During and after the Gulf War, people reported that they had been exposed to chemical warfare agents. To investigate these incidents and to determine if chemical weapons were used, the DOD developed a methodology for investigation and validation based on work done by the United Nations and the international community where the criteria include:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site.
• Physical evidence from the site such as weapons fragments, soil, water, vegetation or human/animal tissue samples.
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence.
• Testimony of eyewitnesses.
• Multiple analyses.
• Review of the evidence by experts.

While the DOD methodology (Tab D) for investigating chemical incidents is based on these protocols, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence was often not collected at the time of an event. Accordingly, our methodology is designed to provide a thorough, investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and determine what happened. Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical agent presence, nor is a single individual’s observation sufficient to validate a chemical agent presence.

By following our methodology and accumulating anecdotal, documentary, and physical evidence, and by interviewing eyewitnesses and key personnel, and analyzing the results, the investigator can assess the validity of the presence of chemical warfare agents on the battlefield. Because information from various sources may be contradictory, we have developed an assessment scale (Figure 1) ranging from "Definitely" to "Definitely Not" with intermediate assessments of "Likely," "Unlikely," and "Indeterminate." This assessment is tentative, based on facts available as of the date of the report publication; each case is reassessed over time based on new information and feedback.

Figure 1. Assessment of chemical warfare agent presence

On 28 February, 1991, a Fox vehicle belonging to Task Force Ripper was directed to inspect an Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) located southwest of Kuwait International Airport, in the vicinity of map coordinates QT75393910. While inspecting the ASP, the Fox crew reported alerting on traces of three different chemical agents within 100 meters of each other. The Fox vehicle MM-1 Mass Spectrometer operator printed tapes of the three alarms. The vehicle commander, GySgt Grass, passed these tapes to his chain-of-command, which, in turn, reported up through the 1st MarDiv to Central Command (CENTCOM). As a result, an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team was sent to the ASP the following day. After a thorough inspection on March 1, 1991, the EOD team did not find any chemical weapons. The negative results of this inspection were also passed up the 1st MarDiv chain-of-command, and reported in the CENTCOM Logs. The ASP was dismantled during cleanup operations in Kuwait after the Gulf War. No chemical weapons were found during these cleanup operations.

Based on extensive research of all available documentation on these events, numerous interviews of the personnel involved, as well as the United Nations’ Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) and the Intelligence Community’s assessment that Iraq never moved chemical agents or weapons into Kuwait, we assess it is unlikely there were chemical weapons stored in this ASP. These alerts were most probably false positives caused by battlefield contaminants, contaminants from the orchard and/or contaminants from a nearby industrial facility.

In May 1996 and May 1997, Gunnery Sergeant (GySgt) George Grass, testified before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Illnesses about several suspected chemical weapons incidents of which he had personal knowledge during the Gulf War. GySgt Grass was a Marine Corps Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) weapons defense specialist and Fox Vehicle Commander. He also testified in December 1996 before the Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee of the House of Representatives. In each testimony, GySgt Grass discussed several specific Fox alerts for chemical warfare agents (CWA), including three at an Ammunition Supply Point located southwest of Kuwait City. The first public discussion of this event occurred in 1993, when a Marine linked his service with Marine units during the Gulf War to a severe disease he was suffering. He asked several Marine NBC specialists, including GySgt Grass to make statements about any CWA they may have detected during the war. Several Marines were then asked to testify in front of several congressional committees in 1993 and 1994—which they did. In 1994, the Marine Corps initiated an investigation in response that concluded the Marine was not suffering from any classical chemical warfare exposures.[2]

The ground war to liberate Kuwait began on February 24, 1991. By February 28th, after four days of fighting and movement, the 7th Marine Regiment, known as Task Force Ripper, was headquartered at Al Jaber Airfield and the 1st Marine Division (1st MarDiv) had taken their objectives around Kuwait City. Task Force Ripper was part of the 1st MarDiv—which was in turn a major subordinate unit of the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). (Figure 2) Most of the units discussed in this narrative were in the 1st MarDiv or under this division’s operational control. Task Force Ripper consisted of the three battalions of the 7th Marine Regiment: the 3rd Tank Battalion, the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marine Regiment (1/5), and the 1st Battalion of the 7th Marine Regiment (1/7). Task Force Ripper was also augmented with forces from the 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, the 3rd Amphibious Assault Battalion and the 3rd Battalion of the 11th Marine Regiment (3/11), which provided artillery support. The 1st MarDiv also gave Task Force Ripper one of the four Fox NBC Detection vehicles attached to the division.[3] (Figure 3) The Task Force Ripper Fox vehicle was commanded by GySgt Grass.

Figure 2. Organizational Chart

Figure 3. A Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle in Desert Storm Camouflage

The ASP GySgt Grass was sent to inspect was located outside the ring road around Kuwait City in an orchard or tree farm, southwest of Kuwait International Airport. (Figures 4 and 5)

Figure 4. Location of ASP

Figure 5. Location of ASP[4]

Several reports of an industrial area across the road were gathered from interviews.[5] Elements of the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines (1/5) were camped around the area. GySgt Grass’s journal entry placed the ASP at map grid coordinates QT 766395,[6] but message traffic and log entries from February 28th placed it at QT 75393910. The driver of Grass’s Fox vehicle believes the disparity between the two map grid coordinates is the result of inherent inaccuracies in the Vehicle Orientation System used by the Fox vehicle during the Gulf War.[7]

The munitions stored in the ASP included small arms ammunition and artillery rounds. Visual inspections conducted by the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel and Marines from the 1/5 determined the munitions were primarily manufactured in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The writing on the sides of the ammunition boxes indicated some of these munitions may have entered Iraq through Jordan.[8] There are also conflicting reports of munitions manufactured in Holland and the United States.[9] Despite these reports, members of the EOD team have stated: "There is NO CHANCE that we missed U.S. ordnance or forgot seeing it. As for Dutch ordnance, that also would be very hard to forget seeing, as it would be quite a rare find."[10] (emphasis in original)

According to GySgt Grass, the ASP was divided into two sections: a larger area with hundreds of bunkers and a smaller area located across the road. The chemical agent alarms occurred in the smaller area. This area was bermed all around and there was a line of trees impeding the view of the main road. A small brick building and a dug-in Winnebago, or motor home, stood at the entrance of this smaller area. A road circled the inside of the smaller ASP and there were roads between each row of bunkers. (Figure 6) This smaller area was also configured differently than the larger ASP. GySgt Grass describes it this way in his testimony:

Completing the Army Technical Escort course seven months prior to deployment to SWA [Southwest Asia], being a former Ammunition Technician for 6 years and working as the NCOIC [Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge] of the Marine Corps Offensive Chemical Weapons unit, I observed several signs of possible chemical weapons storage. There were fire extinguishers colored in red, blue or green with each grouped in a specific area according to their color....Also this particular storage area had several ... open top 55 gallon drums that were painted all blue, red and blue, olive drab green and white and green. Each set of drums were grouped together according to its color and whether the color of the drum was solid or striped. No other area ... that my Fox vehicle checked was designed and set up like that area.[11]

GySgt Grass’s journal entry from the time ("What do blue, red & green fire exting[uishers] mean?"[12] ) indicates he was unsure of the meaning of this configuration while in the ASP. However, the leader of the EOD team inspecting the ASP the following day (who was also trained to look for visual cues indicating chemical weapons storage), does not recall concluding that the area was arranged in a manner indicating chemical weapons’ storage. He remembers the open 55-gallon drums and recalls that they were full of water —"standard for an ASP"—for fire fighting purposes. The EOD team leader also recalls the different colored fire extinguishers, but he does not consider them as evidence of a chemical weapons storage area.

After the war local merchants told stories of Iraqis using their ‘AK-47 Express Card’ to retrieve whatever the military needed. When stocking their field ASPs, the Iraqis took whatever fire extinguishers were available without regard to color.[13]

Figure 6. Diagram of Small ASP[14]

According to GySgt Grass, reports from Iraqi Prisoners of War indicated the possible presence of chemical weapons in the ASP.

During the intelligence briefing that morning, it was stated by the S-2 [Task Force Ripper’s Intelligence Officer] that the Iraqi’s [sic] had established the 3d Armored Corps Ammunition Supply Point just outside of Kuwait City and that sources (Iraqi prisoners) have stated there were chemical weapons stored somewhere within the Ammo Storage Area. I was informed that my task was to do a complete survey of the entire ASP and locate any chemical weapons that may be stored there.[15]

Task Force Ripper’s NBC Officer remembers, "[we] wouldn’t have been surprised to find chemical weapons in there."[16] It was Standard Operating Procedure to assume the possibility of chemical weapons in any Iraqi ASPs.[17]

The primary chemical agent detector on the Fox vehicle is the MM-1 mass spectrometer. The MM-1 detects chemical agents by analyzing the ionic activity of a sample collected through a retractable probe. The probe can collect samples by "sniffing" the surrounding air (the "Air/Hi" method) or by taking them from a silicone wheel which is lifted from the ground to the probe (the "Surface/Lo" method). At the time it entered the ASP on February 28th, 1991, the Fox MM-1 probe was sniffing the air in the "Air/Hi" method. This is the least sensitive of the Fox methods of chemical detection and more than 100 times less sensitive than an M256 kit. (Table 1) In the "Air/Hi" method, the MM-1 is performing a "quick-look" analysis of air samples, looking for ions that resemble chemical agents.

Table 1. Vapor Chemical Agent Detector Characteristics[20]

If the MM-1 alerts to a possible chemical agent, there is an audible alarm. A full spectrum analysis must then be performed to confirm or deny the presence of chemical agents. The preferred method for performing a full spectrum is the "Surface/Lo" method: the MM-1 probe is extended to the ground (usually to a suspected liquid chemical agent) and the operating temperature of the MM-1 is lowered. Only by performing a full spectrum can an alert be confirmed or denied solely by the Fox vehicle. A "tape," which provides details of the MM-1’s findings, can be printed as a permanent record of the initial alert and the full spectrum.

During the Gulf War, the Fox vehicle was manned by a crew of four—the Fox vehicle commander, a driver, an MM-1 operator and a wheel operator. The wheel operator uses levers inside the vehicle to lift the silicone wheels from the ground to the probe for sampling. The driver and commander sit in the front of the vehicle, while the MM-1 and wheel operators sit in the rear. The two areas are connected by a narrow crawl-through.[21]

According to GySgt Grass’ testimony, the first alarm in the ASP occurred "while [the Fox was] monitoring for chemical agent vapors."[22] The MM-1 alarm "was set off with a full distinct spectrum across the monitor and a lethal vapor concentration of S Mustard."[23] In his testimony, the MM-1 operator stated the Fox crew was outside the vehicle trying to get a closer look at some bunkers when they heard the alarm.[24] He does not mention what Mission Oriented Protective Posture[25] (MOPP) level the crew was in, but both the driver and the wheel operator recall never being higher than MOPP-2—that is, carrying, but not wearing, their protective masks and gloves—while outside the Fox in this ASP.[26] None of the exposed crew experienced any symptoms consistent with exposure to chemical agents while in the ASP.

When the MM-1 sounded the alarm, the crew returned to the vehicle and drove closer to the nearest dug-in bunker. In subsequent testimony and interviews, GySgt Grass recalls the following: "...[F]ully visible were the skull and cross bones either on yellow tape with red lettering or stenciled to the boxes or some had a small sign with the skull and crossbones painted on it."[27] Several "155mm rounds with colored bands around them"[28] were stacked on top of some boxes in the bunker. "The labeling on the boxes was from the United States."[29] GySgt Grass identified these rounds as the source of the Sulfur Mustard alarm. He also stated they were not leaking.[30]

Once the Fox backed up to the bunker, a "full and complete spectrum was taken and printed out as proof of the detection."[31] GySgt Grass does not know the exact procedures the MM-1 operator used, but stated, "I know we didn’t check for liquid contamination - everything was all vapor."[32] A complete spectrum, detailing the exact ionic makeup of the surrounding area, is the only way to affirm an initial alert is a "confirmed detection." During his testimony, the MM-1 operator did not discuss the procedures he used to obtain a spectrum while in the ASP. We have attempted to interview the MM-1 operator to obtain additional information, but have so far been unsuccessful. The wheel operator (the other member of the crew located in the back of the Fox with the MM-1 operator) was interviewed but could not recall the procedures used to get the spectrum. It is possible to print a tape of an initial alarm without conducting a complete, confirming spectrum. A tape printed from an initial alarm will have the name of the suspected agent in capital letters across the top. Without clarification from the MM-1 operator and a copy of the tape printed, we cannot determine the exact ion make up of the alert.

After the MM-1 operator printed the tape, GySgt Grass notified the Task Force Ripper NBC Officer that they had found some "Honey." (To avoid alarming the entire Task Force, the Task Force Ripper NBC Officer told the Fox crew to use the code word "Honey" if they had any chemical alerts while in the ASP.)[33] The Task Force Ripper NBC Officer ordered the crew to "return to [Task Force] Ripper’s Main [Headquarters location]."[34]

The MM-1 operator testified that the three alarms at the smaller ASP occurred at the same time, with each of the three agents alerting the MM-1 simultaneously. "There were a number of readings on the MM-1’s computer screen. They were S mustard, HT mustard and a benzene [sic] bromide agent....[A] couple of spectrums were run and the printouts were given to [GySgt] Grass."[35] GySgt Grass, however reports the three alarms as separate events. He describes the second alarm this way:

[a]s we continued driving through the ammo storage area the alarm sounded again. The chemical agent HT Mustard in a lethal dose came across the monitor. Again, the skull and crossbones were present although the boxes were closed with markings from the United States and Holland. A full spectrum on the Mass Spectrometer was easily accomplished and printed out as proof of detection.[36]

GySgt Grass does not identify a specific type of ammunition as the source for this alarm. As with the alarm for Sulfur Mustard, we have no information on the procedures the MM-1 operator used to obtain a spectrum and print the tape for HT Mustard. After printing the tape, the Fox crew continued on its way out of the ASP.

According to GySgt Grass, the third and final alarm in the ASP occurred as the crew was driving out of the area.

[T]he alarm sounded once more showing a positive reading of Benzene [sic] Bromide. This reading was taken next to a large metal container with no distinct markings. The vapor concentration was in the air and a full spectrum was ran [sic] on the Mass Spectrometer and printed out as proof of the detection.[37]

During an interview, GySgt Grass identified a large shipping container, or Conex box, located in the southeast corner of the ASP as the possible source of this alarm. [38] (Figure 6) Although GySgt Grass stated the Fox was only checking for vapor concentration while in the ASP[39] (indicating the "Air/Hi" method was being used), it is unclear what method the Fox vehicle was using when the MM-1 got this alarm. Benzyl Bromide, a tearing agent, is one of the 60 chemicals for which the MM-1 monitors, but it is not normally one of the 10 or 11 chemicals typically monitored for while using the "Air/Hi" method. As with the two other alarms, we have no information on the procedures the MM-1 operator used to obtain a spectrum and print the tape.

After printing this third tape, the Fox crew drove past several other bunkers in the area without incident prior to departing the ASP. They then drove to the headquarters area of the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines (1/5), located nearby, to warn the 1/5 NBC Officer of the possibility of chemical agents or weapons in the ASP. After stopping at the 1/5, the Fox crew returned to Task Force Ripper’s Headquarters.

The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines took control of the ASP without resistance during the night of the third or fourth day of the ground war. By the time of the cease-fire on February 28th, they had established a defensive position at the ASP. The Commanding Officer and the Executive Officer of the 1/5 do not recall hearing of chemical alerts or the possible presence of chemical weapons in the ASP.[40] The 1/5 NBC Officer recalls the presence of the Fox vehicle, but is not sure what day it was there. He remembers the vehicle alarming for a chemical, but does not recollect the specific agent. The 1/5 NBC Officer recalls that, after alarming, the Fox drove around the area attempting to recreate the alarm, but was unsuccessful. The NBC Officer also reports that at some point while the 1/5 was encamped nearby, he led a team through the ASP with Chemical Agent Monitors (CAMs) and determined the ASP was only stocked with conventional munitions. There are conflicting memories as to whether the NBC Officer led his team through the ASP while the Fox crew was there or at some other time. The 1/5 NBC Officer reported the Fox alarm up his chain of command to the 1/5 Assistant Operations Officer.[41] The Assistant Operations Officer recalls being told a Fox vehicle drove through the ASP and detected Mustard but then lost its detection[42] —and so was unable to confirm the alarm. As the Fox was unable to recreate its initial alert and the CAM tests proved negative, the 1/5 NBC Officer and the Assistant Operations Officer decided there was no need to move their unit to a new location.[43] The ASP was not cordoned off or declared off limits.[44]

After stopping at the 1/5 Headquarters area, the Fox crew returned to Task Force Ripper’s Headquarters area. Upon arriving, GySgt Grass recalls going to the command post tent to report the agents his vehicle had alarmed for in the ASP. GySgt Grass passed the MM-1 tapes printed in the ASP to the Task Force Ripper NBC Officer and explained what he thought he’d found there to members of the Task Force Ripper command staff.[45] At this meeting, it was decided that the 1st MarDiv headquarters, code-named PRIDE[46] , should be notified.[47] At 1531 hours on February 28th, the following message was passed from Task Force Ripper to PRIDE:

1. Have detected S mustard, HT mustard and Benzine [sic] Bromide at grid QT75393910.
2. Means of detection: Fox vehicle.
3. Hazard seems to be very localized vapor from bunker complex.[48]

At 1720 hours the same day, the 1st MarDiv radioed Direct Support Command (DSC) requesting Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) support for the next day, March 1st.

Req EOD support at QT 75393910 suspected chemical mustard agent munitions in Ammo bunker agent detected by Fox vehicle.
POC TF [Task Force] RIPPER NBCO at grid QT 805350.[49]

GySgt Grass was told to escort the EOD team back to the ASP the next day.

During the evening of February 28th, the Task Force Ripper Fox alerts were recorded in several unit logs throughout the 1st MarDiv, including the 5th Battalion of the 11th Marines (5/11):

Fm Div
To All units
Possible Mustard Hazard
QT 7539/3910
Vapor Hazard local to area.
Hazard appears to be from bunker in that area
Method of detection left by Fox veh[icle][50]

The 1st Reconnaissance Battalion of the 1st MarDiv also logged the alerts:

1620 281620C Feb 1991 Possible mustard agent QT 75393910 localized to area appears to be from bunkers. Fox vehicle detected.[51]

The 1st Battalion of the 12th Marines (1/12), which was assigned to 11th Marines, also reported "Mustard agent hazard in bunker" on the 28th.[52]

Central Command (CENTCOM) received a SPOT Report (SPOTREP) from the 1st MarDiv at 2150 local time on the 28th:

1st MarDiv rpts.
Probable ammo bunker w/ chemical munitions, vic[inity] of 2914N/4750E, 5 miles west of Ku[wait] City airport.
Area has been cordoned off.
EOD personnel will enter bunker tomorrow morning.[53]

The CENTCOM logs then recorded the following:

281930 [1st MEF NBC Watch Officer] called. 1st MarDiv has come across an ammo bunker complex (QT75393910) with suspected chemical munitions. The Fox (GCMS) [sic] has come up with indications of small conc [sic] of sulfur mustard after numerous tests. All possible interferences with petroleum products ruled out. They are outside the bunker now, no one has gone in. They’ve moved their EOD people up, but won’t do anything until the morning. Area is cordoned off, all their people in the area have been warned.[54]

The next day, March 1st, GySgt Grass and his Fox crew escorted a five member EOD team to the ASP. This team was part of the 1st Force Service Support Group (FSSG) EOD Platoon, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, which was working at Al Jaber Airfield. We have interviewed the four members of this team who entered the ASP, as well as the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the 1st FSSG EOD Platoon during the Gulf War, to whom the EOD team reported their findings. We are in the process of contacting the fifth member of the EOD team, a communications specialist who did not enter the ASP.

When they arrived at the ASP, the EOD team established a command post in their vehicle (a HMMWV or "Humvee") and donned their protective gear—a standard precaution for any suspected contaminated area.[55] The team then conducted a thorough inspection of the ASP—visually inspecting for suspicious munitions and using M8 chemical detector paper and M18A2 chemical detector kits to check for chemical contamination. Visual recognition involves far more than simply looking at munitions. Depending on the country of origin, color codes often indicate the type of munition. In the Gulf War, however, using color codes to determine munition type was not reliable because the Iraqis frequently painted munitions with whatever color was readily available. The physical configuration of a weapon is often a better indication of its use. Chemical munitions must, by their very nature, be built to hold liquids—so their assembly points have filler plugs. [56] It was these cues the EOD team members were looking for during their inspection of the ASP.

Recollections of the EOD team’s inspection differ considerably. GySgt Grass remembers it this way:

I watched everything that they did….They went in there and got in their chemical protective equipment....They had a little monitor, a little hand-held kind of machine. I am not sure what that was...and they walked around the area that we showed them and they were writing things down. When they got done, they decontaminated themselves and there was nothing destroyed while I was standing there...They said, yes, you are right. There are chemical weapons stored out there.…[but] they were not sent up there to verify that. They were up there to check the lot numbers on the ammunition that was stored up there to...see if those rounds were coming after sanctions were imposed on Iraq.[57]

In contrast, every member of the EOD team categorically denies finding chemical weapons or any evidence of chemical agents in the ASP. The team leader stated: "[t]he only munitions in the ASP were conventional."[58] Every member of the team also denies telling GySgt Grass or any member of his crew otherwise.[59] "No, that would never have been said."[60]

Members of the team recall only one suspicious incident while they were in the ASP. The team was inspecting a stack of artillery munitions that were painted gray, the base color used by many countries to mark some chemical weapons. The munitions were in a puddle of liquid. As a member of the team picked up one of the artillery rounds, the liquid ran down his arm, which was covered by his protective gear. Following standard procedures, the team swiped the liquid with M8 paper and tested with their M18A2 chemical detector kits. Neither of these tests showed positive for the presence of chemical agent. In addition, the EOD team took the ordnance

to the Fox vehicle so they could ‘sniff’ them....The Fox vehicle ‘smelled’ nothing and the color of the projectile, though similar to U.S. chemical ordnance, was indicative of a Warsaw Pact high-explosive, fragmentation round, so it was ruled condensation from being enclosed in a plastic container and the wide variation in temperatures that we had been experiencing.[61]

According to one EOD team member,

...[t]he Iraqi’s did not have the ASP sealed to protect the ammunition from the elements and several stacks of munitions were...sitting in dark puddles of rainwater…[T]o the untrained eye…these stacks could appear to be leaking munitions.

After completing their inspections, the EOD team followed GySgt Grass back to the Task Force Ripper headquarters area. The EOD team leader passed the negative results of their inspection to the Task Force Ripper NBC Officer.[62] The EOD team then returned to its unit; there they told the Officer In Charge (OIC) they had not found chemical weapons in the ASP. The team leader filed a Call Sheet to record the inspection.[63] In an effort to find this Call Sheet, we have contacted the 1st EOD Platoon Headquarters in Camp Pendleton, CA. After searching their files, the 1st EOD Platoon could not find the Call Sheet. Typically, the 1st EOD Platoon retains its records for only two years. It is most likely, therefore, that the Call Sheet was destroyed sometime in 1993.[64]

Task Force Ripper next passed the EOD team’s negative results up the chain of command and around the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO). The 1st MarDiv NBC Officer recalls being told by the Task Force Ripper NBC Officer that the EOD team did not discover any chemical weapons in the ASP. The same day, the 1st MarDiv NBC Officer received the MM-1 tapes printed in the ASP by the Fox MM-1 operator. Thinking the matter closed, he saw no need to keep the tapes. Although we have tried to find these tapes, their location, and even existence, is unknown. The 1st MarDiv NBC Officer believes he either destroyed them or placed them in files that were routinely destroyed after the Gulf War.[65]

At 1920 hours local time on March 1st, CENTCOM received the following SPOTREP:

Suspect chem[ical] munitions bunker in 1st MarDiv sector (2914N04515E) checked by EOD - No chem[ical] munitions present.[66]

The CENTCOM logs then recorded those results:

011930 [1st MEF NBC Watch Officer] called back. The suspect bunker was checked out thoroughly - no chemical munitions found.[67]

The NBC Operations Summary in the After Action Report of the Army Central Command (ARCENT) VII Corps records the following:

ARCENT reported IMARDIV sent individuals to check suspected chemical munitions storage site (no grid available) on 28 Feb. Initial results of testing indicated mustard agent. An NBC/EOD team re-evaluated the site with more sensitive equipment. They determined that no chemical agent was present. Initial readings were result of petrochemical burning.[68]

The 1/5 Commander and the NBC Officer do not recall hearing of the EOD team visit to the ASP. The 1/5 remained encamped around the ASP through at least March 2nd. According to the Commanding Officer, the Executive Officer and the Assistant Operations Officer, the ASP was never declared off limits or physically cordoned off, but people were warned to stay away from the area. This was, however, due to the significant amount of ammunition in the area, rather than a perceived or suspected chemical threat.[69] Several Marines from the 1/5 did enter the ASP at various times while they were encamped nearby—including the Commander, the NBC Officer, the Assistant Operations Officer and "approximately 25 - 30"[70] others. None of those who entered was higher than Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) level 2—that is, carrying, but not wearing their protective gloves and mask—while in the ASP. None of the 1/5 personnel interviewed had any physical symptoms consistent with chemical agent exposure after going through the ASP. Additionally, no one, including the Commander (to whom such a thing should have been reported) recalls hearing reports throughout the 1/5 of any symptoms or injuries consistent with exposure to chemical agents.[71]

This Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) was dismantled in late fall 1992 or early spring 1993 during cleanup operations in Kuwait.[72] According to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), "during the three-year, post Persian Gulf War ordnance clearance operations in Kuwait, chemical warfare agents were never detected."[73] Following the war, the Kuwaiti government contracted ordnance-clearing services to rid the country of munitions left by the occupying Iraqi army. Sources involved in the clean-up report that clearance operations, which ran from 1992 to 1994, were methodical and thorough. Seven countries participated in the clean-up: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The designated U.S. sector, which included the ASP/Orchard area, ran 3,000 square kilometers across the country from Kuwait Bay to the southwestern border. It was the largest and most difficult to clear. All of the nearly 150 U.S. personnel involved in the disposal of unexploded ordnance were U.S. military-trained EOD personnel. EOD field experience for the technicians ranged from eight to 20-plus years.

After careful study, it was determined that special chemical agent detection equipment was not necessary during clean-up operations. Prior to bidding, the U.S. contracting company conducted an extensive survey of the U.S. sector. The survey team,

was on the alert for anything that would complicate clearance operations - in particular, agent-filled munitions requiring special disposal procedures....Because the survey team found no evidence of CW agent presence, the company made the business decision to bid, and then to operate, without special equipment.[74]

Once begun, clean-up operations were divided into two distinct stages: reconnaissance and clearance.[75]

During the nine month reconnaissance phase, all discovered ordnance was visually inspected and cataloged. To ease the cataloging effort and ensure complete coverage, the U.S. sector was divided into 36 subsectors, each approximately 80 square kilometers. The unexploded ordnance (UXO) teams used "portable GPS [Global Positioning Satellite] kits and laptop computers to mark, piece-by-piece, subsector-by-subsector, the exact location and type of all ordnance."[76] No chemical weapons were discovered in this phase of clean-up operations.

Following the reconnaissance phase, operations moved on to ordnance clearance. Using the database developed during the reconnaissance phase, teams moved through each subsector and divided all the ordnance. Serviceable ordnance was turned over to the Kuwaiti government. Ordnance selected for destruction was collected at a central location and placed into large berm-enclosed pits. Alertness for "special munitions," including chemical weapons, remained high throughout this phase. It was standard procedure to suspend operations whenever previously un-encountered types of munitions were discovered. Operations were only resumed when teams positively identified and classified each new munition.[77] No chemical weapons were discovered during this phase.

Ordnance selected for destruction was destroyed on a daily basis. No chemical detectors were set up around the demolition area. A "safe area" was set up at a certain distance around the pits during actual demolition—not to protect against possible chemical exposure, but rather to protect against fragments from the exploded munitions. The demolition areas were used six nights a week. The same pits were used over and over again—day after day, night after night. UXO personnel entered the area daily to stack ammunition slated for destruction and to set charges. UXO personnel did not wear chemical protective gear during these operations.[78] No chemical injuries were reported by personnel involved in demolition operations.

During the entire course of clearance operations in Kuwait after the war, there were never any reports of chemical weapons being found in the U.S. sector, or indeed anywhere in Kuwait. Additionally, in the three years since the clearance operations were completed, no contractor personnel who worked in the U.S. sector have reported any medical problems related to chemical agents exposure.[79]

The leader of the EOD Team that inspected the ASP/Orchard on March 1, 1991 returned to Kuwait as a civilian and was involved in all phases of the clean-up operations. He returned to the ASP in fall 1992 or early spring 1993 and was involved in its dismantling. During cleanup operations in this ASP, all the bunkers were cleared and the ordnance was divided into serviceable and unserviceable items. UXO personnel did not wear protective gear while working in the ASP, and there were no indications of chemical weapons, agents, or injuries while UXO personnel dismantled the ASP.[80]

To date we have found no evidence Iraq moved chemical weapons or chemical agents into Kuwait. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has made the following statement:

Our current understanding is that Iraq did not deploy CW into Kuwait during the Gulf War. The furthest south Iraqi CW has been found is at Khamisiyah, Iraq.[81]

There are several reasons to believe that the Iraqis never deployed CW into Kuwait. First, there is no confirmed evidence that they did so. Neither Kuwait nor the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) companies assisting the Kuwaitis have reported finding any CW during cleanup operations. Iraqi troops stationed in Kuwait often did not have the best CW defensive equipment. This indicates they were not prepared to fight in a contaminated environment.

The Iraqis also feared U.S. retaliation if they used chemical weapons and may have decided to use them only if the regime’s survival were threatened. This would explain why Iraq deployed CW to Khamisiyah and An Nasiriyah, but not to Kuwait. Finally, Iraq’s most well trained and trusted forces, the Republican Guard - who were in Iraq, not Kuwait - were the units best equipped to deliver CW. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that any CW were stored behind these forces, not in front of them.[82]

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concurs with DIA’s assessment. "We also conclude that Iraq did not use chemical or biological agents nor were any agents located in Kuwait."[83]

In line with these intelligence community assessments, it is highly unlikely there were chemical weapons in this ASP. According to the EOD team, as well as message traffic and log entries from March 1st, 1991, no chemical weapons were in the ASP on that day. Once the ground war ended, only Coalition forces - primarily the U.S. and Kuwaiti - had access to this ASP. We have found no records of U.S. forces discovering or destroying chemical weapons in Kuwait between March 1991 and the beginning of cleanup operations in 1992. The ASP was still intact when the leader of the EOD team returned as an unexploded ordnance contractor. The ASP was inspected twice during the reconnaissance and dismantling phases of cleanup operations. No chemical weapons were found at either time. Additionally, we have found no records the Kuwaitis discovering chemical weapons anywhere inside their country after the war. While it is possible they did so and did not report it, it is unlikely. The Kuwaitis would have had no motivation to conceal the presence of Iraqi chemical weapons on their soil and a great deal of incentive to announce their presence, should they have been found.

The MM-1 Mass Spectrometer in the Fox vehicles used by U.S. forces during the Gulf War, was a sophisticated detector. However, according to GySgt Grass, when his vehicle received the alarms in the ASP, its detection equipment was operating in the "Air/Hi" (vapor detection) method. This is the least sensitive method of employment. The Fox vehicle was designed primarily to detect residual persistent liquid agents on the ground. While the MM-1 "will respond to vapor...its sensitivity threshold to most chemical warfare agents is well above the militarily significant concentration."[84] That is to say, although the MM-1 can detect chemical agent vapors, an inordinate amount of liquid must be present to create sufficient vapors to cause the MM-1 to alarm. Such a large amount of liquid agent would have been noticed by the Fox crew and other personnel who inspected the ASP; except for the puddle of rainwater, none of the Marines who entered or inspected the ASP mentioned large puddles of liquid or leaking munitions.

Although GySgt Grass has stated the MM-1 operator did whatever he was trained to do to get and print a full spectrum,[85] we have no information on the procedures the MM1 operator used to print the tapes from the ASP. Without these tapes, it is impossible to determine what the MM-1 alerted for. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, the tapes were lost and probably inadvertently destroyed.

It is possible to retrieve a spectrum from the MM-1 computer, if it is among the last 72 spectra saved in memory. In 1994, in response to questions raised by Congress, the Army dispatched a team of subject matter experts to read the memory of all Operation Desert Storm (ODS) era Fox vehicles. By that time, Fox vehicle #5604 was stationed in Okinawa, Japan. A memorandum prepared by the Army team states:

No spectra or extra substances were found in USMC S/N 5604 which was the vehicle which reported Lewisite and benzyl bromide detections during ODS.[86]

This indicates there were no spectra saved in the MM-1’s memory - probably because an MM-1 operator, in the course of routine maintenance, erased all previously performed spectra.

Marines from the 1/5 used Chemical Agent Monitors (CAMs) to check for chemical agents at the ASP/Orchard. According to the Army’s Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM), the CAM is significantly more effective at detecting Mustard agent than the "Air/Hi" method used by the Fox. (See Table 1) Despite their greater sensitivity, the CAMs detected no chemical agents at the ASP/Orchard.

Mustard, the agent named in the first two Fox alarms, is a persistent liquid agent. Indications of its presence should still have been in the ASP when the EOD team inspected it the day after the alarms and when elements of the 1/5 conducted their inspection while encamped in the area. Additionally, several members of the Fox crew recall being outside their vehicle in MOPP-2—that is, carrying, but not wearing, their protective masks and gloves—when they got these alarms. No one recalls any garlic smells indicating mustard agent and none of the exposed crew reported any physical symptoms consistent with exposure to mustard agent. Members of the 1/5 also went through the ASP unprotected; again, there were no reports of a garlic scent or symptoms of mustard agent exposure. Battlefield contaminants—including those from burning oil wells—could have caused the Fox to alarm for the possible presence of mustard.

Benzyl Bromide, the third agent alarmed for in the ASP, is not typically put in weapons and there is no evidence Iraq had developed a delivery method for this agent. As with the mustard alarms, both the Fox vehicle driver and the wheel operator recall the presence of unprotected soldiers (in addition to the Fox vehicle crew) when the MM-1 alerted for this agent. No one, with the exception of the driver, recalls any physical symptoms consistent with exposure to Benzyl Bromide, a tearing agent. The driver recalls feeling a temporary burning sensation on his hand after the Benzyl Bromide alarm. However, this is not consistent with exposure to tearing agents. He believes the short-lived burning sensation to have been a psychosomatic response to the alarm, rather than a symptom of chemical agent exposure.[87] According to experts at the Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM), there are several possible explanations for the Benzyl Bromide alarm. "The ions used to identify benzyl bromide could have come from toluene, a common solvent and cyclopentadiene (C5H6), which is used as an insecticide and a fungicide."[88] Toluene, used as a solvent and found in aviation gasoline, could have come from the industrial area located nearby. Cyclopentadiene, a common insecticide, may have been used sometime previously in the orchard area.

This investigation is not complete, but based on the information available so far, the presence of chemical weapons or agents in the ASP inspected by GySgt Grass’s Fox vehicle on February 28, 1991 is judged to be "Unlikely." Based on testimony and interviews with participants it seems certain the Fox MM-1 alerted to the possible presence of S-Mustard and HT-Mustard (both persistent blister agents) as well as Benzyl Bromide (a tearing agent) in the ASP on the 28th. The MM-1 operator printed tapes of these alerts. Investigation has failed to turn-up these tapes or determine the procedures used to print them.

According to interviews with members of the Fox crew, as well as Marines from the 1/5 (the unit co-located with the ASP), there were unprotected personnel in the ASP when the Fox vehicle received these alerts. None of these personnel received any chemical injuries or experienced symptoms consistent with the presence of the alerted for chemical agents.

The Fox vehicle commander reported the alerts and passed the MM-1 tapes to his chain-of-command. These tapes have been lost and are believed to have been inadvertently destroyed after the war. Without these MM-1 tapes it is impossible to determine what caused the MM-1 to alarm. However, these alerts to possible contamination in the ASP were well-documented and were reported up the Task Force Ripper and 1st MarDiv chain-of-command to CENTCOM.

Based on the reporting of the alerts up the chain-of-command, an EOD team was ordered to re-inspect the ASP the following day, 1 March 1991. The EOD team visually inspected the ASP with the assistance of M8/M9 chemical detector paper and the M18A2 chemical detector kit. The M18A2 is a more sensitive detector than the Fox MM-1 in the "Air/Hi" mode. Despite this, the EOD team inspections failed to turn up evidence of the persistent chemical agent Mustard, the tearing agent Benzyl Bromide or any chemical weapons. The negative results of the EOD team inspections were also passed up the chain-of-command to CENTCOM.

In addition to the Fox vehicle and EOD team inspections, Marines from the 1/5 inspected the ASP using Chemical Agent Monitors. As with the M18A2, the CAM is more sensitive than the Fox MM-1 in the "Air/Hi" mode. The 1/5 inspections also failed to turn-up evidence of chemical agents or chemical weapons in the ASP.

The leader of the EOD team that inspected the ASP on March 1, 1991 returned to Kuwait after the Gulf War and was involved in clean-up operations throughout the country, including this ASP. There were no chemical weapons discovered or chemical agents detected at any time during these multi-phased clean-up operations. The U.S. Intelligence Community continues to assess that Iraq never moved chemical weapons into Kuwait.

Given the preceding evidence and analysis, we assess it is unlikely there were chemical weapons or chemical agents in the ASP. Without the MM1 tapes, we cannot definitively say the alarms in the ASP on February 28, 1991 were false positives. However, the evidence suggests the alarms were indeed false positives and were most probably caused by battlefield contaminants, contaminants from the orchard and/or contaminants from a nearby industrial facility. The negative results of the more sensitive EOD tests on March 1, 1991, as well as the CAM inspections conducted by Marines from 1/5, outweigh the Fox alarms on February 28th. The Intelligence Community’s assessment that Iraq never moved chemical agents or weapons into Kuwait before the war, the absence of physical symptoms among exposed personnel and the absence of chemical weapons discoveries in Kuwait after the war also lend weight to an "unlikely" assessment.

This assessment is tentative, based on the information available to us to date. This case will be reassessed over time in accordance with any new information and feedback from the publication of this narrative.

This case is still being investigated. As additional information becomes available, it will be incorporated. If you have records, photographs, recollections, or find errors in the details reported, please contact the DOD Persian Gulf Task Force Hot Line at 1-800-472-6719.

1/5 First Battalion, Fifth Marines

1/12 First Battalion, Twelfth Marines

5/11 Fifth Battalion, Eleventh Marines

I MEF First Marine Expeditionary Force

AOR Area of Responsibility

ARCENT Army Central Command

ASP Ammunition Supply Point

BW Biological Warfare

CAM Monitor Chemical Agent Monitor

CBDCOM Chemical and Biological Defense Command

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CW Chemical Warfare

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DOD Department of Defense

DSC Direct Support Command

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

FSSG Force Support Service Group

GySgt Marine Corps Gunnery Sergeant

HMMWV High Mobility Multi-Wheel Vehicle

HT Mustard Agent

IAD Investigations and Analysis Directorate

KTO Kuwait Theater of Operations

MarDiv Marine Division

MOPP Mission Oriented Protective Posture

NBC Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Officer

NCOIC Noncommissioned Officer in Charge

ODS Operation Desert Storm

OIC Officer in Charge

OSAGWI Office of Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses

S MUSTARD Sulfur Mustard (Blister Agent)

SPOTREP SPOT Report

SWA Southwest Asia

TF Ripper Task Force Ripper

UNSCOM United Nations' Special Commission on Iraq

UXO Unexploded Ordnance Disposal

VOS Vehicle Orientation System

Blister Agents

Mustard (H) gas was used during the later parts of World War I. In its pure state, mustard is colorless and almost odorless. The name mustard comes from earlier methods of production that yielded an impure, mustard or rotten onion smelling product.

Distilled mustard (HD) was originally produced from H by a purification process of washing and vacuum distillation. HD is a colorless to amber colored liquid with a garlic-like odor, it has less odor and a slightly greater blistering power than H and is more stable in storage. It is used as a delayed action casualty agent, the duration of which depends upon the munitions used and the weather. HD is heavier then water, but small droplets will float on the water surface and present a hazard.

Heavily splashed liquid mustard persists one to two days or more in concentrations that produce casualties of military significance under average weather conditions and a week to months under very cold conditions. HD on soil remains vesicant for about two weeks. The persistency in running water is only a few days, while the persistency in stagnant water can be several months. HD is about twice as persistent in sea water.

Mustard acts first as a cell irritant and finally as a cell poison on all tissue surfaces contacted. Early symptoms include inflammation of the eyes; inflammation of the nose, throat, trachea, bronchi and lung tissue; and redness of the skin. Blistering or ulceration is also likely to occur. Other effects may include vomiting and fever that begin around the same time as the skin starts to redden.

Eyes are very sensitive to mustard in low concentrations: skin damage requires a much larger concentration. HD causes casualties at lower concentrations in hot, humid weather, because the body is moist with perspiration. Wet skin absorbs more mustard than does dry skin. HD has a very low detoxification rate; repeated exposures, therefore, are cumulative in the body.

Individuals can be protected from small mustard droplets or vapor by wearing protective masks and permeable protective clothing. The use of impermeable clothing and masks can protect against large droplets, splashes and smears.

References: Department of the Army, Navy and Air Force, FM 3-9, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds and NBC Equipment.

Detection Paper

Detection paper relies on certain dyes being soluble in chemical warfare agents. Normally, two dyes and one pH indicator are mixed with cellulose fibers in a paper without special coloring (unbleached). When a drop of chemical warfare agent is absorbed by the paper, it dissolves one of the pigments. Mustard agent dissolves a red dye and nerve agent a yellow. In addition, VX (a form of liquid nerve agent) causes the indicator to turn to blue which, together with the yellow, will become green/green-black.

Detection paper can thus be used to distinguish between three different types of chemical warfare agents. A disadvantage with the papers is that many other substances can also dissolve the pigments. Consequently, they should not be located in places where drops of substances such as solvent, fat, oil, or fuel can fall on them. Drops of water produce no reaction.

Depending on the spot diameter and density on the detection paper, it is possible to gauge the original size of the droplets and the degree of contamination.

Reference: Detection of Chemical Weapons: An overview of methods for the detection of chemical warfare agents; homepage: http://www.opcw.nl/chemhaz/detect.htm.

M256A1Chemical Agent Detection Kit

The M256A1 kit is a portable, expendable item capable of detecting and identifying hazardous concentrations of chemical agent. The M256 kit is used after a chemical alert to determine if it is safe to unmask. The M256A1 kit has replaced the M256 kit. The only difference between the two kits is that the M256A1 kit will detect lower levels of nerve agent. This improvement was accomplished by using an eel enzyme for the nerve test in the M256A1 kit in place of the horse enzyme used in the M256 kit.

Reference: Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, p. 430.

Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP)

The wearing of MOPP gear provides soldiers protection against all known chemical agents, live biological agents, and toxins. MOPP gear consists of the following items:

• Overgarment (chemical suit)
• Overboots
• Mask (gas mask) with hood
• Gloves

When a person is wearing MOPP gear, they can not work for very long nor can they work very fast. They may also suffer mental distress as a result of feeling closed in and will also suffer from heat stress and heat exhaustion when working in warm temperatures and at high work rates. The MOPP concept arose from the need to balance individual protection with the threat, temperature, and urgency of the mission.

Commanders can raise or lower the amount of protection through five levels of MOPP. In addition, commanders can exercise a mask-only option.

MOPP Zero: Individuals must carry their protective mask with them at all times. Their remaining MOPP Gear must be readily available (i.e., within the work area, fighting position, living space, etc.).

MOPP Level One: Individuals wear their overgarment. They must carry the rest of their MOPP gear.

MOPP Level Two: Individuals wear their overgarment and overboots and carry the mask with hood and gloves.

MOPP Level Three: Individuals wear their overgarment, overboots, and mask with hood. They carry the gloves.

MOPP Level Four: Individuals wear all their MOPP gear.

Source: U.S. Army Field Manual 3-4, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC, 21 October 1985.

• 7th Marine Regiment (Task Force Ripper)
• 1/5 Marine Battalion
• 7th Engineers Support Battalion
• 1st FSSG EOD Platoon

1st Reconnaissance Battalion Command Chronology.

1 Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment Command Chronology.

1 Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment Command Chronology.

1st Battalion 12th Marine Regiment Command Chronology, Mar - Jun 1991, Incidents Messages Orders Journal.

5th Battalion 11th Marines Command Chronology, Journal Files, Daily Journal 28Feb91.

11th Marines Chronology.

11th Marines War Journal.

ARCENT VII Corps After Action Report.

CENTCOM Logs, 28 Feb 91 and 1 Mar 91.

Bermudez, Joseph S., Jr., "Iraqi Missile Operations During ‘Desert Storm’ - Update." Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 1991, p. 225.

"Breaching Operations, 7th Marines Log", February 24, 1991.

Chemical and Biological Warfare in the Kuwait Theater of Operations: Iraq’s Capability and Posturing, Defense Intelligence Agency, Undated (but 1990).

"Chemical Warfare Agent Detectors Probe the Fogs of War," Chemical and Engineering News, August 1, 1994.

"Command Chronology for Period 1 January to 28 February 1991," 7th Marines.

"Command Chronology for the 1st Combat Engineering Battalion, 1 Jan to 28 Feb 91," March 15, 1991.

"DIA Answers to Questions from Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses ," June 23, 1997, (received 1997).

DIA Intelligence Information Report, June 2, 1997, Subject: "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait."

DIA Intelligence Information Report, June 1997, Subject: "Post-Gulf War Chemical Warfare Detection Methodology Used in Kuwait."

Final Report to Congress, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April, 1992.

"Fox Reconnaissance Vehicle," Information Paper, July 31, 1997.

Gulf War Journal, GySgt George Grass, 28 Feb 1991.

Heflin, Ron CWO3, Ordnance destroyed in SWA, NAVEODTECHEN, 1997. Note, Table A shows all USMC ordnance found to be unfit for transport back to the U.S. and destroyed in place as well as some foreign ordnance on the bottom of this list.

Intelligence Report, Iraqis Prepositioned Chemical Munitions, ARCENT, March, 1991.

Interview with GySgt George Grass, Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, 20 February 1997.

Investigation to Inquire into the Circumstances surrounding the Possible Exposure of Sergeant [Name Deleted] USMC to Chemical Agents During Operation Desert Storm. 1st MEF, USMC, 22 Feb 1994.

Iraqi Chemical Warfare: Analysis of Information Available to DOD (U), Section 11 (U) Possible CW Agent Release, Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Committee Report, June 16, 1997.

Lead Sheet 748, Interview with Fox Expert, 30 April 1996.

Lead Sheet 5183, Interview with Fox 5604 MM1 Operator, 4 Jun 1997.

Lead Sheet 5259 and 5293, Interview with EOD Team Leader, 11 June 1997 and 23 May 1996.

Lead Sheet 5263, Interview with 1st MarDiv NBC Officer, 13 June 1997.

Lead Sheet 5291, Interview with Member of EOD Team, 18 June 1997.

Lead Sheet 5294, Interview with Officer-in-Charge of 1st EOD Platoon, 16 May 1996, 17 May 1996, 21 May 1996 and 18 June 1997.

Lead Sheet 5325, Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, 18 June 1997.

Lead Sheet 5333, Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Commanding Officer, 24 June 1997.

Lead Sheet 5334, Interview with 1st EOD Platoon Point-of-Contact, 24 June 1997.

Lead Sheet 5338, Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Executive Officer, 25 June 1997.

Lead Sheet 5352, Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Assistant Operations Officer, 26 June 1997.

Lead Sheets 5353 and 5359, Interview with Fox 5604 driver, 7 Dec 1993, 31 May 1996 and 27 June 1997.

Lead Sheet 5357, Interview with 1st MarDiv Executive Officer, 30 June 1997.

Lead Sheet 5370, Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines NBC Officer, 1 July 1997.

Lead Sheet 5390, Interview with member of 1st and 2nd Platoon EOD, 2 July 1997.

Lead Sheet 5391 and 5411, Interview with Fox 5604 Wheel man, 2 July 1997.

Letter by Fox Vehicle 5604 Driver Concerning Possible Chemical Attack, December 22, 1993.

Letter by Task Force Ripper NBC Officer Concerning Possible Chemical Attack, Undated - but prepared in 1993.

Letter by member of EOD team to Representative Shays, December 19, 1996.

"Marine Corps NBC Defense in Southwest Asia," Marine Corps Research Center Research Paper #92-0009, Captain T. F. Manley, July 1991.

Memorandum from Marine Corps Casualty Section, Subject: "Chemical Casualties During Desert Shield/Desert Storm," March 11, 1996.

Message from COMUSMARCENT - G-3, 0313592 Feb 91.

"Mission Oriented Protective Posture and Chemical Protection," August 30 1997.

"Persian Gulf Special Summary", Central Intelligence Agency, September 1990.

Peterlick, Daniel Capt., EOD Situation Report for the period 23 February 1991 through 31 March 1991, MALS-16, 10 April 1991, enclosure 1 and enclosure 3.

1st MarDiv Radio Message Traffic.

Task Force Ripper (1st Battalion, 7th Marines) Command Chronology for the Period 1 January to 28 February 1991.

Testimony of CWO Joseph P. Cottrell, USMC, at the Hearing before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, November 18, 1993.

Testimony of Fox Subject Matter Expert, Mr. Richard Vigus, CBDCOM, before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, November 18, 1993.

Testimony of Fox Vehicle 5604 Driver Concerning Possible Chemical Attack, "Christmas Investigation", September 22, 1993.

Testimony of GySgt George J. Grass, Task Force Ripper Fox Vehicle Commander, May 1, 1996, to the Presidential Advisory Committee.

Testimony of GySgt George J. Grass, Task Force Ripper Fox Vehicle Commander, May 7, 1997, to the Presidential Advisory Committee.

Testimony of GySgt George J. Grass, Task Force Ripper Fox Vehicle Commander, "Christmas Investigation", January 11, 1994.

Testimony of Mr. James Kenny, Task Force Ripper Fox MM-1 Operator, to the Presidential Advisory Committee, May 7, 1997.

Testimony of Lt. Gen. Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., before the Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, February 27, 1997.

Testimony of Task Force Ripper NBC Officer Concerning Possible Chemical Attack, "Christmas Investigation," December 14, 1993.

The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, United Nations, New York, 1996.

The Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects, June, 1994.

U.S. Army/Marine Corps FM 3-4/FMFM 11-9, "NBC Protection."

U.S. Army FM 3-9 U.S. Navy NAVFAC Publication P-467 U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990.

U.S. Army, FM 3-100, "NBC Operations,"

U.S. Army FM 3-101-2, "NBC Reconnaissance Squad/Platoon (FOX) Operations - Tactics, Techniques and Procedures," August 10, 1994.

U.S. Army, Message Form, Subject: MARCENT Report, 240955C Feb 91.

U. S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C., 1993.

U. S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C., 1993.

U.S. Navy Ships Technical Manual Chapter 470 Change 4, September 91, "Shipboard BW/CW Defense and Countermeasures."

Vigus, Richard, Summary of MM-1 Spectra, U.S. Army Chemical Biological Defense Command, 15 Feb 1994.

Watts, Barry D. And Kearny, Dr. Thomas A., Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), Volume II, Effects and Effectiveness, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.

Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995.

Wronka, Dr. John, Analysis of MM-1 Data, Bruker DALTRONICS, 15 July 1997.

The DOD requires a common framework for our investigations and assessments of chemical warfare agent incident reports, so we turned to the United Nations and the international community which had experience concerning chemical weapons. Because the modern battlefield is complex, the international community developed investigation and validation protocols[89] to provide objective procedures for possible chemical weapons incidents. The standard that we are using is based on these protocols that include:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site.
• Physical evidence from the site such as weapons fragments, soil, water, vegetation, or human or animal tissue samples.
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence.
• Testimony of eyewitnesses.
• Multiple analyses.
• Review of the evidence by an expert panel.

While the DOD methodology for investigating chemical incidents (Figure 7) is based on these protocols, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence was often not collected at the time of an event. Accordingly, the methodology is designed to provide a thorough, investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and determine what happened. The major efforts in this methodology are:

• Substantiate the incident.
• Document the medical reports related to the incident.
• Interview appropriate people.
• Obtain information available to external organizations.
• Assess the results.

Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical agent presence, nor is a single individual’s observation sufficient to validate a chemical agent presence.

To substantiate the circumstances surrounding an incident, the investigator searches for documentation from operational, intelligence, and environmental logs. This focuses the investigation on a specific time, date, and location, clarifies the conditions under which the incident occurred, and determines whether there is "hard" as well as anecdotal evidence. Additionally, the investigator looks for physical evidence that might indicate that chemical agents were present in the vicinity of the incident, including samples (or the results of analyses of samples) collected at the time of the incident.

The investigator searches the medical records to determine if personnel were injured as a result of the incident. Deaths, injuries, sicknesses, etc. near the time and location of an incident may be telling. Medical experts should provide information about alleged chemical casualties.

Figure 7. Chemical Incident Investigation Methodology

Interviews of incident victims (or direct observers) are conducted. First-hand witnesses provide valuable insight into the conditions surrounding the incident and the mind-set of the personnel involved, and are particularly important if physical evidence is lacking. NBC officers or personnel trained in chemical and biological testing, confirmation, and reporting are interviewed to identify the unit’s response, the tests that were run, the injuries sustained, and the reports submitted. Commanders are contacted to ascertain what they knew, what decisions they made concerning the events surrounding the incident, and their assessment of the incident. Where appropriate, subject matter experts also provide opinions on the capabilities, limitations, and operation of technical equipment, and submit their evaluations of selected topics of interest.

Additionally, the investigator contacts agencies and organizations that may be able to provide additional clarifying information about the case. These would include, but not be limited to:

• Intelligence agencies that might be able to provide insight into events leading to the event, imagery of the area of the incident, and assessments of factors affecting the case.
• The DOD and Veterans’ clinical registries, which may provide data about the medical condition of personnel involved in the incident.

1. An acronym listing/glossary is at Tab A.
2. Investigation to Inquire into the Circumstances surrounding the Possible Exposure of Sergeant [Name Deleted] USMC to Chemical Agents During Operation Desert Storm. Finding 36, 1st MEF, USMC, 22 Feb 1994.
3. Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead sheet 5325.
4. Drawing provided by GySgt George Grass. TRF stands for Task Force Ripper.
5. Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5370, dated July 1, 1997 and Interview with Fox #5604 Driver, Lead Sheets 5353 and 5359, dated December 7, 1993, May 31, 1996 and June 27, 1997.
6. GySgt George Grass' Gulf War Journal.
7. The Vehicle Orientation System (VOS) relied on number of wheel revolutions to determine its relative position. Therefore, anytime the wheels turned without moving the vehicle (for example, when stuck in the sand) the location displayed by the VOS would be inaccurate from that point on. Resetting the VOS required a major land feature to be in the line of sight - an infrequent occurrence in the desert. The VOS has since been replaced with the more accurate Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) system.
8. Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 1 May 96; Interview with member of EOD team, CMAT Number 1997170-0000026 and Interview with EOD team leader, Lead Sheets 5259 and 5293, dated June 11, 1997 and May 23, 1996, respectively.
9. Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 1 May 96 and Interview with EOD team leader, Lead Sheets 5259 and 5293, dated June 11, 1997 and May 23, 1996, respectively.
10.  Letter to Representative Shay, Chairman of the House Government Relations and Oversight Subcommittee from member of EOD team, December 19, 1996, CMAT Number 1997169-0000-054.
11. Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 10 Dec 96.
12. GySgt George Grass' Gulf War Journal.
13. Interview with EOD team leader, Lead Sheets 5259 and 5293, dated June 11, 1997 and May 23, 1996, respectively.
14. Provided by GySgt George Grass.
15. Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 10 Dec 96.
16. Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5325, dated June 18, 1997.
17. Interview with 1st MarDiv NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5263, dated June 13, 1997.
18. Because the minimum detectable amount is calculated from the background and backgrounds vary-dependent on environmental and atmospheric conditions-the minimum detectable amounts will vary. The sensitivities listed in Table 2 are relevant only for the specific conditions they were calculated from.
19. At this level unprotected personnel would experience moderate to severe symptoms from Sarin before the MM-1 would alert.
20. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects; June 1994 Table 18, Gulflink, http://www.gulflink.health.mil/dsbrpt/table18.gif.
21. For more information on the Fox vehicle, please refer to the Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle Information Paper.
22. Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 11 Jan 94. This same information about the Fox Vehicle alerts in the ASP is also reported in the Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Committee Report: Iraqi Chemical Warfare: Analysis of Information Available to DOD (U), Section 11 (U) Possible CW Agent Release, June 16, 1997, p. 19-20. However, as noted in the section EOD Team Inspection on March 1, 1991 of this narrative, recollections of the results of the inspection differ. Based on Grass’s testimony, the Mitre report says the EOD team confirmed the presence of chemical weapons; but numerous interviews with the EOD team indicated their inspections turned up no evidence of chemical weapons in the ASP, which was reported up the chain of command. In addition to these interviews these results were confirmed in a letter sent to Congressman Shay by a member of the EOD team. Letter to Representative Shay, Chairman of the House Government Relations and Oversight Subcommittee from member of EOD team, December 19, 1996, CMAT Number 1997169-0000-054.
23. Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 14 Mar 96.
24. Testimony of Fox #5604 MM1 Operator, Lead Sheet 5183, dated June 4, 1997.
25. For more on MOPP see the MOPP Information Paper (to be published and linked at a future date).
26. Interview with Fox #5604 Wheel Operator, Lead Sheet 5411, dated July 2, 1997 and Interview with Fox #5604 Driver, Lead Sheets 5353 and 5359, dated December 7, 1993, May 31, 1996 and June 27, 1997.
27. Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 14 Mar 96.
28. Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 10 Dec 96.
29. Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 10 Dec 96.
30. Interview with GySgt George Grass, 20 February 1997, p. 68.
31. Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 10 Dec 96.
32. Interview with GySgt George Grass, 20 February 1997, p. 61.
33. Interview with GySgt George Grass, 20 February 1997, p. 62.
34. Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 10 Dec 96.
35. Testimony of Fox #5604 MM1 Operator, Lead Sheet 5183, dated June 4, 1997.
36. Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 10 Dec 96.
37. Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 10 Dec 96.
38. Interview with GySgt George Grass, 20 February 1997, p. 60. Grass described the Conex box as being like "the back of a tractor-trailer that's been set down on the ground and painted green."
39. Interview with GySgt George Grass, 20 February 1997, p. 61.
40. Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Executive Officer, Lead Sheet 5338, dated June 25, 1997 and Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Commanding Officer, Lead Sheet 5333, dated June 24, 1997.
41. Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5370, dated July 1, 1997.
42. Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Assistant Operations Officer, Lead Sheet 5352, dated June 26, 1997.
43. Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5370, dated July 1, 1997.
44. Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Assistant Operations Officer, Lead Sheet 5352, dated June 26, 1997; Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Commanding Officer, Lead Sheet 5333, dated June 24, 1997 and Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Executive Officer, Lead Sheet 5338, dated June 25, 1997.
45. Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 14 Mar 96.
46. Interview with Task Force Ripper NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5325, dated June 18, 1997.
47. Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 14 Mar 96.
48. 1st MarDiv Radio Message Traffic from Ripper to PRIDE, Gulflink http://www.dtic.mil/gulflink/db/marines/123096_oct96_decls10_0001.html.
49. 1st MarDiv Radio Message Traffic from Division to DSC, Gulflink http://www.dtic.mil/gulflink/db/marines/123096_oct96_decls11_0001.html.
50. Command Chronology 5th Battalion 11th Marines Journal Files, Daily Journal 28Feb91, Gulflink http//www.dtic.mil/gulflink/db/marines/121096_sep96_decls24_0003.html.
51. Command Chronology 1st Reconnaissance Battalion Jan - Mar 1991, Journal 1st Recon BN 28 Feb 91, Gulflink http://www.dtic.mil/gulflink/db/marines/121096_sep96_decls20_0004.html.
52. Command Chronology 1st Battalion 12th Marine Regiment Mar - Jun 1991, Incidents Messages Orders Journal, Gulflink http://www.dtic.mil:80/gulflink/db/marines/102596_sep96_decls22_0001.html.
53. CENTCOM SPOTREP 282150C, Gulflink http://www.dtic.mil:80/...082696_DOC_133_SIG_OPS_EVENTS_35.txt. (The geographic coordinates (geocoords) given correspond to the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid coordinates recorded in other logs.)
54. CENTCOM Logs, Gulflink http://www.dtic.mil/gulflink...centcom/100996_nbc_024-34.html.
55. Interview with EOD team member, Lead Sheet 5291, dated June 18, 1997and CMAT Number 1997153-0000131 and Interview with EOD team member, CMAT Number 1997170-0000026.
56. Interview with EOD team member, CMAT Number 1997170-0000026; Interview with EOD team leader, Lead Sheets 5259 and 5293, dated June 11, 1997 and May 23, 1996, respectively and Interview with EOD team member, Lead Sheet 5291, dated June 18, 1997 and CMAT Number 1997153-0000131.
57. Testimony of GySgt George Grass, 1 May 96.
58. Interview with EOD team leader, Lead Sheets 5259 and 5293, dated June 11, 1997 and May 23, 1996, respectively.
59. Interview with EOD team leader, Lead Sheets 5259 and 5293, dated June 11, 1997 and May 23, 1996, respectively; Interview with EOD team member, CMAT Number 1997170-0000026; Interview with EOD team member, Lead Sheet 5291, dated June 18, 1997and CMAT Number 1997153-0000131 and Interview with EOD team member, CMAT Number 1997170-0000025.
60. Interview with EOD team member, CMAT Number 1997170-0000026.
61. Letter to Representative Shay, Chairman of the House Government Relations and Oversight Subcommittee from member of EOD team, December 19, 1996, CMAT Number 1997169-0000-054.
62. Interview with EOD team leader, Lead Sheets 5259 and 5293, dated June 11, 1997 and May 23, 1996, respectively.
63. Interview with 1st FSSG EOD Platoon Officer-In-Charge, Lead Sheet 5294, dated May 16-17, 1996, May 21, 1996 and June 18, 1997.
64. Interview with 1st EOD Platoon Representative, Lead Sheet 5334, dated June 24, 1997.
65. Interview with 1st MarDiv NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5263, dated June 13, 1997.
66. CENTCOM SPOTREP 011930C, Gulflink http://www.dtic.mil:80/...082696_DOC_133_SIG_OPS_EVENTS_32.txt.
67. CENTCOM Logs, Gulflink http://www.dtic.mil/gulflink...centcom/100996_nbc_024-34.html.
68. ARCENT VII Corps After Action Report, Gulflink http://www.dtic.mil/gulflink/db/army/970107_sep96_decls23_0027.html.
69. Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Assistant Operations Officer, Lead Sheet 5352, dated June 26, 1997; Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Commanding Officer, Lead Sheet 5333, dated June 24, 1997 and Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Executive Officer, Lead Sheet 5338, dated June 25, 1997.
70. Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Commanding Officer, Lead Sheet 5333, dated June 24, 1997 and Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Executive Officer, Lead Sheet 5338, dated June 25, 1997.
71.  Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Executive Officer, Lead Sheet 5338, dated June 25, 1997; Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Assistant Operations Officer, Lead Sheet 5352, dated June 26, 1997 and Interview with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines NBC Officer, Lead Sheet 5370, dated July 1, 1997.
72. Interview with EOD team leader, Lead Sheets 5259 and 5293, dated June 11, 1997 and May 23, 1996, respectively.
73. Defense Intelligence Agency, IIR 7-717-0082-97, "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait (U)," (U) - redacted copy, June 1997. (This source is unavailable pending declassification and uploading procedures.) This is consistent with testimony presented by Mr. Charles Duelfer representing UNSCOM in testimony to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses on July 29th, 1997 in Buffalo, NY. Mr. Duelfer indicated that there is no evidence that chemical weapons were moved into Kuwait.
74. Defense Intelligence Agency, IIR 7-717-0087-97, "Post-Gulf War Chemical Warfare Detection Methodology Used in Kuwait (U)," (S), June 1997. In addition to this reporting, OSAGWI interviewed the President of the division of the US contracting company responsible for clean-up in the US sector. This interview corroborates DIA’s conclusions that no chemical weapons were found in Kuwait after the war. Interview with Division President, Lead Sheet 1288, dated February 11, 1997.
75. Defense Intelligence Agency, IIR 7-717-0082-97, "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait," redacted copy, June 1997. (This source is unavailable pending declassification and uploading procedures.)
76. Defense Intelligence Agency, IIR 7-717-0082-97, "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait," redacted copy, June 1997. (This source is unavailable pending declassification and uploading procedures.)
77. Defense Intelligence Agency, IIR 7-717-0087-97, "Post-Gulf War Chemical Warfare Detection Methodology Used in Kuwait (U)," (S), June 1997. (This source is unavailable pending declassification and uploading procedures.)
78. Interview with EOD team leader, Lead Sheets 5259 and 5293, dated June 11, 1997 and May 23, 1996, respectively.
79. Defense Intelligence Agency, IIR 7-717-0082-97, "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait," redacted copy, June 1997 (unavailable pending declassification and uploading procedures) and Interview with EOD team leader, Lead Sheets 5259 and 5293, dated June 11, 1997 and May 23, 1996, respectively.
80. Interview with EOD team leader, Lead Sheets 5259 and 5293, dated June 11, 1997 and May 23, 1996, respectively.
81. This was confirmed in a statement by Mr. Charles Duelfer, UN Special Commission, to the Presidential Advisory Committee (PAC) on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses, July 29, 1997. Major Cross of the PAC asked "Do you see any evidence where any weapons were moved from the three lower depots, actually down into Kuwait, maybe brought back at some time?" Mr Duelfer answered, "We have seen no evidence of that and Iraqis have said that no movements took place other than what is described here." Mr. Duelfer was referring to movements of munitions to and from the depots near Baghdad and the three lower depots, of which the southernmost (and closest to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) was Khamisiyah.
82. Defense Intelligence Agency Answers to Questions from Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses , June 23, 1997. (This source is unavailable pending declassification and uploading procedures.)
83. Central Intelligence Agency Testimony to Presidential Advisory Committee, 9 Jul 96.
84. Interview with Subject Matter Expert from Chemical Biological Defense Command, Lead Sheet 748, dated April 30, 1996 and e-mails from same dated November 12 ,1993 and July 28, 1997.
85. Interview with GySgt George Grass, 20 February 1997, p. 61.
86. Summary of MM-1 Spectra, US Army Chemical Biological Defense Command, 15 Feb 1994. For more information on the reported Lewisite alarm, see the Al Jaber Airfield case narrative.
87. Interview with Fox #5604 Driver, Lead Sheets 5353 and 5359, dated December 7, 1993, May 31, 1996 and June 27, 1997.
88. Interview with Subject Matter Expert from Chemical Biological Defense Command, Lead Sheet 748, dated April 30, 1996 and e-mails from same, dated November 12 ,1993 and July 28, 1997.
89.  "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This Chemical Weapons Convention was opened for signature in Paris, France, on January 13, 1993. It has been signed by 165 States and ratified by 93 States (as of June 1997.) It was signed by the U.S. on Jan 13, 1993 and ratified on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the Convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. [http://www.unog.ch/frames/disarm/distreat/chemical.htm]