconds.

Chronic Exposure: Chronic exposure to low concentrations of the oxides of nitrogen may produce wearing down and decay of the teeth, pulmonary emphysema, and chronic inflammation of the respiratory passages, often with ulceration of the nose or mouth.

Exposure Limit

Threshold Limit Value - Time Weighted Average (TLV� -TWA): A threshold limit value for IRFNA itself has not been established, however the atmospheric threshold limit values for its more toxic components are as follows:

Threshold Limit Value - Short Term Exposure Limit (TLV� -STEL) values are as follows:

Emergency Exposure limits for Nitrogen Dioxide have been set as follows:

• 10 minutes at 30 ppm (54 mg/m3)
• 30 minutes at 20 ppm (36 mg/m3)
• 60 minutes at 10 ppm (18 mg/m3)

Many individuals and organizations had contact with the tank; however, they did not always communicate with one another, nor did they always know of the others’ contact. This was primarily attributable to the various jurisdictions of each organization and the principle of need-to-know. A prime example is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers which initially investigated the tank but were left out of subsequent discussions. Although the Corps had pertinent information that may have brought this issue to closure early on, it was left out of the proverbial loop due to jurisdiction and the corresponding need-to-know.

Another lesson learned in the area of communication is that reporting solely to command elements rather than specific individuals involved does not always provide the closure desired. Institutional memory is held by individuals not organizations, which often have significant staff turnover. This was the case when the results of the British analysis of the samples on resin were relayed to Task Force Victory. The principals involved from Task Force Victory, including Lt. Col. Killgore, then-Capt. Johnson and the rest of the 54th Chemical Troop, had already left the theater of operations and were never notified of the results. Interviews with these individuals continually yielded the same outcome: that, to their knowledge, the tank contained chemical warfare agent. Conflicting reporting between those involved and the DOD/MOD, coupled with the fact that a final report was never generated, warranted an investigation into the matter. Notifying those individuals involved could have brought the matter to conclusion rapidly while providing immediate closure to many of the questions and concerns of those involved.

Finally, the need to disseminate necessary intelligence to units entering theater, not just those already in theater, should be addressed. Disseminating information regarding the CAM registering eight bars on mustard in the presence of IRFNA was apparently limited to units in theater at the time of reporting (February 1991). None of the U.S. forces interviewed could confirm receiving this report on the CAM and IRFNA. All of the U.S. forces involved at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School entered theater after this message had been relayed. Had they been briefed about this upon entering theater, they may have questioned the results at the time of the testing.

A key lesson learned from this investigation is that all reporting relating to a potential CW/BW incident should be documented. Regardless of whether or not it substantiates the allegation, all evidence should be recorded in written form with the ultimate goal of a formal report on the incident to be disseminated to those involved and other appropriate parties. This is particularly essential when there are many jurisdictions involved. Furthermore, this documentation needs to be recorded at the time of the incident with all initial and subsequent documentation passed up through the chain-of-command.

The knowledge that IRFNA can cause various chemical weapons detectors to register a false positive should be disseminated to those military elements employing them in the field. This knowledge will likely precipitate a change in training to account for these false positives and methods to reconfirm. In addition, requirements may change in order to properly address this new information. It is prudent to upload the known atomic mass unit of IRFNA into the existing Fox vehicles’ MM-1s.

Understanding that IRFNA is likely not alone in its ability to cause false positives on chemical weapons detectors, other "battlefield interferents" should be investigated in order to fully address potential alterations in the scope of Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, Procedures, Training and Requirements.

There is a definitive need for those reviewing an incident, in which multiple sovereign parties are involved, to understand that each sovereign participants’ operating procedures and policy guidelines are often dissimilar to the others’. Some of the concern of both the Senate Committee and the PACGWVI that no information dated 1991 could be located could have been promptly addressed had the parties understood the British code on release of information.

1. Sheet K7611, 5648-III, Al Ahmadi, Edition 5-GSGS, Directorate of Military Survey, Ministry of Defence, UK.
2. IIR 5380 005 91, 290938Z MAR 91, "SILKWORM Test Facility"
3. Maj. Watkinson's Initial Report, Aug. 7, 1991, p. 1.
4. Letter from Passive Barriers to Brown & Root dated August 24, 1991. Letter from Brown & Root to Contracting Officer, Kuwaiti Emergency Recovery Office dated Oct. 30, 1991.
5. Lead Sheet 5987, Interview with U.S. State Department Kuwaiti Desk Officer.
6. Photograph of the front of the school taken during the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses trip to Kuwait in October 1997.
7. IIR 5380 005 91, 290938Z MAR 91, "SILKWORM Test Facility"
8. "The ongoing saga of the 'Styx'", Jane's Intelligence Review, July 1, 1997, p 304.
9. Hazards of Chemical Rockets and Propellants, Vol III Liquid Propellants, Chemical Propulsion Information Agency, September 1984, pp. 15-1 to 15-16.
10. U2 reconnaissance photo of the Kuwaiti Girls' School, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, March 1, 1991.
11. RII-1488, "Mating Chem Warheads to Frogs/SILKWORMs" (CENTAF RFI#803)
12. 121910Z SEP 91, "Captive Foreign Hardware from Desert Storm".
13. 291338Z OCT 91, "Distribution of Explosive Components from Desert Storm Captive Hardware".
14. Memorandum for record regarding SILKWORM warheads, OSAGWI, Oct. 21, 1997.
15. Memorandum for record regarding SILKWORM warheads, OSAGWI, Oct. 21, 1997.
16. Memorandum for record regarding SILKWORM warheads, OSAGWI, Oct. 21, 1997.
17. Photograph of SILKWORM missiles captured at the Kuwaiti Girls School awaiting transport at the Shubaiha Port, Kuwait to the US for exploitation. Photo taken by U.S. Naval officer, March 1991.
18. Dr. Janet McDonnel, (Draft) After Desert Storm, The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait, Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, October 1997, p. 97.
19. Dr. Janet McDonnel, (Draft) After Desert Storm, The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait, Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, October 1997, p. 97.
20. Lead Sheet 5981, Interview with program manager for Brown & Root Kuwaiti school reconstruction effort, p. 1.
21. Lead Sheet 7213, Interview with U.S. Army Corps of Engineers safety officer, p. 2.
22. Lead Sheet 7213, Interview with U.S. Army Corps of Engineers safety officer, p. 1.
23. Photographs of the storage tank at the Kuwaiti Girls' School taken by the safety officer, August 1991.
24. Lead Sheet 5984, Interview with Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office military policeman, p. 1.
25. All of the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office's situation reports and logs from July through October 1991 were reviewed, however, no mention of the storage tank at the Kuwaiti Girls' School could be found. Lead Sheet 5988, Interview with U.S. Army Corps of Engineers historian, p. 1.
26. Lead Sheet 7005, Interview with Maj. General Kelly, USA (Ret.), p. 1.
27. Lead Sheet 7213, Interview with U.S. Army Corps of Engineers safety officer, p. 2
28. Transcript of Interview with Col. Macel, October 16, 1997, p. 7.
29. Transcript of Interview with Maj. Watkinson, October 16, 1997, p. 1.
30. Lead Sheet 6025, Interview with commander of the 146th EOD Detachment, p. 1
31. Lead Sheet 6430, Interview with senior EOD officer in theater, p. 1.
32. Lead Sheet 6430, Interview with senior EOD officer in theater, p. 1.
33. Lead Sheet 6025, Interview with commander of the 146th EOD Detachment, p. 1.
34. Maj. Watkinson's Initial Report, August 7, 1991, p. 1.
35. Transcript of Interview with Maj. Watkinson, October 16, 1997, p. 8.
36. Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, October 1995, p. 332.
37. Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, October 1995, p. 422.
38. According to the U..S Army, mustard agent is an oily liquid that ranges in color from a light yellow to brown and its odor is that of garlic, onion, or mustard (hence its name). Sublethal doses of mustard agent causes redness and blisters on the skin, irritation and damage to the eyes, and mild upper respiratory distress to marked airway damage. The clinical effects of mustard are not immediate, taking as little as two hours after a high-dose exposure, and as long as 24 hours following a low-dose vapor exposure. Field Manual 3-9, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, Blister Agents (Vesicants): Mustard (HD, H).
39. Transcript of Interview with Major Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 13.
40. Major Watkinson's Initial Report, Aug. 7, 1991, pp. 1-2.
41. Photograph of Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM), UK Ministry of Defence.
42. Photograph of British one-color detector paper, UK Ministry of Defence.
43. Transcript of Interview with Major Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 14.
44. Maj. Watkinson's Initial Report, August 7, 1991, pp. 1-2.
45. Photograph of M18A2 chemical agent detector kit, UK Ministry of Defence.
46. Email Message from VII Corps RBBS to all MSC's, CAM Burnout, 191741 FEB 91.
47. Transcript of Interview with Maj. Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 13.
48. Maj. Watkinson's Subsequent Report, Aug. 18, 1991, E-1.
49. Transcript of Interview with Maj. Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 11.
50. Maj. Watkinon's Subsequent Report, Aug. 18, 1991, E-1.
51. Transcript of Interview with Major Watkinson, October 16, 1997, p. 11.
52. Photograph of British NBC protective gear, UK Ministry of Defence.
53. Major Watkinson's Initial Report, August 7, 1991, pp. 1-2.
54. Major Watkinson's Initial Report, August 7, 1991, pp. 2-3.
55. Major Watkinson's Initial Report, August 7, 1991, p. 2.
56. Transcript of Interview with Maj. Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 4.
57. Transcript of Interview with Maj. Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 6.
58. Transcript of Interview with Maj. Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 14-15.
59. Memorandum for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical Biological Matters [OASD (CBM)], Suspect Chemical Container Found in Kuwait City, Kuwait in August 1991, July 29, 1994, p. 3.
60. Memorandum for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical Biological Matters [OASD (CBM)], Suspect Chemical Container Found in Kuwait City, Kuwait in August 1991, July 29, 1994, p. 4.
61. GVIU investigators' telephone conversations with the Sampling Team Leader and Major Watkinson, March 5, 1998.
62. Memorandum for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical Biological Matters [OASD (CBM)], Suspect Chemical Container Found in Kuwait City, Kuwait in August 1991, July 29, 1994, pp. 4-5.
63. For a detailed explanation of the Fox NBC reconnaissance vehicle see, Fox Information Paper, Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, July 29, 1997.
64. Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents - Information Paper, Jan. 4, 1994, p. 1.,
65. Memorandum for Commander, 11th ACR, ATTN: RS3, Tasking Number 91-047, Aug. 7, 1991.
66. Transcript of Interview with Major Watkinson, October 16, 1997, pp. 27-28.
67. Lead Sheet 6025, Interview with commander of the 146th EOD Detachment, p. 3.
68. Transcript of Interview with Maj. Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 51.
69. Lead Sheet 6430, Interview with senior EOD officer in theater, p. 2.
70. Transcript of Interview with Col. Macel, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 4-5.
71. Transcript of Interview with Col. Macel, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 19-20.
72. Lead Sheet 7131, Interview with the operations officer for the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office.
73. Multiple sources indicate this occurred on August 8, while other reporting indicates it was the 9th of August. However, the Fox tapes from the second operation are dated August 9, as well as the sample hand over record commence on August 9 and this notes when the samples were taken, thus we regard the date of Aug. 9, 1991 as being the date of this operation.
74. Lead Sheet 5982, Interview with U.S. soldier inside the hot line on the day of the Fox testing, p. 2.
75. Transcript of Interview with Lt. Col. Killgore, Oct. 15, 1997, p. 8., Major Watkinson's Subsequent Report, Aug. 18, 1991, p. C-1.
76. Major Watkinson's Subsequent Report, Aug. 18, 1991, p. C-1.
77. Major Watkinson's Subsequent Report, Aug. 18, 1991, p. 3.
78. Fullers Earth is a clayish substance of hydrous aluminum silicate. It is a good absorbent, and is used as a filter aid in coagulation.
79. Statement of Troop Commander of 1st Troop, 21 EOD Squadron, Nov. 10, 1997, pp. 2-3.
80. Transcript of Interview with Maj. Watkinson, Oct.16, 1997, pp. 19, 25.
81. Lead Sheet 5982, Interview with U.S. soldier inside the hot line on the day of the Fox testing, p. 2.
82. Fox Tapes from testing at the Girls' School. (TAB H).
83. Lead Sheet 5982, Interview with U.S. soldier inside the hot line on the day of the Fox testing, p. 2.
84. Lead Sheet 6510, Interview with U.S. officer in charge of decontamination operations on the day of the Fox testing, p. 1., Memorandum for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical Biological Matters [OASD (CBM)], Suspect Chemical Container Found in Kuwait City, Kuwait in August 1991, July 29, 1994, p. 6.
85. Fox Tapes from testing at the Girls' School. (TAB H).
86. Photograph of Fox testing taken by the US officer in charge of decontamination operations.
87. Major Watkinson's Subsequent Report, Aug. 18, 1991, p. 2.
88. Major Watkinson's Subsequent Report, Aug. 18, 1991, p. 3.
89. Statement of Troop Commander of 1 Troop, 21 EOD Sqn, Nov. 10, 1997, p. 3.
90. Major Watkinson's Subsequent Report, Aug. 18, 1991, p. 4.
91. Statement of Troop Commander of 1 Troop, 21 EOD Sqn, Nov. 10, 1997, p. 3.
92. Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents - Information Paper, Jan. 4, 1994, p. 2.
93. Deposition of Injured British Soldier, Dec. 5, 1997, p. 4.
94. Major Watkinson's Subsequent Report, Aug. 18, 1991, p. E-1.
95. Deposition of Injured British Soldier, Dec. 5, 1997, p. 4.
96. Photograph of injured British soldier taken by the Sampling Team Leader, Aug. 10, 1991.
97. Field Manual 3-9, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, Choking Agents: Phosgene (CG).
98. "CW Agents at the Kuwaiti Girls School: Why and Why Not," Information Summary, Persian Gulf War Illness Task Force, Aug. 26, 1997.
99. Lead Sheet 6753, Interview with Maj. Johnson, p. 2.
100. Field Manual 3-9, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, Blister Agents (Urticants): Phosgene Oxime (CX).
101. Transcript of Interview with Lt. Col. Killgore, Oct. 15, 1997, p. 22.
102. Fox Tapes from testing at the Girls' School. (TAB H).
103. Fox Information Paper, Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, July 29, 1997, p. 9
104. Photograph of the ammunition box used to store samples taken from the tank. Photo taken by Sampling Team Leader on Aug. 10, 1991.
105. Lead Sheet 5982, Interview with US soldier inside the hot line on the day of the Fox testing, p. 3.
106. Transcript of Interview with Major Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 23-24.
107. Lead Sheet 5982, Interview with US soldier inside the hot line on the day of the Fox testing, p. 3.
108. The difference between inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA) and red fuming nitric acid (RFNA) is IRFNA contains an inhibitor such as hydrogen fluoride or hydrogen iodine to impede corrosion of the container.
109. Letter from Program Manager, NBC Defense Systems, Department of the Army to Director, Investigation and Analysis, Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Sept. 11, 1997, p. 2.
110. Lead Sheet 6753, Interview with Maj. Johnson, p. 2.
111. Maj. Watkinson's Subsequent Report, Aug. 18, 1991, p. 5., Initial Report: Sampling and Assessment of Suspected Chemical Container, Aug. 11, 1991, p. 2.
112. Lead Sheet 6870, Interview with regimental commander, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, p. 1.
113. Transcript of Interview with Lt. Col. Killgore, Oct. 15, 1997, p. 14-15.
114. Memorandum for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical Biological Matters [OASD (CBM)], Suspect Chemical Container Found in Kuwait City, Kuwait in August 1991, July 29, 1994, p. 6.
115. Message from PGWI-TF to OSAGWI regarding sampling of the tank at the Kuwaiti Girls School, Sept. 23, 1997.
116. Initial Report: Sampling and Assessment of Suspected Chemical Container, Aug. 11, 1991, pp. 1-2.
117. Memorandum for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical Biological Matters [OASD (CBM)] Suspect Chemical Container Found in Kuwait City Kuwait in August 1991, July 29, 1994, p. 7.
118. Clarification of the Sampling Team Leader's Interview, Dec. 17, 1997.
119. Maj. Watkinson's Subsequent Report, Aug. 18, 1991, p. 4-5., Initial Report: Sampling and Assessment of Suspected Chemical Container, Aug. 11, 1991, p. 2.
120. XAD-4 is an inert (non-reactive) sample collection medium much like charcoal or chromosorb.
121. Analysis of Samples from Kuwait: Preliminary Report, Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, Porton Down, UK, Sept. 24, 1991.
122. Initial Report: Sampling and Assessment of Suspected Chemical Container, Aug. 11, 1991, p. 3.
123. Clarification of the Sampling Team Leader's Interview, Dec. 17, 1997.
124. Maj. Watkinson's Subsequent Report, August 18, 1991, p. 5.
125. Photograph of the samples taken for further analysis in the UK. Photo taken by Sampling Team Leader on August 10, 1991.
126. Transcript of Interview with Sampling Team Leader, Oct. 9, 1997, p. 11.
127. Transcript of Interview with Sampling Team Leader, Oct. 9, 1997, p. 9.
128. Initial Report: Sampling and Assessment of Suspected Chemical Container, Aug. 11, 1991, p. 4.
129. Transcript of Interview with Sampling Team Leader, Oct. 9, 1997, p. 5.
130. Major Watkinson's Subsequent Report, Aug. 18, 1991, p. 5.
131. Transcript of Interview with Major Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 35.
132. Report on the Resealing of the Salabiyah Chemical Container, Aug. 25, 1991, p. 1.
133. Transcript of Interview with Major Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 37.
134. Transcript of Interview with Major Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 43.
135. Report on the Resealing of the Salabiyah Chemical Container, Aug. 25, 1991, p. 2.
136. "Mustard Gas Reveals Iraqi Chemical War Plan", The Sunday Observer, Aug. 18, 1991, p. 2.
137. Clarification of the Sampling Team Leader's Interview, Dec. 17, 1997.
138. Memorandum on collection of samples taken from Kuwaiti Girls School, Dec. 8, 1997.
139. Analysis of Samples from Kuwait: Preliminary Report, Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, Porton Down, UK, Sept. 24, 1991.
140. Transcript of Interview with Major Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 46.
141. Transcript of Interview with Colonel Macel, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 31.
142. Transcript of Interview with Colonel Macel, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 11.
143. Signal traffic from HQBF Kuwait to CBDE Porton Down, PR271100Z September 1991, p. 1.
144. Signal traffic from CBDE Porton Down to HQBF Kuwait, 301530Z September 1991.
145. Letter from Brown & Root to Contracting Officer, Kuwaiti Emergency Recovery Office dated Oct. 30, 1991.
146. Lead Sheet 5981, Interview with program manager for Brown & Root Kuwaiti school reconstruction effort, p. 2.
147. Statement of Passive Barriers employee, Feb. 10, 1998.
148. Written Testimony by the former Commander of the 54th Chemical Troop, U.S. Army, before the Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, United States House of Representatives, Dec. 10, 1996, p. 2.
149. Lead Sheet 6753, Interview with Major Johnson, p. 1.
150. U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, Oct. 7, 1994, p. 18.
151. U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, Oct. 7, 1994, p. 8.
152. U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, Oct. 7, 1994, p. 14.
153. U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, Oct. 7, 1994, p. 16.
154. U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, Oct. 7, 1994, pp. 7-11.
155. U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, Oct. 7, 1994, p. 11.
156.  Email message from VII Corps RBBS to all MSC's, CAM burnout, 191741 Feb 91.
157. Major Watkinson's Initial Report, August 7, 1991, pp. 1-2; Transcript of Interview with Major Watkinson, October 16, 1997, pp. 12, 15.
158. Transcript of Interview with Maj. Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 14.
159. Letter from Project Manager, NBC Defense Systems to Director of Investigation and Analysis, Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Sept. 11, 1997; Letter from Bruker Daltonics, Dec. 15, 1997; Letter from the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Dec. 19, 1997.
160. Letter from Deputy for Chemical/Biological Matters, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, p. 2.
161. U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, Oct. 7, 1994, p. 17.
162. 60 Minutes, March 19, 1995., "Gulf war sequel: Claims, counterclaims," USA Today, March 12, 1995, p. 8A., "Drumbeat of Denial," Soldier of Fortune, May 1997, pp. 38-39., Eddington, Patrick G., Gassed in the Gulf, Insignia Publishing Company, Washington, DC, March 1997, pp. 48-49, 120-121, 126-129.
163. Neither the Fox tapes or U.S. analysis of them was ever provided in its original form. All UK materials including analysis of samples on resin, were only referenced in letters. The actual reports from 1991 were not provided.
164. For more information about the UK Code of Practice on Access to Government Information see http://www.mod.uk/pol_docs/dcil1997.htm or http://www.open.gov.uk/m-of-g/foihome.htm
165. Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, Public Meeting transcript, Charleston, South Carolina, May 7, 1997.
166. Extract of Testimony by UNSCOM representatives to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses meeting in Buffalo, NY, July 29, 1997.
167. Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, Public Meeting transcript, Alexandria, Virginia, Sept. 4, 1997.
168. "Chemical Weapons Used in Gulf War", Evening Standard, Oct. 13, 1994, p. 23., "Allies Found Iraq Stored Blister Agent in Kuwait", The Times, Oct. 14, 1994, p. 15.
169. "Why is the Government lying?" The Mail On Sunday - Night and Day, Nov. 12, 1995, p. 1.
170. Written Answers, Jan. 25, 1995, p. 282.
171. Memorandum Through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical/Biological Matters, Testing Response of Chemical Detection Equipment to Red Fuming Nitric Acid, April 11, 1997.
172.  Letter from Project Manager, NBC Defense Systems to Director of Investigation and Analysis, Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Sept. 11, 1997, p. 2.
173.  Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, Public Meeting transcript, Charleston, South Carolina, May 7, 1997.
174.  CBDCOM is the parent command of the Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center (ERDEC) and the successor organization to the Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center (CRDEC).
175. Letter from Project Manager, NBC Defense Systems to Director of Investigation and Analysis, Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Sept. 11, 1997, p. 2.
176. Memorandum Through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical/Biological Matters, Testing Response of Chemical Detection Equipment to Red Fuming Nitric Acid, April 11, 1997, Fox Tapes from testing at the Girls' School (TAB H).
177. Letter from Project Manager, NBC Defense Systems to Director of Investigation and Analysis, Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Sept. 11, 1997, pp. 1, 2.
178. Letter from the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Dec. 19, 1997.
179. Letter from Bruker Daltonics, Dec. 15, 1997, pp. 1-2.