

Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept



Version 2.0


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APPROVAL

As the lead author, US Joint Forces Command matured this concept through the use of joint and Service operational lessons learned and experimentation including numerous co-sponsored joint wargames, seminars, workshops and other concept development venues. Throughout, this process was guided by direct input from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

During the development of this concept each Service, combatant command, selected members of the Joint and OSD staffs, as well as multinational partners and selected non-DOD agencies made significant contributions. Also included throughout were a host of active and retired flag and junior officers, academics, and professional strategic thinkers.

US Joint Forces Command will continue to use experimentation and lessons learned to refine this concept. The next revision period leading to Version 3.0 is expected to commence in the June 2008 timeframe.



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Purpose

The purpose of the *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations Joint Operating Concept* [hereafter cited as the *Military Support to SSTR Operations JOC*] is to describe how the future Joint Force Commander (JFC) will provide military support to stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operations within a military campaign in pursuit of national strategic objectives in the 2014-2026 time frame. This joint operating concept posits an operational level solution for a very challenging future military problem: how the Joint Force can more effectively prepare for and conduct stabilization, security, transition and reconstruction operations to assist governments or regions under serious stress. Additionally, this JOC identifies the operational capabilities required for achieving military campaign objectives and effects in support of national strategic end-states.

B. Scope

This *Military Support to SSTR Operations JOC* focuses on the full range of military support that the future Joint Force might provide in foreign countries across the continuum from peace to crisis and conflict in order to assist a state or region that is under severe stress or has collapsed due to either a natural or man-made disaster. A SSTR operation is not solely a military effort, but rather one that requires a carefully coordinated deployment of military and civilian, public and private, U.S. and international assets. Accordingly, this JOC adheres to National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 - *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization* by recognizing that the Secretary of State is the designated lead of U.S. Government (USG) efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct SSTR activities. Therefore, the U.S. military will conduct SSTR operations in support of a broader U.S. Government effort to advance U.S. interests by assisting an existing government with internal challenges or helping establish a new social, economic, and political domestic order in the short-term, and in the longer term, by establishing conditions for a sustainable peace.

This JOC covers both future military operations undertaken in response to crisis and selected forms of routine, military theater security cooperation. Military support to SSTR operations will be undertaken to:

- Assist an existing or new host nation government in providing security, essential public services, economic development, and governance following the significant degradation or collapse of the

government's capabilities due to internal failure or as a consequence of the destruction and dislocation of a war¹;

- Provide support to stabilize and administer occupied territory and care for refugees in major combat operations fought for limited objectives that fall short of forcibly changing the adversary regime;
- Support a fragile national government that is faltering due to serious internal challenges, which include civil unrest, insurgency, terrorism and factional conflict;
- Assist a stable government that has been struck by a devastating natural disaster;
- Provide limited security cooperation assistance to a state that is facing modest internal challenges; and
- Provide military assistance and training to partner nations that increase their capability and capacity to conduct SSTR operations at home or abroad.

C. The Military Problem Associated with SSTR Operations

If a national government is weak, corrupt, incompetent, or in the absence of any governing authority, then a triggering shock can seriously exacerbate the already difficult situation, producing widespread suffering, growing popular grievance, and often civil unrest, all of which can be intensified by several interrelated factors: the absence of key government functions, widespread lawlessness, poor economic performance, pronounced economic disparities, and in some cases, a serious external threat.

Once such difficult conditions emerge, the drivers of instability and conflict tend to reinforce one another, creating a degenerating cycle in which conditions continue to deteriorate, and the feelings of insecurity and the grievances of the local population intensify. Without a countervailing force to break this cycle, these developments can eventually destabilize the interlinked political, economic and social systems that make up the fabric of a society. Within this setting, the Joint Force must be able to establish a safe, secure environment and simultaneously work with interagency, coalition, multinational, and host nation partners to support the establishment of a new domestic order.

¹ In the case of the beleaguered fragile government, noted above, the armed opposition may take the form of an insurgency. In such cases, the SSTR operation is called a counterinsurgency (COIN) operation.

D. The Solution - The Central Idea

During SSTR operations, the primary focus of U.S. policy carried out by U.S. military forces, civilian government agencies, and, in many cases, multinational partners, will be on helping a severely stressed government avoid failure or recover from a devastating natural disaster, or on assisting an emerging host nation government in building a “new domestic order” following internal collapse or defeat in war. The new domestic order refers to a series of new patterns of organization and process within the security, economic and political systems, which are significantly different than the previous character of these systems.


Whether responding to a devastating natural disaster or assisting in rebuilding a new domestic order, U.S. military efforts in SSTR operations will be focused on effectively combining the efforts of the U.S. and coalition militaries with those of USG agencies and multi-national partners to provide direct assistance to stabilize the situation and build self-sufficient host nation capability and capacity in several key areas. These efforts, which are called “major mission elements (MMEs)” or “lines of operation” are executed in a concurrent manner and are integrated and tailored to the specific situation. Additionally, most of the MMEs represent desired end states within the overall SSTR operation. The six MMEs are:

- Establish and maintain a safe, secure environment;
- Deliver humanitarian assistance;
- Reconstruct critical infrastructure and restore essential services;
- Support economic development;
- Establish representative, effective governance and the rule of law; and
- Conduct strategic communication.

Throughout the conduct of SSTR operations, the Joint Force will implement a continuous learning process that incorporates lessons learned into ongoing and future operations. This continuous learning process will be conducted through constant observation of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); assessment of best practices; understanding how to implement best practices; and adapting TTPs.

Figure 1 illustrates the central idea for conducting SSTR operations.

Figure 1. The Central Idea for Conducting SSTR Operations



Each SSTR operation the U.S. Government undertakes will differ in the mix and application of the MMEs. At the high end of the spectrum are SSTR operations associated with a U.S. imposed regime change, assisting a faltering government or responding to the collapse of a government caused by internal failure or military defeat; the most critical determinant of success will be convincing the local populace to recognize the legitimacy of the existing or new government and to actively support the government's efforts to build a "new domestic order." If this situation includes the presence of armed insurgent forces actively opposing the efforts of the existing or new host government, then this operation is a counterinsurgency (COIN) operation. During such "high end" SSTR operations, the Joint Force must not only provide force protection for military forces, but may also need to provide protection for USG civil agencies in order to allow these organizations to conduct their SSTR missions. Section 4.b.(vi) contains a vignette describing how a potential "high end" SSTR operation could unfold.

In major combat operations (MCO) fought by the United States for objectives short of forcibly changing an adversary regime, some combination of the major mission elements may be carried out to achieve

stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction in territories annexed from the defeated adversary. These MMEs may also be drawn upon to help care for refugees displaced by the war and to directly assist the recovery of partner nations in the region, which suffered serious damage during the conflict.

Under a less challenging security environment associated with helping a government cope with the consequences of a devastating natural disaster, the U.S. military will coordinate its support of humanitarian assistance, and, in some cases, reconstruction efforts with those of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other parts of the Department of State, including the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and the host nation. In addition, the U.S. military will often coordinate with multinational relief organizations. These efforts will generally focus on rapidly providing food, clean water, shelter, and emergency medical treatment to ease the suffering of disaster victims when their needs are most acute and will, if necessary, help to restore order in the disaster area. U.S. military personnel may also provide support to initial rebuilding efforts in the affected area.

E. Supporting Ideas

E.(i). Unified Action

During the planning and conduct of military support to SSTR operations, it is imperative to achieve unity of effort, through what the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* labels “unified action,” in order to successfully integrate efforts across the “seams” of the wide range of U.S. and multinational military and civilian organizations involved in the many aspects of the operation. With respect to this *Military Support to SSTR Operations JOC*, **unified action** involves the successful integration and synchronization of the multidimensional efforts of the U.S. military, U.S. Government agencies, coalition partners, as well as multinational and private sector actors, along with host nation agencies in pursuit of success in all of the MMEs.

E.(ii). Contingency Planning & Preparation

The objective of the planning and preparation stage of SSTR operations is to harmonize the many diverse civilian and military efforts within a comprehensive, integrated strategy. While integrated civil-military SSTR planning is crucial, certain pre-crisis military security cooperation activities can help create the conditions for the successful conduct of SSTR operations; or they can prevent the emergence of a situation that triggers the conduct of a future SSTR operation. SSTR-related security cooperation activities are those activities that (1) help build SSTR-related

capabilities of partner countries in ways that directly support U.S. efforts with regard to the potential conduct of SSTR operations and (2) assist a fragile, stressed government or region to avoid becoming unstable.

E.(iii). Establishing and Maintaining a Safe, Secure Environment

The objective of the efforts to establish and maintain a safe, secure environment is to create a situation where the security of the people, property, and livelihoods within the country is sufficient to allow the general populace to routinely go about its business. This includes freedom from undue external threats that divert attention and limited resources from internal security efforts. A secure environment will also facilitate the conduct of large scale, civilian-led reconstruction efforts. Ultimately, however, the ability of the existing or new host nation government to maintain a safe, secure environment—both internally and with regard to external security threats—will be a crucial factor in its gaining political legitimacy and widespread popular support.

E.(iv). Building Host Nation Capability and Capacity and Reducing the Drivers of Instability and Conflict

The host government needs to develop its indigenous security, and economic and political capabilities in order to successfully reduce the drivers of internal instability and conflict within the context of the “new domestic order” it seeks to build. Building this new capacity is critical to enabling host nation leaders at all levels to garner the popular support they will need to be able to carry out comprehensive nation building.

The lion’s share of the international assistance to these host nation efforts across the MMEs, including security sector reform, will be undertaken by civilian organizations in a permissive environment and by military organizations in a contested environment. Therefore, it is essential that military organizations develop the capability to support nation building in an insecure environment and that the USG acquire adequate numbers of deployable civil agency capabilities to sustain on-the-scene nation building assistance over a period of years.

E.(v). Conduct Strategic Communication

The objective of the effort to conduct strategic communication is to understand and engage key local and foreign audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to achievement of overall SSTR goals and objectives. Throughout the operation, the three primary supporting capabilities of strategic communication—public affairs, information operations, and defense support to public diplomacy, must be continually coordinated and synchronized, both horizontally and

vertically. Thus, strategic communication involves unified action by military, civil, and coalition entities operating from the national strategic to the tactical unit level.

F. Capabilities

The effective conduct of SSTR operations requires a range of **functional** and **operational capabilities** across the Joint Force, U.S. Government departments and agencies, and multinational organizations.

Each functional and operational capability is made up of a series of critical and enabling capabilities. **Critical capabilities** focus on the primary abilities that allow the force to accomplish a desired effect.

Enabling capabilities support critical capabilities and allow a force to accomplish an important task that underpins the accomplishment of a desired effect. Due to the multiple foci of the various SSTR mission elements, many required capabilities may reside outside of DOD. This JOC identifies four SSTR functional capabilities and six operational capabilities.

Functional capabilities are those capabilities that allow the Joint Force to perform tasks that occur across all aspects of SSTR operations; thus, functional capabilities are required to successfully carry out each of the major mission elements throughout the campaign, e.g. creating shared situational awareness among diverse stakeholders. The four functional capabilities are:

- **U.S. Government institutional agility:** the ability of U.S. government institutions to distribute funds, goods, and services rapidly and efficiently under challenging circumstances to successfully conduct SSTR operations.
- **Command, control, and coordination:** the ability to exercise authority and direction over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of SSTR missions; and the ability to effectively coordinate and integrate efforts between elements of DOD, engaged U.S. Government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector in order to accomplish SSTR objectives.
- **Battlespace awareness/understanding:** the ability to develop situational awareness and understanding and to produce intelligence through persistent and pervasive observation of all domains.

- **Joint Force generation and management:** the ability to man, equip, and organize resources and to develop Joint Force skills necessary to ensure the Joint Force Commander can fulfill SSTR objectives

Operational capabilities focus on capabilities associated with accomplishing a desired end state (i.e. major mission element) within a SSTR operation, e.g., delivering supplies of food and medicine, rebuilding a power generation and distribution system. The six operational capabilities are:

- **Creating a safe, secure environment.** The ability to provide sufficient security in order to allow the conduct of large-scale civilian and host nation-led reconstruction and activities.
- **Delivering humanitarian assistance/disaster relief.** The ability to provide the immediate provision of basic necessities (e.g., water, food, sanitation, public health, medical care) in order to relieve human suffering.
- **Reconstituting critical infrastructure and essential services.** The ability to rebuild and/or improve strategically important institutions and essential services.
- **Supporting economic development.** The ability to assist in the early recovery of local and national economic activity and lay the foundation for sustained economic growth.
- **Establishing representative, effective government and the rule of law.** The ability to engage in early restoration of local governance activities, e.g., restoring city/regional councils, developing transparent reconciliation processes, restoring or possibly reforming the internal security and judicial systems, and resolving property claims and disputes.
- **Conduct strategic communication.** The ability to engage key local and foreign audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to achievement of overall SSTR goals and objectives.

G. Risks and Mitigation

There are several risks associated with conducting SSTR operations that could significantly hinder the conduct of or even halt such operations. These risks include:

- **The American public and its elected representatives will not allow the United States to get involved in a major SSTR operation, or should such involvement be permitted, will prove unwilling to sustain their support for the conduct of a lengthy, costly SSTR campaign. (high risk)**

The recommended mitigation strategy focuses on having DOD and its IA partners develop the rapidly deployable and sustainable capabilities that will be needed to rapidly initiate effective operations within and across the MMEs of a major SSTR operation. These capabilities will include strategic communication strategies and means that complement other SSTR operations. SSTR strategic communication strategies must include a strong focus on keeping the American public accurately informed prior to and during the course of the SSTR operation.

- **The U.S. interagency community will not develop sufficient amounts of the kinds of deployable civilian capabilities needed to conduct an extended SSTR campaign. (high risk)**

The recommended mitigation strategy involves working with the National Security Council, as well as other applicable U.S. departments and agencies, and with the Congress to gain the support needed to build SSTR-related civilian capabilities in the interagency.

- **DOD force structure and force management policies will not facilitate the recruitment, development, rotation, and sustainment of sufficient military personnel for extended duration and manpower intensive SSTR operations. (medium risk)**

The recommended mitigation strategy involves the development and experimentation of innovative concepts that would enable the Joint Force to conduct SSTR operations without a dramatic increase in manpower, e.g., the development of niche and surge capabilities within the Total Force, longer tours to maintain force structure, and on-the-ground expertise.

- **In the coming years, the U.S. military will abandon the very significant new approaches that have recently been implemented to prepare American military forces to**

The recommended mitigation strategy is to ensure that U.S. military personnel are taught at all levels during their training and Professional Military Education (PME) to understand the importance of SSTR operations for U.S. national security and to recognize these operations as one of their most important and challenging missions.

- **Multiple external actors, including the U.S. military and interagency elements, will prove unable to integrate their efforts across the SSTR operation's multidimensional mission elements with those of the existing or new host nation government during a high end SSTR operation and thus the operation will not succeed in creating the new domestic order or a viable peace.² (low risk)**

The recommended mitigation strategy is to give priority to developing and exercising integration mechanisms for the planning and conduct of SSTR operations.

² Peace becomes viable when the capacity of domestic institutions to resolve conflict peacefully prevails over the power of obstructionist forces. (Eds; Covey, Dziedzic and Hawley, *The Quest for a Viable Peace*, p. 14)

1. Purpose

The purpose of the *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations Joint Operating Concept* [hereafter cited as the *Military Support to SSTR Operations JOC*] is to describe how the future Joint Force Commander (JFC) will provide military support for stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operations within a military campaign in pursuit of national strategic objectives in the 2014-2026 time frame. This joint operating concept posits an operational level solution for a very challenging future military problem: how the Joint Force can more effectively prepare for and conduct SSTR operations to assist governments or regions under serious stress. Additionally, this JOC identifies the operational capabilities required for achieving military campaign objectives and effects in support of national strategic end-states.

Additionally, this *Military Support to SSTR Operations JOC* will provide the basis for experimentation and exercises addressing the conduct of such operations. It will influence subsequent concept development regarding military support to SSTR operations and will provide a basis for force development guidance that could result in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development and education, and personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) changes associated with the development of the enhanced capabilities needed to successfully conduct future SSTR operations.

2. Scope

The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO) establishes the foundation for the military support to SSTR operations. It emphasizes that the Joint Force must be capable of successfully conducting stability operations prior to, during, and after combat operations or as a stand-alone mission. The CCJO defines stability operations as inherently interagency operations. In carrying out these integrated operations, the Joint Force may be required to establish a safe, secure environment and initiate reconstruction efforts to facilitate transition to civilian control. The Joint Force may also be required to provide security, initial humanitarian assistance, limited governance, restoration of essential public services, and similar types of assistance typically required in reconstruction efforts.³

³ *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, Version 2.0, August 2005, page 9, paragraph 3.E.2

2.a. Defining Military Support to SSTR Operations⁴

Using the CCJO as a guiding framework, this *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations JOC* focuses on the full range of military support that the future Joint Force might provide in foreign countries across the continuum from peace to crisis and conflict in order to assist a state or region that is under severe stress or has collapsed due to either a natural or man-made disaster. SSTR operations are highly integrated interagency operations that involve a carefully coordinated deployment of military and civilian, public and private, U.S. and international assets. Accordingly, this JOC adheres to National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 - *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization* by recognizing that the Secretary of State is the designated lead of U.S. Government (USG) efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct SSTR activities. Therefore, the U.S. military will conduct SSTR operations in support of a broader USG effort to advance U.S. interests by restoring an existing government or establishing a new social, economic, and political domestic order in the short-term, and in the longer term, by establishing conditions for a sustainable peace.⁵

The central elements of SSTR operations that are conducted to assist a state or region under serious stress are: stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction. **Stabilization** involves activities undertaken to manage underlying tensions, to prevent or halt the deterioration of security, economic, and/or political systems, to create stability in the host nation or region, and to establish the preconditions for reconstruction efforts. **Security** involves the establishment of a safe and secure environment for the local populace, host nation military and civilian organizations as well as USG and coalition agencies, which are conducting SSTR operations.⁶ **Transition** describes the process of shifting the lead responsibility and authority for helping provide or foster security, essential services, humanitarian assistance, economic

⁴ Unless otherwise specified, definitions within this section are not doctrinal. These definitions provide a baseline for common terms within the *Military Support to SSTR Operations JOC*.

⁵ A sustainable peace is characterized by: conflict resolved by a domestic political process; security sector is reformed and subordinated to political authority; local institutions maintain the rule of law; the formal economy outperforms the gray/black markets (Eds; Covey, Dziedzic and Hawley, *The Quest for a Viable Peace*, Table 1.1)

⁶ Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines security as "A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influence. Additionally, the Joint Capability Area (JCA) for "Joint Stability Operations" builds upon the JP 1-02 security definition by including ability to reinforce the perception of security by the populace.

development, and political governance from the intervening military and civilian agencies to the host nation. Transitions are event driven and will occur within the major mission elements (MMEs) at that point when the entity assuming the lead responsibility has the capability and capacity to carry out the relevant activities.⁷ Finally, **Reconstruction**⁸ is the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socio-economic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for longer-term development.

This *Military Support to SSTR Operations JOC* addresses how future military operations will be conducted both in response to a crisis and addresses selected routine, military theater security cooperation in order to:

- Assist an existing or new host nation government in providing security, essential public services, economic development, and governance following the significant degradation or collapse of the government's capabilities due to internal failure or as a consequence of the destruction and dislocation of a war⁹;
- Provide support to stabilize and administer occupied territory and care for refugees in major combat operations fought for limited objectives that fall short of forcibly changing the adversary regime;
- Support a fragile national government that is faltering due to serious internal challenges, which include civil unrest, insurgency, terrorism and factional conflict;
- Assist a stable government that has been struck by a devastating natural disaster;
- Provide limited security cooperation assistance to a state that is facing modest internal challenges; and

⁷ In some cases, there will be two leadership transitions, the first between external military forces and external civilian agencies, and the second between the external civilian agencies and the new host nation government. However, in other cases the military will be in support of a civilian lead and the first transition will hand off responsibility from civilian to host nation agencies and organizations.

⁸ The JCA "Joint Stability Operations" defines reconstruction as "the ability to rebuild the critical systems or infrastructure (i.e. physical, economic, justice, governance, societal) necessary to facilitate long-term security and the transition to legitimate local governance. It includes addressing the root cause of the conflict. Reconstruction is likely to be a civil led effort."

⁹ In the case of the beleaguered fragile government, noted above, the armed opposition may take the form of an insurgency. In such cases, the SSTR operation is called a counterinsurgency (COIN) operation.

- Provide military assistance and training to partner nations in order to build their capability and capacity to conduct SSTR operations at home or abroad.


The circumstances under which the United States might become involved in SSTR operations can vary greatly. In some cases, the United States will be asked by a nation under stress to provide assistance, or the United States may also elect to conduct SSTR operations without an invitation from the local government. The decision to participate in SSTR operations will be made by the President, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense. Once the decision is made to conduct SSTR operations, the United States can participate in either a leading or supporting role and, in some cases, in the context of a mandate from the United Nations Security Council. If it is the lead country, the United States will generally assume responsibility for planning and coordinating most of the activities within the operation; whereas in a supporting role, the United States will offer limited, targeted assistance to the host nation or international organization(s) conducting the operation.

2.b. Campaign Framework for SSTR Operations

The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* establishes a new framework, which emphasizes that a campaign within theater conflicts generally consists of six simultaneous lines of effort—*shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority* (See Figure 2). The CCJO campaign framework provides a means to plan, execute, and assess campaigns in an integrated manner. The simultaneous execution of activities within each line of effort reinforces the need to continuously consider activities across all lines of effort during planning and execution. This approach also captures the varying levels of activity within each line of effort over time that may be required to achieve priority objectives.¹⁰

¹⁰ *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, Version 2.0, August 2005, D-2.

Figure 2. CCJO Lines of Effort



This JOC posits that the more challenging types of SSTR operations are those that seek to build a new domestic order in a defeated or failed state and are carried out in a contested security environment. In such circumstances, the Joint Force Commander will be required to simultaneously conduct a military campaign with multiple lines of effort, including conventional and irregular offensive and defensive operations, while providing support to USG and coalition agencies undertaking SSTR efforts. It is precisely the challenge of integrating military full spectrum operations with the SSTR efforts of other USG agencies and often multinational partners that requires us to develop innovative ways and means for the Joint Force to conduct major combat and SSTR operations simultaneously.

2.c. A Broader View of “Stability Operations”

The scope of this JOC is a sub-set of the broader view of stability operations outlined DOD Directive (DODD) 3000.05, *Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*. DODD 3000.05 defines **stability operations** as “military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in states and regions.” The directive goes on to define **military support to stability, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR)** as “DOD activities that support USG plans for **stabilization, security, reconstruction, and transition operations**, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.” While the scope of this JOC is more limited than DODD 3000.05, the activities described in this JOC are consistent with and support the directive.

Some U.S. military publications, including Joint Publication (JP) 3.0, *Joint Operations*, and Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* have defined “stability operations” much more broadly than the SSTR operations addressed in this joint operating concept. These publications emphasize that any major military operation abroad will almost certainly involve the full spectrum of operations, that is, the simultaneous conduct of offensive, defensive, and stability operations.

Such conduct of full spectrum operations is distinct from phasing. Commanders combine the three types of operations according to the situation throughout the campaign. The relative emphasis the JFC places among these three types of operations will vary across the continuum of military operations and will also vary significantly within operations of the same type based on the USG desired strategic end state, military campaign objectives and desired effects and the specific situation. A major combat operation, for example, will require the simultaneous conduct of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. According to this paradigm, any ongoing SSTR operation will also likely involve a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations, with the precise mix among these three operations during a given time period varying substantially within the overall area of operations.¹¹ The more expansive definition of stability operations includes all of the military actions undertaken to support governments under serious stress that are identified above and discussed within this *Military Support to SSTR Operations JOC*. However, the broader stability operations category also includes the full range of American military engagement and security cooperation activities undertaken in peacetime to shape the international security environment in ways that protect and advance U.S. national interests.

While a wide variety of theater security cooperation activities could play a significant role in creating more favorable conditions for the conduct of a particular SSTR operation, the *Military Support to SSTR Operations JOC* does not include the full spectrum of shaping/security cooperation activities as elements of SSTR operations. This JOC does, however, encompass those theater security cooperation activities that *directly* lay the foundation for conduct of military support to SSTR operations or seek to prevent the destabilization of a particular state or region. These activities include:

¹¹ According to Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*: “The proportion of offense, defense, and stability operations varies with changes in the nature of the operation, where it falls on the spectrum of conflict, and the military requirements....[S]tability operations predominate during peace operations and counterinsurgency. Offensive and defensive operations predominate during major combat operations, although stability operations are prominent.”

- Helping partner militaries improve their SSTR related capabilities for employment internally or abroad;
- Conducting multinational experiments to enhance collective planning and execution of SSTR operations; as well as
- Military assistance activities, which are undertaken to help beleaguered states address internal instability challenges and thus avert failure that could trigger a responsive SSTR operation.

The *Military Support to SSTR Operations JOC* also recognizes that many other types of theater security cooperation activities could help support the successful conduct of a specific SSTR operation. For example, routine security cooperation, including security assistance programs, bilateral and multinational exercises, military-to-military consultations and the like, that help build positive political and defense relationships with individual states can prove very useful when the U.S. Government needs to conclude transit, staging, or basing arrangements that are critical to conducting a specific SSTR operation.

While routine security cooperation activities certainly can bear fruit during the mounting of a major U.S. crisis response like SSTR operations, they are undertaken in pursuit of broader U.S. national security objectives, that is, in support of the “assure, dissuade, deter, and defeat” aspects of the *National Defense Strategy*. Consequently, this *Military Support to SSTR Operations JOC* does not encompass the full range of shaping and security cooperation activities.

Figure 3 depicts both the broad definition of stability operations and the narrower view of SSTR operations, which are the subject of this *Military Support to SSTR Operations JOC*.

Figure 3. Military Support to SSTR Operations




Figure 3 illustrates that the broader approach to stability operations includes all of the military actions undertaken to support governments under serious stress as well as the full range of American military engagement and security cooperation activities undertaken in peacetime to shape the international security environment in ways that protect and advance U.S. national interests.

Military support to SSTR operations is a sub-set of stability operations. As Figure 3 illustrates, military support to SSTR includes those activities that the Joint Force might conduct in foreign countries across the continuum from peace to crisis and conflict in order to assist a state or region that is under severe stress or has collapsed due to either a natural or man-made disaster. Additionally, military support to SSTR operations includes a variety of theater security cooperation activities that play a direct role in setting the conditions for SSTR operations. These activities include building partner capacity to conduct SSTR operations and/or assisting states in the efforts to cope with internal instability challenges.

2.d. Relationship to Other Joint Operating Concepts

2.d.(i). Major Combat Operations

This *Military Support to SSTR Operations JOC* recognizes that SSTR operations can occur independently of MCO, as discussed above, or in combination with MCO in a

Within the context of a theater conflict campaign, MCO and SSTR operations occur simultaneously and are inextricably linked.

theater conflict that includes the commitment to seize and hold former enemy territory, or, more ambitiously, to drive the existing political regime from power. When SSTR operations are conducted simultaneously with MCO, then the MCO and SSTR operations are inextricably linked from the very outset of the campaign and success in both operations is needed to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Planning, preparation and execution activities associated with SSTR operations crosses all lines of effort of the campaign and are not unique to the concluding stage of the conflict, previously called “phase 4.”


The planning and conduct of a military campaign that seeks regime change must integrate MCO and SSTR operations in a manner that is focused on both decisively defeating and expelling the adversary regime and “winning the peace” by helping a new host government create a new domestic order. The planning and conduct of more limited objective MCO, one that does not involve forcible expulsion from power of the enemy regime, requires the integration of SSTR activities into the campaign as well.

At any given time, the decisive combat and SSTR aspects of the overall campaign can, if not carefully planned and executed, create serious operational dilemmas for the Joint Force. While conducting major combat operations, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) must ensure that the campaign maintains focus on achieving the desired strategic end states, which is, setting the conditions for achieving stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction objectives needed to create a new domestic order and a viable peace.

Therefore, within a joint campaign, the JFC, campaign planners, and even individual units, must continually balance their activities across the lines of effort throughout the campaign. For example, during MCO, the JFC should refrain from tasking friendly forces to destroy critical infrastructure needed to maintain security and provide essential services for the general populace, unless its destruction is absolutely necessary to achieve campaign objectives and desired effects. Similarly, care should be taken to actively protect key administrative facilities, ministries and

the like from destructive attack and from looting, if feasible, because these key assets could be critical for successful SSTR operations by the new host nation government. (See Figure 4).

Figure 4. Major Combat Operations and Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations



2.d.(ii) Deterrence Operations

Deterrence operations are relevant to certain aspects of the *Military Support to SSTR Operations JOC*. Deterrence achieved via the threat of cost imposition or the denial of the prospect of success certainly cannot impact the likelihood of a natural disaster. However, SSTR-related activities that strengthen the ability of a friendly government to create and maintain a safe, secure environment or reduce the grievances of the general populace can certainly impact the calculations of the antagonists wanting to unseat the friendly government through violent means. In addition, a nation's apparent will and capability to prevail in a regional

SSTR security cooperation programs can strengthen the militaries of friendly governments and thus contribute to deterring regional conflicts.

conflict, including having the ability to defeat aggression by conducting effective major combat and SSTR operations could be an important factor in deterring such a conflict. Thus, through security cooperation programs, the USG and coalition partners can assist the militaries of friendly governments in developing significant MCO and SSTR capabilities, which can contribute to deterring regional conflicts.

2.d.(iii) Homeland Defense and Civil Support

The main impact of the *Military Support to SSTR Operations JOC* on homeland defense will involve the fact that successful SSTR operations can eliminate or prevent the emergence of a hostile government or ungoverned space that could serve as the breeding ground for hostile groups that hatch plots to threaten U.S. national security interests, including carrying out attacks on the U.S. homeland. Thus, effective SSTR operations can represent an important element of the forward region component of the layered defense concept set forth in the *Homeland Defense and Civil Support JOC*.

Additionally, the training, organization, and equipping of interagency partners for SSTR operations will have relevance for civil-military operations that address crises or disasters within the United States.

SSTR operations can serve as another layer of homeland defense by preventing the emergence of hostile actors that seek to attack the U.S. homeland.

2.e. Time Frame

This concept broadly describes how the future Joint Force will be expected to conduct military support to SSTR operations in the 2014-2026 time frame in support of national strategic objectives. In accordance with the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO)*, this JOC applies to operations around the globe conducted unilaterally or in conjunction with multinational military partners and other government and non-government agencies. It envisions military operations conducted within a national security strategy that effectively integrates all instruments of national power.

2.f. Assumptions

This *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations JOC* is premised on the following assumptions:

- The efforts throughout the Department of Defense (DOD) devoted to planning, organizing, training, equipping and otherwise

preparing to conduct SSTR operations will be very substantial, roughly comparable to those devoted to preparing for major combat operations.

- U.S. Government departments and agencies beyond DOD will develop a core planning and rapidly deployable implementation capability with sufficient capacity for extended, sustained SSTR operations. There is significant risk that this assumption may prove false (see Section 5 - Risks and Mitigation). Moreover, even if civilian capabilities to support SSTR operations double in the next 10-15 years, there will still be a capability gap that the military will be called upon to fill, even in a secure environment.
- DOD will support SSTR operations through the evolution and deployment of the net-centric operational environment (NCOE). The NCOE, whose cornerstone is the Global Information Grid, will provide information transport, information assurance, enterprise services, network management, applications, and knowledge management capabilities to facilitate SSTR operations. The NCOE will link DOD garrison and deployed organizations, and reach back elements to support the full range of military operations. DOD will also work with interagency, coalition, international, regional, non-government, and private sector partners who possess capabilities that can contribute to SSTR objectives to ensure that they can effectively share information and collaborate in the assured DOD information environment.

3. The Strategic Setting and the SSTR Military Problem

3.a. The Strategic Setting

The United States will continue to face a complex array of security challenges, which are identified in the 2005 *National Defense Strategy* as the traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges. (See Figure 5).

- **Traditional** challenges will be posed by states employing recognized military capabilities and forces in well-understood forms of military competition and conflict.
- **Irregular** challenges will be those posed by actors employing “unconventional” methods to counter the traditional advantages of stronger opponents.

- **Catastrophic** challenges will involve the efforts of U.S. adversaries to acquire, possess and possibly use WMD or other capabilities that produce WMD-like effects.
- **Disruptive** challenges will arise from the efforts of adversaries to develop and use breakthrough technologies to negate current U.S. advantages in key operational domains.

Figure 5. Strategic Challenges

The United States will need to integrate the application of the diplomatic, informational, military and economic elements of its national power in order to meet these four challenges. In addition, the Joint Force must be prepared to meet all four of these challenges simultaneously and proportionally within any given area of operation.



If the U.S. military conducts a traditional military campaign during a theater war, it will almost certainly include a simultaneous SSTR operation. However, the SSTR operation within the traditional military campaign would most likely be characterized by non-traditional forms of military conflict. Hostile forces will likely opt to attack the Joint Force, U.S. allies, elements of the existing or new host government, and even the local population with various forms of irregular warfare, e.g., terrorism and insurgency. These “spoiler” groups¹² may choose to employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or methods producing WMD-like effects to threaten or to attack critical U.S., allied, or host nation targets, should these groups come to possess such weapons. SSTR operations undertaken in the wake of the internal collapse of a failed state that possessed weapons of mass destruction would present “catastrophic” challenges for the intervening military forces conducting the operation. In such a case, highest priority attention will be focused on safely securing and ultimately eliminating the WMD capabilities.

¹² Spoiler groups consist of groups who are generally very hostile to the presence and activities of foreign forces and will likely employ political, economic, informational, and violent means to achieve their objectives,

3.b. Key Trends

There are certain trends in the current strategic environment that will likely figure even more prominently in the years ahead. It will be important to understand these trends, briefly described below, because it is very likely that they will directly impact both the frequency and character of future SSTR operations.

3.b.(i). Failed and Failing States

The strategic importance of failed or failing states on the world scene has much greater salience in the aftermath of the tragic events of 9/11. Beyond purely humanitarian considerations, the nexus of state failure and transnational terrorism poses potentially catastrophic consequences to international security. Failed or failing states may arise as a result of the effects of globalization, economic collapse, resource competition, corrupt government, and/or failed social infrastructure. Failed or failing states frequently lead to the emergence of ungoverned spaces, which provide opportunities for warlords, crime bosses, tribal leaders, and religious authorities to gain control or compete for power. These groups will appeal to desperate citizens, and may offer sanctuary to criminals and insurgents. Additionally, terrorists, drug dealers, and criminal elements may use ungoverned areas as bases of operation to spread their influence among the indigenous and foreign populations.

3.b.(ii). Ethnic and Religious Rivalries

Post-conflict stabilization, security transition and reconstruction operations during the past decade in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq have, in some cases, been triggered by and, in all cases, been strongly influenced by serious ethnic and religious differences. While not new, ethnic and religious conflicts pose a serious challenge to secular local authorities and external governments like the United States, which find themselves often conducting SSTR operations in highly charged environments. Moreover, long-standing ethnic, tribal, and religious-based conflicts are rarely resolved by external force alone but almost only resolved through political means.

Ethnic conflicts tend to arise when identities are challenged by the kinds of major social changes that accompany modernization and globalization. While current ethnic fault lines tend to be geographically centered, in the future, ethnic dynamics may have major impact on regional balances of

power. Recognizing and understanding the ethnic dimension of an environment will remain critical.

Religious ideology is a powerful, driving social and political force. Those seeking national, regional, or global goals of dominance increasingly employ religion, particularly in its most extreme form, as a means to motivate oppressed, impoverished, or culturally adrift populations. Religious fundamentalism is attractive to those who feel victimized or threatened by the cultural and economic impacts of globalization and increased social interconnectivity. Additionally, there is a tendency for religious-based political movements to gain support when secular civic institutions of political authority appear unable to deal successfully with serious challenges, be they local or global in origin.

3.b.(iii). Urbanization

With over 60 percent of the world population living in urban areas by the year 2030, the potential for urban combat significantly increases. In much of the developing world, insurgents and terrorists will exploit the density of major urban centers, finding money and sanctuary among the population and the complex terrain of a modern metropolis. Urban centers can also provide a steady stream of disaffected and unemployed youth, who can be recruited and turned into insurgents or terrorists. Additionally, complex urban terrain often provides insurgents or terrorists with asymmetric advantages, including more lucrative targets and broader support. Where political systems are weak and fragile and the economic base is overwhelmed, the combination of population growth and urbanization will foster instability and increase challenges to political control and public security.

In many of the major urban areas, the government's inability to provide the basic public services heightens the potential for chaos and civil unrest. Critical infrastructure most likely will be austere—water and sewer services in disrepair; limited or compromised electrical service; and inadequate educational opportunities and medical care.

Such cities may be ungovernable and increasingly run by an informal network of politicians, criminal undergrounds, and special-interest groups. The close proximity of various divergent ethnic or religious groups could ignite long-standing tensions, exacerbating already delicate balances. The diverse, fractured nature of the society and its internal instability means that external organizations with special interests or links to the society will likely influence SSTR operations.

3.b.(iv). Networked Global Media

Since SSTR operations are largely won or lost in the political and information domains, global communications and information dissemination are vital factors. Information will be at the heart of conflicts, permeating and influencing all operations by focusing on changing behavior and perceptions among target audiences. The velocity of information flows and the power of imagery can imbue a tactical act with strategic importance by relaying an out-of-context description or image of that act around the globe in a matter of minutes.

The media will provide a powerful means of influence because societies that have unprecedented access to information will be enormously susceptible to media impact. Media coverage of operations and the real-time dissemination of information will not only affect domestic politics, international relations and strategic interaction, but also have critical political and psychological impacts. Observers throughout the world will interpret actions on the battlefield and their consequences largely through the lens of omni-present media channels (e.g., television, internet, cell phones). Many world media outlets are not held to the legal constraints of “traditional journalism” (e.g., laws of libel, slander). Perversely, the very criminals or spoilers causing instability in fragile states may take advantage of the global media to carry out their operations or manipulate global perceptions of their “grievances.”

Modern media information does not always penetrate “traditional cultures” that rely on information through the word of mouth. Moreover, traditional cultures usually defer to the opinions and views of authority figures (e.g., village leaders) rather than to outside media sources. In these cases, if the authority figures accept the legitimacy of the intervening force then it is likely that positive information will resound with the local populace. Conversely, if the legitimacy of the intervening force is criticized by the authority figures then negative, and often false, information can eclipse any positive media information.

3.b.(v). Technology Diffusion

Advances in technology will spur technology diffusion that may enable minor states, non-state groups, and even individuals the ability to acquire and employ WMD and other weapons that produce mass effects. The large numbers of casualties caused by the employment of such weapons could rapidly undermine progress made in SSTR operations. In addition, access to advanced technologies can result in the development

and use of highly sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to disrupt troop movements and inflict heavy casualties.

3.b.(vi). Multiplicity of Actors

Another complicating factor is the proliferation of actors in the future security environment such as non-governmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, private companies, news organizations, and commercial security companies. The engagement of non-DOD actors dramatically increases the complexity of trying to characterize the battle space, determining who is supportive of U.S. efforts, who is neutral, and who is the enemy.

Globalization is producing intensified international interaction on a wide range of issues, often creating friction as the many cultures, religions, governments, people, organizations, and economic networks collide in highly competitive global settings. Increased economic globalization and the development of advanced information systems are generating enhanced worldwide awareness, as noted previously. This has influenced national and non-governmental policies and has resulted in increased roles for the United Nations, regional, non-governmental, and international organizations. When political circumstances allow the establishment of a U.N. Security Council mandate for SSTR operations, the United Nations should assume the responsibility of facilitating the unity of effort for all task execution and coordination.

3.c. The Most Challenging Military Problem Associated with Military Support to SSTR Operations


The Joint Force of the 21st Century will face formidable challenges in the enormously complex and uncertain international security environment, some of whose most salient features are discussed above. In the era of the “long war” against global terrorist networks, serious shocks—both natural and man-made—will have the potential to push a fragile nation-state or region into a deteriorating spiral of stresses on multiple elements of the government and society.

If a national government is weak, corrupt, incompetent, or non-existent then a triggering shock can seriously exacerbate an already difficult situation, producing widespread suffering, growing popular grievance, and often civil unrest, all of which can be intensified by several interrelated factors:

- The absence of adequate internal security, essential public services, and other key government functions due to ineffective, often corrupt governance; or the absence of any governing authority;
- Widespread lawlessness in an atmosphere of anarchy as well as sectarian conflict among ethnic, tribal or religious groups or between the incumbent government and its violent opposition;
- Very poor economic performance due to internal disorder, eroded infrastructure, and the destruction of key economic assets; and
- Extensive unemployment and pronounced economic disparities within the populace that breed pervasive dissatisfaction and help generate recruits for opposition groups.

Once such difficult conditions emerge, the drivers of instability and conflict tend to reinforce one another, creating a degenerating cycle in which conditions continue to deteriorate, and the feelings of insecurity and the grievances of the local population intensify (See Figure 6). Without a countervailing force to break this cycle, these developments can eventually destabilize the interlinked political, economic and social systems that make up the fabric of a society.

Figure 6. Drivers of Instability and Conflict



4. The Solution

4.a. The Central Idea

During SSTR operations, the primary focus of U.S. policy carried out by military forces, U.S. civilian agencies, and, in many cases, multinational partners¹³, will be on helping a severely stressed government to avoid failure or to recover from a devastating natural disaster, or on assisting an emerging host nation government to build a “new domestic order” following internal collapse or defeat in war. The new domestic order refers to a series of new patterns of organization and process within the security, economic and political systems, which are significantly different than the previous character of these systems.

Whether responding to a devastating natural disaster or assisting in rebuilding a new domestic order, U.S. military efforts in SSTR operations will be focused on effectively combining the efforts of the U.S. and coalition militaries with those of USG agencies and multi-national

¹³ Multinational partners” includes international and regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, private sector entities, and international and regional governments.

partners to provide direct assistance and build self-sufficient host nation capability and capacity in several key areas. These efforts, which are called “major mission elements (MMEs)” or “lines of operation” are executed in a concurrent manner and are integrated and tailored to the specific situation.¹⁴

Additionally, MMEs represent desired end states within the overall SSTR operation. The six MMEs are:

- Establish and maintain a safe, secure environment;
- Deliver humanitarian assistance;
- Reconstruct critical infrastructure and restoring essential services;
- Support economic development;
- Establish representative, effective governance and the rule of law; and
- Conduct strategic communication.

The Central Idea

The primary focus of SSTR operations is on helping a severely stressed government avoid failure or recover from a devastating natural disaster, or on assisting an emerging host nation government build a “new domestic order” following internal collapse or defeat in war.


Within this setting, the Joint Force must be able to help establish a safe, secure environment and, simultaneously, work with interagency, coalition, multinational, and host nation partners to support the establishment of a new domestic order.

Throughout the conduct of military support to SSTR operations, the Joint Force will implement a continuous learning process that incorporates lessons learned into ongoing and future operations. This continuous learning process will be conducted through constant observation of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); assessment of

¹⁴ Major mission elements (MMEs) are synonymous with lines of operations. Due to the highly integrated civil-military activities during SSTR operations, this JOC utilizes MMEs because it is a neutral term for the interagency community. Additionally, *the US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation* (December 2005), co-authored by USJFCOM and the Department of State, uses MMEs when describing the major interagency activities during SSTR operations.

best practices; understanding how to implement best practices; and adapting TTPs. Figure 7 illustrates the central idea for conducting SSTR operations.

Figure 7. The Central Idea for Conducting SSTR Operations



4.a.(i). “High End” SSTR Operations

Each SSTR operation that the U.S. Government undertakes will differ in the mix and application of the MMEs. At the high end of the spectrum are SSTR operations associated with a U.S.-imposed regime change, assisting a faltering government, or responding to the collapse of a government caused by internal failure or military defeat. The worst case scenario, which would signify a “high end” SSTR operation, is discussed in the vignette in section 4.b.(vi). When conducting “high end” SSTR operations, the most critical determinant of success will be convincing the local populace to recognize the legitimacy of the existing or new government and to actively support the government’s efforts to build a “new domestic order.” If this situation includes the presence of armed insurgent forces, actively opposing the efforts of the existing or new host government, then this operation is a counterinsurgency (COIN) operation. During such “high end” SSTR operations, the Joint Force must not only provide force protection for military forces, but may also need to provide protection for USG civil agencies in order to allow these organizations to conduct their SSTR missions.

The design of the efforts to build a self-sufficient host nation capability and capacity in each of the MMEs should adhere to certain fundamental precepts.

- First, the lead responsibility for organizing and carrying out these concurrent nation-building efforts must be transitioned from the external military and civilian organizations to the existing or new host nation government as rapidly as possible. Transitions within the various MMEs are event-driven and will not occur simultaneously, but will proceed at their own pace; nor will transitions in a given MME occur at the same time in all regions of the host country.
- Second, the existing or new government must ultimately assume full responsibility for the range of challenges and activities designed to overcome the drivers of conflict and build the new political, economic, and security domestic order.
- Third, the provision of large scale assistance by the U.S. and other foreign militaries within SSTR operations will almost certainly prove acceptable to the local populace for only a limited period of time, after which external troops may increasingly be viewed as hostile imperial intruders rather than as a force for assistance and progressive change. Consequently, these militaries must make

substantial contributions to SSTR efforts as quickly as possible and then give way first to external civilian agencies and, ultimately, to host nation institutions to carry out medium to long-term reconstruction and development.

- Fourth, care must be taken, when providing direct assistance to a stricken nation, not to create extreme dependency on the coalition, or to provide services at U.S. standards that cannot be sustained over an extended period, thereby helping to undermine the legitimacy of the existing or new government.

4.a.(ii). Other Potential SSTR Operations

In major combat operations fought by the United States for objectives short of forcibly changing an adversary regime, some combination of the SSTR major mission elements may be carried out to achieve SSTR objectives in territories annexed from the defeated adversary. These MMEs also may be drawn upon to help care for refugees displaced by the war and to directly assist the recovery of partner nations in the region, which suffered serious damage during the conflict.

Under a less challenging security environment associated with helping a stable government cope with the consequences of a devastating natural disaster, the U.S. military will directly coordinate its support of humanitarian assistance, and, in some cases, reconstruction efforts with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other parts of the Department of State, including the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and the host nation. In addition, the U.S. military will often coordinate with multinational relief organizations. These efforts will generally focus on rapidly providing food, clean water, shelter, and emergency medical treatment to ease the suffering of disaster victims when their needs are most acute and will, if necessary, help to restore order in the disaster area. U.S. military personnel may also provide support to initial rebuilding efforts in the affected area.

4.b. Supporting Ideas

4.b.(i). Supporting Idea: Mechanisms for Achieving Unified Action

During the planning and conduct of military support to SSTR operations, it is

The actions of the military alone are insufficient to achieve success in SSTR operations.

imperative to achieve unity of effort through what the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* labels “unified action” in order to successfully integrate efforts across the “seams” of the wide range of U.S., nongovernmental organizations, and multinational military and civilian organizations involved in the many aspects of the operation. With respect to this *Military Support to SSTR Operations JOC*, **unified action** involves the successful integration and synchronization of the multidimensional efforts of the U.S. military, U.S. Government Agencies, and coalition partners as well as private sector actors and host nation agencies in pursuit of success in all of the MMEs.¹⁵ This unified action within and between the various mission elements is critical due to the strong interdependencies among the different rebuilding efforts, for example:

- Without the creation and maintenance of a safe, secure environment, there is little prospect that significant progress can be made in any of the other mission elements;
- Without progress in the other mission elements, it is unlikely that military forces will gain the trust and support of the population needed to gather timely and reliable intelligence that can enable them to find destabilizing forces and maintain a safe, secure environment;
- Progress in near and longer term reconstruction will rely heavily on the restoration of critical public infrastructure and essential services; and

¹⁵ Successful implementation of unified action requires appropriate legislation that provides the legal authority and rationale for increasing budgets and manpower necessary to meet the challenges of SSTR operations. The 2007 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is a first step in this direction. Currently, section 1222 of the NDAA tasks the Executive Branch to provide Congress a report that outlines the interagency operating procedures, roles and responsibilities, and required capabilities for the planning and conduct of stabilization and reconstruction operations.

- Successes in providing security and essential public services as well as visible progress in stimulating economic development are crucial to gaining the popular support and perception of legitimacy needed to create the new representative forms of governance that adhere to the rule of law and to carry out the many aspects of SSTR operations.

National Planning Guidance and a National Concept of Operations.

Unified action must begin with common USG objectives and goals. Both NSPD-44 and DODD 3000.05 task the Departments of State and Defense, respectively, to identify states at risk of instability where potential SSTR operations are highly likely to be conducted. As the U.S. Government lead for SSTR activities, the Secretary of State should develop a *National Planning Guidance*, in coordination and consultation with the Secretary of Defense.

A *National Planning Guidance* would provide a national strategy with USG-wide goals and objectives for each geographic region world-wide.

A *National Planning Guidance*, promulgated by the President, would provide USG-wide goals and objectives for each geographic region world-wide. Additionally, the *National Planning Guidance* would list those countries and sub-national regions with the potential for U.S. Government engagement in SSTR operations.¹⁶ This list would guide the development of standing interagency contingency plans, as well as serve as the unifying purpose for coordinated security cooperation activities in each region. When relevant and appropriate, SSTR contingency plans should be integrated with military contingency plans.

Unified action could also be further strengthened by the drafting and adoption of a *National Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for SSTR Operations*. This *SSTR CONOPS* would provide the basis for conducting SSTR operations, as well as for USG-wide exercises and rehearsals. This *CONOPS* would also create a useful framework for civil-military planning and for the rehearsal of key activities, including the processes of

¹⁶ DODD 3000.05, *Military Support to Stability, Security, Transformation, and Reconstruction* directs the development of “a list of countries and areas with the potential for U.S. military engagement in stability operations in consultation with DOD Components and U.S. Departments and Agencies.” Additionally, NSPD 44 – *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization* charges the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization of the Department of State to “coordinate interagency processes to identify states at risk of instability, lead interagency planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, and develop detailed contingency plans for integrated United States Government reconstruction and stabilization efforts...”

transitioning lead responsibility within the various major mission elements from external military to civilian-led organizations and ultimately to the existing or new host nation government.

In addition to having available national-level planning guidance and a *SSTR CONOPS*, the development of several important coordination mechanisms operating at the strategic, operational, and

A National Concept of Operations for SSTR Operations would provide the basis for conducting SSTR operations, as well as for USG-wide exercises and rehearsals.

tactical levels would assist in developing the agreed-upon goals, shared situational understanding, plans, and execution oversight required to achieve unity of effort. While each of the mechanisms at the differing operational levels will have a distinct focus and objective, planners and operators must remain cognizant that these levels will inherently involve overlapping roles and require close, coordinated collaboration to assure successful SSTR operations. Many of the capabilities described below do not yet exist and will need to be developed by the Secretary of State in coordination with the Secretary of Defense.

Unified Action at the Strategic Level. Interagency (IA) coordination at the strategic level will continue to be governed by the National Security Council process. In the event of a crisis, the National Security Council may either establish a new high-level IA coordination group or expand an existing group. This group would develop the long term vision and goals for SSTR operations, based on the *National Planning Guidance*.

Additionally, this group would promulgate guidance for coordination of IA activities during the operation and make decisions or recommendations on resource allocation issues.¹⁷ Membership in this group would include representatives from all of the federal departments and agencies involved in a particular SSTR operation.

Once USG strategic guidance is established, the coordination group should convene a series of interagency planning bodies, consisting of experienced planners from all the departments and agencies involved in the operation, would develop and rehearse the overall plan for the SSTR operation, as well as individual plans for each of the MMEs. The establishment of these planning bodies would require each of the relevant departments and agencies to create a cadre of civilian planners.

¹⁷ The State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) has a draft, not yet approved, operational concept for a "Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG)" that is similar to the high-level IA coordination group described in this JOC.

Unified Action at the Operational Level. In order to ensure unity of purpose, as well as unity of command, the development of a new interagency planning and execution oversight element, which could operate “split based” at both the headquarters of the geographic combatant command and forward in the field, would help ensure key perspectives, plans and capabilities from the various USG agencies involved in the SSTR operation are factored into the preparation of military plans and their execution. This IA planning element and execution coordination body¹⁸, subordinated to the regional combatant commander, would work closely with, and may be embedded into, the Combatant Command’s standing Joint Interagency Coordination Group.

The development of a new interagency coordination group, attached to either the senior U.S. civilian authority or the senior military commander on site, and able to be deployed to the area of operations to assist either of these senior leaders in integrating the multidimensional nation building activities, would also be useful. The group would maintain communications between the lower level interagency provincial teams and the senior U.S. representative in theater, thus helping channel information upward and guidance downward to the teams operating at the province level.¹⁹ Such a coordination group would require a cadre of deployable civilian personnel.

Unified Action at the Tactical Level. At the province level, interagency bodies embedded with the military or operating alone are valuable tools. The composition, organizational subordination, and modes of operation for these tactical interagency teams will be developed using the lessons learned from the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Iraq and Afghanistan, and from other SSTR operations undertaken in the past. PRTs would coordinate multi-agency activities on the ground. Therefore, these teams must be balanced with military and civilian personnel. As a result, relevant U.S. Departments and agencies will need to develop a cadre of deployable civilians to staff PRTs.²⁰

Multinational Involvement. All of these bodies, from the US-based strategic planning elements down to those operating at the province level in the field will, when appropriate, be expanded to include representatives from coalition partner militaries and civilian agencies as

¹⁸ S/CRS has a draft, not yet approved, operational concept for a “Civil-Military Planning Team” that is similar to the interagency planning and execution oversight element described in this JOC.

¹⁹ Today, this element has been designated the Advance Civilian Team Headquarters.

²⁰ S/CRS has a draft, not yet approved, operational concept for Advance Civilian Teams that are similar to the provincial level teams described in this JOC.

well as from the United Nations and other international and non-governmental organizations. Where possible and applicable, host nation planners should be integrated into the SSTR campaign design effort from the very outset.

4.b.(ii). Supporting Idea: Contingency Planning & Preparation

The objective of the planning and preparation stage of SSTR operations is to harmonize the many diverse civilian and military efforts within a comprehensive, integrated strategy for


Creation of a comprehensive, integrated strategy to provide an effective basis for harmonizing diverse civilian and military efforts is the central objective during the planning and preparation stage of SSTR operations.

achieving the host nation's new domestic order. Coordinated civil-military planning has the potential to substantially strengthen unified action; however, it also has the potential to slow down the planning process. This may present an unacceptable level of risk in situations where time is of the essence and rapidity of response is a critical determinant of ultimate success. Certain situations may necessitate an abbreviated SSTR operation planning process. However, experience has shown that the absence of advance coordinated planning can undermine the ultimate success of SSTR operations; therefore, abbreviated SSTR operation planning should be used only rarely and where risk of delay is deemed to be extreme.

Situation Assessment. At the outset of planning, a crucial planning component is the development of a comprehensive situation assessment or diagnosis that places a premium on developing an in-depth knowledge of the underlying causes and dynamics of the conflict and the relevant aspects of a society's local culture as well as its political, military and economic systems. In particular, understanding the drivers of instability and/or conflict should be a central feature of this first phase of the planning process. The goal of this assessment is to fill knowledge gaps to enable the interagency planning team to develop a coordinated strategy and identify critical supporting tasks that are tailored to the unique conditions in the society at hand. The assessment process will include an independent Red Team review based on the premise of how to use the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) elements of national power in order to affect the targeted political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) systems. This situation assessment must be continually refined and updated to reflect the latest intelligence and "on-the-ground" learning.

Desired End State, Goals and Objectives. The overall desired end state, major goals, and key objectives of SSTR operations should represent very significant achievements with regard to the creation of internal security, economic development and effective governance, and should be understood as laying the foundation for a more ambitious vision of the long term future (See Figure 8).²¹

Figure 8. Example of a SSTR Civil-Military Planning Template



When planning for the attainment of the SSTR operation goals and objectives, undertaken in conjunction and coordination with the Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and, in many cases, multinational partners, civil-military planners should:

- **Focus on event-driven stages and transitions** rather than employing a purely time-phased approach. There are two major "lead change" transitions during SSTR operations: the first is the hand-off of the leadership role in the several MMEs between the foreign military forces, who took the lead in most areas initially, and the external civilian agencies. The second transition is

²¹ Figure 8 is derived from, U.S. Joint Forces Command and DoS Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability, *U.S. Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation, Version One*, December 2005

between the external military and civilian agencies and the leadership of the existing or new host nation government. These transitions will very likely be neither simultaneous across the MMEs nor homogenous within all regions of the host nation at the same time for a given MME. These transitions are based upon clearly defined conditions established in the CONOPS and modified, if required, during the planning and execution phases. These conditions include, but are not limited to the expected security environment and the capability and capacity of the civilian organizations to carry out the activities needed to accomplish the mission.

- **Set the right trajectory** by ensuring that the initial activities undertaken within SSTR operations are consistent with and directly supportive of the longer term objectives and goals of the operation. This approach also emphasizes that actions taken in each mission element are not done in isolation, but rather as elements of a series of closely linked, concurrent civil-military efforts in a comprehensive and coherent rebuilding program. Setting the right trajectory also involves planning for the swift deployment of the essential military and civilian SSTR capabilities to the area of operations as soon as U.S./coalition forces begin to occupy and control host nation territory.
- **Pay close attention to cultural traditions and sensitivities** by focusing on the likely priorities and concerns of the existing or anticipated new host government. Additionally, civil-military plans must be informed in a manner described as “culturally and psychologically aware,” that is, these plans are developed in a process that considers how any action will likely be perceived and responded to by the local populace and/or hostile elements.
- **Allow for continuous learning and adaptation during execution** by recognizing there are likely to be tensions between the operational plan and unanticipated exigencies on the ground. Critical to the support of such adaptive plans is the establishment of responsive feedback channels that allow planners and units to continually observe, assess, understand, adapt, and anticipate from the outset of the intervention. Additionally, these feedback channels should engender regular adaptations and adjustments to various aspects of the plan.

SSTR-Related Security Cooperation Activities. While integrated civil-military SSTR planning is crucial, certain pre-crisis military security cooperation activities can help create the conditions for the successful

conduct of SSTR operations; or they can prevent the necessity for the conduct of SSTR operations in the future. Therefore, allocating adequate resources towards SSTR-related shaping activities prior to a crisis enables the U.S. Government to advance its interests using relatively modest amounts of targeted resources, rather than spending much more substantial, and often, massive amounts of resources to respond to a crisis. Finally, SSTR-related shaping activities enable the Joint Force, as well as U.S. civilian agencies and multinational partners to develop a better understanding of a specific region, which may prove critical for the successful planning and execution of SSTR operations.

SSTR-related security cooperation efforts are those activities that:

- Assist a fragile, stressed government or region thus preventing them from becoming seriously unstable, and/or
- Help build SSTR-related capabilities of partner countries in ways that directly support U.S. efforts with regard to the potential conduct of SSTR operations.

During pre-crisis and preventive security cooperation efforts, the Department of State has a central role. NSPD 44 charges the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) with coordinating SSTR activities and preventive strategies with foreign countries, international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations and private sector entities. S/CRS will also develop strategies to build partnership capacity abroad and seek to maximize nongovernmental and international resources for reconstruction and stabilization activities. Additionally, The Secretary of the Treasury is responsible for coordinating with international financial institutions and multilateral financing bodies regarding the Secretary of State's SSTR work. Military security cooperation efforts must be closely coordinated and integrated, where applicable, with other U.S. Government Department and Agencies.

Military security cooperation efforts in support of SSTR efforts must be closely coordinated and integrated, where applicable, with efforts of other USG departments and agencies.

Figure 9 highlights a preventive shaping effort currently being undertaken by U.S. military forces, other USG Departments and Agencies, and foreign militaries in the Horn of Africa.

Figure 9. SSTR-Related Shaping Activities in East Africa

**Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa:
Building SSTR-related Capacity and Preventing Instability**

Since 2002, Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) has been active combating terrorism and halting the growth of extremist groups, while assisting the people with their basic needs. These security cooperation activities help the countries in the Horn of Africa – Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti -- by creating more secure internal environments and thus strengthening regional stability. CJTF-HOA has approximately 1,400 U.S. forces on the ground and over 500 Coalition personnel at sea. CJTF also works in conjunction with regional partner governments, U.S. embassy personnel, USAID, and other U.S. government agencies.

In order to combat terrorism and enable regional stability, CJTF-HOA conducts both traditional and non-traditional military activities. Specific activities carried out in order to increase national and regional security include:

- Assisting in the creation of a Yemeni Coast Guard;
- Working with the Kenyan government to improve its capabilities in the areas of border control, law enforcement, criminal investigation, and airport and seaport security;
- Improving counterterrorism capabilities throughout the Horn of Africa.

Non-traditional military activities carried out in the region include building and repairing schools, medical facilities, and drilling wells in order to enable regional stability by helping to provide people with their basic needs. From September 2003 through March 2005 CJTF-HOA renovated 33 schools, eight clinics and five hospitals; dug 11 wells; and conducted nearly 40 medical and veterinary visits. Additionally, CJTF-HOA and USAID are developing processes and mechanisms to integrate with and support common, long-term development activities.

Steps toward more effective host nation governance have improved local conditions and set the stage to minimize tribal, ethnic, and religious conflict, decreasing the possibility of failed states or ungoverned spaces in which terrorists or armed insurgent groups can more easily operate or take shelter.

4.b.(iii). Supporting Idea: Establishing and Maintaining a Safe, Secure Environment

The objective of the efforts to establish a safe, secure environment is to create a situation where the security of the people, property, and

Within a safe, secure environment, the reconstruction efforts can proceed and the general populace can routinely go about its business.

livelihoods within the country is sufficient to allow the general populace to routinely go about its business. This includes freedom from external threats that could divert attention and limited resources from internal security efforts. A safe, secure environment will also facilitate the conduct of large scale, civilian-led external assistance efforts and host nation activities for reconstruction. Increased civilian participation enables the first key transition in SSTR operations as civilian-led external organizations providing assistance to the host nation assume lead responsibility across the various major mission elements.

Success across the several dimensions of SSTR operations is critically dependent on the ability of coalition military forces, working closely with reconstituted host nation security forces, to achieve a sustainable level of security in the face of determined, violent “spoiler” organizations. Ultimately, the ability of the existing or new host nation government to maintain a safe, secure environment—both internally and externally—will be a crucial factor in its gaining political legitimacy and widespread popular support. In order to permit the host nation government to focus on internal security in the early aftermath of a crisis, U.S. and coalition military forces will most likely assume direct responsibility for external security until the host nation can develop its own armed forces capable of protecting its territory from external threats. For example, one of the key activities undertaken by coalition military forces will be to secure borders and ammunition stores to preclude exploitation by hostile forces. This activity should be undertaken at the outset by coalition military forces while host-nation domestic military forces are carefully trained to take over the protection of the borders and ammunition stores as soon as is effectively possible.

In order to establish a safe and secure environment, it will be essential that the Joint Force in combination with its coalition partners, if present, have sufficient numbers of forces with the capabilities needed to establish order and create positive pre-conditions for reconstruction. At times, the numbers of military personnel required to carry out effective military support to SSTR operations will exceed the number of forces needed to prevail during the sustained combat of MCO.

Measured, Discriminate Offensive Operations. When establishing a secure environment in the face of anarchy or armed opposition, U.S. and coalition military forces will conduct offensive and defensive air and land operations in a targeted, measured and highly discriminate manner. In some cases, the opposition may take the form of an armed insurgency, which employs terrorism as one of its primary means of attack. While the Joint Force must map, neutralize, and eliminate these terrorist networks, it must use measured and discriminate force in doing so.

Joint and coalition military forces conducting a COIN operation in the face of determined armed insurgents, will mount carefully targeted offensive operations to:

Measured, discriminate military operations are designed to reduce enemy capabilities without alienating the local populace.

- Defeat, destroy or disrupt the coherence of hostile military forces;
- Kill or capture prominent insurgent leaders;
- Disrupt or preempt enemy operations; and
- Seize or destroy enemy support capabilities

Success in these efforts will greatly reduce enemy capabilities and discredit the enemy's reputation for effectiveness, while at the same time enhancing the reputation and effectiveness of the Joint and coalition forces and the host nation government.

Timely, measured and discriminate operations help to avoid furthering the insurgents' cause by mitigating potential negative effects, which might create more enemies during a given operation than those who are captured or killed. This approach should feature efforts to separate the hostile elements from the civilian populace. It will involve targeted raids on enemy force concentrations such as cordoning off specific areas and investigating specific locations to search for and apprehend individuals rather than resorting to destructive, fire-intensive "sweeps," which often produce substantial collateral damage. Finally, the success of measured and discriminate operations is heavily dependent on the availability of actionable intelligence, especially human intelligence, needed to precisely locate hostile forces and to carry out highly discriminate operations at the right time and in the right place, thus allowing the coalition forces to seize and maintain the initiative.

In order to establish a sufficiently secure environment for effective civilian-led reconstruction operations to take place, the Joint Force must

do more than just defeat organized military resistance. It must also conduct operations to secure in stride: population centers, essential national and regional resources, and key infrastructure, including critical transportation and communications nodes, and key medical, water, sanitation, and power generation facilities. These efforts to defeat organized military resistance and secure critical assets must often be accomplished simultaneously, not sequentially. While overwhelming speed and precisely applied firepower are essential to those elements of the Joint Force locating and destroying organized armed resistance, those responsible for securing key objectives will be more deliberate in their operations, relying less on firepower and more on other capabilities, including those resident outside the military arm of the unified action SSTR efforts.

Force Protection. The coalition military units and multinational civilian organizations conducting SSTR operations must be protected from the efforts of insurgents or other hostile spoiler groups, who will seek to disrupt their rebuilding efforts and kill or maim their personnel. This protection will involve a mix of preventive offensive operations noted above, combined with a variety of active and passive defense measures, including the establishment of protected areas (green zones), use of special security details, and specialized sniper and counter-sniper operations. Particular emphasis will be placed on protecting the military forces, their bases, their major movement routes, and critical supporting capabilities. Coalition defensive operations will also be mounted to protect the host nation leadership and critical infrastructure.

Recent experience has demonstrated that increasingly sophisticated IEDs, in particular, can pose a deadly threat to movements of materiel and personnel during SSTR operations. In the years ahead, additional threats will likely emerge, including possible terrorist use of chemical, biological or radiological weapons. Consequently, major efforts will be devoted to strategies and operations undertaken to counter high explosive IEDs and other advanced weapons. These will include attack operations to prevent or disrupt the manufacture and emplacement of IEDs and other weapons as well as active and passive defense measures to neutralize these devices prior to use and reduce the impacts of their successful detonation. Similarly, full dimensional protection measures must be undertaken to counter other critical threats such as those posed by suicide bombers, shoulder-fired, surface-to-air missiles, and unmanned aerial systems.

While effective force protection is an essential mission activity, it must not become the mission. During SSTR operations, direct personal interaction with the local populace is essential for developing supportive relationships and gaining the people's trust. Consequently, force

protection measures must be consistent with patrolling methods and other activities designed to facilitate extensive, routine contacts with the local citizens.

Persistent Presence with Small Tactical Units. Creating a secure environment will generally involve sustained tactical patrolling on a selective basis. This patrolling will be carried out in a way that produces close and culturally-sensitive interaction with local communities. These daily, grass roots, small unit operations should be marked by patience, persistence, and presence and a determination to grant no sanctuary to armed opposition elements. Small units, operating under mission orders, are particularly well suited for these persistent operations because they often act as their own intelligence “sensors” and can respond quickly to changing circumstances while developing and maintaining a rapport with the local people.

Dealing with WMD or Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Materials. If the U.S. military conducts SSTR operations in a country or region where stocks of WMD or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) materials are present as a legacy from the previous regime, then timely elimination of these WMD and CBRN stocks, delivery systems, and possibly production facilities will be crucial for establishing a safe, secure environment. WMD/CBRN elimination refers to a process of systematically locating, characterizing, securing, disabling, and/or destroying a state or non-state actor’s WMD/CBRN programs and related capabilities (weapons production, key personnel, knowledge, and delivery means).²² Seeking out and eliminating WMD and CBRN materials in the SSTR theater serves the dual purpose of protecting the intervention force in theater and defending the U.S. Homeland by preventing potential adversaries from acquiring WMD or CBRN materials that could be used against the United States.

Growing Host Nation Role. Foreign military commanders can leverage and enhance indigenous security and intelligence assets by closely coordinating their multi-dimensional security building efforts with host nation security forces and political authorities. The goal of such coordination will be to get local leaders actively involved as soon as possible in these efforts so that they develop a stake in the process. Securing host nation participation may complicate operations and its outcome and, in some cases, result in lower levels of efficiency and effectiveness. Despite these difficulties, the security building results will take deeper root if host nation leaders assume ownership early on for the problems and their solutions.

²² *National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NMS-CWMD)*. 13 February 2006

Multi-Dimensional Nation-Building Operations Are Essential to Creating a Secure Environment. Recent experience has clearly demonstrated that even measured, carefully targeted security operations conducted by U.S. military and Iraqi security forces are not as effective in establishing a safe, secure environment as a more comprehensive approach that includes concurrent operations across the full range of major mission elements, e.g., humanitarian assistance, restoration of critical infrastructure, economic and political development.

Joint Force Commanders will likely conduct multiple civil-military operations to support these ambitious, multidimensional and concurrent undertakings across several challenging “lines of operation” that cannot be conducted solely by civil affairs (CA) units. CA personnel can help bridge the gap between the military and civilian-led efforts, but they are incapable of adequately organizing and managing the huge reconstruction efforts involved. Therefore, other units, including not only engineers but also large numbers of combat and support units, will need to be incorporated into these robust, “industrial strength” civil-military nation building efforts from the very outset of these operations until such a time as can be safely transitioned to civilian organizations.


Flexible, Adaptable Resources. In order for the U.S. military to undertake broader reconstruction efforts that directly affect security by enhancing the well being of the people and keeping large portions of the adult labor force gainfully employed, operational commanders should have access to adequate contingency funds that can be flexibly and adaptively spent (“Money is ammunition”). Recent operations demonstrated the high value of exercising this discriminate use of flexible funds through the extensive and wide-ranging use of the Commander’s Emergency Reconstruction Program (CERP) funds. The availability of and flexibility in expending such funds will allow operational commanders to underwrite projects that provide humanitarian aid, restore essential public services, support the development of small and medium-sized businesses, and promote local political development in ways that produce tangible signs of progress within a relatively short time period. These visible accomplishments will help garner popular support and build momentum for longer term endeavors. Operational commanders should work with local community leaders to identify immediate, high-impact projects. Additionally, local efforts should be coordinated with larger reconstruction projects that are usually conducted by USAID and the Corps of Engineers.

4.b.(iv). Supporting Idea: Building Host Nation Capacity and Reducing the Drivers of Instability and Conflict

While significant initial progress with regard to the other major mission elements associated with the conduct of a high end SSTR operation is critical to the establishment of a safe, secure environment, as described above, other essential components of SSTR operations include: the delivery of humanitarian assistance as long as it is needed; the sustained progress in the repair and enhancement of critical infrastructure and essential public services; the support of economic development; and the creation of more effective and representative governance. All of the efforts of the external civil agencies and foreign militaries must be focused on helping the host government develop and effectively employ, as rapidly as possible, the new capabilities and capacity needed in these critical areas.

The host government needs to develop its indigenous security, economic and political capabilities in order to successfully ameliorate the drivers of internal instability and conflict within the context of the “new domestic order” they seek to build (See Figure 10). Building this new capacity is critical to enabling the host nation leaders at all levels to gain the popular support they will need to be able to carry out comprehensive nation building. The lion’s share of the international assistance to these host nation efforts across the MMEs, including security sector reform, will be undertaken by civilian rather than military organizations.

Figure 10. Building Host Nation Capacity and Reducing Instability and Conflict



From a U.S. perspective, adequate numbers of deployable U.S. civil agency capabilities are required to sustain the on-the-scene nation building assistance provided to the host nation across the full range of MMEs, including key elements of security sector reform. The initial cadre of civilian specialists from the Department of State, including USAID, the Department of the Treasury and so forth should be available to deploy rapidly to SSTR operations as soon as security conditions permit. This initial cadre will need to be backed by adequate numbers of deployable civilian personnel to sustain this multidimensional support over a period of at least a few years.

The sections that follow identify recommended practices to be employed during the lengthy period of capability and capacity building across the major mission elements within complex SSTR operations.

Coalition Management. A first order responsibility of the JFC leading multi-national SSTR-operations is to establish and implement a plan for effectively managing the coalition military force and other multi-national partners. This multi-national effort will generally consist of three separate entities: foreign military forces, foreign civilian government organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

The commander of the lead nation must be cognizant of all the capabilities, limitations, and varying rules of engagement within the military coalition and must appropriately manage and coordinate the efforts of the partner militaries throughout the duration of the mission. Additionally, the commander should leverage cultural and historical ties between coalition forces and the host nation that could positively impact the mission.

Non-military members of the coalition will not fall under the direct chain of command of the JFC; however, the JFC must continually coordinate activities with these entities in order to ensure unity of effort. Coordination with foreign, non-military government organizations and NGOs can be particularly challenging because these organizations typically have their own objectives and missions and will not necessarily want the coalition military forces to impinge on their independence and jeopardize their neutrality. Nevertheless, NGOs will often operate in the area of operation of the coalition forces and the responsibility for coordinating with and, in many cases, protecting their operations will fall on the commander of the lead force.

In many instances, a JFC leading a multi-national operation will be operating under an U.N. mandate and may function under a variety of U.N. structures in the host nation depending on the manner in which the U.N. Security Council Resolution is written and the extent of the U.N. structure established in the host nation. In light of this operational structure, the JFC and preferably all forces supporting the JFC, must be well trained regarding operations in a U.N.-mandated environment and must clearly understand their roles and responsibilities under these conditions and how they differ from conventional missions.

Broader Security Sector Reform. In order to expand and solidify the safer, more secure environment, U.S. and coalition forces will focus on training and equipping host nation security forces (both military and police forces), integrating them into the conduct of internal security operations and enabling them to take the lead in the conduct of internal security operations as rapidly as is feasible. Critical elements of this activity include:

- **Embedding U.S. and coalition advisory teams into host nation units.** These advisory teams enable continuous, “round-the-clock” training as well as facilitate the development of positive relationships with the local populace that build trust and rapport.
- **Establishing a joint, military-police intelligence sharing and planning framework.** The joint participation of military and

civilian police units from intelligence assessment to planning and ultimately to the execution of operations will generally produce more effective operations. Intelligence sharing between military and police organizations enables coordinated actions against threats to public security (e.g., organized crime, civil disturbances).

- **Avoiding “mirror imaging” the organization and capabilities of U.S. forces.** Security training of host nation militaries must be specifically tailored for the types of forces that the host nation needs to develop and local military traditions.
- **Building the institutional infrastructure.** A critical component of this reform effort will be the development of the public sector institutional infrastructure (e.g., Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, National Security Council, Human Rights Ombudsman, etc.) needed to support the new military and police forces. In virtually all cases, this must be designed to reflect civilian control consistent with the legal norms of the host country; it must also focus on the creation of a judicial system, including correctional institutions, to enforce the rule of law.

Deliver Humanitarian Assistance. The objective of the effort to deliver humanitarian assistance (HA) is to rapidly relieve or reduce human suffering, as well as to improve the capacity of the host nation to provide essential services to its population, and better prepare for future disasters. It is also important to closely coordinate all HA efforts with civilian agencies (public and private) to expedite the transition from U.S. military to U.S. and host nation delivery of HA and subsequent stabilization activities.

Humanitarian assistance is generally limited to providing victims of the disaster immediate access to the basic human necessities, e.g., clean water, food, shelter,

Delivery of humanitarian assistance requires close coordination and integration with medical and other relief organizations.

sanitation, public health, and medical care. In this situation, immediate medical coordination and integration with other relief organizations will be essential, as well as the ability to rapidly augment the host nation's medical infrastructure.²³

HA can be delivered either following governmental failure due to internal collapse or defeat in war, or following a devastating natural disaster, such as a flood, tsunami, or earthquake. In the wake of major theater war, especially in a contested environment, the Joint Force will most likely play a leading role in delivering HA during the initial stages of the operation. Under these circumstances, joint medical units must be prepared to provide specialized care to non-U.S. military personnel such as the local populace, detainees, and contractor support personnel.

Reconstitute Critical Infrastructure and Essential Services. At the outset of SSTR operations, especially within a contested, hostile environment, efforts to reconstitute critical infrastructure and restore essential services will primarily be a military-led activity. The objectives of this effort will be to:

- Protect and secure critical national and regional infrastructure, natural resources, and strategically important institutions, e.g., government buildings, religious sites, courthouses, communications needed to support SSTR efforts. The Joint Force Commander must consider limiting and/or avoiding damage to this infrastructure during the planning and execution of combat operations and ensure that proper force is applied to secure this important infrastructure; and

²³ *Health Capabilities in Stability Operations*, White Paper, USJFCOM.

- Establish or create procedures and processes for the provision of essential services, e.g., providing clean water, telecommunications services, electrical power, sewage and garbage disposal, medical care²⁴, and education that are deemed essential by the Joint Force Commander to promote stabilization and to preserve freedom of action for the Joint/coalition force. Services deemed “essential” will vary according to the assigned mission and will be based on numerous factors such as national objectives, expected duration of the mission and international legal obligations. Commanders at all levels will conduct civil-military operations to meet legal obligations and preserve their own freedom of action.

The rapid reconstruction of critical infrastructure, including key transportation systems and telecommunications networks, and the restoration of essential public services must be accomplished with an eye toward the creation of a durable foundation that supports a wide

As the security environment becomes increasingly safe and secure, implementation of infrastructure reconstruction efforts will be transitioned to civilian-led organizations and the existing or new host government.

range of longer term efforts to develop a diversified, modern economy in the host nation that is effectively integrated into the global economy. Therefore, it will be essential for the military to work with U.S. and international civilian organizations and host nation government officials to identify, fund, and directly support strategic projects in those areas critical to demonstrating visible signs of progress. Rebuilding efforts should also use local labor where possible, which fosters employment and gives the populace positive options through clear improvement in quality of life.

As the security environment becomes increasingly safe and secure, the planning and implementation of longer term infrastructure reconstruction efforts will be transitioned to civilian-led external assistance organizations and the existing or new host government.

Support Economic Development. In the short-term, the objectives of the effort to support economic development are to assist in the early

²⁴ Recent studies have highlighted the importance of focusing medical efforts on host nation capacity-building rather than on U.S. military direct patient care. Providing direct medical care to civilian populations can raise a population’s expectation that their government or organizations will be able to continue to provide the same level of care. Since this is not likely to be the case, the resulting frustration can promote dependency, make the transition more difficult, and, ultimately, undermine the legitimacy of the host nation’s health care system. See *Health Capabilities in Stability Operations*, White Paper, USJFCOM.

recovery of local and national economic activity and to lay the foundation for sustained economic growth. In the long-term, the objective is to launch economic development activities that establish a legal, financial, and regulatory environment where economic activity is derived from legitimate, formal transactions in accordance with the rule of law and to foster successful economic development in a variety of key economic sectors.

While civilian entities will lead the bulk of this mission element, U.S. and coalition military forces will play a supporting role within the short-term objective of stimulating economic recovery, especially during SSTR operations mounted in

Civilian organizations will lead the bulk of economic development efforts; however, U.S. and coalition military forces will play a supporting role by assisting in the stimulation of economic recovery.

connection with a theater war. Military activities will tend to focus on generating small projects that employ members of the local population and help generate income, e.g., municipal clean-up, restoration of basic infrastructure. It is crucial that the efforts of U.S. and coalition forces in the economic arena set the conditions (i.e. set the trajectory) for the longer-term economic development objectives. As noted earlier, operational commanders will often use their CERP funds in innovative and entrepreneurial ways to assist near- and mid- term, local business development efforts.

However, it is possible for CERP-funded activities to actually retard longer-term economic recovery if they do not contribute to the longer-term, sustainable growth objectives. Close coordination with U.S. and international development agencies at the earliest feasible point in SSTR operations will help ensure these development activities complement one another.

Long-term economic development efforts will be led by these U.S. and international development agencies (such as USAID and the World Bank) NGOs, and private sector actors—all working closely with the emerging host country leadership, both national and local. Achieving the longer-term objective of creating stable economic institutions and processes and supporting significant development within key economic sectors requires initiatives that address the specific economic root causes of instability and conflict in the host country, which may include:

- Reducing widespread poverty, deprivation, and socio-economic inequalities by developing and implementing a comprehensive and inclusive economic growth strategy.

- Enhancing workforce skills and employment opportunities through targeted education and training programs, developed with local community involvement and market-sensitive private sector engagement.
- Reducing illicit, informal black market activities through legal reforms, strengthened enforcement activities, and aggressive efforts to provide alternative income sources to the traffickers.
- Putting in place the necessary incentives (laws, policies and practices) that enable domestic and international investors to create jobs, social benefits and hope for the future.

Establish a Representative, Effective Government and the Rule of Law. In the wake of a MCO in which U.S. and coalition forces have forcibly expelled the adversary regime and occupied its territory, the United States and its coalition partners, as occupying powers, will need to create a temporary “military government.” Despite being labeled military, the occupation government may be military, civilian, or mixed in composition. In most cases, this temporary government will likely be a civilian led civil administration that exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority throughout the occupied territory in accordance with international law. Guidance regarding the precise form of governance and the performance of these key governing functions will be determined by the President, in consultation with his senior advisors, and may also involve an international policy making group. The highest priority tasks for this civil administration will be the maintenance of law and order, which will be carried out in a manner that seeks to preserve the pre-existing legal order (where applicable), and the care of the civilian population to ensure it receives adequate food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. Other key functions of this administration will include reconstituting essential public services and fostering the recovery of the national economy.²⁵

During military support to SSTR operations, efforts will get underway to rebuild or help create host nation government structures that will ultimately assume the responsibility to govern. These new structures should be representative and inclusive, responsive to constituents, and accountable for their actions. Political reform efforts must take into account deep-seated rivalries and distrust among ethnic and religious communities, should they exist. The new political arrangements must provide all groups/communities with the opportunity to participate

²⁵ Schmitt, Michael N. “The Law of Belligerent Occupation.”
<http://www.crimesofwar.org/special/Iraq/news-iraq5.html>

meaningfully in the governance process, including mechanisms to protect minority groups from discriminatory actions by the majority.

Activities within this mission element will be led primarily by civilian organizations. However, in the opening weeks of military support to SSTR operations, especially when the environment is hostile and contested, the Joint Force may need to engage in early restoration of local governance activities such as restoring city/regional councils, developing transparent reconciliation processes, and resolving property claims and disputes.

Military efforts in the area of governance must take into account existing local and cultural laws. Additionally, early governance reform activities must help set the trajectory toward the political end states established as both the mid-term goals and long term vision associated with the SSTR operation.

4.b.(v). Supporting Idea: Conduct Strategic Communication

Strategic communication is the focused United States Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power.²⁶ The objective of strategic communication efforts and supporting communication strategies is to understand and engage key local and foreign audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to achievement of overall stabilization goals and objectives. Reaching the local population quickly through the media is critical to defeating extremist and criminal challenges to local stability. Therefore, strategic communication efforts must be pro-active, anticipating opposition strategic communication capabilities and preempting or rapidly responding to adversary communication methods.

The development of strategic communication messages must take cultural sensitivities and perceptions into account. In order to facilitate this effort, DOD personnel expertise and capabilities should be enhanced with the appropriate linguistic, historical, and cultural training. Sustaining credibility at all levels is an essential goal for strategic communication. Therefore, strategic communication messages cannot be empty rhetoric: in order to maintain credibility and trust with friends and foes alike, including the American domestic audiences and coalition partners, all messages must be consistent and transparent. Additionally,

²⁶ 2006 QDR Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication, paragraph 1.3, p. 3.

overall strategic communication plans must be coordinated with the Staff Judge Advocate, public affairs officer, as well as information operations and operational planners to ensure messages are in compliance with DOD and other national guidance.²⁷

Throughout the operation, the primary supporting capabilities for strategic communication within the DOD—public affairs, information operations, and defense support to public diplomacy, must be continually coordinated and synchronized, both horizontally and vertically:

- **Information Operations.** The focus of the IO planning will be on influencing, disrupting, corrupting, or usurping *foreign* adversary human and automated decision-making processes, while protecting human and automated decision-making processes of the Joint Force engaged in SSTR operations.²⁸ To conduct IO, the Joint Force will employ offensive and defensive information means to degrade, destroy, exploit, and influence an adversary's information-based process while protecting its own.²⁹
- **Public Affairs.** The focus of public affairs planning will be on conducting public information, command information, and community relations activities that provide truthful, timely, and factual unclassified information about SSTR activities to host nation, and U.S. domestic and foreign audiences. These information activities will be critical to efforts to manage expectations, as well as to gaining and sustaining support within each of the target audiences.
- **Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD).** The focus of DSPD is to understand, engage, influence and inform key foreign audiences through words and actions to foster understanding of U.S. policy and advance U.S. interests regarding SSTR operations. DSPD incorporates DOD's support to USG strategic communication, and can collaboratively shape the operational environment in support of USG information activities through security cooperation efforts. DSPD may also involve multi-media programs to assist selected host nations and the DOS in reaching foreign target audiences, but may also involve specific actions by DOD forces.³⁰

²⁷ Observation: Sea Viking 04 Final Report p. 4

²⁸ JOPEs DRAFT p. 4

²⁹ JP 2-01.2, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*.

³⁰ Visual Information is also an important capability for strategic communication. Generally, visual information provides the ability to advise, plan, synchronize, and

4.b.(vi). Vignette

The following is an illustrative vignette that describes how the future JFC might conduct a successful high-end SSTR operation within a hostile, contested environment. Additionally, the vignette highlights the linkages among the military problem, military support to SSTR operations, the central idea, supporting ideas, and anticipated functional and operational capabilities. This vignette also illustrates how the JFC can collaborate with multinational partners, as well as the pre-SSTR operation planning activities that contribute to the successful execution of SSTR operations.

Beginning in 2015, an international coalition, led by the U.S. military, becomes engaged in a major combat operation aimed at decisively defeating a foreign government that had provided protracted materiel support to a global terrorist organization responsible for detonating a WMD in the largest city of an important U.S. ally.

Joint major combat operations, waged concurrently on the land, and from the air, sea and space, are conducted with precision and achieve decisive effects, resulting in the swift defeat of the perpetrating government. In the wake of major sustained combat and the defeat of the perpetrating government, the Joint Force swiftly adjusts itself accordingly to carry out a successful stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operation. The SSTR operation objective in the near term is to establish a safe secure environment throughout the host nation, recognizing that this is the necessary precondition for success in all other parts of the SSTR effort. This security effort is part of a multidimensional campaign conducted concurrently to effectively reduce the drivers of societal conflict and, as a result, build a new domestic order in the host nation and, more broadly, viable peace internationally in which the host nation's populace can prosper long into the future.

The seeds for success in this high-end SSTR operation were sown prior to the intervention during relevant preparatory, planning and theater security cooperation activities that included the following salient components:

rapidly acquire and distribute visual products (still and video) to external audiences in support of commanders' strategic and operational objectives operations. All VI information activities are essential to information sharing between DOD elements, U.S. Government agencies, and multinational partners prior to, during, and after the completion of SSTR operations.

- A high-level, joint interagency planning team, through effective coordination mechanisms, developed an in-depth situational understanding of the complex dynamics of the society at hand, including the wider environment. The body of information openly shared across both civilian and military agencies included an expert assessment of the causes, ideologies, aims, organizations, capabilities, methods/approaches, and external support for irregular threats that already existed in the host nation and those that would likely coalesce in the wake of the deposed government. Other areas probed included identifying the sources of societal conflict that required a mitigation plan, as well as the key power brokers whose influence and legitimacy should be (and was) significantly leveraged throughout the SSTR operation;
- This joint planning team, comprised of senior military and civilian representatives, developed the long-term vision for the host nation, the goals for the operation based on situation-specific intelligence, guidance for integration of interagency activities during the operation, and decisions or recommendations on resources. Policy conflicts and disconnects were effectively identified and reconciled as part of this planning process, thus increasing the scope of unified action in the field once the operation commenced;
- This planning body also ensured that the individual plans for each of the MMEs within the SSTR operation were synchronized and aligned with the long-term vision for the host nation's new domestic order;
- The MCO and SSTR operation phases of the campaign were planned coextensively in Washington, at the headquarters of the geographic combatant command as well as forward in the field to ensure interagency perspectives, plans and capabilities were sufficiently factored into the preparation of military plans and their execution. For instance, SSTR operation-related considerations affected the targeting of ordnance during major combat operations to avoid inflicting unnecessary destruction to the host nation's critical civilian infrastructure;
- A Joint Force estimator modeling program defined the force requirements for this situation-specific operation. The real-time database identified available units and potential sources to fill capability gaps and supported adaptive planning throughout the campaign. This enabled rapid identification and generation of appropriate interagency deployment packages for such tasks as governance, judicial, law enforcement, economic, humanitarian,

and reconstruction support. In the initial weeks and months after major combat operations ceased, these interagency packages enabled the Joint Force to immediately respond to urgent humanitarian needs as well as administer public services with an appropriate mix of military and civilian assets, while minimizing delays to providing sustained relief;

- An international initiative that was launched ten years before this crisis had achieved its primary goal of training and equipping a standing military force, a majority hailing from neighboring nations. These states chose to enter the coalition thereby greatly increasing the capacity of the combined force available to help conduct the SSTR operation, while also strengthening its perceived legitimacy in the eyes of the indigenous populace; and
- Other military shaping activities in the region that bore fruit during this SSTR operation in the form of the granting of critical transit and access arrangements to support coalition military operation to defeat the perpetrating state included the establishment of combined training, exercises and other military-to-military interactions; creating programs to cover such issues as defense security cooperation, international military education and training, and international arms cooperation.

Consistent with the well coordinated MCO and SSTR operation plans, major combat operations left minimal damage to the host nation's critical infrastructure, including its major natural resource sites and governmental buildings; this, respectively, proved critical to spearheading efforts at reviving the economy and creating a new host nation government. Despite this advantage, the war severely disrupted virtually all aspects of normal life in most parts of the country.

In the wake of our victory in the sustained combat phase of the war, the Joint Force quickly shifted its dynamic mix of conventional and unconventional forces to counter irregular threats that sought to take advantage of the subsequent turmoil and chaos to undermine our SSTR operation efforts, in particular our operations to create a safe, secure environment. Tactical defensive operations occurred seamlessly following Joint Force control of populated territory, preventing the incidence of property crimes from surpassing anticipated levels during the brief, albeit critical period, of anarchy following MCO. The Joint Force, recognizing that security of the populace is the indispensable cornerstone of SSTR operation success, executed the plan to integrate and synchronize all the major mission elements—establishing a safe, secure environment, meeting obligations to the civilian population under

international humanitarian law, restoring critical infrastructure, assisting economic development, helping create effective representative governance, and supporting strategic communication, with varying emphasis at different times and in different parts of the nation, depending on the situation on the ground. Each major mission element was, on the whole, conducted in consonance with the other MMEs, thus minimizing the size and number of “gaps” that adversarial forces were able to exploit.

Joint Force Commanders entered the SSTR operation recognizing that there was no “success template” that could be laid down across the various intervention activities, and therefore allowed for the different MMEs to be flexibly tailored to unique situations that invariably arose over time. In particular, significant educational and training resources related to SSTR operation activities across the DOD enterprise equipped unit leaders with the adaptive mindset and operational art necessary to succeed in this particular operation. Troop leaders, from the JFC all the way down to company commanders, were prepared physically, emotionally and intellectually to work in and through the post-war chaos, turning the inherent complexity of the situation to their collective advantage. U.S. troops were similarly well trained and otherwise prepared to conduct this challenging SSTR operation.

Adaptability was also supported by superior tactical intelligence resulting from sufficient manpower focused on its timely collection and rapid analysis. In fact, the high fidelity and accuracy of the tactical intelligence created for many units a benevolent, self-reinforcing cycle that underpinned success across the other MMEs: it enabled timely, discriminative, precise operations to counter insurgent activities, thus enhancing the perceived legitimacy of ongoing coalition operations, leading to more sources of actionable intelligence, which in turn furthered counterinsurgent efforts, and so on.

In terms of force sizing, the extensive use of small units further enabled tactical operations to be conducted in a timely, measured and discriminate fashion. Large unit operations were occasionally necessary to conduct a full-scale offensive operation against concentrated bands of adversaries in well identified locations. However, the Joint Force achieved greater success in countering various insurgent elements with smaller units that fostered closer contact with the populace and avoided over-reliance on “kill or capture” operations that, while decisive, risked creating more animosity as a function of collateral damage.

Progress within the other MMEs, conducted concurrently, allowed the overall coalition SSTR effort to reduce the underlying drivers of conflict in this host nation. These drivers included widespread official corruption,

degraded essential services, longstanding and intermittent bouts of sectarian conflict, and the lack of an independent judiciary and/or trusted penal system. The initial phase of activities across the MMEs set the right trajectory towards the primary SSTR operation objective: each major activity thrust was aligned with ultimately producing a self-sustaining host nation capability and capacity to govern its own affairs without substantial external support.

Execution of the capability and capacity building efforts within the MMEs was greatly facilitated by the augmented use and availability of adequate amounts of CERP funds, which had become a highly flexible funding mechanism following appropriation reforms by the U.S. Congress. Enhanced CERP funds coupled with flexible contracting arrangements, many prepared prior to the onset of combat operations, ensured that no time-sensitive opportunities to jumpstart SSTR activities were squandered.

Commanders used these CERP funds for a variety of projects, all of which resulted in measurable progress towards improving the provision of essential services (such as food, power, clean water, the disposal of waste, and rudimentary medical care), developing the economy, strengthening the infrastructure (including building and restoring schools and hospitals) in a sustainable manner, and developing key institutions (e.g., police forces, an independent judiciary and media, etc.) that are essential ingredients for a prosperous civil society.

One critical way that unit leaders used resources for the greatest effect was by exercising best efforts to get the general population actively involved in confronting challenges and implementing culturally acceptable solutions. Assisted by economic development specialists from USAID, the Joint Force played a key role in both short-term and long-term economic development efforts. A paramount consideration of the short-term effort was to find productive ways to employ a large percentage of the young and middle-aged men of the host nation, which meant in effect that almost every household had a legal means for income. The focus on local employment as a key consideration in contracting initial reconstruction activities also prevented insurgent elements from capitalizing on concrete elements of civil discontent.

Security was further strengthened over time with a full-scale, comprehensive effort to train, equip and advise host nation security forces, both police and armed forces. The Joint Force in this endeavor benefited greatly from global security cooperation programs that created a number of discrete, deployable teams from multinational coalition nations, which were specifically designed to fulfill this mission. A general precept that guided enormous progress in this dimension was avoiding

the temptation to train the new host nation security forces “in our own U.S. image.” Instead, the Joint Force trained and developed the indigenous military in a manner that befitted their purpose and situation. This allowed many indigenous forces to combine with the Joint Force in conducting internal security operations earlier than would have been possible if full-scale combat capabilities were first required.

The Joint Force also achieved significant benchmarks early on in the SSTTR operation in promoting lasting institutions of responsible, representative governance. In particular, the Joint Force was able to accurately assess the state of the existing society’s legal system and helped the indigenous people develop and implement a new legal system that struck a balance between local cultural norms and universal notions of how the rule of law is supposed to operate (e.g., proportionate punishment, the right to a fair trial, humane treatment of prisoners, etc.).

Beyond the rule of law, the SSTTR operation made significant progress in forming, and in many cases reforming, the governmental bureaucracy. These political reform efforts were designed to provide effective, inclusive, and responsive governance at all levels, while also accommodating deep-seated rivalries and distrust that existed among certain ethnic and religious communities. The new political arrangements were always crafted with an eye towards ensuring that all indigenous groups/communities had the opportunity to participate meaningfully in their political governance.

Civilian experts from U.S. Government agencies and multinational organizations were often supported by military units in this political endeavor. However, in some cases, where resources were limited, the military engaged directly and principally in these wide-ranging tasks. As a result, the public administration of the host nation was noticeably strengthened over time, especially once ministries were established along functional lines that were able to manage the host nation’s governmental programs in a reasonably effective manner. Ministries were formed at the national, provincial and local levels, and were comprised in rough proportion to the society’s overall ethnic demographics to prevent potential sectarian strife over the control and use of these institutions.

The Joint Force strived to transition governance responsibilities to these indigenous ministries as soon as was practicable to, among other things, demonstrate to the populace the limited duration of the Joint Force intervention and to provide avenues for the indigenous government to win the allegiance of its population, further isolating the insurgency and other sources of instability. The combination of restoring capability and building self-sufficient capacity facilitated the transition to legitimate

local governance and the ultimate reduction of coalition efforts leading eventually to full withdrawal.

Certainly, the Joint Force's collective effort to build the capacity and capability of the host nation was not without significant, albeit isolated, setbacks. The use of widespread, indiscriminate violence by insurgent elements at key junctures challenged the credibility of the Joint Force to provide for the lasting security of the host nation populace.

Longstanding and deep-seated ethnic and religious rivalries within the society also proved a vexing challenge to surmount. Nonetheless, the Joint Force helped institute a number of national and sub-national reconciliation mechanisms to diffuse tensions and provided a number of productive, peaceful venues aimed at fostering inter-ethnic trust and transparency.

During the final stage of the SSTR operation, the Joint Force successfully culminated its efforts to have the host nation be able and willing to accept responsibility for the conduct of activities across all the major mission elements. This transition was based on the new host nation government's capacity to sustain the rule of law, meet humanitarian needs, provide essential services, foster economic development, and govern responsibly without substantial external assistance. In the final months of this last transition stage to host nation self-reliance, the Joint Force withdrew in substantial numbers until only a modest routine military assistance team remained in the host nation.

4.c. Capabilities

Stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operations are manpower and resource-intensive operations and mandate the development of an agile Joint Force, as well as a robust civilian force, that can work cooperatively with each other, allowing the collective effort to carry out effective full-spectrum operations. The effective conduct of SSTR operations requires a range of functional and operational capabilities across the Joint Force, U.S. Government departments and agencies, and multinational organizations. **Functional capabilities** are those capabilities that allow the Joint Force to perform tasks that occur across all aspects of SSTR operations; thus, functional capabilities are required to successfully carry out each of the major mission elements throughout the campaign, e.g. creating shared situational awareness among diverse stakeholders. **Operational capabilities** focus on capabilities associated with accomplishing a desired end state (i.e. major mission element) within a SSTR operation, e.g., delivering supplies of

food and medicine, rebuilding a power generation and distribution system.

Functional and operational capabilities are made up of a series of critical and enabling capabilities. **Critical capabilities** focus on the primary abilities that allow the force to accomplish a desired effect. **Enabling capabilities** support critical capabilities and allow a force to accomplish an important task that underpins the accomplishment of a desired effect. Due to the multiple foci of the various SSTR mission elements, many required capabilities may reside outside of DOD. This section outlines ten SSTR operational capabilities and their corresponding critical and enabling capabilities. For a detailed enumeration of the desired objectives, effects, and capabilities needed to produce the desired effects see Appendix C.

4.c.(i). Functional Capabilities

U.S. Government Institutional Agility. U.S. government institutions must be able to distribute funds, goods, and services rapidly and efficiently to successfully conduct SSTR operations. Critical and enabling capabilities include:

- **Critical capability.** The ability for DOD to systemically plan, program, budget, and allocate funds for SSTR operations.
 - **Enabling capability.** The ability for U.S. commanders to have access to contingency funds that can be spent in a flexible and adaptive manner.
 - **Enabling capability.** The ability for U.S. commanders to rapidly bring to bear reliable, expert foreign and domestic contractor support a wide variety of SSTR undertakings.
- **Critical capability.** The ability of all U.S. government agencies to systematically plan and execute humanitarian, development, and reconstruction projects within an integrated strategic and operational framework.
 - **Enabling capability.** The ability for non-DOD U.S. Government Agencies to plan for, rapidly deploy, and sustain civilian specialist assets in the area of SSTR operations for longer tours to maintain the needed capacity and expertise.

Command, Control and Coordination. In military terms, command, control, and coordination is the ability to exercise authority and direction

by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of SSTR missions. Additionally, command, control, and coordination is the ability to conduct a coherent operation with the interagency, coalition, and multinational partners. Therefore, DOD must be able to effectively coordinate and integrate efforts between elements of the Department of Defense, engaged U.S. Government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations in order to accomplish SSTR objectives.³¹

This capability requires the ability to manage and make available relevant, accurate information to appropriate stakeholders. Inherent in this capability must be the ability to protect and defend information systems by ensuring their integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation.³² Critical and enabling capabilities include:

- **Critical capability.** The ability to conduct integrated, parallel, and distributed planning within DOD, across the U.S. interagency community, with coalition partners, and with other multinational organizations.³³
- **Critical capability.** The ability to conduct seamless knowledge sharing among DOD elements, U.S. Government agencies, and multinational partners prior to, during, and after the completion of SSTR operations.

Battlespace Awareness/Understanding. Battlespace Awareness/Understanding is the ability to develop situational awareness and understanding and to produce intelligence through persistent and pervasive observation of all domains.³⁴ Critical capabilities and enabling capabilities include:

- **Critical capability.** The ability to develop intelligence requirements, coordinate and position the appropriate collection assets, from the national to the tactical level.³⁵
 - **Enabling capability.** The ability to conduct persistent surveillance of critical enemy activities in difficult and denied areas by using sensors to capture timely, relevant, and interoperable source data.

³¹ Capabilities are adapted from the following Joint Capability Areas (JCAs): Joint Command & Control, Joint Interagency, and Joint Net-Centric Operations.

³² Adapted from Tier 2 JCAs, “Knowledge Sharing and Information Assurance” under Joint Net-Centric Operations.

³³ Adapted from Tier 2 JCA, “Plan Collaboratively” under Joint Command & Control.

³⁴ Derived from Joint Battlespace Awareness JCA.

³⁵ Derived from Tier 2 JCA, “Planning & Direction” under Joint Battlespace Awareness

- **Enabling capability.** The ability to locate, tag, and track hostile elements in all domains.
- **Enabling capability.** The ability to produce information from exploited all-source information and provide intelligence in an assured environment.
- **Enabling capability.** The ability to make information and intelligence available to support the User-Defined Operational Picture.³⁶
- **Enabling capability.** The ability of DOD to disseminate information to the appropriate members of the interagency community to ensure consistent communication.
- **Critical capability.** The ability to understand the cultural context in which operations take place, including the culture of coalition partners, civilian organizations and agencies.

Joint Force Generation and Management. In order to successfully execute SSTR operations, Services must be able to man, equip, and organize resources to ensure the JFC has the capabilities to support USG objectives for the SSTR campaign.³⁷ Additionally, Services must be able to develop the Joint Force with the necessary skills to conduct SSTR operations. Critical and enabling capabilities include:

- **Critical capability.** The ability to craft rotation policies among the major components of the U.S. Joint Force.
- **Critical capability.** The ability to package personnel and equipment into optimal units to meet the demands of a JFC for SSTR operations.³⁸
 - **Enabling capability.** The ability to provide DOD surge or niche capabilities from a steady state environment to a crisis, in ways that do not degrade combat readiness.
- **Critical capability.** The ability to instruct personnel to enhance their cognitive thought and leadership skills for SSTR missions.³⁹

³⁶ Derived from Tier 2 JCAs, “Analysis and Production and Dissemination and Integration” under Joint Battlespace Awareness.

³⁷ Derived from Joint Force Generation JCA.

³⁸ Derived from Tier 2 JCA, “Organize” under Joint Force Generation.

³⁹ Derived from Tier 2 JCA, “Educate” under Joint Force Generation.

- **Enabling capability.** The ability for Professional Military Education to develop curricula that includes: foreign language capabilities, regional area knowledge, and understanding of foreign governments and international organizations.
- **Critical capability.** The ability to train DOD and non-DOD personnel to enhance their ability to perform specific SSTR-functions and tasks.⁴⁰
 - **Enabling capability.** The ability to develop and conduct individual training for DOD and IA personnel on the planning, conduct, and support of SSTR operations.
 - **Enabling capability.** The ability to develop and deliver extensive, specialized, pre-deployment SSTR training across several operational areas.
 - **Enabling capability.** The ability to collect, assess, and rapidly integrate SSTR lessons learned into DOD SSTR training curricula at all venues and levels.

4.c.(ii). Operational Capabilities

Create a Safe, Secure Environment. Creating a safe, secure environment requires the elimination or neutralization of hostile actions or influences of adversaries, criminal elements, or other illicit actors. Additionally, creating a safe, secure environment requires the Joint force to enable sufficient security to allow the conduct of large-scale, civilian and host nation-led activities. Critical and enabling capabilities include:

- **Critical capability.** The ability of Joint Force to conduct focused yet measured offensive and defensive operations against the leaders and military forces of hostile groups.
 - **Enabling capability.** The ability to plan and execute security operations with coalition partners and the military and police forces of the existing or new host government.
 - **Enabling capability.** The ability to use both kinetic and non-kinetic means to capture and defeat terrorists/insurgents, often

⁴⁰ Derived from Tier 2 JCA, “Train” under Joint Force Generation.

in dense urban environments, while minimizing collateral damage.

- **Enabling capability.** The ability to carry out a mix of targeted offensive attacks to disrupt IED manufacture and emplacement, active defense efforts to neutralize implanted devices, and passive defense measures to reduce the impact of detonated IEDs.
- **Enabling capability.** The ability to interdict, seize and eliminate WMD and CBRN materials, as well as the ability to operate in an environment in which WMD/CBRN has either been used or is threatened to be used by adversary forces.
- **Critical capability.** The ability for the U.S. Armed Forces to train, equip, and advise large number of foreign forces in the full range of SSTR-related skills.

Deliver Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief. Delivering humanitarian assistance/disaster relief requires capabilities that enable the immediate provision of basic necessities (e.g., water, food, sanitation, public health, medical care) in order to relieve or reduce human suffering. Additionally, providing humanitarian assistance involves helping improve the capacity of the host nation to provide essential services to its population, and better preparing the nation for future disasters. Critical and enabling capabilities include:

- **Critical capability.** The ability to coordinate and integrate with USG agencies and multinational organizations in order to support humanitarian assistance and disaster response efforts.
- **Critical capability.** The ability to obtain and redistribute essential supplies, food and medicine from within an affected nation, or deliver essential items that are not available locally or regionally, to disaster sites.
 - **Enabling capability.** The ability to promptly deliver and operate water purification and electrical power generation equipment in devastated regions.
 - **Enabling capability.** The ability to provide flexible and agile joint medical forces, capable of conducting sustained operations in multiple locations.

- **Enabling capability.** The ability to provide timely emergency medical treatment and prophylaxis to people impacted by natural or man-made disaster;
- **Enabling capability.** The ability to construct and operate camps and facilities for migrant and/or internal displaced person

Reconstitute Critical Infrastructure and Essential Services.

Rebuilding/improving critical infrastructure requires capabilities that enable the protection of critical and strategically important institutions. Critical and enabling capabilities include:

- **Critical capability.** The ability to conduct immediate reconstruction of critical infrastructure and essential services.
 - **Enabling capability.** The ability to protect key infrastructure that provides essential services to the population.
 - **Enabling capability.** The ability to repair or construct roads, bridges, tunnels, and airfields for road, rail, and air transport.
 - **Enabling capability.** The ability to repair or build primary health care clinics, administrative buildings and hospitals.
 - **Enabling capability.** The ability to build or restore schools and provide text books and supplies.
 - **Enabling capability.** The ability to build or restore water purification plants, electrical power generation grids and telecommunication networks.
 - **Enabling capability.** The ability to repair or construct sewage disposal systems and collect and dispose of garbage.

Support Economic Development. Supporting economic development requires capabilities that enable the establishment of economic processes and institutions where the bulk of economic activities are derived from legitimate transactions. These capabilities include those that will be largely provided by civilian economic development specialists from the interagency community, who are supporting SSTR operations. Critical and enabling capabilities include:

- **Critical capability.** The ability to assist the host nation in developing near-term reconstruction and longer-term economic

development plans, e.g., reestablishing the central bank and government payment mechanisms, rationalizing revenues and expenditures.

- **Enabling capability.** The ability to design, fund and implement public works initiatives to rapidly provide employment for the local populace.
- **Enabling capability.** The ability to help plan and financially support a variety of small-, medium-, and large-sized business development programs to stimulate the economy.

Establish Representative, Effective Government and the Rule of Law. Promoting representative, effective local and national governance requires capabilities that enable the establishment of political institutions and processes that will be accepted as legitimate by the host nation population. Critical and enabling capabilities include:

- **Critical capability.** The ability of the USG to deploy and sustain civilian specialists over an extended period to assist the host nation in developing the new governance system.
- **Enabling capability.** The ability to assist in the drafting of local and national laws, designed to establish the rule of law, accommodate communal differences, and provide legislative oversight of military and security forces.
- **Enabling capability.** The ability to assist in the organization and training of personnel to work in the various government ministries and agencies.
- **Enabling capability.** The ability to assist in the creation of civic groups, political parties and representative governance at the national, province and local levels.
- **Enabling capability.** The ability to assist in the training elected officials at all levels about constituency building, accountability, transparency, participatory decision-making and conflict management.

Conduct Strategic Communication. Conducting effective strategic communication requires capabilities that enable the Joint Force to engage key local and foreign audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to achievement of overall SSTR goals and objectives. Critical and enabling capabilities include;

- **Critical capability.** The ability to design and disseminate information in various forms to influence the views of adversary, neutral, and supportive audiences.
 - **Enabling capability.** The ability to broadcast U.S. and coalition intentions and to help the local population find quick survival relief.
 - **Enabling capability.** The ability to plan and synchronize joint public information and joint psychological operations activities and resources in order to communicate truthful, timely, and factual unclassified information about SSTR activities to the appropriate audiences within the area of operation.

5. Risks and Mitigation

There are several risks associated with conducting SSTR operations that could significantly hinder the conduct of or even halt such operations. These risks include:

- **The American public and its elected representatives will not allow the United States to get involved in a major SSTR operation, or should such involvement be permitted, will prove unwilling to sustain their support for the conduct of a lengthy, costly SSTR campaign. (high risk)**
 The recommended mitigation strategy focuses on having DOD and its IA partners develop the rapidly deployable and sustainable capabilities that will be needed to rapidly initiate effective operations within and across the MMEs of a major SSTR operation. These capabilities will include strategic communication strategies and means that complement other SSTR operations. SSTR strategic communication strategies must include a strong focus on keeping the American public accurately informed prior to and during the course of the SSTR operation.
- **The U.S. interagency community will not develop sufficient amounts of the kinds of deployable civilian capabilities needed to conduct an extended SSTR campaign. (high risk)**
 The recommended mitigation strategy involves working with the National Security Council, as well as other applicable U.S. departments and agencies, and with the Congress to gain the support needed to build SSTR-related civilian capabilities in the interagency.

- **DOD force structure and force management policies will not facilitate the recruitment, development, rotation, and sustainment of sufficient military personnel for extended duration and manpower intensive SSTR operations. (medium risk)**

The recommended mitigation strategy involves the development and experimentation of innovative concepts that enable the Joint Force to conduct SSTR operations without a dramatic increase in manpower, e.g., the development of niche and surge capabilities within the Total Force, longer tours to maintain force structure, and on-the-ground expertise.

- **In the coming years, the U.S. military will abandon the very significant new approaches that have recently been implemented to prepare American military forces to effectively conduct multi-dimensional SSTR operations. (low risk)**

The recommended mitigation strategy is to ensure that U.S. military personnel are taught at all levels during their training and Professional Military Education (PME) to understand the importance of SSTR operations for U.S. national security and to recognize these operations as one of their most important and challenging missions.

- **Multiple external actors, including the U.S. military and interagency elements, will prove unable to integrate their efforts across the SSTR operation's multidimensional mission elements with those of the existing or new host nation government during a high end SSTR operation and thus the operation will not succeed in creating the new domestic order or a viable peace. (low risk)**

The recommended mitigation strategy is to give priority to developing and exercising integration mechanisms for the planning and conduct of SSTR operations.

6. Implications

This *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations JOC* can provide the basis for operational and force development as well as further joint concept development and experimentation, including various types of wargaming. While this joint operating concept identifies a series of key conceptual elements as well as many joint capabilities that should play important roles in future SSTR operations, there is much that needs to be done to further refine our understanding of the concepts and capabilities U.S. military forces will require to ensure we can effectively conduct both preventive and reactive SSTR operations.

6.a. Operational and Force Development

The vision of SSTR operations laid out in this JOC makes clear that U.S. Joint Forces must be appropriately trained, ready, and equipped to provide the essential military support needed to carry out the several key aspects of these complex, contingency operations. U.S. military personnel, from the senior leaders to the most junior troops, will need to internalize the idea that preparing for and, when needed, conducting the many challenging tasks associated with stability and reconstruction operations are essential “core” missions for the U.S. Armed Forces as they help provide for the Nation’s defense.

Many of the most important military capabilities needed to carry out effective SSTR operations are discussed in Section 4.c. above. Measures to enhance several of these capabilities such the development of new counterinsurgency doctrine and multiple efforts to develop more effective means to counter IEDs are well underway. Other capability development efforts could flow out of the completion of a capabilities-based assessment (CBA) based on a more detailed JIC focused on a key aspect of this JOC (see below for the suggestion that a JIC-CBA combination be developed from this JOC).

In addition, the effort being led by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on behalf of the Secretary of Defense to implement the many specific initiatives set forth in DOD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, is designed to push forward improvements in many areas covered in this JOC. These include enhancing SSTR capabilities with regard to:

- Interagency and DOD operational and intelligence planning;

- Training, education and personnel management, with particular focus on key specialized skills such as foreign area officers, civil affairs, global public health, psychological operations, and joint public affairs;
- Rapid demonstration and fielding of urgently needed DOD, U.S. Government agency, and multinational service and agency capabilities;
- Expanded means to build international partner capabilities and capacity for conducting SSTR operations; and
- Improved training and education for DOD military and civilian personnel in operations in a U.N./international environment.

6.b. Concept Development and Experimentation

The Joint Concept Development and Experimentation (JCD&E) Community, in accordance with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02B, *Joint Operations Concept Development Process*, may consider nominating a selected aspect of this JOC for the drafting of a Joint Integrating Concept and/or for additional follow-on experimentation.

This *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations JOC* should serve as a primary resource to assist designers of Title 10 and interagency wargames and other experiments in identifying key problems to address and potential solutions to these problems to test during experimentation on SSTR operations. During experiments and wargames, relevant modeling and simulation tools should be utilized to develop and test potential SSTR courses of actions and assess potential outcomes of actions.

This JOC identifies a high-level overarching problem and proposed conceptual solution for conducting future SSTR operations. However, responding to adaptive future adversaries in situations with the potential for posing any one or a combination of the four strategic challenges identified in the concept creates, in fact, a number of problems for which we must find more specific and detailed solutions. Solutions to these gaps or shortfalls may be found in realistic, focused experimentation and gaming events, which leverage technological advances in the public and private sectors, and thorough examination of lessons learned in on-going and future real world SSTR operations “laboratories.”

Identifying solution sets for the problems associated with SSTR operations is a continuous, ongoing process. The collaborative Joint Concept Development and Experimentation community has identified two key SSTR operations challenges, briefly discussed below, as the initial priority candidates for assessment in focused experimentation venues over the next few years. These experiments will seek to replicate the anticipated future operational environment and to facilitate a competition of ideas from which various candidate solutions may be derived. Those key SSTR operations challenges are:

6.b.(i). Assessing DOD's ability to fulfill its SSTR-support role

During SSTR operations, key transitions will place DOD in a support role, e.g., supporting other civilian agencies in reconstruction activities, supporting the host nation in their security sector reform. It is essential to identify and to understand the critical tasks and capabilities required for key transitions during SSTR operations. This exercise should focus on how tasks and capabilities change as DOD takes on a more supportive role in SSTR operations. In order to incorporate the necessary subject matter experts and practitioners, within both DOD and non-DOD organizations, this exercise could be conducted in a virtual, distributed manner.

6.b.(ii). Testing the SSTR Operations JOC on its own merits

A potential wargame could test the validity of the central and supporting ideas by assessing if a JFC could build an operational plan based on the *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations JOC*.

Further recommendations for assessment are referenced in Appendix D-2.

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Appendix B - Abbreviations and Acronyms

| | |
|----------------|--|
| AO | Area of Operation |
| CA | Civil Affairs |
| CBA | Capabilities-Based Assessment |
| CBRN | Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear |
| CERP | Commander's Emergency Response Program |
| CJCSM | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum |
| CJTF | Combined Joint Task Force |
| CONOPS | Concept of Operations |
| CRSG | Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group |
| DIME | Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic |
| DOD | Department of Defense |
| DODD | Department of Defense Directive |
| DOTMLPF | Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Education, Personnel, and Facilities |
| EW | Expeditionary Warfare |
| HA | Humanitarian Assistance |
| HOA | Horn of Africa |
| HUMINT | Human Intelligence |
| IA | Interagency |
| IED | Improvised Explosive Device |
| IO | Information Operations |
| JCA | Joint Capability Area |

| | |
|---------------|---|
| JFC | Joint Force Commander |
| JIACG | Joint Interagency Coordination Group |
| JIC | Joint Integrating Concept |
| JOC | Joint Operating Concept |
| JP | Joint Publication |
| MCO | Major Combat Operations |
| MME | Major Mission Element |
| MN | Multi-National |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NCOE | Net-Centric Operational Environment |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| NEO | Noncombatant Evacuation Operations |
| PME | Professional Military Education |
| PMESII | Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information |
| PRT | Provincial Reconstruction Teams |
| OSD | Office of the Secretary of Defense |
| S/CRS | Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization |
| SA | Security Assistance |
| SO | Stability Operation |
| SSTR | Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction |
| TRADOC | United States Army Training and Doctrine Command |
| TTP | Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures |

| | |
|----------------|--|
| USAID | United States Agency for International Aid |
| USG | United States Government |
| USJFCOM | United States Joint Forces Command |
| USMC | United States Marine Corps |
| UW | Unconventional Warfare |
| WMD | Weapons of Mass Destruction |

Appendix C - Table of Objectives, Operational Effects and Capabilities

This section outlines the desired objectives, effects and capabilities within each of the SSTR mission elements in pursuit of the end state. The **end state** is defined as the achievement of full host nation responsibility across the major mission elements. The **objectives** describe the necessary conditions to achieve the end state. **Effects** describe a change to a condition, behavior or degree of freedom. **Capabilities** describe the abilities required to execute a specified effect.

The tables reflect and expand upon the capabilities enumerated in section 4.c. While each capability is described in isolation, during a SSTR operation, many of the below capabilities will be utilized in a simultaneous and reinforcing manner.

| Objectives | Effects | Critical Capabilities | Enabling Capabilities |
|--|--|---|---|
| Achieve U.S. Government Institutional Agility | Distribute funds, goods, and services rapidly and efficiently to successfully conduct SSTR operations. | The ability for DOD to systematically plan, program, budget, and allocate funds for SSTR operations. | The ability for U.S. commanders to have access to contingency funds that can be spent across the MMEs in a flexible and adaptive manner. |
| | | | The ability for U.S. commanders to rapidly bring to bear reliable, expert foreign and domestic contractor support cost for a wide variety of SSTR undertakings. |
| | | The ability of all U.S. government agencies to systematically plan and execute humanitarian, development, and reconstruction projects within an integrated strategic and operational framework. | The ability for non-DOD U.S. Government agencies to plan for, rapidly deploy, and sustain civilian specialist assets in the area of SSTR operations for longer tours to maintain the needed capacity and expertise. |

| Objectives | Effects | Critical Capabilities | Enabling Capabilities |
|--|---|--|-----------------------|
| Provide Unified Action through Joint Command, Control, and Coordination | <p>Exercise authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of SSTR missions.</p> | <p>The ability to conduct integrated, parallel, and distributed planning within DOD, across the U.S. interagency community, with coalition partners, and with other multinational organizations.</p> | |
| | <p>Coordinate and integrate efforts between elements of the Department of Defense, engage U.S. government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.</p> <p>Manage and make available relevant, accurate information, and transform it into shared knowledge.</p> <p>Protect and defend information systems by ensuring their integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation.</p> | <p>The ability to conduct seamless knowledge sharing among DOD elements, U.S. Government agencies, and multinational partners prior to, during, and after the completion of SSTR operations.</p> | |

| Objective | Effects | Critical Capabilities | Enabling Capabilities |
|---|---|--|--|
| Establish Responsive Battlespace Awareness / Understanding | <p>Develop situational awareness and understanding and produce intelligence through persistent and pervasive observation of all domains.</p> <p>Convince the indigenous population to provide actionable intelligence</p> | The ability to develop intelligence requirements, coordinate and position the appropriate collection assets, from the national to the tactical level. | The ability to conduct persistent surveillance of critical enemy activities in difficult and denied areas by using sensors to capture timely, relevant, and interoperable source data. |
| | | | The ability to tag, track and localize hostile elements in all domains. |
| | | | The ability to produce information from exploited all-source information and provide intelligence in an assured environment. |
| | | | The ability to make information and intelligence available to support the User-defined Operational Picture. |
| | | | The ability of DOD to disseminate information to the appropriate members of the interagency and other non traditional partners to ensure consistent communication. |
| | | The ability to understand the cultural context in which operations take place, including the culture of coalition partners, civilian organizations and agencies. | |

| Objectives | Effects | Critical Capabilities | Enabling Capabilities |
|--|---|---|---|
| Conduct Joint Force Generation and Management | <p>Man, equip, and organize resources the Joint Force in order to ensure the JFC has the capabilities to support USG objectives for the SSTR campaign.</p> <p>Develop a Joint Force with the necessary SSTR skills.</p> | The ability to craft rotation policies among the major components of the U.S. Joint Force. | |
| | | The ability to package personnel and equipment into optimal units to meet the demands of a JFC for SSTR operations. | The ability to provide DOD surge or niche capabilities from a steady state environment to a crisis, in ways that do not degrade combat readiness. |
| | | The ability to instruct personnel to enhance their cognitive thought and leadership skills for SSTR missions. | The ability for Professional Military Education to develop curricula that includes: foreign language capabilities, regional area knowledge, and understanding of foreign governments and international organizations. |
| | | The ability to train DOD and non-DOD personnel to enhance their ability to perform specific SSTR-functions and tasks. | The ability to develop and conduct individual training for DOD and Interagency personnel on the planning, conduct, and support of SSTR operations. |
| | | | <p>The ability to develop and deliver extensive, specialized, pre-deployment SSTR training across several operational areas.</p> <p>The ability to collect, assess, and rapidly integrate SSTR lessons learned into DOD SSTR training curricula at all venues and levels.</p> |

| Objectives | Effects | Critical Capabilities | Enabling Capabilities |
|--|--|--|--|
| Establish and Maintain a Safe, Secure Environment | Elimination or neutralization of hostile actions or influences of adversaries, criminal elements, or other illicit actors. | The ability of the Joint Force to conduct focused yet measured offensive and defensive operations against the leaders and military forces of hostile groups. | The ability to plan and execute security operations with coalition partners and military police forces of the existing or new host government. |
| | <p>Enable sufficient security to allow the conduct of large-scale, civilian and host nation-led activities.</p> <p>Environment affords limited opportunities for taking violent action</p> <p>The protection of the lives, property, and livelihood of local population from hostile acts or influences.</p> <p>Creating an environment of civil obedience</p> | | <p>The ability to use both kinetic and non-kinetic means to capture and defeat terrorists/insurgents, often in dense urban environments, while minimizing collateral damage.</p> <p>The ability to carry out a mix of targeted offensive attacks to disrupt IED manufacture and emplacement, active defense efforts to neutralize implanted devices, and passive defense measures to reduce the impact of detonated IEDs.</p> <p>The ability to interdict, seize, and eliminate WMD and CPBRN materials, and operate in an environment in which WMD/CBRN has either been used or is threatened to be used by adversary forces.</p> <p>The ability train and equip host nation military in border and internal security</p> |
| | | The ability for the U.S. Armed Forces to train, equip, and advise large number of foreign forces in the full range of SSTR-related skills. | |

| Objectives | Effects | Critical Capabilities | Enabling Capabilities |
|--|--|--|--|
| Deliver Humanitarian Assistance | Immediate provision of basic necessities in order to relieve or reduce human suffering. | The ability to coordinate and integrate with USG agencies and multinational organizations in order to support humanitarian assistance and disaster response efforts. | |
| | Provide immediate access to the basic human necessities at the level customary for that region. | | The ability to promptly deliver and operate water purification and electrical power generation equipment to devastated regions. |
| | Support indigenous skilled personnel (doctor’s nurses, engineers, technicians, etc.) to supplement aid delivery in order to develop host nation capacity to care for its citizens. | The ability to obtain and redistribute essential supplies, food and medicine from within an affected nation, or deliver essential items that are not available locally or regionally, to disaster sites. | The ability to provide flexible and agile joint medical forces, capable of conducting sustained operations in multiple locations. |
| | | | The ability to provide timely emergency medical treatment, prophylaxis, and clothing. |
| | | | The ability to construct, operate, and maintain camps and facilities for migrant and/or internal displaced person |
| | | | The ability to manage crowds of refugees/victims |
| | Manage relief efforts in a culturally sensitive manner | | The ability to provide forage and veterinary care for livestock of refugees |
| | | | The ability to expeditiously deliver/redistribute from local sources sufficient supplies of food, medicine, temporary shelter into austere locations from bases on land and sea. |
| | | | The ability to store and secure supplies of food and medicine at austere locations |
| | | | The ability to manage and isolate sanitary waste facilities; includes mortuary and body recovery/disposal. |
| | | | The ability to deploy and sustain civil-military teams to initiate public health programs. |

| Objectives | Effects | Critical Capabilities | Enabling Capabilities |
|-------------------------------------|---|---|--|
| Support Economic Development | Establishment of economic processes and institutions where the bulk of economic activities are derived from legitimate transaction. | The ability to assist the host nation in developing near-term reconstruction and longer-term development plans. | The ability to design, fund, and implement public works initiatives to rapidly provide employment for the local populace. |
| | <p>Establishment of legitimate business and financial systems.</p> <p>Creation of immediate employment for the local population</p> <p>Isolate and reduce illicit informal transactions.</p> <p>Develop a diverse modern economy in the host nation that is integrated into the global economy and attracts international investment.</p> | | The ability to help plan and financially support a variety of small-, medium-, and large-sized business development programs to stimulate the economy. |

| Objectives | Effects | Critical Capabilities | Enabling Capabilities |
|--|---|---|---|
| Reconstitute Critical Infrastructure and Essential Services | <p>Enable the protection of critical and strategically important institutions.</p> <p>Create a functioning transportation, power, waste management, electric, education, housing, and health infrastructure customary for the local region.</p> <p>Promote a public capacity to build and sustain infrastructure.</p> <p>Establish an environment where there are visible signs of progress.</p> <p>Create an environment of cooperation with local government officials and civil organizations to identify strategic project.</p> | <p>The ability to conduct immediate reconstruction of critical infrastructure and essential services.</p> | <p>The ability to identify and protect key infrastructure that provides essential services to the population.</p> <p>The ability to repair or construct roads, bridges, tunnels, and airfields for road, rail, and air transport.</p> <p>The ability to repair or build primary health care clinics, administrative buildings and hospitals in a manner that can be sustained by the host nation.</p> <p>The ability to build or restore schools and provide text books and supplies, in a sustainable manner and in coordination with the host nation.</p> <p>The ability to build or restore water purification plants, electrical power generation grids and telecommunication networks.</p> <p>The ability to repair or construct sewage disposal systems and collect and dispose of garbage.</p> |

| Objectives | Effects | Critical Capabilities | Enabling Capabilities |
|---|---|--|---|
| Establish a Representative, Effective Government and the Rule of Law | Establishment of political institutions and processes –both interim and long term --that are accepted as legitimate by the host nation population. | The ability of Joint Force to engage in early restoration of local governance activities | <p>The ability to provide security to enable voters to register and vote in elections</p> <p>The ability to establish jails and prisons</p> |
| | <p>Establish basic tenets of the rule of law and governance</p> <p>Establishment of a credible judiciary</p> <p>Host nation police forces capable of enforcing law.</p> <p>Establishment of a system of rights</p> <p>Participation of the host nation population in the political process.</p> | The ability of the USG to deploy and sustain civilian specialists over an extended period to assist the host nation in developing the new governance system. | <p>The ability to assist in the drafting of local and national laws, designed to establish the rule of law, accommodate communal differences, and provide legislative oversight of military and security forces.</p> |
| | | | <p>The ability to assist in the organization and training of personnel to work in the various government ministries and agencies.</p> <p>The ability to assist in the creation of civic groups, political parties, and representative governance at the national, province, and local levels.</p> |
| | | | <p>The ability to assist in the organization and conduct of elections.</p> <p>The ability to assist in the training elected officials at all levels about constituency building, accountability, transparency, participatory decision-making and conflict management.</p> |

| Objectives | Effects | Critical Capabilities | Enabling Capabilities |
|--|--|---|---|
| Conduct Strategic Communication | Engage key local and foreign audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to achievement of overall SSTR goals and objectives | The ability to design and disseminate information in various forms to influence the views of adversary, neutral, and supportive audiences | The ability to broadcast U.S. and coalition intentions and to help the local population find quick survival relief. |
| | Establish integrated communication operations: one voice, one message | | The ability to plan and synchronize joint public information and joint psychological operation activities and resources in order to communicate truthful, timely, and factual unclassified information about SSTR activities to the appropriate audiences within the area of operations |
| | Establish an environment where the actions of the Joint Force, as well as coalition members and civilian entities are seen as legitimate | | The ability to assess short and long-term affects of communication messages to ensure civil compliance and support. |
| | | | The ability for a single communications entity to craft and synchronize messages to directly support civil-military activities. |

Appendix C-2: Joint Capability Area Matrix

| SSTR Capability | | Most Relevant JCA(s) | | Comparison - Implications |
|-----------------|---|--|---|--|
| | | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | |
| | U.S. Government Institutional Agility. U.S. government institutions must be able to distribute funds, goods, and services rapidly and efficiently to successfully conduct SSTR operations | Joint Command & Control Joint Logistics Joint Shaping Joint Stability Operations Joint Interagency/IGO/N GO Coordination | Exercise Command Leadership; Manage Risk Joint Deployment/Rapid Distribution; Agile Sustainment; Joint Theater Logistics; Multinational Logistics Building Military Partner Capability; Building Military Partner Capacity Basic Services Restoration; Humanitarian Assistance; Reconstruction All Tier 2 Joint IA/IGO/MN/NGO Coordination JCAs | JCAs don't specifically address distribution of funds |
| | The ability for DOD to systemically plan, program, budget, and allocate funds for SSTR operations | Joint Force Management | Future Capability Identification; Planning | JCAs don't cover PPB&E cycle |
| | The ability for U.S. commanders to have access to contingency funds that can be spent in a flexible and adaptive manner. | Joint Force Management | Future Capability Identification; Planning | JCAs don't cover PPB&E cycle |
| | The ability for U.S. commanders to rapidly bring to bear reliable, expert foreign and domestic contractor support a wide variety of SSTR undertakings. | No Tier 1 JCAs | No Tier 2 JCAs | JCAs don't address contingency funds; ties to Tier 2 Restoration of Basic Services under Joint Stability Operations. |

| SSTR Capability | | Most Relevant JCA(s) | | Comparison - Implications |
|-----------------|--|--|--|--|
| | | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | |
| | The ability of all U.S. government agencies to systematically plan and execute humanitarian, development, and reconstruction projects within an integrated strategic and operational framework. | <p>Joint Force Management</p> <p>Joint Logistics</p> <p>Joint Stability Operations</p> | <p>Future Capability Identification; Planning</p> <p>Joint Deployment/Rapid Distribution; Agile Sustainment; Operational Engineering; Force Health Protection; Joint Theater Logistics; Logistics Information Fusion; Multinational Logistics</p> <p>Security; Peace Operations; Basic Services Restoration; Humanitarian Assistance; Reconstruction</p> | JCAs don't specifically address contractor support |
| | The ability for non-DOD U.S. Government Agencies to plan for, rapidly deploy, and sustain civilian specialist assets in the area of SSTR operations for longer tours to maintain the needed capacity and expertise | Joint Stability Operations | Security; Peace Operations; Basic Services Restoration; Humanitarian Assistance; Reconstruction | JCAs do not specifically address non-DOD USG support to SSTRO using appropriate civilian expertise deployed to SSTR operations |
| | Command, Control, Coordination: In military terms, command, control, and coordination is the ability to exercise authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of SSTR missions. | Joint Command & Control | <p>Exercise Command Leadership</p> <p>Building Military Partner Capability; Building Military Partner Capacity</p> <p>All Tier 2 Joint IA/IGO/MN/NGO Coordination JCAs</p> | |

| SSTR Capability | | Most Relevant JCA(s) | | Comparisons-Implications |
|-----------------|--|-------------------------|--|--|
| | | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | |
| | The ability to conduct integrated, parallel, and distributed planning within DOD, across the U.S. interagency community, with coalition partners, and with other multinational organizations | Joint Command & Control | Operational Planning; Develop Joint/Coalition Campaign Plan; Develop Plans Across full ROMO; Coordinate w/MSN Partners to Gain Actionable Commitment | JCAs specifically address joint planning with non-DOD or non-military entities (JIINC) |
| | The ability to conduct seamless knowledge sharing among DOD elements, U.S. Government agencies, and multinational partners prior to, during, and after the completion of SSTR operations. | Joint Command & Control | Operational Planning; Develop Joint/Coalition Campaign Plan; Develop Plans Across full ROMO; Coordinate w/MSN Partners to Gain Actionable Commitment | JCAs specifically address joint planning with non-DOD or non-military entities (JIINC) |

| SSTR Capability | | Most Relevant JCA(s) | | Comparison - Implications |
|-----------------|---|---|--|---|
| | | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | |
| | Battlespace Awareness/Understanding. The ability to develop situational awareness and understanding and to produce intelligence through persistent and pervasive observation of all domains. | Joint Information Operations | Computer Network Exploitation | |
| | The ability to develop intelligence requirements, coordinate and position the appropriate collection assets, from the national to the tactical level | Joint Information Operations Joint Special Operations & Irregular Warfare Joint Battlespace Awareness | Computer Network Exploitation Special Reconnaissance Observation & Collection (All Domains); Processing & Exploitation (incl. all “-INT”s); Science & Technology | JCAs do not specifically mention use of sensors as intelligence collection assets, however their use is inherent in military collection plans and architectures |
| | The ability to conduct persistent surveillance of critical enemy activities in difficult and denied areas by using sensors to capture timely, relevant, and interoperable source data. | Joint Net-Centric Operations Joint Battlespace Awareness | Observation & Collection (All Domains); Processing & Exploitation (All “-INT”s) | |
| | The ability to tag, track and localize hostile elements in all domains. | Joint Special Operations & Irregular Warfare Joint Battlespace Awareness | Special Reconnaissance Observation & Collection (All Domains); Processing & Exploitation (All “-INT”s) | JCAs do not specifically address tagging and tracking adversaries |

| SSTR Capability | | Most Relevant JCA(s) | | Comparison - Implications |
|-----------------|--|---|--|---------------------------|
| | | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | |
| | The ability to produce information from exploited all-source information and provide intelligence in an assured environment. | <p>Joint Net-Centric Operations</p> <p>Joint Battlespace Awareness</p> <p>Joint Command & Control</p> | <p>Knowledge Management</p> <p>Analysis & Production (incl. Indications & Warning, Current Intelligence, General Military Intelligence, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Operational Intel & Targeting Intel, Counter Intelligence, & Predictive Intelligence); Dissemination & Integration (incl. all subcategories)</p> <p>Develop & Maintain Shared Situational Awareness & Understanding (incl. all subcategories)</p> | |

| SSTR Capability | | Most Relevant JCA(s) | | Comparison - Implications |
|-----------------|---|--|---|---------------------------|
| | | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | |
| | The ability to make information and intelligence available to support the User-Defined Operational Picture. | Joint Net-Centric Operations Joint Battlespace Awareness Joint Command & Control | Knowledge Management Analysis & Production | |
| | The ability of DOD to disseminate information to the appropriate members of the interagency and other non-traditional partners to ensure consistent communication | Joint Net-Centric Operations Joint Battlespace Awareness Joint Command & Control | Knowledge Management | |
| | The ability to understand the cultural context in which operations take place, including the culture of coalition partners, civilian organizations and agencies. | | Knowledge Management | |

| SSTR Capability | | Most Relevant JCA(s) | | Comparison - Implications |
|-----------------|--|--|--|---|
| | | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | |
| | Joint Force Generation and Management. In order to successfully execute SSTR operations, Services must be able to man, equip, and organize resources to ensure the JFC has the capabilities to support USG objectives for the SSTR campaign. Additionally, Services must be able to develop the Joint Force with the necessary skills to conduct SSTR operations. | Joint Force Management Joint Force Generation Joint Logistics Joint Command & Control | Joint Deployment/Rapid Distribution; Agile Sustainment; Joint Theater Logistics; Multinational Logistics Synchronize Execution Across All Domains (Enable Self-Synchronization of Subordinate Forces, Synch Operations w/MSN partners & other agencies, Synch Execution Between/Across Phases) Global Force Management Man; Equip; Organize; Develop Skills (incl. all subcategories in each) | |
| | The ability to craft rotation policies among the major components of the U.S. Joint Force. | No Tier 1 JCAs | No Tier 2 JCAs | JCAs do not address policy-level activities |

| SSTR Capability | | Most Relevant JCA(s) | | Comparisons-Implications |
|-----------------|---|---|--|--|
| | | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | |
| | The ability to package personnel and equipment into optimal units to meet the demands of a JFC for SSTR operations. | Joint Logistics Joint Force Management Joint Force Generation | Joint Deployment/Rapid Distribution; Joint Theater Logistics; Multinational Logistics Global Force Management; Planning | JCAs do not specifically address balancing of SSTR-related skill sets with combat readiness |
| | The ability to provide DOD surge or niche capabilities from a steady state environment to a crisis, in ways that do not degrade combat readiness. | Joint Logistics Joint Force Management Joint Force Generation | Joint Deployment/Rapid Distribution; Joint Theater Logistics; Multinational Logistics Global Force Management; Planning Organize | JCAs do not specifically address balancing of SSTR-related skill sets with combat readiness |
| | The ability to instruct personnel to enhance their cognitive thought and leadership skills for SSTR missions. | Joint Force Generation | Educate (Academic & PME); Train (Individual, Collective, Staff); Exercise (Validation, Mission Rehearsal Exercise, Interagency/Intergovernmental/ Multinational Exercises) | JCAs do not specifically identify content of training and education, such as foreign language skills, regional area knowledge, lessons learned, etc. |
| | The ability for Professional Military Education to develop curricula that includes: foreign language capabilities, regional area knowledge, and understanding of foreign governments and international organizations. | Joint Force Generation | Educate (Academic & PME); Train (Individual, Collective, Staff); Exercise (Validation, Mission Rehearsal Exercise, Interagency/Intergovernmental/ Multinational Exercises) | JCAs do not specifically identify content of training and education, such as foreign language skills, regional area knowledge, lessons learned, etc |

| SSTR Capability | | Most Relevant JCA(s) | | Comparisons - Implications |
|-----------------|--|------------------------|--|---|
| | | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | |
| | The ability to train DOD and non-DOD personnel to enhance their ability to perform specific SSTR-functions and tasks. | Joint Force Generation | Educate (Academic & PME); Train (Individual, Collective, Staff); Exercise (Validation, Mission Rehearsal Exercise, Interagency/Intergovernmental/ Multinational Exercises) | JCAs do not specifically identify content of training and education, such as foreign language skills, regional area knowledge, lessons learned, etc |
| | The ability to develop and conduct individual training for DOD and IA personnel on the planning, conduct, and support of SSTR operation; | Joint Force Generation | Educate (Academic & PME); Train (Individual, Collective, Staff); Exercise (Validation, Mission Rehearsal Exercise, Interagency/Intergovernmental/ Multinational Exercises) | JCAs do not specifically identify content of training and education, such as foreign language skills, regional area knowledge, lessons learned, etc |
| | The ability to develop and deliver extensive, specialized, pre-deployment SSTR training across several operational areas | Joint Force Generation | Educate (Academic & PME); Train (Individual, Collective, Staff); Exercise (Validation, Mission Rehearsal Exercise, Interagency/Intergovernmental/ Multinational Exercises) | JCAs do not specifically identify content of training and education, such as foreign language skills, regional area knowledge, lessons learned, etc |

| SSTR Capability | | Most Relevant JCA(s) | | Comparisons Implications |
|-----------------|--|---|--|---|
| | | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | |
| | The ability to collect, assess, and rapidly integrate SSTR lessons learned into DOD SSTR training curricula at all venues and levels. | Joint Force Generation | Educate (Academic & PME); Train (Individual, Collective, Staff); Exercise (Validation, Mission Rehearsal Exercise, Interagency/Intergovernmental/ Multinational Exercises) | JCAs do not specifically identify content of training and education (e.g. foreign language skills, regional area knowledge) |
| | Create a Safe, Secure Environment. Creating a safe, secure environment requires capabilities that enable sufficient security to allow the conduct of large-scale, civilian- and host nation-led activities. | Joint Information Operations Joint Stability Operations Joint Protection Joint Shaping | Electronic Protection; Computer Network Defense; Operations Security Security All Tier 2 Joint Protection JCAs Security Cooperation (incl. all subcategories) | |

| SSTR Capability | | Most Relevant JCA(s) | | Comparisons-Implications |
|-----------------|--|---|--|---|
| | | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | |
| | The ability of Joint Force to conduct focused yet measured offensive and defensive operations against the leaders and military forces of hostile groups. | <p>Joint Information Operations</p> <p>Joint Stability Operations</p> <p>Joint Special Operations & Irregular Warfare</p> <p>Joint Protection</p> <p>Joint Command & Control</p> <p>Joint Shaping</p> <p>Joint IA/IGO/MN/NGO Coordination</p> | <p>Electronic Warfare (incl. all subcategories); Computer Network Operations (incl. all subcategories); Operations Security</p> <p>Security</p> <p>All Tier 2 Joint Special Operations & Irregular Warfare JCAs</p> <p>All Tier 2 Joint Protection JCAs</p> <p>Leverage Mission Partners (incl. all subcategories)</p> <p>Security Cooperation (incl. all subcategories)</p> <p>All Tier 2 Joint IA/IGO/MN/NGO Coordination JCAs</p> | JCAs do not specifically mention coordination with host nation in SSTR operations; this may be inherent in the Joint IA/IGO/MN/NGO Coordination JCA |
| | The ability to plan and execute security operations with coalition partners and the military and police forces of the existing or new host government. | <p>Joint Stability Operations</p> <p>Joint Special Operations & Irregular Warfare</p> <p>Joint Protection</p> <p>Joint Command & Control</p> <p>Joint IA/IGO/MN/NGO Coordination</p> | <p>Security</p> <p>All Tier 2 Joint Special Operations & Irregular Warfare JCAs</p> <p>All Tier 2 Joint Protection JCAs</p> <p>Leverage Mission Partners (incl. all subcategories)</p> <p>Security Cooperation)</p> <p>All Tier 2 Joint IA/IGO/MN/NGO Coordination JCAs</p> | JCAs do not specifically mention coordination with host nation in SSTR operations; this may be inherent in the Joint IA/IGO/MN/NGO Coordination JCA |

| SSTR Capability | | Most Relevant JCA(s) | | Comparison - Implications |
|-----------------|---|--|---|--|
| | | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | |
| | The ability to use both kinetic and non-kinetic means to capture and defeat terrorists/insurgents, often in dense urban environments, while minimizing collateral damage. | Joint Special Operations & Irregular Warfare | Direct Action; Counter-terrorism; Unconventional Warfare; Counterinsurgency | JCAs do not specifically mention urban environments |
| | The ability to carry out a mix of targeted offensive attacks to disrupt IED manufacture and emplacement, active defense efforts to neutralize implanted devices, and passive defense measures to reduce the impact of detonated IEDs. | Joint Stability Operations Joint Protection Joint Special Operations & Irregular Warfare | WMD Threat (incl. all subcategories) Force Health Protection | |
| | The ability to interdict, seize and eliminate WMD and CBRN materials, as well as the ability to operate in an environment in which WMD/CBRN has either been used or is threatened to be used by adversary forces. | Joint Protection Joint Special Operations & Irregular Warfare | WMD Threat (incl. all subcategories) Force Health Protection | JCAs do not specifically mention operating in WMD environments; however, this is inherent in Force Health Protection |
| | The ability for the U.S. Armed Forces to train, equip, and advise large number of foreign forces in the full range of SSTR-related skills. | Joint Special Operations & Irregular Warfare Joint Shaping Joint Force Generation Joint IA/IGO/MN/NG O Coordination | Civil-Military Operations; Foreign Internal Defense Military Diplomacy; Security Cooperation (incl. all subcategories) Equip (Acquire, Integrate); Organize; Educate; Train (incl. all subcategories); Exercise (incl. all subcategories) Multinational Coordination | |

| SSTR Capability | | Most Relevant JCA(s) | | Comparison - Implications |
|-----------------|--|---|---|--|
| | | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | |
| | Deliver Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief. Delivering humanitarian assistance/disaster relief requires capabilities that enable the immediate provision of basic necessities (e.g., water, food, sanitation, medical care) in order to relieve or reduce human suffering. | Joint Stability Operations | Humanitarian Assistance | Ties to Joint Logistics |
| | The ability to coordinate and integrate with USG agencies and multinational organizations in order to support humanitarian assistance and disaster response efforts | Joint Stability Operations Joint C2 Joint Logistics | Humanitarian Assistance Establish/Adapt Command Structures and Enable both Global and Regional Collaboration | May tie to Joint Logistics Force Health Protection |
| | The ability to obtain and redistribute essential supplies, food and medicine from with an affected nation, or deliver essential items that are not available locally or regionally, to disaster sites. | Joint Stability Operations Joint Logistics | Humanitarian Assistance | May have implications for different basing operation capabilities (i.e.: sea basing) |
| | The ability to promptly deliver and operate water purification and electrical power generation equipment in devastated regions | Joint Stability Operations | Basic Services Restoration; Humanitarian Assistance | |

| SSTR Capability | | Most Relevant JCA(s) | | Comparison - Implications |
|-----------------|---|---|--|--|
| | | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | |
| | The ability to provide flexible and agile joint medical forces, capable of conducting sustained operations in multiple locations | Joint Stability Operations | Humanitarian Assistance | May tie to Joint Logistics Force Health Protection |
| | The ability to provide timely emergency medical treatment and prophylaxis to people impacted by natural or man-made disaster | Joint Stability Operations | Basic Services Restoration; Humanitarian Assistance | |
| | The ability to construct and operate camps and facilities for migrant and internal displaced persons | Joint Land Operations Joint Stability Operations | Conduct Refugee Operations; Manage Indigenous Displaced Persons Basic Services Restoration; Humanitarian Assistance; Reconstruction | |
| | Reconstitute Critical Infrastructure and Essential Services. Rebuilding/improving critical infrastructure requires capabilities that enable the protection of critical and strategically important institutions. | Joint Stability Operations | Security; Basic Services Restoration; Reconstruction | JCAs do not specifically mention protection of critical and strategically important institutions |
| | The ability to conduct immediate reconstruction of critical infrastructure and essential services. | Joint Stability Operations | Basic Services Restoration; Reconstruction | |
| | The ability to protect key infrastructure that provides essential services to the population. | No Tier 1 JCAs | No Tier 2 JCAs | May tie to Basic Services Restoration Tier 2 Joint Stability Operations |
| | The ability to repair or construct roads, bridges, tunnels, and airfields for road, rail, and air transport | Joint Stability Operations | Basic Services Restoration; Reconstruction | |

| SSTR Capability | | Most Relevant JCA(s) | | Comparison - Implications |
|-----------------|---|----------------------------|--|---------------------------|
| | | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | |
| | The ability to repair or build primary health care clinics, administrative buildings and hospitals | Joint Stability Operations | Basic Services Restoration; Reconstruction | |
| | The ability to build or restore schools and provide text books and supplies. | Joint Stability Operations | Basic Services Restoration; Reconstruction | |
| | The ability to build or restore water purification plants, electrical power generation grids and telecommunication networks | Joint Stability Operations | Basic Services Restoration; Reconstruction | |
| | The ability to repair or construct sewage disposal systems and collect and dispose of garbage. | Joint Stability Operations | Basic Services Restoration; Reconstruction | |

| SSTR Capability | | Most Relevant JCA(s) | | Comparisons-Implications |
|-----------------|--|----------------------------|--|---|
| | | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | |
| | Support Economic Development. Supporting economic development requires capabilities that enable the establishment of economic processes and institutions where the bulk of economic activities are derived from legitimate transactions. These capabilities include those that will be largely provided by civilian economic development specialists from the IA, who are supporting the SSTR operation. | No Tier 1 JCAs | No Tier 2 JCAs | JCAs address support of economic development & restoration of commerce under Tier 2 Reconstruction. |
| | The ability to assist the host nation in developing near-term reconstruction and longer-term economic development plans (e.g., reestablishing the central bank and government payment mechanisms, rationalizing revenues and expenditures) | No Tier 1 JCAs | No Tier 2 JCAs | JCAs address support of economic development & restoration of commerce under Tier 2 Reconstruction. |
| | The ability to design, fund and implement public works initiatives to rapidly provide employment for the local populace. | Joint Stability Operations | Basic Services Restoration; Reconstruction | JCAs do not specifically address activities to provide employment for the local populace; this is typically a 2nd order effect of contracting for reconstruction services |

| SSTR Capability | | Most Relevant JCA(s) | | Comparisons - Implications |
|-----------------|--|----------------------|----------------|---|
| | | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | |
| | The ability to help plan and financially support a variety of small-, medium-, and large-sized business development programs to stimulate the economy. | No Tier 1 JCAs | No Tier 2 JCAs | JCAs do not address support of economic development & restoration of commerce |
| | Establish Representative, Effective Government and the Rule of Law. Promoting representative, effective local and national governance requires capabilities that enable the establishment of political institutions and processes that will be accepted as legitimate by the host nation population. . | No Tier 1 JCAs | No Tier 2 JCAs | May tie to Tier 2 Reconstruction under Joint Stability Operations |
| | The ability of the USG to deploy and sustain civilian specialists over an extended period to assist the host nation in developing the new governance system. | No Tier 1 JCAs | No Tier 2 JCAs | JCAs do not address deploying civilians. |
| | The ability to assist in the drafting of local and national laws, designed to establish the rule of law, accommodate communal differences, and provide legislative oversight of military and security forces. | No Tier 1 JCAs | No Tier 2 JCAs | May tie to Tier 2 Reconstruction under Joint Stability Operations |

| SSTR Capability | | Most Relevant JCA(s) | | Comparisons-Implications |
|-----------------|---|----------------------|----------------|--|
| | | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | |
| | The ability to assist in the organization and training of personnel to work in the various government ministries and agencies. | No Tier 1 JCAs | No Tier 2 JCAs | May tie to Tier 2 Reconstruction under Joint Stability Operations |
| | The ability to assist in the creation of civic groups, political parties and representative governance at the national, province and local levels. | No Tier 1 JCAs | No Tier 2 JCAs | May tie to Tier 2 Reconstruction under Joint Stability Operations |
| | The ability to train elected officials at all levels about constituency building, accountability, transparency, participatory decision-making and conflict management | No Tier 1 JCAs | No Tier 2 JCAs | May tie to Tier 2 Reconstruction under Joint Stability Operations |

| SSTR Capability | | Most Relevant JCA(s) | | Comparisons-Implications |
|-----------------|--|--|--|--------------------------|
| | | Tier 1 | Tier 2 | |
| | Conduct Strategic Communications. Conducting effective strategic communication requires capabilities that enable the Joint Force to engage key local and foreign audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to achievement of overall SSTR goals and objectives. | Joint Public Affairs Operations Joint Shaping Joint Special Operations & Irregular Warfare | Public Information (incl. all subcategories); Community Relations Strategic Communication Joint Psychological Operations | |
| | The ability to design and disseminate information in various forms to influence the views of adversary, neutral, and supportive audiences. | Joint Public Affairs Operations Joint Shaping Joint Special Operations & Irregular Warfare | Public Information (incl. all subcategories); Community Relations Strategic Communication Joint Psychological Operations | |
| | The ability to broadcast U.S. and coalition intentions and to help the local population find quick survival relief. | Joint Special Operations & Irregular Warfare Joint Public Affairs Operations Joint Shaping | Psychological Operations Public Information (incl. all subcategories); Community Relations Strategic Communication | |
| | The ability to plan and synchronize joint public information and joint psychological operations activities and resources in order to communicate truthful, timely, and factual unclassified information about SSTR activities to the appropriate audiences within the area of operation. | Joint Public Affairs Operations Joint Special Operations & Irregular Warfare | Public Information (incl. all subcategories); Community Relations Joint Psychological Operations | |

Appendix D - Plan for Assessment

1. Experimentation and Assessment Conducted During the Writing Effort

Several experiments and events completed during calendar years 2004, 2005 and 2006, helped provide insights and understanding that directly contributed to shaping many of the thoughts and ideas expressed in the original version of the *Stability Operations JOC* (version 1.0 signed by the Secretary of Defense) and later helped shape the current revision to that document. These experiments and events also provided forums for sidebar discussions by senior military and civilian subject matter experts and mentors, providing key appreciation and knowledge on the subject which guided this version of the *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations JOC*. Among the events that influenced this JOC are:

Unified Engagement 04, July 2004. This was a jointly sponsored USJFCOM-Air Force Title 10 wargame geared toward exploring the “Effects Based Approach” to planning a MCO. It influenced the USJFCOM J9 thinking on SSTR operations by: highlighting the need to implement an effects-based approach to SSTR operations planning across the military, multinational, and interagency communities; underscoring the importance of having clear and concise commander’s intent regarding the conduct of a SSTR operation; highlighting the implications of our deficiencies in understanding non-western cultures and motivations; and calling attention to our deficiencies in locating, tracking and securing weapons of mass destruction under the chaotic conditions of a post-MCO SSTR operation.

Sea Viking 04, October 2004. This was a USJFCOM-USMC Title 10 wargame, primarily designed to test the *Joint Forcible Entry Operations JIC*. This wargame reinforced a point made in the USJFCOM internal paper on stability operations that forces slated to carry out the operation must be included in the planning and initial force deployment, so that they can operate with combat forces in a successful Joint Forcible Entry Operation. The final report noted that additional experimentation opportunities to explore this idea should occur in the follow-on Sea Viking events.

Unified Quest 05, May 2005. This was a USJFCOM-Army TRADOC Title 10 wargame focused on planning, shaping and entry operations, urban operations and logistics associated with a MCO. It influenced the

USJFCOM J9 thinking on SSTR operations by effectively using the State/Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) “Essential Task Matrix,” which was utilized in the revision of this JOC. This event also experimented with and validated the Army’s concept for concurrent MCO and SSTR operations.

Joint Urban Warrior 05, May 2005. This was a Title 10 Marine Corps wargame that examined interagency coordination in conducting MCO and SSTR operations simultaneously in an urban environment. It influenced the revision of the SSTR operations concept by: examining the effects and difficulties of interagency integration in the conduct of simultaneous MCO and SSTR operations in an urban environment; exposing the technical and procedural difficulties of moving essential classified information to the tactical and interagency levels; showing the importance of achieving cultural understanding in order to forestall easily avoided mistakes when dealing with the local leadership and population; highlighting the challenges that need to be addressed in order to isolate insurgents from their base of support among the local population; confirming that the support of the local populace is always the “center of gravity” in a counterinsurgency/SSTR operation; and reemphasizing that efforts to gain popular support are a very critical component in devising a plan to deal with that insurgency.

Stability Operations Limited Objective Experiment (LOE), September 2005. This LOE, conducted by USJFCOM J9, examined the impact of information operations on the outcome of SSTR operations. It compared a traditional, stove-piped communications approach with an integrated strategic communication approach conducted under a single communication director. The event utilized the Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulation model, which demonstrated a fourteen percent improvement in the local population’s perception of the SSTR operation when it included the conduct of an integrated strategic communication approach. The LOE also highlighted substantial improvements in strategic communication down to the tactical level and several benefits associated with an integrated communications operation.

Expeditionary Warrior 06, January 2006. This U.S. Marine Corps workshop refined the USMC's approach to Irregular Warfare, which is similar to the approach to SSTR operations laid out in this JOC. The Marine Corps is using a "lines of operation" construct that mirrors the approach laid out in Major General Peter Chiarelli's groundbreaking *Military Review* article, published in the summer of 2005. A variant of this approach is used within the central idea of the new *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations JOC*. The Small Wars Panel in this workshop suggested that the revised JOC on SSTR operations prepared by USJFCOM should focus on "how to bridge the gap between civil and military planning and execution of complex contingency operations."

Multinational Experiment 4 (MNE 4), Feb-Mar 2006. This USJFCOM-sponsored international experiment explored the integrated use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power, and how such integrated efforts can influence the behavior of adversaries in the context of various types of military operations. The experiment included examination of SSTR operations, which progressed through increasing levels of conflict and difficulty. The experiment was designed to assist in the development of future processes, organizations and technologies at the operational level. This is a direct linkage to part 4.b.(ii) of this JOC which deals with civil-military planning during the planning and preparation phase of SSTR operation. In SSTR operations, it was found that a multinational interagency effort is needed to ensure maximum utilization of resources. Future MNE events will continue to support and redefine the content of the SSTR operations concept.

SSTR Operations JOC Workshop, 14 Feb 2006. This event, attended by SSTR operations subject matter experts from DOD, the Services, Joint Staff, and various think tanks, solicited ideas on the scope, problem statement, and central idea for the concept, as well as supporting conceptual ideas for conducting SSTR operations.

SSTR Operations JOC Senior Advisor Review, 7 Mar 2006. This senior level review, attended by Lieutenant General James Mattis (USMC), Lieutenant General Walter Buchanan (USAF), Major General David Fastabend (USA), RADM (S) Philip Cullom (USN), Dr. Jeffrey Nadaner (DASD/Stability Operations), Ms. Michelle Flournoy (CSIS), and Ms. Laura Hall (S/CRS), discussed the main ideas that were emerging as key elements of the revised JOC on *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations*. They provided valuable input regarding many aspects of the concept, including, in particular, the proper scope of the concepts, the relevant future security

environment, as well as the central and supporting ideas. Subsequent discussions were held separately in late March and early April with Lieutenant General David Petraeus (USA) and Ms. Barbara Stephenson (S/CRS), both of whom provided important insights on issues of the JOC's scope, central idea, supporting ideas and capabilities.

Unified Quest, April 06 was conducted in the 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2006 to analyze lessons learned from recent conflicts and assess insights gained from other wargames. UQ-06 provided an opportunity to explore the conduct of military operations against an adversary employing traditional, irregular, disruptive and catastrophic means. The final report contains insights on irregular warfare and identifies potential impacts on current and future doctrine in a SSTR operations environment.

2. Recommendations for Further Assessment

This joint operating concept identifies a high-level overarching problem and conceptual solution for conducting future SSTR operations. However, responding to adaptive future adversaries and/or situations with the potential for posing any one, or a combination of the four strategic challenges, creates a number of problems for which we must find more specific and detailed solutions. Solutions may be identified through focused experimentation and gaming events, leveraging technological advances in the public and private sectors, and careful examination of lessons learned in recent SSTR operations.

Identifying solution sets for the problems associated with SSTR operations is a continuous, ongoing process. The writing team for this JOC, in collaboration with the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Community, the Services, the COCOMS and various defense agencies identified eight SSTR challenges for incorporation into future experimentation. The eight challenges discussed below are initial priority candidates for assessment over the next few years in focused experimentation venues. These experimentation venues must adequately replicate the future operational environment for SSTR operations and facilitate a competition of ideas from which solutions may be derived. The key SSTR operation challenges recommended for experimental exploration are:

a. Improving Coordination to Achieve Unified Action. The Joint/multinational/interagency/non government agency community must be able to create unified action with regard to integrated planning, direction, and the coordination and control of forces in order to perform the key tasks in all the major mission elements of a SSTR operation.

Future situations that involve SSTR operations will call for new organizational and operational concepts for civil-military teams, which will have the functions of ensuring security, developing or restoring local governance structures, promoting bottom-up economic activity, delivering humanitarian assistance, rebuilding infrastructure, and building or restoring indigenous capacity for such tasks. It will be beneficial to conduct interagency workshops to develop proposed civil-military organizational structures, and coordination processes. In turn, these organizational arrangements and concepts should be tested at larger experiments and simulations.

b. Operationalizing Cultural Understanding. The Joint Force and multinational/interagency/non government agency community must be able to achieve cultural understanding in order to achieve knowledge and understanding of the characteristics and conditions of the local environment. Given the need to understand the local populace and their cultural perspectives, the Joint Force must be able to gain and operationally apply this cultural knowledge and understanding in SSTR operations. It would be beneficial to develop scenarios, in coordination with the Services, for inclusion in their Title 10 wargames. In order to effectively address the cultural issues, scenarios must contain multiple cultural characteristics that are ‘melded’ together to represent the local environment.

c. Defeating Armed Obstructionists. The Joint Force and multinational /interagency /non government agency community must be able to defeat obstructionists in order to create a safe, secure, environment. This will involve the conduct of measured, discriminate offensive, and defensive operations, as emphasized in this JOC. Experimentation needs to be undertaken to explore the manner in which such joint land, air, and maritime operations can be most effectively planned, prepared for, and carried out.

d. Conducting Communications Operations. The Joint Force will be called upon to conduct integrated, synchronized strategic communication operations, extending from the strategic through the tactical level, in order to inform and/or influence the views of adversary, neutral, and supportive audiences in ways to facilitate desired perceptions and

expectations of the SSTR operation throughout the international community.

e. Defining Adaptive Intelligence. The Joint and multinational force needs the ability to adaptively adjust intelligence systems at the operational and tactical level in order to observe, assess, understand, learn, and adapt to the actions and attitudes of the local populace in order to support coordination and synchronization throughout the full range of SSTR operations. Adaptive intelligence will support seamless transitions during operations.

f. Protecting Critical Infrastructure. The Joint and multinational force, and interagency must be able to identify, assess, and rapidly secure critical infrastructure in order to restore basic services and deter, dissuade, or defeat entities intent on infrastructure disintegration.

g. Collaboratively Sharing Information. The Joint /multinational/ interagency/non-governmental organization community requires the capability to conduct operational and tactical collaborative information sharing during SSTR operations in order to share knowledge, develop battlespace awareness, and facilitate military support to SSTR operations.

h. Force Mix/Ratio. The Joint and multinational force must be able to configure operational and tactical units for simultaneous support of MCO and SSTR operations. Specific aspects for experimentation include synchronization of execution across all domains and the monitoring of execution, assessment of effects, adaptation of operations, application of appropriate joint command and control, management of focused logistics, and force management that allows for successful SSTR transitions.

3. Potential Future Venues for Further Assessment

The following are potential experimentation venues where key SSTR concepts can be refined and validated. These venues are either in the development or planning stage and are being integrated into USJFCOM's JCD&E experimentation work plan supported throughout DOD and other government agencies. The results of the experimentation process will be used to refine the *Military Support to SSTR Operations JOC*,

provide potential solutions for prototypes, and identify solutions for the JCIDS process.

a. Unified Action, 07, tentatively scheduled for the 1st quarter of fiscal year 2007, will address a SSTR operation in an environment involving a volatile political situation, which includes a significant humanitarian disaster. The specific problem statement for UA 07 is: “Over the past fifteen years, as violent state failure has become a greater global threat, the military has borne a disproportionate share of post-conflict responsibilities because our civilian agencies have not had the standing capability to fully play their part.” This was true in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and it is partially true today in Iraq and Afghanistan. UA 07 will present an excellent opportunity to further explore new concepts for delivering humanitarian assistance/disaster relief.

b. Multinational Experimentation 05, tentatively scheduled for the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2008, is a multinational experiment sponsored by USJFCOM. MNE 05 is designed to test improved methods for coalition partners to conduct rapid interagency and multinational planning, coordination and execution in order to carry out a unified and comprehensive approach. The desired end state of MNE 05 will be an agreed method that multinational partners can use to plan, execute and assess both preventive and crisis response SSTR operations. MNE 05 presents an opportunity for the SSTR operations concept to become further informed on the activities of coalition partners during a SSTR operation.

c. Unified Quest 07, scheduled for the 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2007 will be an extension of UQ 05 and UQ 06. It is designed to analyze lessons learned from recent conflicts and insights gained from wargames and offer an opportunity to explore the conduct of military operations against an adversary employing traditional, irregular, disruptive and catastrophic means. The writing team expects this wargame will provide a means to expand discussions on irregular warfare and its impacts on current and future doctrine in a SSTR operations environment.

d. Urban Resolve 2015, scheduled for the 1st quarter fiscal year 2007, is a USJFCOM experiment with Service, interagency and multinational participation that will focus on: how a joint task force can isolate and control a large urban battlespace area during a wide range of military operations in 2015. This experiment will inform the *Joint Urban*

Operations Concept and other Joint and Service concepts, including the *Military Support to SSTR Operations JOC*, providing potential solutions that measurably improve the Joint Force Commander's ability to isolate and control the urban battlespace. In particular, UR 2015 will explore potential command and control, organizational, and process improvements for integrating and employing forces, sensors, and systems to more effectively anticipate and respond to enemy attacks as a basis for actionable recommendations.

e. Urban Resolve–Future, currently planned for the 2nd quarter fiscal year 2008, will gather Service and COCOM approaches to providing security and essential services to a major urban population immediately following major combat operations.



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