One prominent hypothesis about illnesses among Gulf War veterans is that some of the reported symptoms are the result of exposure to chemical warfare agents. During and after the Gulf War, some veterans reported that they had been exposed to chemical warfare agents. To investigate these incidents, and to assess the likelihood that chemical warfare agents were present in the Gulf, the Department of Defense developed a methodology for investigation and validation based on work done by the United Nations and the international community. The criteria include:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site;
• Physical evidence from the site such as weapons fragments, soil, water, vegetation or human/animal tissue samples;
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence;
• The testimony of witnesses;
• Multiple analyses; and
• A review of the evidence by experts.

While the methodology (Tab D) used to investigate suspected chemical warfare agent incidents is based on these protocols, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence was often not collected at the time of an event. Therefore, we cannot apply a rigid template to all incidents, and each investigation must be tailored to its unique circumstances. Accordingly, we designed our methodology to provide a thorough, investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and to determine what happened. Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical warfare agent presence, nor is a single observation sufficient to validate the presence of a chemical warfare agent.

After following our methodology and accumulating anecdotal, documentary, and physical evidence; after interviewing witnesses and key servicemembers; and after analyzing the results of all available information, the investigator assesses the validity of the presence of chemical warfare agents on the battlefield. Because we do not expect to always have conclusive evidence, we have developed an assessment scale (Figure 1) ranging from Definitely Not to Definitely, with intermediate assessments of Unlikely, Indeterminate, and Likely. This assessment is our best judgement, based on facts available as of the date of the report publication; each case has been reassessed over time based on new information and feedback.

Figure 1. Assessment of chemical warfare agent presence

The standard for making the assessment is based on common sense: Do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that chemical warfare agents were or were not present? When insufficient information is available, the assessment is Indeterminate until more evidence can be found.

We investigated the possible presence of chemical warfare agents at Tallil Air Base, a major tactical air base in southeastern Iraq that was a suspected chemical warfare munitions storage site. This narrative was initially published on October 30, 1997. Since that time, the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses has not received any new information on the material presented, nor have any additional leads developed to change the narrative’s assessments. Additionally, the Presidential Special Oversight Board reviewed the narrative and recommended that the Office of the Special Assistant republish it as final. For this reason, this is a final report.

During the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, fighter-attack aircraft from this base used chemical warfare munitions against Iranian targets. The intelligence community thought S-shaped bunkers were among the types of facilities Iraq used to store chemical and biological warfare weapons. Therefore, during the air campaign, Coalition planners prioritized targeting for this type bunker believed to be supporting Iraq’s national chemical warfare programs. In early February 1991, a 2,000-pound bomb struck the S-shaped bunker at Tallil, seriously damaging it and partially collapsing the ceiling. After Desert Storm's cease-fire, 82nd Airborne Division units occupied Tallil. Before they withdrew from Iraq, US forces destroyed the remaining facilities, equipment, and munitions that had survived Desert Storm’s air and ground phases at Tallil and the surrounding area.

During the US occupation, chemical warfare specialists using specialized chemical detection equipment, including XM93 nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance (Fox) vehicles and explosive ordnance disposal technicians searched Tallil for chemical warfare agents and munitions. The investigators’ interviews with these soldiers and combat engineers who did much of the hands-on demolition work and comprehensive review of available information, including intelligence community sources, did not produce evidence that chemical warfare agents or weapons were present at Tallil during the US occupation. The extensive chemical warfare specialists’ and explosive ordnance disposal technicians’ searches did find defensive equipment associated with chemical warfare (e.g., masks, suits, antidotes, and decontaminants.) Due to pre-war briefings that Iraq marked its chemical warfare munitions with colored bands, some soldiers believed that they had discovered, reported, or destroyed some of Iraq’s chemical warfare munitions. Post-war assessments of Iraq’s chemical warfare program have determined that this identification method was totally unreliable. However, explosive ordnance disposal technicians said that they relied on specific munitions design characteristics to identify chemical warfare-capable munitions.

Iraq did not declare Tallil Air Base as a chemical weapons storage site under United Nations Resolution 687, which required Iraq to declare all weapons of mass destruction and their research, testing, production, and storage facilities for verification, monitoring, and demolition purposes. The United Nations Special Commission did not find evidence that Iraq moved chemical weapons to Tallil before or during the Gulf War, and the United Nations Special Commission team that inspected Tallil and its S-shaped bunker in December 1992 did not find evidence of chemical weapons or bulk storage of chemical warfare agents. However, it is important to note that neither the US occupation forces nor the United Nations Special Commission team was able to inspect the portion of the S-shaped bunker where the ceiling had collapsed or examine any materials buried under the remaining debris. Had Iraq stored chemical weapons or agents in this facility when it was struck during the war, the resulting contamination almost certainly would have required Iraq to completely remove all bunker debris, extensively decontaminate the area, and then rebuild before using it for conventional storage. However, after the war, Iraq cleared the rubble from the bunker’s intact area and used it to store conventional munitions. Given these facts, combined with the lack of any US reports of chemical warfare agent detections or injuries, we find it unlikely that chemical weapons or chemical warfare agents were present at Tallil Air Base during the period of US occupation from March 2-April 7, 1991.

The narrative was initially published on October 30, 1997. Since that time, the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses has not received any new information on the material presented, nor have any additional leads developed to change the narrative’s assessments. Additionally, the Presidential Special Oversight Board reviewed the narrative and recommended that the Office of the Special Assistant republish it as final. For this reason, this is a final report. See Tab E for changes included in this final report.

1. Talil Air Base Description

Tallil Air Base[2] is located in southeastern Iraq, approximately 160 miles southeast of Baghdad and 140 miles northwest of Kuwait City (Figure 2). Its coordinates are:

• Geographic: 30� 56� North Latitude, 046� 06� East Longitude
• Military Geographic Reference: 38R PV042230

Figure 2. Talil Air Base and other selected Iraqi chemical warfare production and storage locations. 

Tallil played a prominent role during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War since it has two major runways and associated support facilities, including hardened bunkers to shelter aircraft and aircraft ordnance. This base (Figure 3) also has one of the S-shaped bunkers in which, during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the intelligence community believed Iraq stored chemical weapons.[3] The An Nasiriyah Southwest Ammunition Storage Point (An Nasiriyah SW ASP) (Figures 2 and 3) located just northeast of Tallil Air Base is a separate installation. Many of the soldiers, airmen, and units at Tallil also conducted the same type of activities at this nearby ASP. These activities are described later in sections C and D and in another published case narrative, "An Nasiriyah Southwest Ammunition Storage Point, Final Report."[4]

Figure 3. Talil Air Base

2. Iraq's Air-Delivered Chemical Weapons Program

During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq developed the ability to produce and store chemical weapons for use against Iranian targets. Iraq filled 250-kilogram and 500-kilogram aerial bombs with mustard blister agent and nerve agents like tabun and sarin.[5]

During the Iran-Iraq war, fighter-attack aircraft and helicopters from Tallil conducted numerous strikes—some using chemical weapons—against Iranian targets.[6] Reports indicate that Iraqi fighter-attack aircraft dropped mustard-filled and tabun-filled 250-kilogram bombs and mustard-filled 500-kilogram bombs on Iranian targets. Other reports indicate that Iraq’s helicopters may have dropped 55-gallon drums filled with unknown agents (probably mustard) from altitudes of 3,000-4,000 feet. The Iraqis also used spray systems consisting of two spray tanks (each with a 1,000-liter volume) attached to helicopters.[7]

Subsequently, Desert Shield and Desert Storm intelligence assessments indicated that Iraq’s aircraft had the capability to deliver mainly 250 and 500-kilogram bombs with chemical warfare agents. However, after the Gulf War, Iraq did not list in their chemical "Full, Final and Complete Disclosure" document that tabun was used as a fill for 250-kilogram bombs.[8] More significantly, at the start of the Gulf War, US intelligence believed Iraq stored chemical and biological weapons in certain types of bunkers[9] possessing ventilation, security, and/or structural characteristics not seen in facilities storing conventional weapons.[10] During the Iran-Iraq War, intelligence analysts identified newly constructed ammunition storage bunkers as likely repositories for chemical and biological weapons based on these characteristics. The intelligence community assessed the S-shaped bunker design as one of several types associated with chemical warfare munitions storage. Therefore, the intelligence community assessed Iraq’s 22 S-shaped bunkers, including the one located at Tallil, as part of its national chemical warfare storage capability.[11] However, after the war, the intelligence community learned that Iraq stored chemical weapons in a variety of bunkers, and sometimes in the open.

1. The Air War

Destroying chemical weapon production and storage areas was a priority during the Desert Storm air campaign of January 17-February 28, 1991.[12] In early February, an air strike inflicted moderate damage, including a partially collapsed roof, on Tallil’s S-shaped bunker.[13] To penetrate reinforced concrete bunkers, the US Air Force uses the BLU-109, a laser guided, 2,000-pound general-purpose bomb whose hardened steel casing allows it to penetrate several feet of earthen cover and reinforced concrete before detonating.[14] When detonation occurs within a confined space such as a reinforced concrete bunker, the blast blows a portion of the bunker’s contents through the doors, ventilation ducts, and the bomb’s own entry hole. If the contents are flammable or explosive, a secondary explosion usually results, which in most cases destroys the bunker and its contents. If the bunker contains nothing flammable or explosive, it often will survive partly or even completely intact, even though the blast may severely damage or destroy some of its contents. Depending on the type of contents and quantity, the bunker’s size, and the weapon’s entry angle and fusing, it is possible for some of a bunker’s contents to survive a BLU-109’s penetration and detonation.

A February 7, 1991, Defense Intelligence Agency message sums up the intelligence community’s assessment of where Iraq dispersed and stored their chemical warfare munitions stockpile after several weeks of Coalition air strikes:

We do not know with any degree of confidence where the Iraqis are storing their chemical weapons in the KTO [Kuwait Theater of Operations]. Traditionally, Iraq has not deployed its chemical weapons to forward based units until their use was imminent. Since the coalition’s bombing campaign against Iraqi chemical production, storage, and filling facilities began on January 17, 1991, it is believed that they have probably dispersed their sensitive chemical weapons stocks to improve survivability. The current whereabouts of their chemical inventory is unknown.[15]

2. The Ground War

At the start of the ground war, a message from the XVIII Airborne Corps warned subordinate units of their responsibility should they find suspected chemical and biological weapons:

Units who capture or find suspected chemical and/or biological munitions or material will not handle, move, or destroy them. Units will mark the location and, if possible, secure the area and identify the location to XVIII Corps G3 operations and supporting EOD teams. Iraqi chemical munitions may be difficult to identify. Some are possibly marked with gold, yellow, green, or blue bands. Other marking schemes and/or patterns may exist. CW/BW munitions may be stored with conventional munitions.

Units are currently not authorized to destroy chemical/biological munitions. EOD will have technical responsibility for control and disposition of chemical/biological munitions. Under no circumstances will chemical/biological weapons be retrograded out of Kuwait or Iraq into Saudi Arabia without COMUSARCENT approval.[16]

On February 27, 1991, at 1:30 PM local time, the 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor, 197th Infantry Brigade, 24th Mechanized Infantry Division raided Tallil Air Base, the first time in the Gulf War that US ground forces entered this facility. This action was a tactical feint designed to convince Iraq’s senior leadership that the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division intended to continue its drive north and cross the Euphrates river—when in fact, the 24th proceeded to the southeast toward the city of Basra.[17] This raiding force did not occupy or push off Iraq’s forces at Tallil. According to the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor, his tanks penetrated only 600-700 yards into the base and stayed about 45-60 minutes and did not search or clear any bunkers during this action.[18] Short, but intense, the raid destroyed six fighter-attack aircraft, three helicopters, four self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery pieces, and two tanks.[19] While the 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor suffered no casualties, it left behind four vehicles immobilized by mechanical and terrain difficulties. The 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor then refueled south of Tallil at 5:30 PM before rejoining the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division’s drive toward Basra.[20]

The XVIII Airborne Corps called the area it would occupy in southern Iraq Area of Operations (AO) Bragg (Figure 4). It encompassed Tallil Air Base and An Nasiriyah SW ASP to the northwest, Khamisiyah ASP in the middle, and Jalibah airfield to the southeast. On February 27, 1991, at 9:30 PM local time, XVIII Airborne Corps published Fragmentary Order 74 which directed the 82nd Airborne Division to "clear enemy forces from AO Bragg and destroy all equipment" commencing by 10:00 AM on February 28, 1991.[21]

Figure 4. Area of Operation Bragg

As 82nd Airborne Division units moved to their assigned sectors in AO Bragg,[22] the XVIII Airborne Corps repeated USCENTCOM commander’s announcement that offensive operations would end effective 8:00 AM on February 28, 1991.[23] After the cease-fire went into effect, 82nd Airborne Division units developed a psychological operations plan to convince the Iraq’s soldiers still occupying Tallil either to retreat northwest or to surrender without resistance.[24] The plan worked—82nd Airborne Division units secured the base on March 1 and 2, 1991, without major incident. 82nd Airborne Division units - particularly the 504th and 505th Parachute Infantry Regiments and other subordinate units (Tab B) - occupied Tallil Air Base and started the long process of identifying munitions and other materiel to destroy before departing. While many small infantry units performed impromptu demolition of fighting trenches, personnel bunkers, arms caches, and vehicles, C Company, 307th Engineer Battalion, with the technical advice and support of the 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Detachment systematically destroyed most of the large quantities of munitions and major facilities. The 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment[25] with its 84th Engineer Company and the attached 82nd Engineer Battalion (no relationship to the 82nd Airborne Division) replaced the 82nd Airborne Division units when the 82nd Airborne Division units rotated out of the area on March 24, 1991.

Precision guided munitions already had hit many of Tallil’s facilities, especially hardened aircraft shelters and maintenance hangars (Figures 5, 6, and 7). Some of these attacks destroyed the facilities and their contents in place, while others initiated secondary explosions, scattering material and debris for considerable distances. Coalition aircraft also had seeded large areas of the base with US aerial mines (nicknamed ‘gators’) to impede aircraft and vehicles from using the airfield’s parking aprons, taxiways, and runways.[26]

Figure 5. Bomb damaged hardened aircraft shelters

Figure 6. Blast damaged aircraft maintenance hanger

Figure 7. Damaged entrance to hardened aircraft shelter

One of the US commanders’ highest priorities at Tallil Air Base was to identify hazardous areas: of primary concern were potential chemical warfare munitions sites and unexploded ordnance. Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense personnel from the 82nd Airborne Division searched for chemical warfare agents with a full range of chemical warfare agent detection equipment, including two Fox vehicles, while the 60th EOD identified and neutralized US and Iraqi unexploded ordnance.[27]

1. Search for Chemical Warfare Munitions

A March 23, 1991 message from the 82nd Airborne Division chemical officer to the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment chemical officer summarizing the search for chemical warfare munitions and agents at Tallil relayed this information:

When the 82nd Airborne Division occupied the sector, Fox vehicles and unit reconnaissance teams checked for evidence of contamination or chemical weapons. No contamination was found.

Buildings at Tallil were marked, in English, with spray paint during the clearing process. The bldgs [buildings] have been checked. There are several buildings marked "chem." They contain NBC equipment [gas masks, filters, suits, antidotes, etc.], decontaminants, or industrial chemicals. No toxic chemicals.[28]

Interviews with an 82nd Airborne Division brigade-level chemical officer[29] and a Fox vehicle crewmember[30] operating at Tallil confirmed this message summary. Because the Fox vehicle was too big to enter the bunkers, the search teams used hand-held testing systems—including the M256 Chemical Agent Detection Kit and Chemical Agent Monitors—to check the bunker interiors, but they found no chemical weapons or chemical warfare agents.[31]

One specialist of the two-member 60th EOD Detachment’s team supporting the 307th Engineer Battalion searched the S-shaped bunker that might have contained chemical weapons. For safety reasons, the standard procedure was for EOD technicians to clear facilities before other soldiers entered, so it is likely that he was the first person to enter this bunker.[32] Numerous anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines littered the outside area of the bunker and a bomb had partially collapsed the roof into the main storage area,[33] so it is unlikely that other non-EOD soldiers would have entered this bunker.[34]

During this investigation, we interviewed more than 100 veterans who had searched bunkers or conducted demolition operations at Tallil, but we located only two EOD technicians (the one from the Army 60th EOD and one from the US Air Force 4404th EOD) who could identify the S-shaped bunker’s location, its external characteristics, and internal contents. The 60th EOD technician who searched the S-shaped bunker did not report seeing any items resembling either conventional or chemical warfare munitions in the bunker. He found only debris, rubble, and scorching from the BLU-109 detonation, not any evidence of a secondary explosion, which probably would have occurred had the bunker stored conventional munitions. He also saw no evidence that material of any kind was stored in the bunker when it was struck, although it is possible that the partially collapsed ceiling could have buried material.[35] The other 60th EOD team member at Tallil did not enter this bunker, so he could not confirm the report of the bunker’s contents, but he reported that he did not see any chemical warfare munitions during his work on this installation.[36] The 60th EOD incident journal confirms these technicians’ statements in that it does not relate finding any chemical warfare munitions at Tallil; however, the incident journal does identify a single suspected chemical warfare shell on March 7, 1991, at the coordinates, PV162247, which is several kilometers east of the An Nasiriyah SW ASP. As indicated in the incident journal entry, Fox vehicles detected no chemical warfare agents on the split-in-half shell or in the area near the coordinate.[37]

The Air Force EOD technician who entered the S-shaped bunker also found no evidence of chemical weapons. His mission was to ensure that this particular bunker did not contain chemical warfare munitions or agents. He described the bunker as being damaged with large chunks of concrete present and the roof collapsed. He reported that he saw no chemical warfare munitions or chemical warfare agent residue or liquids in the bunker’s undamaged area. This technician also checked other Tallil storage bunkers, where he found no chemical munitions, but he did remember seeing equipment associated with chemical warfare such as protective equipment and bulk quantities of antidote kits which were in most of the bunkers he inspected.[38]

2. Demolition Activities

On March 2, 1991, the 82nd Airborne Division units began organized demolition operations, which continued through March 20, 1991.[39] The combat engineers who assisted the 60th EOD in destroying facilities and munitions were primarily from B and C companies, 307th Engineer Battalion, with the former having a limited role because of other duties. We interviewed more than 25 engineers from C Company, 307th Engineer Battalion, including platoon leaders, the executive officer, and the 307th Engineer Battalion commander. Destroying captured munitions is not normally a common task of a combat engineer, but because of the large numbers of Tallil bunkers containing munitions, EOD personnel got assistance from the combat engineers to set demolition charges and gave the engineers on-the-job training. Though two engineers from the 307th Engineer Battalion[40] said that they encountered possible chemical warfare munitions, they had based their munitions’ identifications on visual observations of color schemes, such as yellow or red bands. However, the senior 60th EOD technician said, "they could recognize chemical warfare agent capable munitions by filler plugs, double walled construction, thin skin, and color (two yellow bands) even though it was taken for granted that chemical warfare munitions may not be marked or marked inconsistently (making the marking schemes an unreliable indicator of chemical warfare munitions.)[41] Additionally, during interviews, the C Company, 307th Engineer Battalion executive officer[42] and platoon leaders[43] consistently reported that they prepared no chemical warfare munitions for destruction and had no first-hand knowledge of any chemical warfare agents discovered at Tallil. The 307th Engineer Battalion commander was present at Tallil from March 3-10, 1991. He remembers receiving a division intelligence report the day before his arrival of a probable chemical facility there. He remembers receiving no other chemical warfare warnings. While at Tallil, he and his subordinates did not wear chemical protective clothing because 82nd NBC specialists already had cleared the facility.[44] The engineers and EOD teams destroyed conventional army munitions: small arms ammunition, mines, mortar rounds, anti-tank rockets, artillery rounds and rockets, anti-aircraft artillery rounds, tank ammunition, and conventional explosives. They also destroyed aircraft munitions (e.g., general-purpose bombs, cluster munitions, incendiary bombs, unguided rockets, and air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles.[45] The 307th Engineer Battalion operations summary reported that they also destroyed 18 aircraft, but listed no chemical warfare items on the summary.[46]

While the 307th Engineer Battalion and the 60th EOD performed most of the bunker demolition work at Tallil, several other units were also present. US Air Force EOD technicians from the 1703rd and 4404th EOD Flights destroyed unexploded ordnance and identified specific air-to-air and air-to-ground ordnance for shipment to rear areas. Investigators interviewed several of these technicians, including the 1703rd EOD commander. One of the EOD technicians said he initially had thought he had encountered some chemical munitions because they were gray with red bands, but on closer examination he realized they had no filler plugs so he determined he did not encounter any chemical munitions.[47] None of the other 1703rd technicians saw or heard anything about chemical weapons.[48] Additionally, US Air Force civil engineering teams (Red Horse) used approximately 80,000 pounds of explosives to cut the runways and taxiways every 2,000 feet.[49]

No one interviewed in this investigation reported experiencing symptoms associated with nerve or blister agent poisoning, nor did they seek medical attention because of contact with a suspected chemical warfare agent during Tallil demolition operations. In an interview, one soldier from the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment reported that, while removing equipment and weapons from a Tallil warehouse, he became very nauseated and dizzy after exposure to a white powder in a can. The inhaled substance caused him to vomit immediately, but the nausea lasted only one to three hours and was not severe. He did not report this incident or seek medical attention when it occurred and reported no lasting effects from this incident. The unidentified powder could have been one of several compounds, including a riot control agent, but the specific circumstances the 505th soldier related in the interview several years after the fact without any supporting physical evidence make a follow-up determination impossible.[50] Regardless, these symptoms do not correspond to exposure to any of the chemical warfare agents assessed to be in Iraq’s inventory.

3. Transition to 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment 

On March 24, 1991, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, including its supporting units (particularly the 84th Engineer Company and 146th EOD Detachment) replaced the 82nd Airborne Division and its supporting units, the 307th Engineer Battalion and 60th EOD Detachment, who rotated out of the area.[51] The 146th EOD incident journal indicates that they continued to destroy substantial quantities of munitions and that demolition operations at Tallil and the nearby An Nasiriyah SW ASP continued into April 1991.[52] In an interview, the 146th EOD Detachment commander stated that he supervised destroying large quantities of air and land ordnance, bunkers, aircraft, and facilities, but he did not observe any chemical warfare munitions.[53]

Approximately 18 months after US forces withdrew from the Tallil area, United Nations chemical warfare technical experts inspected the S-shaped bunker there. During this 18 months interval, Iraq attempted to salvage material, equipment, and facilities at Tallil for further military use. On December 8, 1992, a United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) chemical and biological weapons inspection team inspected Tallil airfield. The team found nothing falling under the purview of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, which addresses weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. [54] At the S-shaped bunker, they saw the heavy bomb damage from Desert Storm. Although the center section’s roof had collapsed, the side roof sections were intact, leaving room to maneuver inside the bunker on either side of the collapsed center section.  The report described the interior contents as follows:

The bunker contained at least 30 crated FAB-500 high explosive (HE) aerial bombs as well as at least 8 gray packing crates (1x1.5 meters). No vehicular access through the bunker was possible, since the bomb/crate storage blocked the thoroughfare. One crate was split open, and paper wrapping was noted at one corner; the contents were not observed. Markings were noted on the side. Numerous copies of shipping documents were scattered on the floor. Yellow "end labels" for crates for FAB-500 and FAB-250 bombs were also found. A hand-written note in Arabic described the symptoms for nerve agent poisoning. Comments: The S-shaped bunker is designed for special weapon storage; however, no typical western method for chemical agent/weapon storage was noted outside of the sump. … Since the bunker was available for storage, the Iraqis probably placed FAB-500/250 HE aerial bombs in it for storage and would have probably removed them if special weapons were brought there.[55]

On July 29, 1997, in Buffalo, NY, two UNSCOM representatives testified about Tallil’s S-shaped bunker at a hearing of the Presidential Advisory Committee (PAC) for Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses. They reported that they believed Iraq deployed chemical weapons in January 1991 to four depots only, none of which was Tallil, and back to areas near Baghdad. In response to a question, they clarified that they found nothing at Tallil:[56]

MR. MITROKHIN (UNSCOM): ... UNSCOM inspected, of course, Nasiriyah munitions depot, Khamisiyah ammunition depot, Tallil Air Field in 1992 and also underground storage bunkers which is entry number 12 on your list. This was inspected in 1994. The results of following inspections at Nasiriyah and Khamisiyah ammunition depots are well-known and we briefed the committee on these results. Concerning Tallil Air Field and underground storage bunkers which appeared to be the stores of metal missiles were inspected and no evidence of chemical weapons found there.

DR. PORTER (PAC): Let, let me understand. There were four sites of the 17 that UNSCOM visited.

MR. MITROKHIN (UNSCOM): That is correct.

DR. PORTER (PAC): And of course one was Khamisiyah, we know the Khamisiyah story, but at the other three sites, the inspection revealed no evidence of chemical weapons or damage.

MR. MITROKHIN (UNSCOM): Actually, yes. As it was explained by Mr. Duelfer, 155 mm. shells were removed from Nasiriyah ammunition depot prior to UNSCOM arrival and later on these were found in the vicinity of the Khamisiyah ammunition depot in the desert area. Concerning two remaining sites, Tallil Air Field and underground storage bunkers, no evidence of chemical weapons were found there.

After US forces left Iraq, this United Nations inspection is the only known on-site examination of the internal condition and contents of Tallil’s S-shaped bunker.

In May 1996, Iraq gave UNSCOM an update to the "Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure" document on its chemical warfare program as it existed in 1991. UNSCOM incorporated the update into an inspection report. This update listed Iraq’s inventory of chemical warfare munitions by specific types, quantities, and locations. This document does not include Tallil Air Base as a chemical warfare munitions storage site.[57]

Although Iraq flew chemical warfare missions from Tallil Air Base during the Iran-Iraq War and may have stored chemical weapons for these missions in the base’s S-shaped bunker, Coalition forces found no chemical warfare weapons or chemical warfare agent contamination there. NBC specialists used M-8’s, chemical agent monitors, and Fox reconnaissance vehicles at Tallil Air Base and found nothing.[58] Though several persons interviewed reported that they encountered possible chemical warfare munitions based on marking schemes,[59, 60] EOD technicians, NBC personnel and commanders having direct knowledge of chemical warfare munitions characteristics determined that nothing they saw indicated that chemical weapons were present. No one reported experiencing any chemical warfare agent symptoms after being near or in contact with munitions so marked. Demolition crews that destroyed munitions, equipment, and structures at the base also discovered no chemical warfare munitions. Although their extensive searches did uncover significant quantities of defensive equipment associated with chemical warfare, such as masks, suits, antidotes, and decontaminants; this was to be expected based on Tallil’s history during the Iran-Iraq war. Additionally, post-war assessments of Iraq’s chemical warfare program confirmed that identification through color markings was totally unreliable. Instead, interviews with EOD personnel show that they relied on specific munitions design characteristics to identify munitions capable of chemical warfare.[61, 62]

The 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment soldier’s nausea resulted from a white powder in a can. The inhaled substance caused him to vomit immediately, but the nausea lasted only one to three hours and was not severe. He did not report this incident or seek medical attention when it occurred and he did not report any lasting effects from this incident.[63] The unidentified powder could have been a number of different compounds, including a riot control agent, but the specific circumstances related in the interview make a follow-up determination impossible. These symptoms do not indicate exposure to any of the chemical warfare agents assessed as being in Iraq’s inventory.

The UNSCOM team that inspected Tallil and its S-shaped bunker in December 1992 did not find evidence of chemical weapons or bulk storage of chemical warfare agents.[64] However, it is important to note that neither the US occupation forces nor the UNSCOM team were able to inspect the bunker area where the ceiling had collapsed. Nor could they examine any materials buried under the remaining debris. After the war, Iraq cleared the rubble from the bunker’s intact area and used it to store conventional munitions.[65] If Iraq had stored chemical weapons or agents in this facility when it was struck during the war, the resulting contamination almost certainly would have forced Iraq to remove all bunker debris completely, decontaminate the area extensively, and then rebuild before using the bunker for conventional storage. Iraq did not list Tallil as a chemical weapons storage site in the "Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure" given UNSCOM in 1996.

Because EOD specialists and other experts knowledgeable about chemical warfare munitions attributes determined that they saw nothing to indicate the presence of chemical warfare munitions or agents were present; because the UNSCOM team that inspected Tallil and its S-shaped bunker in December 1992 did not find evidence of chemical weapons or bulk storage of chemical warfare agent; because Iraq did not list Tallil as a chemical warfare munitions storage site in the "Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure;" and because no one we interviewed in this investigation reported experiencing medical symptoms associated with nerve or blister agent exposure, our assessment is that it is unlikely chemical warfare weapons or agents were present at Tallil Air Base during the US occupation in 1991.

During the Gulf War, two primary methods existed for detecting chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents. One was visual: markings on munitions (e.g., painted bands or symbols) or physical characteristics (thin, double-walled casings; burster tubes; welded construction; fill plugs; etc.) However, these visual characteristics are not always reliable. The use of chemical detectors was the second available method. Unfortunately, properly designed, manufactured, and filled chemical munitions often do not emit enough chemical warfare agent vapor for current M256 kits or chemical agent monitors (CAMs) to reliably detect. This presented explosive ordnance disposal technicians with the very impractical and dangerous task of having to disassemble an unknown munition to determine whether it contained a hazardous agent. As soon as possible, US forces should employ current technology that can reliably detect munitions contents by external sensors.

This is a final report. However, if you believe you have information that may change this case narrative, please contact my office by calling 1-800-497-6261.

AO area of operations

ASP Ammunition Supply Point

COMUSARCENT Commander, United States Army Central Command

CWA chemical warfare agent

DOD         Department of Defense

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

FRAGO fragmentary order

HE high explosive

KTO Kuwait Theater of Operations

NBC Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

PAC               Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses 

SW southwest

UN United Nations

UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission

US United States

USCENTCOM US Central Command

Blister agent

A blister agent is a chemical warfare agent that produces local irritation and damage to the skin and mucous membranes, pain and injury to the eyes, reddening and blistering of the skin, and when inhaled, damage to the respiratory tract. Blister agents include mustards, arsenicals like lewisite, and mustard and lewisite mixtures. Blister agents are also called vesicants or vesicant agents.[66]

BLU-109

A 2000 pound air-delivered hard target penetration bomb.

Chemical agent monitor (CAM) 

A chemical agent monitor is a hand-held, soldier-operated device that is used to monitor chemical warfare agent contamination on individuals and equipment.[67]

Chemical warfare agent (CWA)

A chemical warfare agent is a chemical substance excluding riot control agents, herbicides, smoke, and flame, used in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate through its physiological effects. Included are blood, nerve, blister, choking, and incapacitating agents.[68]

Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)

The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance. It may also include removal of explosive ordnance that has become hazardous by damage or deterioration.[69]

FAB-500/250

Russian-made 500 or 250 kilogram high explosive bomb

Fox Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Reconnaissance System

The Fox is a six-wheeled, light armored vehicle designed primarily for reconnaissance of liquid chemical warfare agent hazards. On-board chemical warfare agent detection capabilities include the MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer, which is the primary detection device, the M43A1 chemical agent detector, which is an integral component of the M8 alarm system, and the M256A1 chemical agent detector kit. The Fox is also equipped with two radiation detectors. The Fox does not provide any biological warfare agent detection capability, but it does protect the crew from biological hazards, and it allows the crew to mark areas of potential hazard and safely take samples for laboratories to analyze for biological hazards.[70]

G-series nerve agents

 G-series nerve agents are lethal chemical warfare agents that work by inhibiting the proper functioning of the cholinesterase enzymes needed for the transmission of nerve impulses throughout the body. These agents affect the functioning of all bodily systems, including the eyes, nose, throat, lungs, and muscles. The G-series nerve agents include tabun (GA), sarin (GB), soman (GD), and cyclosarin (GF). The normal sequence of symptoms is a running nose, tightness of the chest, dimness of vision and pinpointing of the eye pupils, difficulty breathing, drooling and excessive sweating, nausea, vomiting, cramps, involuntary defecation and urination, twitching, jerking and staggering, headache, confusion, drowsiness, and coma. Cessation of breathing and death follow.[71]

GulfLINK

A World Wide Web site maintained by the Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses (www.gulflink.health.mil).

M256 chemical warfare agent detector kit 

In the field, the M256-series chemical warfare agent detector kit is referred to simply as the M256 kit. The M256 kit is a portable, expendable item capable of detecting and identifying hazardous concentrations of blister, blood, and nerve agents. The M256 kit is used after a chemical warfare agent warning to test for and confirm the presence and type of chemical warfare agent, and to determine if it is safe to unmask. The M256A1 kit has replaced the M256 kit. The only difference between the two kits is that the M256A1 kit will detect lower levels of nerve agent. US forces used both the M256 kit and the M256A1 kit during the Gulf War.

Some smokes, high temperatures, standard US decontamination solution number two (DS2), and petroleum products may cause false readings. Results may be inaccurate when sampling is performed in smoke from burning debris.[72]

M8A1 chemical alarm 

The M8A1 is an automatic chemical agent detection and warning system designed to detect the presence of nerve agent vapors or inhalable aerosols. The M8A1 will automatically signal the presence of the nerve agent in the air with both an audible and visual warning. The US military fielded the M8A1 to replace the wet chemical M8 detector—which eliminated the M229 refill kit, the logistic burden, and associated costs. The M8A1 operates in a fixed, portable, or vehicle mounted configuration.[73]

MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer

The MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer is the primary chemical warfare agent detector in the Fox reconnaissance vehicle. During Operation Desert Storm, the MM-1 monitored against a target list of up to 22 pre-selected chemical warfare agents most likely to be present, based on intelligence reports of the suspected chemical warfare agent threat.

To speed the initial search, the sampling probe operates at 180� C and the MM-1 looks for only four ion peaks of each detected chemical warfare agent and attempts to match the target list of chemicals against the pattern and ratio of these peaks. If an initial match is made with these four ion peaks at a pre-determined intensity and relationship, the MM-1 sounds an alarm. However, this first alarm does not confirm the presence of a chemical warfare agent, since there are many chemicals that have similar ion peaks and many combinations of chemicals that may yield ion patterns similar to those in the target list. Consequently, the MM-1 can falsely indicate the presence of dangerous chemical warfare agents.

To more conclusively determine what chemical is present, the operator must lower the sampling probe temperature to 120� C, re-acquire a sample of the suspected substance, and run a spectrum analysis with the MM-1 against all the detection algorithms stored in the MM-1 chemical library. For a more detailed analysis later, the complete ion spectrum of the suspected sample can be printed on a paper tape.[74]

Nerve Agents 

Nerve agents are the most toxic of the chemical warfare agents. Nerve agents are absorbed into the body through breathing, by injection, or absorption through the skin. They affect the nervous and the respiratory systems and various body functions. They include the G-series and V-series chemical warfare agents.[75]

Riot control agent 

A riot control agent is a chemical that produces transient effects that disappear within minutes after exposure and rarely require medical treatment. Riot control agents are effective in quelling civil disturbances and in some military operations, in preventing unnecessary loss of life.[76]

Sarin 

A nerve agent known as GB
Chemical name: Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate[77]

Tabun 

A nerve agent known as GA
Chemical name: Ethyl N, N-dimethylphosphoroamidocyanidate[78]

UN Security Council Resolution 

The UN Security Council at its 2981st meeting, on April 3, 1991, adopted this resolution. The pertinent section of this resolution, as it relates to the Tallil narrative, follows:

6. Notes that as soon as the Secretary-General notifies the Security Council of the completion of the deployment of the United Nations observer unit, the conditions will be established for the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end consistent with resolution 686 (1991);

Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925, and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of April 10, 1972;

Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:

(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;

(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers and related major parts, and repair and production facilities.

Decides... the following:

(a) Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution, a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site inspection as specified below;

(b) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the appropriate Governments and, where appropriate, with the Director-General of the World Health Organization, within forty-five days of the passage of the present resolution, shall develop, and submit to the Council for approval, a plan calling for the completion of the following acts within forty-five days of such approval.[79]

• 1st Battalion, 319th Field Artillery, 82nd Airborne Division
• 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division (also known as the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment)
• 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry, (82nd Airborne Division Aviation Brigade)
• 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment
• 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor, (197th Infantry Brigade)
• 3rd Battalion, 73rd Armor, (82nd Airborne Division)
• 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division (also known as the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment)
• 6th Battalion, 158th Aviation, 12th Aviation Brigade
• 18th Infantry Battalion, (197th Infantry Brigade)
• 21st Chemical Company, 82nd Airborne Division
• 24th Signal Battalion, 24th Infantry Division
• 36th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance), 1st Medical Group, 44th Medical Brigade
• 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment (US Army)
• 82nd Engineer Battalion, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment
• 84th Engineer Company, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment
• 87th Chemical Company, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment
• 146th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment (US Army)
• 307th Engineer Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division
• 307th Medical Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division
• 313th Military Intelligence Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division
• 407th Supply and Transportation Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division
• 450th Civil Affairs Company, 360th Civil Affairs Brigade
• 497th Transportation Company, 46th Corps Support Group, 1st Corps Support Command
• 533rd Transportation Company, 46th Corps Support Group, 1st Corps Support Command
• 546th Transportation Company, 46th Corps Support Group, 1st Corps Support Command
• 603rd Transportation Company, 46th Corps Support Group, 1st Corps Support Command
• 782nd Maintenance Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division
• 1703rd Explosives Ordnance Disposal Flight (US Air Force)
• 4404th Explosives Ordnance Disposal Flight (US Air Force)
• Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 12th Aviation Brigade
• I Company, 1st Aviation Battalion, (1st Infantry Division)

• 146th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, "Incident Journal (Desert Shield)," May 15, 1991.
• 197th Infantry Brigade, "Operation Desert Storm Summary of Operations, January 17 - March 10, 1991," April 24, 1991.
• "505th Parachute Infantry Regimental History, Operation Desert Shield/Storm," undated.
• 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, "Incident Journal (Desert Storm)," April 1, 1991.
• 82nd Airborne Division chemical officer handwritten message, March 23, 1991.
• 82nd Airborne Division Engineer message, Subject: "307th Engineering Battalion Operations Summary," March 23, 1991.
• Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995. Copies of the Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook may be purchased from the CBIAC.
• Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence," April 9, 1997.
• "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997.
• Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "BW/CW bunkers," February 16, 1991.
• Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "IIR 2 251 0001 93/ Inspection of the S shaped Bunker at Al Tallil Airfield," May 28, 1993.
• Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "IIR 6 021 0196 96, Iraqi Fallujah, Khamisiyah, and An Nasiriyah Chemical Warfare related sites," May 1996.
• Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "Iran-Iraq Frontline," undated.
• Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "Iraqi Air Force Capability to Deliver Chemical Weapons," December 1, 1990.
• Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "Iraqi Chemical Warfare (CW) Facilities and Storage Areas," December 28, 1990.
• Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "Response To RII-2093, Location Of All Iraqi CW/BW Contamination Sites And Ammo Storage Areas In The KTO," February 7, 1991.
• "FRAGO 74 to XVIII Airborne Corps Operations Order Desert Storm," February 27, 1991.
• "FRAGO 78 to XVIII Airborne Corps Operations Order Desert Storm," February 28, 1991.
• Hartzer, Dr. Ronald B., "Engineering and Services in the Gulf War," undated.
• Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military Terms," Department of Defense, April 6, 1999, web site www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/e/02287.html (as of September 2, 1999).
• Lead Report 1079, Interview of 1st platoon leader, Company C, 307th Engineer Battalion, October 23, 1996.
• Lead Report 1080, Interview of executive officer, Company C, 307th Engineer Battalion, October 23, 1996.
• Lead Report 6498, Interview of commander, 307th Engineer Battalion, May 7, 1997.
• Lead Report 6500, Interview of commander, 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor May 19, 1997.
• Lead Report 7947, Interview of 82nd Airborne Division chemical officer, June 17, 1996.
• Lead Report 7948, Interview of 3rd platoon leader, Company C, 307th Engineer Battalion, October 23, 1996.
• Lead Report 8102, Interview of 4404th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Flight technician, October 13, 1997.
• Lead Report 9918, Interview of 2nd platoon leader, Company C, 307th Engineer Battalion, April 29, 1997.
• Lead Report 10168, Interview of Fox vehicle operator, December 18, 1997.
• Lead Report 10358, Interview of 1703rd Explosive Ordnance Disposal Flight technician, March 10, 1997.
• Lead Report 10523, Interview of commander, 146th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, June 3, 1997.
• Lead Report 10775, Interview of 1703rd Explosive Ordnance Disposal Flight technician, May 6, 1997.
• Lead Report 10787, Interview of 1703rd Explosive Ordnance Disposal Flight technician, May 27, 1997.
• Lead Report 11036, Interview of senior technician, 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal, May 20, 1997.
• Lead Report 11043, Interview of 1703rd Explosive Ordnance Disposal Flight team leader, May 29, 1997.
• Lead Report 11325, Interview of combat engineer, Company C, 307th Engineer Battalion, June 17, 1997.
• Lead Report 11875, Interview of combat engineer, Company B, 307th Engineer Battalion, June 13, 1997
• Lead Report 12100, Interview of 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment soldier, July 14, 1997.
• Memorandum from 307th Engineer Battalion operations officer to 82nd Airborne Division commander , Subject: "307th Engineer Battalion Desert Storm Narrative," June 3, 1991.
• Mitrokhin, Igor A., United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, Testimony to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses, Buffalo, NY, July 29, 1997.
• Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume I, "Planning and Command and Control," US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1993.
• Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume II, "Operations and Effects and Effectiveness," US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1993.
• Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "An Nasiriyah Southwest Ammunition Storage Point, Final Report" (Case Narrative), January 10, 2000, web site: www.gulflink.health.mil/ an_nasiriyah_ii/.
• Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "M256 Series Chemical Agent Detector Kit" (Information Paper), July 23, 1999, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/m256/.
• Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm" (Information Paper), October 30, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/m8a1alarms/.
• Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Tallil Air Base, Iraq" (Case Narrative), October 30, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/tallil/.
• Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 29, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/.
• Transcript, Interview of [redacted] EAFB, a 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment technician, April 10, 1997.
• Transcript of Proceedings, "Interviews Concerning Activities at Khamisiyah, Iraq in March 1991," Conducted by the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, May 6, 1997.
• "UN Security Council Resolution 687," dated April 1991.
• US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990.
• US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Glossary, Section II, "Definitions and Terms," December 22, 1995, Web site www.nbc-med.org/Sitecontent/MedRef/FieldMannuals/fm8.285/PART_I/index.htm (as of May 16, 2000).
• US Army Material Safety Data Sheet, "Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM)," Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, December 2, 1999.
• XVIII Airborne Corps message, Subject: "Captured Chemical and Biological Munitions," February 27, 91.
• XVIII Airborne Corps SITREP, February 28, 1991.

The Department of Defense requires a common framework for our investigations and assessments of chemical warfare agent reports, so we turned to the United Nations and the international community, which had chemical weapons experience (e.g., the United Nations’ investigation of the chemical weapons used during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war). Because the modern battlefield is complex, the international community developed investigation and validation protocols[81] to provide objective procedures for possible chemical weapons incidents. The methodology we are using is based on these international protocols and guidelines. The methodology includes:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site;
• Physical evidence from the site such as weapons fragments, soil, water, vegetation, or human or animal tissue samples;
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence;
• The testimony of witnesses;
• Multiple analyses; and
• A review of the evidence by an expert panel.

While the methodology used to investigate chemical incidents (Figure 8) is based on these protocols, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence often was not collected at the time of an event. Therefore, we cannot apply a rigid template to all incidents, and each investigation must be tailored to its unique circumstances. Accordingly, we designed our methodology to provide a thorough, investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and determine what happened. The major efforts in our methodology are:

• To substantiate the incident;
• To document available medical reports related to the incident;
• To interview appropriate people;
• To obtain information available to external organizations; and
• To assess the results.

Figure 8. Chemical warfare incident investigation methodology

A case usually starts with a report of a possible chemical warfare agent incident, often from a veteran. To substantiate the circumstances surrounding an incident, the investigator searches for documentation from operational, intelligence, and environmental logs. This focuses the investigation on a specific time, date, and location, clarifies the conditions under which the incident occurred, and determines whether there is "hard," as well as anecdotal, evidence. Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical warfare agent presence, nor is a single observation sufficient to validate a chemical warfare agent presence. The investigator looks for physical evidence collected at the time of the incident that might indicate that chemical agents were present in the vicinity of the incident. Such evidence might include tissue samples, body fluid samples, clothing, environmental samples of soil or vegetation, weapons parts, and Fox MM-1 tapes with properly documented spectrums.

The investigator searches available medical records to determine if anyone was injured by the incident. Deaths, injuries, sicknesses, etc., near the time and location of an incident are noted and considered. Medical experts are asked to provide information about any alleged chemical warfare agent casualties.

Interviews of those involved in or near the incident (participants or witnesses) are conducted. First-hand witnesses provide valuable insight into the conditions surrounding the incident and the mind-set of those involved, and are particularly important if physical evidence is lacking. Nuclear, biological, and chemical officers or specialists trained in chemical testing, confirmation, and reporting are interviewed to identify the unit’s response, the tests that were run, the injuries sustained, and the reports submitted. Commanders are contacted to ascertain what they knew, what decisions they made concerning the events surrounding the incident, and their assessment of the incident. Where appropriate, subject matter experts also provide opinions on the capabilities, limitations, and operation of technical equipment, and submit their evaluations of selected topics of interest.

Additionally, the investigator contacts agencies and organizations that may be able to provide additional clarifying information about the case. These would include, but not be limited to:

• Intelligence agencies that might be able to provide insight into events leading to the event, imagery of the area of the incident, and assessments of factors affecting the case;
• The clinical registries of the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs which may provide data about the medical condition of those involved in the incident; and
• Agencies capable of computer modeling meteorological and source characterization data in cases where airborne dispersion of agent is suspected.

Once the investigation is complete, the investigator evaluates the available evidence in order to make a subjective assessment. The available evidence is often incomplete or contradictory and thus must be looked at in the total context of what is known about the incident being investigated. Physical evidence collected at the time of the incident, for example, can be of tremendous value to an investigation. Properly documented physical evidence would generally be given the greatest weight in any assessment. The testimony of witnesses and contemporaneous operational documentation is also significant when making an assessment. Testimony from witnesses who also happen to be subject matter experts is usually more meaningful than testimony from untrained observers. Typically, secondhand accounts are given less weight than witness testimony. When investigators are presented with conflicting witness testimony, they look for other pieces of information supporting the statements of the witnesses. Investigators evaluate the supporting information to determine how it corroborates any of the conflicting positions. Generally, such supporting information will fit into a pattern corroborating one of the conflicting accounts of the incident over the others. Where the bulk of corroborating evidence supports one witness more than another, that person's information would be considered more compelling.

Our assessments rely on the investigator’s evaluation of the available information for each investigation. Because we do not expect to always have conclusive evidence, we have developed an assessment scale (Figure 9) ranging from Definitely Not to Definitely, with intermediate assessments of Unlikely, Indeterminate, and Likely. The investigator uses his best judgement, based on facts available as of the date of the report publication, in using this scale to make an assessment. Each case is reassessed over time based on new information and feedback.

Figure 9. Assessment of chemical warfare agent presence 

The standard for making the assessment is based on common sense: Do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that chemical warfare agents were or were not present? When insufficient information is available, the assessment is Indeterminate until more evidence can be found.

This narrative was initially published on October 30, 1997. Since that time, the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses has not received any new information on the material presented here, nor have any additional leads developed to change the narrative’s assessments. Additionally, the Presidential Special Oversight Board reviewed the narrative and recommended that the Office of the Special Assistant republish it as final. The only changes that have been made to the paper are:

• The narrative has been rewritten to reflect the updated methodology and footnoting standards of the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses.
• Some new source documents have been referenced to enhance the accuracy of the narrative.
• A "Lessons Learned" section has been added.

1. Tab A contains acronyms, abbreviations, and a glossary.
2. This facility also has been called Tallil Airfield or Al Tallil Airfield (Iraq's documentation).
3. Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "Iraqi Chemical Warfare (CW) Facilities and Storage Areas," December 28, 1990, p. 1, 6.
4. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses," An Nasiriyah Southwest Ammunition Storage Point, Final Report" (Case Narrative), January 10, 2000, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/an_nasiriyah_ii/.
5. Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "Iraqi Air Force Capability to Deliver Chemical Weapons," December 1, 1990, p. 1-3.
6.  Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "Iran-Iraq Frontline," undated, p. 3.
7. Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "Iraqi Air Force Capability to Deliver Chemical Weapons," December 1, 1990, p. 2.
8. Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "IIR 6 021 0196 96, Iraqi Fallujah, Khamisiyah, and An Nasiriyah Chemical Warfare Related Sites," May 1996, p. 4-5.
9. Central Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, "Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence," April 9, 1997, p. 4.
10. Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "Iraqi Chemical Warfare (CW) Facilities and Storage Areas," December 28, 1990, p. 1-2.
11.  Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "Iraqi Chemical Warfare (CW) Facilities and Storage Areas," December 28, 1990, p. 1, 6.
12. Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume I, "Planning and Command and Control," US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1993, p. 146-147.
13. Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "BW/CW Bunkers," February 16, 1991, p. 1.
14. Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume II, "Operations and Effects and Effectiveness," US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1993, p. 33-34.
15. Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "Response To RII-2093, Location Of All Iraqi CW/BW Contamination Sites And Ammo Storage Areas In The KTO," February 7, 1991, p. 1.
16. XVIII Airborne Corps message, Subject: "Captured Chemical and Biological Munitions," February 27, 1991.
17. 197th Infantry Brigade, "Operation Desert Storm Summary of Operations, January 17 - March 10, 1991," April 24, 1991, p. 8.
18. Lead Report 6500, Interview of commander, 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor, May 19, 1997.
19. 197th Infantry Brigade, "Operation Desert Storm Summary of Operations, January 17 - March 10, 1991," April 24, 1991, p. 14.
20. 197th Infantry Brigade, "Operation Desert Storm Summary of Operations, January 17 - March 10, 1991," April 24, 1991, p. 8.
21. "FRAGO 74 to XVIII Airborne Corps Operations Order Desert Storm," February 27, 1991.
22. XVIII Airborne Corps SITREP, February 28, 1991.
23. "FRAGO 78 to XVIII Airborne Corps Operations Order Desert Storm," February 28, 1991.
24. "505th Parachute Infantry Regimental History, Operation Desert Shield/Storm," undated, p. K-5.
25. Memorandum from 307th Engineer Battalion operations officer to 82nd Airborne Division commander, Subject: "307th Engineer Battalion Desert Storm Narrative," June 3, 1991, p. 3.
26. Lead Report 6500, Interview of commander, 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor, May 19, 1997.
27. 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, "Incident Journal (Desert Storm)," April 1, 1991.
28. 82nd Airborne Division chemical officer handwritten message, March 23, 1991.
29. Transcript of Proceedings, "Interviews Concerning Activities at Khamisiyah, Iraq in March 1991," conducted by the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, May 6, 1997, p. 11.
30. Lead Report 10168, Interview of Fox vehicle operator, December 18, 1997, p. 1.
31. Lead Report 7947, Interview of 82nd Airborne Division chemical officer, April 21, 1996, p. 7.
32. Transcript, Interview of [redacted], a 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment technician, April 10, 1997, p. 8.
33. Lead Report 8102, Interview of 4404th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Flight technician, October 13, 1997.
34. Transcript, Interview of [redacted], a 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment technician, April 10, 1997, p. 7.
35. Transcript, Interview of [redacted], a 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment technician, April 10, 1997, p. 7-10.
36. Lead Report 11036, Interview of senior technician, 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal, May 20, 1997, p. 4.
37. 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, "Incident Journal (Desert Storm)," May 22, 2000, p. 5.
38. Lead Report 8102, Interview of 4404th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Flight technician, October 13, 1997.
39. Memorandum from 307th Engineer Battalion operations officer to 82nd Airborne Division commander, Subject: "307th Engineer Battalion Desert Storm Narrative," June 3, 1991, p. 2-3.
40. Lead Report 11325, Interview of combat engineer, Company C, 307th Engineer Battalion, June 17, 1997, who reported that 5 or 10 percent of the artillery shells he observed in bunkers had white or yellow markings on the nose of the projectiles; Lead Report 11875, Interview of combat engineer, Company B, 307th Engineer Battalion, June 13, 1997, who reported that he destroyed six gray bombs with red and yellow stripes painted on them.
41. Lead Report 11036, Interview of senior technician, 60th Explosives Ordnance Disposal Detachment, May 20, 1997.
42. Lead Report 1080, Interview of executive officer, Company C, 307th Engineer Battalion, October 23, 1996.
43. Lead Report 1079, Interview of 1st platoon leader, Company C, 307th Engineer Battalion, October 23, 1996; Lead Report 9918, Interview of 2nd platoon leader, C Company, 307th Engineer Battalion, April 29, 1997; Lead Report 7948, Interview of 3rd platoon leader, C Company, 307th Engineer Battalion, April 17, 1997.
44. Lead Report 6498, Interview of commander, 307th Engineer Battalion, May 7, 1997.
45. 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, "Incident Journal (Desert Storm)," April 1, 1991.
46. 82nd Airborne Division Engineer message, Subject: "307th Engineer Battalion Operations Summary," March 23, 1991, p. 1-5. This summary does not include aircraft destroyed by US Air Force munitions nor aircraft destroyed by other units.
47. Lead Report 10787, Interview of 1703rd Explosive Ordnance Disposal Flight technician, May 27, 1997.
48. Lead Report 10775, Interview of 1703rd Explosive Ordnance Disposal Flight technician, May 6, 1997; Lead Report 10358, Interview of 1703rd Explosive Ordnance Disposal Flight technician, March 4, 1997; Lead Report 11043, Interview of 1703rd Explosive Ordnance Disposal Flight team leader, May 29, 1997.
49. Hartzer, Dr. Ronald B., "Engineering and Services in the Gulf War," undated, p. 45-46.
50. Lead Report 12100, Interview of 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment soldier, July 14, 1997.
51. Memorandum from 307th Engineer Battalion operations officer to 82nd Airborne Division commander, Subject: "307th Engineer Battalion Desert Storm Narrative," June 3, 1991.
52. 146th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, "Incident Journal (Desert Shield)," May 15, 1991; Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "An Nasiriyah Southwest Amunition Storage Point, Final Report" (Case Narrative), January 10, 2000, web site: www.gulflink.health.mil/an_nasiriyah_ii/.
53. Lead Report 10523, Interview of commander, 146th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, June 3, 1997.
54. Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "IIR 2 251 0001 93/ Inspection of the S-shaped Bunker at Al Tallil Airfield," May 28, 1993, p. 2.
55. Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "IIR 2 251 0001 93/ Inspection of the S-shaped Bunker at Al Tallil Airfield," May 28, 1993, p. 3.
56. Mitrokhin, Igor A., United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, Testimony to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, Buffalo, NY, July 29, 1997, p. 60-61.
57. Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "IIR 6 021 0196 96, Iraqi Fallujah, Khamisiyah, and An Nasiriyah Chemical Warfare Related Sites," May 1996, p. 4-5.
58. Lead Report 7947, Interview of 82nd Airborne Division chemical officer, June 17, 1996, p. 7; 82nd Airborne Division chemical officer handwritten message, March 23, 1991.
59. Lead Report 11325, Interview of combat engineer, Company C, 307th Engineer Battalion, June 17, 1997.
60. Lead Report 11875, Interview of combat engineer, Company B, 307th Engineer Battalion, June 13, 1997.
61. Lead Report 11036, Interview of senior technician, 60th Explosives Ordnance Disposal Detachment, May 23, 1997.
62. Lead Report 10787, Interview of 1703rd Explosive Ordnance Disposal flight technician, May 27, 1997. He specifically mentioned finding gray munitions with red bands-and they were not CW.
63. Lead Report 12100, Interview of 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment soldier, July 14, 1997.
64. Mitrokhin, Igor A., United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, Testimony to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, Buffalo, NY, July 29, 1997, p. 60-61.
65. Defense Intelligence Agency message, Subject: "IIR 2 251 0001 93/ Inspection of the S-shaped Bunker at Al Tallil Airfield," May 28, 1993, p. 3.
66. US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Glossary, Section II, "Definitions and Terms," December 22, 1995, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of May 16, 2000).
67. US Army Material Safety Data Sheet, "Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM)," Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, December 2, 1999.
68. US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Glossary, Section II, "Definitions and Terms," December 22, 1995, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of May 16, 2000).
69. Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military Terms," Department of Defense, April 6, 1999, p. 162, web site www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/e/02287.html (as of September 2, 1999).
70. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 29, 1997, p. 3-4, web site: www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/.
71. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual No 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, DC, December 12, 1990, p. 17-18; US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Publication P-5041, US Air Force Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties And Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Washington, DC, December 22, 1995,Chapter 2, "Nerve Agents," web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/Field Manuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of May 16, 2000).
72. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 430-431. Copies of the Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook may be purchased from the CBIAC. To order, please contact the CBIAC Administrator, via phone (410-676-9030), fax (410-676-9703), e-mail (cbiac@battelle.org), or use the interactive request form on the CBIAC web site www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil (as of October 19, 1999). See also Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "M256 Series Chemical Agent Detector Kit" (Information Paper), July 23, 1999, web site: www.gulflink.health.mil/m256/.
73. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 412; See also Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, " M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm," (Information Paper), October 30, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/m8a1alarms/.
74. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 29, 1997, p. 2, 8-9, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/foxnbc/.
75. US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, "Definitions And Terms," web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of May 16, 2000).
76. US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Glossary, Section II, "Definitions and Terms," December 22, 1995, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I /index.htm (as of May 16, 2000).
77. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, DC, December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 19.
78. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, DC, December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 18.
79. "UN Security Council Resolution 687," dated April 1991.
80. Entire units or only some individuals from the unit may have been in the vicinity of Tallil.
81.  "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This chemical weapons convention was opened for signature in Paris, France, on January 13, 1993. It has been signed by 165 states and ratified or acceded by 106 states as of February 1998. It was signed by the United States on January 13, 1993, and ratified on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. Other protocols and guidelines were found in Methodology and Instrumentation for Sampling and Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki, Finland, 1985; Verification Methods, Handling, and Assessment Of Unusual Events In Relation To Allegations of the Use of Novel Chemical Warfare Agents, Consultant University of Saskatchewan in conjunction with the Verification Research Unit of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, March 1990; and Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, Department of External Affairs, Department of National Defence, Health and Welfare Canada, and Agriculture Canada, November 1985. US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-9, "NBC Protection," May 1992; US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy NAVMED P-5041, US Air Force Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11 (adopted as NATO Field Manual 8-285), "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995; US Army Field Manual 19-20, "Law Enforcement Investigations," November 25, 1985; and other DoD investigational procedures contributed ideas for developing this methodology.